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ABSTRACT 
THE INTERPLAY OF CHRISTIANITY, ETHNICITY AND POLITICS IN 
ANKOLE, UGANDA, 1953-1993. 
Christianity was a powerful factor in the re-ordering of the ethno-political events in 
Ankole. Since its inception at the end of the 19`x' Century (1877 & 1879, Protestants 
and Catholics respectively), the Churches, both Protestant and Catholic have played a 
leading role in the new chapter of Western civilisation. Since then, the churches have 
been able to impact on people because of their pioneering advantage in social services 
like schools, hospitals and agriculture. 
Because of such advantage, by the mid 1950s, the churches were not only 
powerful forces in shaping the flow of events in their respective areas, but they were 
also entangled by various forces which have since been difficult to disentangle from. 
Ethnicity, religion and politics, forces that were not so pronounced before, became 
prominent after the introduction of Christianity and especially after the products of 
missionary schools graduated. Hence, since the 1950s, religious and ethnic polarisation 
have dictated the kind of politics in Ankole and Uganda generally with the disastrous 
consequences of religio-political divisionism. 
Underlying these forces is the ethnic factor which has hibernated between 
religion and politics. Thus, whereas it has been possible for the churches to grow in 
numbers in such a short time (within a century), the same growth factors have not been 
an advantage in dispelling ethnic and religious disparity. This is the main thesis of this 
research, that ethnicity more than religion or politics has been the contending factor in 
Ankole politics. 
This thesis is not simply a chronological study of Christianity in Ankole but 
looks at other wider social issues like the Banyarwanda refugees, the Ankole monarchy 
and Islam, and how these factors have impacted on the Ankole church. 
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ORTHOGRAPHY 
The spelling of names of population groups and areas is based on the orthography used 
in Runyankole, the language of Ankole. In quotations and other references, I have 
maintained the spelling as used in the original documents. 
The prefix Mu- (as in Muhima, Muganda) or Mw- (as in Mwiru) designates a single 
person, while Ba- (as in Bahima, Bairu, Baganda) signifies the plural. Sometimes an 
0 is often added before the singular form (as in Omugabe, king) and an, A before the 
plural (as in Abagabe, kings). Also names for population groups have the prefixes 
Munya-and Banya (rather than Mu-and Ba) for the single and plural respectively (for 
example Munyankole or Banyankole for a person or people from/of Ankole. Again, 
Ru- or Runya- (as in Rutooro, Runyankole) identifies the language (of Toro and Ankole 
respectively). This contrasts with the Lu- used in Luganda (the language of Buganda), 
in the spelling of which the L generally takes the place of the R used in Runyankole. 
Finally, Ki- and Kinya- designate adjectives (as in Kiganda and Kinyankole) 
Please note that Nkore and Nkole are used interchangeably in this thesis. The later is a 
Luganda corruption but have since been accepted in Ankole. On the whole Banyankole 
stress, R, instead of L. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.0. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis seeks to address the way in which Christianity, ethnicity and politics have 
interacted in Ankole since 1953. ' It addresses the religious and the ethno-political 
imbalance which was deeply entrenched in Ankole. It attributes this partly to the 
impact of missionary education and the Church in their ability to change the socio- 
political power relations from one dominant ethnic group, the Bahima, to the Bairu, 
who in many ways had been regarded as servants of the Bahima. The argument is that 
though Bahima and Bairu had lived together for many years they had limited social 
contact. The Bairu were agriculturists (peasants) and the Bahima were herdsmen who 
held power advantages through the institution of kingship, which they exclusively 
dominated. 
The thesis examines the widely held view that throughout the British rule, 
they continued to rule through the Bahima. Hence the colonial system accentuated 
them into a privileged class. Bahima continued to be recruited as chiefs in 
overwhelming numbers and Bairu were disregarded despite the fact that they formed 
the majority at the advent of the British rule in Ankole in 1898. The British continued 
the hypothesis that historical Nkore was an ethnic hierarchical society with Bahima 
on top and Bairu at the bottom of the social ladder. This as we shall see later resulted 
in ethnic friction especially after the post war period (1945) when Bairu began to 
challenge this inequality and called for equal distribution of political privileges. 
The study is also concerned with the interplay of Christianity and politics in 
Ankole. The religio-political events in the colonial setting later affected Ankole's 
ethno-political balance and hence caused factional alliances between the various 
interest groups in post independence Ankole. This thesis particularly discusses the 
factors which helped to propel the "power shift" from Bahima to Bairu. I argue that it 
was mainly missionary education which brought about this change. The thesis 
I take this year as my starting point because it was around that period that religio-political changes 
began to be visible in Ankole. 
2 
examines the divisive element denominational Christianity caused, the effects of 
which have continued to be felt in Ankole. It explores why, when party politics were 
introduced in Ankole at the eve of independence (1962), Banyankole identified them 
with their religious denominations and voted accordingly. The thesis attempts to 
answer the question why Protestant Bahima became allies with the Catholic Bairu, 
with whom they had little in common, thus alienating Protestant Bairu. 
I argue that factional antagonism did not stop at independence, but has 
continued in Ankole society until today. In a situation where both Catholic and 
Protestant churches played a leading role in shaping Ankole society, whether 
intentionally or not, they failed to curb the religio-political conflicts that plagued 
Ankole. Their continued involvement in factional politics caused them to fail to be a 
moral guide to the politicians and the masses. 
The study does not attempt to go into a detailed discussion of pre- 
independence religio-political events. Others have already written about that period. ' 
However, to set the background to the events in Ankole at independence, I picked on 
those main events in colonial times which influenced and shaped post independence 
events in Ankole as far as Christianity, ethnicity and politics were concerned. 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters as follows: Chapter 1 gives a 
summary background to pre-independence Ankole and emphasises missionary 
education as a factor that transformed social relations between Bahima and Bairu both 
in the Church and in society at large. Chapter 2 deals with the emergence of the Bairu 
force, their domination of the Eishengyero (kingdom council) of Ankole and the 
creation of a new Anglican Diocese of Ankole which in many ways became an 
empowering factor as far as Bairu were concerned. This chapter also discusses the 
emergence of political parties in Ankole. It analyses the power shift from pre- 
independence ethnic conflicts and how, with the introduction of a multi-party system 
in Ankole, people were polarised and voted along religious-denominational lines. 
2 See Alex Kagume, Church and Society in Ankole, Ugairda, Ani Analysis of the Impact of Evangelical 
Christianity on Ethnic and Gender Relations in Ankole, 1901-1961, PhD dissertation, Trinity College, 
(affliated to the University of Bristol) 1993; Peter Kasenene, Religion and Politics in Nkole, Zomba: 
Spot Publisher, 1993; Eliphaz 
Maari, The Growth of the Anglican Church in Ankole, 1899-1951, MPhil. Thesis, Trinity College, 
Bristol. 
3 
It also discusses the fall of Ankole monarchy. Chapter 3 discusses the significant role 
of the East African Revival movement in trying to bridge the gap between Bairu and 
Bahima. 
Chapter 4 discusses the Amin era and its disastrous consequences while 
Chapter 5 looks at the re-emergence of the Protestant UPC force after the fall of 
Amin's regime. The Protestant Bairu hegemony of the 1960s, which Idi Amin had 
exiled, returned to power and dominated again the politics of Ankole, again 
marginalising Catholics. This chapter also looks at the role of the Anglican Church in 
the politics of the eighties. Chapter 6 looks at the Batutsi Banyarwanda refugees in 
Ankole and analyses the reasons behind their expulsion in 1982. It analyses the role 
played by various churches as far as the refugees' expulsion was concerned and its 
effects on the church. Chapter 7 discusses the re-introduction of the kingdoms which 
the UPC government had abolished in 1967. It analyses why Banyankole resisted the 
re-introduction of the monarchy in Ankole in 1993. It also argues that the monarchy 
issue in Ankole was a "vote-catcher", thus a political factor, which was why the 
government did not want to identify with it. 
4 
1.1. Methodology 
This thesis relies heavily on primary sources; interviews, newspapers, archival 
material and participant observation. Secondary material is mainly used in the 
introduction. Otherwise I have relied on the primary sources. 
I conducted my research in three phases; March-September 1996; February- 
August 1997 and February-March 1998. My primary interviewees were the political 
and religious leaders, some of whom were eyewitnesses in the post independence 
drama in Ankole. This was an advantage in that their involvement and participation 
both in the church and politics determined the degree of accuracy in their accounts. In 
order to ensure an even greater degree of reliability, I selected informants who were 
recognised as leader-elders in society because it is they who are perceived as the 
custodians of the society's memory. They included retired and active Bishops, 
politicians, women, village elders, refugees, academicians and others relevant for 
comparison purposes. 
Secondly, I relied on the newspaper articles, especially New Vision, The 
Monitor, Weekly Topic and other local papers like the Orumuri (light). Their merit 
does not lie in their objectivity or accurateness of record, but rather in the fact that 
they reflected the government version of the incidents reported. I would have 
preferred to rely more on archival material but much of it was destroyed in 1979 
during the war that ousted Idi Amin. Since then not much effort has been made in 
reorganisation. The available archival material at Kamukuzi-Mbarara was piled in 
boxes with hardly any identification labels. The same applied to the files at the two 
Anglican dioceses of West and East Ankole. In the latter, the files were simply heaped 
in one cupboard regardless of which letter was in which file. I had to abandon my 
search for files in some places because my efforts were not only frustrated by such 
disorganisation but dust exposed me to constant bouts of flu. 
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1.2. Limitations 
I interviewed both Catholics and Protestants. While I got useful information from 
both groups, on the whole Catholics were reluctant to be interviewed especially when 
they discovered that I was an Anglican priest. At Nyamitanga (Catholic headquarters) 
despite my persistent visits, the Chancellor denied me access to the diocesan archives. 
I found it very frustrating especially after waiting on the bench for hours. This 
contributes to those areas in the thesis where I lack "Catholic" information. However, 
both Catholic Bishops, John Kakubi and Paul Bakyenga, were extremely helpful for 
they gave me an open invitation to their homes. I owe a good proportion of the 
information on Catholics to them. 
Another frustrating thing was that many of my interviewees did not keep 
appointments. I spent a whole month seeking to interview someone. The fact that I 
conducted the interviews at the time when presidential and local elections were taking 
place made it even harder to get politicians. But those I managed to get were very 
receptive. On the whole, the period I spent in the field was very useful. It not only 
contributed to the bulk of the information for the thesis, it enabled me also to have the 
opportunity to interact with people from diverse backgrounds. 
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1.3. Background and the Socio-political setting 
The area which we know today as Ankole3 is a colonial creation. The original pre- 
colonial kingdom of Nkore comprised the present counties of Isingiro, Kashari (Kaaro 
Karungi) and Nyabushozi. 4 There were also other relatively independent smaller 
chieftains in neighbouring Igara, Buhweju and Buzimba. At the advent of British 
colonialism in 1898 these smaller states were forcefully incorporated into what 
became known as Ankole with Nkore as the nucleus. The extension of Nkore 
increased even further the numerical disparity between Bahima and Bairu by a ratio of 
1: 95 and created what Doornbos calls a "perpetually lopsided balance of power" in 
favour of a minority, the Bahima. 6 
Present Ankole lies south of the equator and covers an area of 6144 square 
miles.? To the East it borders Buganda district and to the west it borders Kigezi with 
River Rwakaberengye and the hills of Rwahi forming the natural borderline. To the 
south, the River Kagera marks its borders with Rwanda and Tanzania while in the 
North, it borders Toro and Kasese, with lakes Edward, George, the Kazinga channel 
and the hills of Kitagwenda forming natural borderlines. Much of western, southern 
and northern Ankole is mainly hilly: the counties of Igara, Buhweju, Bunyaruguru, 
Ibanda and to some extent Rwampara and Kajara. These counties have a fair amount 
of high rainfall and therefore are heavily populated except for Buhweju, which is 
mountainous. The central and eastern counties form the Ankole plateau, with small 
rolling hills, which descend into extensive flatlands covering the counties of Kashari, 
Isingiro and Nyabushozi. These are generally dry areas with seasonal rains, hence 
sparsely populated. These counties especially Nyabushozi, are pastoral areas occupied 
mainly by the Bahima. 
3 The word "Ankole" is a linguistic misrepresentation of "Nkore" by the British and their Baganda 
colonial agents who first came to the kingdom of Nkole. 
4 See H. F. Morris, "The Making of Ankole", Uganda Journal, vol. 21, no. 1, March 1957, p. 3. 
5 D. J. Stenning, 'Salvation in Ankole', in M. Fortes and G. Dieterlen (eds. ), African Systems of 
Thought, London: Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 258; For percentages see, H. F. Morris, A History 
of Ankole, Kampala: East Africa Literature Bureau, pp. 70-73. 
6 M. Doombos, Not All the Kingsmen: Inequality as a Political Instrument in Ankole, Uganda, The 
Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1978, p. 25. 
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In 1974, Ankole was divided into the two districts of East and West Ankole: counties 
of Rwampara, Isingiro, lbanda, Nyabushozi and Kashari formed the East, while the 
West comprised of Igara, Sheema, Kajara, Buhweju and Bunyaruguru. In 1980 these 
districts were named after their towns, Mbarara and Bushenyi respectively. For the 
purposes of this thesis therefore, I will generally use Ankole to mean both districts 
and where Mbarara or Bushenyi is used, it refers to that specific district. 
1.3.1. Social-political setting. 
This chapter discusses the social relations and the manner in which power was 
structured between the two ethnic groups, Bahima and Bairu, in pre-colonial Nkore. 
These two ethnic groups have long been a subject of discussion. One school of 
thought (mainly emanating from Prof. Samwiri Karugire) has emphasised coexistence 
and symbiosis despite being two distinct communities. The other school has stressed 
inequality, subordination and oppression between the two ethnic groups. As Martin 
Doornbos says, this raises the question of the extent to which "Nkore society was 
based upon a single system of social and economical production.. . 
(and) how the 
pattern of power relations related to the two main population groups". 8 
The indigenous people of Ankole consisted of the agricultural Bairu and the 
pastoral Bahima. Bairn formed and still form the majority. They are generally 
believed to have been the original inhabitants of the area-9 Bahima on the other hand 
are pastoral people who are said to have invaded the region five centuries ago10, 
migrating from Somalia or Ethiopia though this is not supported by any evidence. 
Since colonial times population censuses have reckoned Bahima to be less than ten 
percent of the total population of Ankole. I1 
7 See the Uganda Atlas. 
8 Martin Doornbos, op. cit., p. 25. 
9 See Turyahikayo-Rugyema, "The cattle complex in Western Uganda: the BahimaBairu Relationship 
reconsidered", paper presented at the annual conference of African Studies Association, Atlanta, 
Georgia, 1989, p. 1. 
10 M. T, Mushanga, "The clan system among the Banyankole", Uganda Journal, vol. 34, no. 1,1970, 
p. 29. 
11 ibid. 
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Despite being a minority group, Bahima were the traditional rulers of Nkore and all 
the other chiefdoms and Bairu hardly played any political role but they shared the 
same religious beliefs12 and spoke the same language, Runyankole. Both groups also 
share the same enganda (clans, plural) structure: patrilineal, totemic and 
exogamous. 13 Mushanga defines enganda as reference categories, members of which 
did not necessarily know one another. Each oruganda, (clan, singular) had its own 
omuziro (totem) which worked as a bond for all its members and distinguished them 
from other clans. Nevertheless, Bairu and Bahima can be easily distinguished by their 
physical features. The latter tend to be tall and slender while Bairu are generally short 
and muscular. They also have different accents despite speaking the same language. 
1.3.2. Bahima-Bairu relations. 
Before and during colonial period the two groups did not enjoy cordial relations. They 
were characterised by a common "pattern of social stratification" 14 where Bahima 
dominated Bairu politically, socially, and economically. Such exploitation was not 
limited to certain sections. The whole social fabric was so ingrained in the political 
and oral history, that Bairu came to accept their status quo as divinely ordained. 
Significantly, Ankole's oral history indicated that political and economic privileges 
were for Bahima. Ankole's history was enshrined in myths and legends whose 
beginnings were ascribed to a divine origin. The Ankole myth recounts how Ruhanga 
(God) had three sons, Kakama, Kahima and Kairu. Because he wanted to establish the 
worthiest heir, he gave them as a test full milk pots to hold until morning. When 
Kakama dozed off at about mid-night and spilled his milk, he wisely asked his 
brothers to contribute some milk for him and he had a full pot again. Just before 
dawn, Kairu upset his milk pot and lost all his milk. Basing on their performance, God 
decreed that Kairu would be the servant of his brothers because he had an empty pot, 
Kahima would be a herdsman of Kakama to whom he had given his milk while 
12 This is already discussed by both Alex Kagume, op. cit.,; Peter Kasenene, op. cit., and Martin 
Doornbos, op. cit., in their introductory chapters. 
13 Mushanga, op. cit., p. 29. 
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Kakama the youngest son would be the heir and ruler of the land. God returned to 
heaven and thereafter Kakama (or Rugaba) ruled in his place as Omugabe. He became 
the father of the Bahima pastoralists while from Kairu descended the Bairu 
cultivators. 15 
The function of such a myth was mainly a legitimising one. The underlying 
philosophy was that ethnic composition in Ankole was God ordained. It provided an 
ideological basis for Bairu and Bahima ethnic groups as being distinct "social 
categories". Hence Bahima were by birthright of higher social status than Bairu. 
Beattie says: 
in the last resort, what the myth validates is not just this or that particular kind of status differences but 
rather the "rightness" of all such distinctions based on birth. Although in the myth the original 
discrimination was based on achievement, what it validates is a system in which statuses are ascribed and 
not achieved. 16 
14 This phrase is borrowed from Martin Doornbos and will be used throughout the thesis. 
15 See Morris, op. cit., pp. 6-8.; Also Mwambutsya-Ndebesa, "Pre-Capitalist Social Formation: The 
case of Banyankole of South-western Uganda", in Owen J. M. Kalinga (ed. ), East African Social 
Science Research and Southern Africa (OSSREA), January, 1990, p. 80. 
16 J. H. M, Beattie, J. H. M, "Bunyoro: An African Feudality? ", Journal of African History, vol. VI, 
no. 1,1964, P. 39. 
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13.3. Previous Scholarly Interpretations. 
In describing Bahima-Bairu relations, Oberg used the phrase the "premise of 
inequality" and writes that `to the Bahima, "Bairn" signified serfdom, a legal status 
inferior to that existing between themselves. ' Observing the nature of such 
exploitation he said: 
the exploitation between Bairu and Bahima took the form of tribute in food and labour and for this 
purpose the Bahima tended to keep them in subjection. 17 
Stenning noted that the `legal and economic status of "Iru" was inferior to that of 
"Hima". '18 He says: 
in general terms, the traditional pattern of administration authority in Ankole was that of a ruling 
pastoral caste the Hima set in both local and central administration over an inferior caste the Iru". 
19 
The alternative view (which I do not accept and which actually stimulated me to write 
about this particular topic), holds that both Bairu and Bahima were interdependent 
socially and economically with an open class system which allowed either Mwiru or 
Muhima to rise or fall on the social ladder. Such a view denies that there was any 
"premise of inequality" in the system. This is the view, which is put forward by 
Professor Samwiri Karugire: 
The one essential factor, which is the key to the understanding of Nkore class structure..., is that the 
class system was an open one. 20 
17 K. Oberg, "The Kingdom of Ankole in Uganda", in M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (eds. ), 
African Political Systems, London, 1966, p. 154. 
18 D. J. Stenning, "The Nyankole" in Taylor (ed. ), The Western Lacustrine Bantu, London, 1962, pp. 
153-155. 
19 Stenning, op. cit., p. 169. 
20 See, Karugire, A History of the Kingdom of Nkore in Western Uganda to 1898, London, 1971, p. 50; 
See also H. F. Morris, The Heroic Recitations of the Bahima of Ankole, Oxford, 1964, p. 9. 
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According to Karugire, a Muhima academic and historian, the economic activities of 
both Bairu and Bahima were complementary and were based on interdependence 
through mutual exchange. Accordingly, "Nkore was a capitalistic society and the form 
of capital was cattle... "21 Karugire's analysis, however well argued, lacks historical 
backing and therefore leaves many questions unanswered. It might have been true that 
"the vital point [was] that the Omugabe was the greatest single source of wealth-cattle 
for the Bairu as well as for the Bahima" but it is not true that both "the Bairu and the 
Bahima rendered him... services for which they were similarly rewarded" (ibid. p. 53). 
Karugire writing after independence swung the pendulum in an opposite direction. He 
accused people like Oberg, Morris and Stenning, of distorting the history of Ankole as 
far as Bahima-Bairu relations were concerned. He privileged symbiosis and 
coexistence as the models under which Bairu and Bahima lived: 
It appears fairly certain that the economic relations between Bairu and Bahima were based on mutual 
exchange of the goods produced by each other and their occupations were made mutually exclusive by 
the environmental conditions rather than by ethnic superiority or inferiority. 22 
He states that Ankole was an open society whose social mobility was based on wealth, 
measured in terms of cattle ownership, and that some Bairu could acquire cattle, 
marry Bahima women and after generations become Bahima! That likewise, if a 
Muhima lost his cows and became poor, he would become a Mwiru. However 
Professor Y. Elam, who carried out research among the Bahima of Nyabushozi and 
advanced the theory of social separation between Bairu and Bahima, challenged such 
a naive view. He dismisses Karugire's theory of coexistence as contradictory to 
Karugire's own experience: 
His own recollections do not deter Karugire from stating categorically that cows milk, among other 
products of the Hima was in considerable high demand among the Bairu. 23 
21 Karugire, op. cit., pp. 38,40-41,66. 
22 ibid., pp. 33-34. 
23 Y. Elam, The Social and Sexual Roles of the Hima Women, Manchester, 1973, pp. 36-37. 
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Elam argued that there was only a limited and temporary exchange of goods between 
the two groups, and limited contacts. To argue that Nkore was "one society" as 
Karugire does would pre-suppose that it had one single system of social and political 
identity. Yet while I agree that there was a general social contact, they were distinct in 
their way of life and production patterns, "that would normally be associated with a 
single inclusive social system and a shared ranking pattern. " Even today, where both 
ethnic groups have diversified their economies to incorporate cattle and crops, both 
Bahima and Bairu still refer to themselves as distinct groups, each proud of its own 
different traditions. Various behaviour and cultural trends are evident, especially the 
infrequency of intermarriages and different accents whose expressions and metaphors 
may make a conversation unintelligible to the one outside the group. Karugire defends 
a Bahima legitimacy which he himself would have sacrificed anything to keep. He 
once thanked "God for two things", not creating him "as a woman or a Mwiru". 24 
If one argues as Karugire does, that Bairn and Bahima were not two distinct 
groups in their economic, social and ethnic composition, then one wonders how the 
inequality arose; or alternately if the two groups were based on equal ethnic premises, 
how could they be seen as distinct and different communities? There are two 
interpretations to this: one of which is a dominant story among Bairu, which is also 
recounted by Oberg. Both agree on the persuasive, and institutionalised pattern of 
ethnic dominance by Bahima over Bairu: 
From the stand point of political and legal states, the members of the Banyankole kingdom did not form 
a homogeneous mass, but were distinguished by a wide range of rights and prohibitions resulting in a 
stratification of society into classes. At the top was the Bahima State with its growing nucleus centring 
on Omugabe [king]; below were the subject classes of the Bairu. The caste nature of this stratification 
was pronounced resting entirely on racial and economic differences. 25 
Rightly, Oberg sees ethnicity as the underlying factor with which Bahima relegated 
Bairu to an inferior position subject therefore to be controlled by Bahima 
24 Debate between Samwiri Karugire and Prof. Apollo Nsibambi in the late eighties on Uganda 
Television. 
25 Oberg, op. cit., p. 134. 
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economically, socially and politically. On balance, Kagume and Stenning seem nearer 
the truth when they state the fact that in pre-colonial Ankole, Bairu interacted 
amongst themselves and so did Bahima. They had different life styles and diets and 
what took place was a limited exchange of products in terms of the number of people 
it concerned and the intervals of its frequency. Such limited economic reciprocity 
mainly involved Bahima consumption of Bairu products like millet, beer and Bairu 
consumption of ghee from Bahima though the latter traded with Bairu only if they had 
a disposable surplus. 
Among the scholarly interpretations about Ankole, it is Martin Doornbos 
who has given a balanced analysis of the ethnic imbalance between Bairu and 
Bahima. He appreciates those areas, however minimal, which Bairu and Bahima 
shared in common: 
As a result while it would be erroneous to conceive of their relationships as one that was rigidly 
patterned or as one that placed every single Mwiru in a directly subordinate position to a Muhima, 
neither can the proposition be held that members of the two groups had equal chances in an open and 
socially mobile society. 26 
Within the Bairu-Bahima limited contacts, there were a few instances in which both 
groups interacted socially. This was mainly in those instances where Bairu were 
directly in the service of the Bahima. Bairn today still tell, perhaps with gross 
exaggeration, of how the Omugabe could rest his spear on a Mwiru's feet or spit in his 
mouth at will and where they were made to carry off their lord's urine or hold Bahima 
women's thighs whenever they would be having intercourse (many Bahima women 
are heavily overweight). 27 They were prohibited from touching milk pots lest they 
would turn "unclean" as part of their inferior social status. It might be these people 
that Karugire writes about when he talks of cultivators who "lived near the kraals of 
the pastoralists, cultivating short term crops such as vegetables and sweet potatoes 
which supplemented the dairy products from the kraal", while performing services 
26 M. Doornbos, op. cit., p. 35. 
27 See for instance, "Adoration and hatred kiss Ankole's Obugabe", in The New Vision, 26 March, 
1997, and Martin Doornbos, op. cit., p. 39. 
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and moving on with the pastoralists when they trekked to new pastures. 28 It is most 
likely that it was within that social group that the term "Bairn" first carried its specific 
meaning not just as cultivators but as servants. Because the early colonial contacts in 
Ankole were mainly with Bahima, that demeaning word came to embrace all non- 
Bahima. 29 
Economically and apart from the "servant" minority, which was in direct 
Bahima employment, the economic contacts seem to have been more favourable to 
the Bahima than Bairu. Since Bahima controlled the market monopoly of their 
imperishable goods like ghee (butter), they left it to the Bairu to carry their heavier 
products to the Bahima kraals and hence Bahima determined whether or not to trade 
and at what exchange value. Their products were highly valued nutritionally by Bairu. 
Also Bairu were liable to pay for "protection" from Bahima chiefs with tribute 
(okutoya) in return for "protection" since Bahima were chiefs. 30 
The significant visible domination however was political. Nkore's political 
system was based on territorial chiefs who wielded substantial powers and were 
exclusively Bahima. Only in very rare circumstances could a Mwiru become a chief. 
The exception would only be if he distinguished himself as a warlord in the service of 
the state. But such cases were very rare indeed since it was Bahima who formed the 
kingdom's "high command". They controlled courts and therefore determined the 
destiny of justice. The case that came to the Omugabe's court mainly concerned 
Bahima and where Omwiru and Omuhima were involved in a dispute, the former 
chances of getting a fair hearing were uncertain. And as Oberg wrote: 
Perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of Bairu serfdom was that under no circumstances could a 
Mwiru kill a Muhima. The right of blood revenge, which was exercised by the extended families of Bairu 
among themselves, could not be extended to the Bahima. If a Muhima killed a Mwiru, the extended 
family of the murdered man could not claim blood revenge, although he was sometimes able to exact 
28 Karugire, op. cit., pp. 35,40. 
29 See 1. M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, London, 1961, p. 14. 
30 Karugire, pp. 39,64. At times some compulsion from Bahima was evident as implied in Bairu's 
anecdotes about Bahima who would be searching for sweet bananas. Bairn would lead them through 
their plantations, denying they had any such bananas, which their Bahima visitors, unable to tell one 
tree from another, found difficult to check. 
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compensation through the agency of the Omugabe. Bahima on the other hand could avenge the death of 
a kinsman if he were murdered by a Mwiru without consulting the Omugabe. 3 
Where a Muhima's cattle destroyed a Mwiru's crops, the latter would not even bother 
to seek compensation since "the legal and security system was heavily weighed in 
favour of Bahima. "32 We can argue therefore that Bahima hegemony was more 
assertive politically than economically. What gave Bahima such an assertive 
confidence was perhaps the pivotal function of the Omugabe (king) on whom all 
political matters revolved. To both Bahima and Bairu, Omugabe was a symbol of 
power, but while he stood as a central figure in the political system there were no ties 
that linked Bairu to his office. To the Bahima on the other hand, Omugabe was 
Rugaba, the giver, who closely participated in their affairs. He appointed only them as 
chiefs and judges and rewarded them with cows and other benefits. As Omuhima 
himself, not only was his way of life similar to theirs, he was the protector of their 
interests. Hence the Ankole kingship differed greatly from Buganda where the Kabaka 
(king) was akasolya (pinnacle), for all clans. While to Bahima, Omugabe was a 
political symbol, to Bairu, he was a symbol of inequality, exploitation and despotism, 
as an essay from Ntare School History Society claimed: 
Before the British brought in "democracy" the type of government, which prevailed, was... despotic. The 
king's powers were unlimited. He could with a word prevent or make a man's fortune. 33 
As Oberg says, the position of the Omugabe was exalted, his authority 
supreme... power both physical and spiritual was the inherent quality of kingship. "34 
And Roscoe, the man who described Ankole as a Bahima country, conceded that "the 
government of the country was autocratic and the power was in the hands of the 
Omugabe whose rule was absolute and his decision on any matter final. "35 Vansina 
while constructing a typology of African kingdoms characterised Nkore as "a clear 
31 Oberg K. and F. Pritchard (ed. ), Africans Political Systems, London, 1964, p. 126. 
32 Interview: Anania Murumba, July 10,1996, Kafunjo. 
33 See The Government Institutions in Ankole before the British rule, mimeo, Mbarara, 1965, p. 1. 
34 Oberg, op. cit. pp. 136-137. 
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case" of a despotic kingdom where "the king appoints all other officials and wields 
absolute power in practice and in theory. "36 
The Bahima owned cattle not only as a means of subsistence but also a 
symbol of wealth, power and prestige. 37 Having elevated cattle as their source of 
economic, social and political power, they monopolised them and prevented the Bairu 
from owning any. Bahima would not allow Bairu to own reproductive cows38 by 
giving them only bulls in exchange for their services. Bahima also emphasised the 
antagonism between cattle ownership and the agricultural way of life. They claimed 
that vegetable food was dangerous to cattle health and therefore Bairu as vegetable 
eaters would endanger the productivity and life of cows when they drank their milk. 39 
As Roscoe wrote; 
If a man ate potatoes or beans, he had not only to fast twelve hours but also had to take a purgative to 
ensure that all contaminating matter had left his system before he drank milk again. 40 
As Turyahikayo-Rugyema says, Bahima made the process through which the Bairu 
could acquire even unproductive cows and bulls very complicated. The process was 
overlaid with so many obligations that "when and how a Mwiru obtained the cow 
depended on the whims of the Muhima". 41 Bairu could get cows through Okugabisa 
(cattle loan) from the Bahima by paying several pots of beer (amarwa). The 
exploitation in this lay in the fact that Bairu were not only given unproductive bulls, 
but were required to pay several visits with beer before the cow could be given. In 
addition such cows put Bairu recipients in the power of the Bahima's exploitative 
process. The Omuhima donor made continual visits to the Mwiru on the pretext of 
coming to "see his cow. " Though he would bring nothing to the Omwiru, he expected 
Omwiru to entertain him with food and beer. The Mwiru could not resist such 
35 John Roscoe, The Banyankole, London, 1929, p. 12. 
36 See J. Vansina, "A Comparison of African Kingdoms", Africa, vol. 32, no. 4,1962, p. 332. 
37 Interview: Mwambutsya-Ndebesa, March 26,1997, Makerere University. 
38 C. Murray, "Status conflict: cattle and education in Ankole", Uganda Journal, 34,1,1970, p. 10. 
39 Kagume, op. cit., p. 14. 
40 Roscoe, op. cit., p. 72. 
41 Turyahikayo-Rugyema, op. cit., p. 14. 
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exploitation because he desperately wanted the cow either for making marriage 
arrangements, or for religious ceremonies. 42 By denying the Bairu access to 
productive cattle, the only symbol of wealth, Bahima starved them both economically 
and socially. Because they lacked such wealth, Bahima ranked them second class 
citizens. 
It was not that Bairu were unaware of such subjugation nor were they just 
passive victims. As a silent protest, Bairu avoided settling in the low plains of central, 
eastern and south-western Ankole, the main Bahima grazing lands and settlements. F. 
D. Lugard corroborates this factor. In 1891 he came to Ankole and described it as a 
"foodless country with few villages and little cultivation". 43 They instead settled in the 
hilly areas where they would not conflict with Bahima over cows destroying crops. 
Another form of resistance was subtle. If a Mwiru felt "stretched" by the demands of 
the Muhima, he would either migrate to another area or delay the action without 
telling Muhima that he did not want to do it. I was told of cases where Bairu, when 
carrying Bahima loads, pretended to stumble and spill the whole load. 
Bairn could not put up active resistance knowing that they lacked the 
political know-how and organisation. Bahima controlled the political machinery right 
from the grass roots to the Omugabe. Because the domination was so comprehensive 
Bairu were unable to mount open rebellion against the Bahima. Karugire contended 
that their quiescence indicated that they were not suffering any oppression. 44 But the 
fact that no open rebellion is recorded in Ankole traditions does not necessarily rule 
out the possibility of one. It was Bahima who "designed" Ankole's traditions to exalt 
their glory and success. Prof. Richard Gray agrees that African traditions have this 
tendency to conceal their past when he writes that: 
Rebellious and revolutionaries are difficult to discern in the records of oral tradition on which we depend 
for so much of our knowledge of pre-colonial Africa. Traditions often provide the charter or justification 
42 Stenning, op. cit., p. 153. 
43 F. D. Lugard, The Rise of our Last African Empire, vol. II, London: Blackwood, 1893, pp. 155-160. 
44 Karugire, op. cit., p. 53. 
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for a political order. So even if the system had originated in revolution, its origins might soon become 
clothed in respectability and successful rebellions could be glossed over with rapidity. 45 
This brings us to the role of the colonial masters in the Bairu-Bahima relations. The 
British did not change the status quo but preferred to rule through it and confirmed 
the Bahima chiefs in their respective positions. By 1901 when the Ankole Agreement 
was signed, the British had placed all the conquered territories under the Omugabe 
Kahaya of Ankole. Subsequently the incorporated kingdoms became counties and 
their Bahima kings became their county chiefs. Until the late 1930s, when education 
became a necessity for civil office-holders like county chiefs, the British did not 
tamper with the Bahima establishment. Out of the ten county chiefs who signed the 
1901 Ankole Agreement with the British, nine were Bahima and only one Mwiru, 
Ruhara. In 1907, out of the ten county chiefs, six were Bahima, three Baganda and 
Ruhara. 46 This report further indicates that the reduction of Bahima dominance had 
only taken place at the county chief level. At sub-county level Bahima still retained 
the highest representation. Bairu who constituted more than 90% of the population 
held only 8 out of the 84 chiefdoms in Ankole. In 1923 after the death of Ruhara, 
even he was replaced by a Muhima thus bringing the number of Bahima county chiefs 
to nine and one Muganda. 47 Far from initiating any significant change, colonial 
administration in Ankole perpetuated the Bahima oligarchy. This was understandable 
because it was Bahima as traditional rulers of Nkore who received the British. The 
British found Ankole as a hierarchical society and chose to leave it as it was. Their 
policy of "indirect rule", meant that one section of the people continued to be 'set 
against' the other thus perpetuating long lasting divisions. Ankole could perhaps have 
emerged as a unified society had the British applied a more inclusive administration. 
On the contrary, colonial rule widened fissures between the Bahima and 
Bairu. So racially obsessed were the Europeans that they attributed the Bahima 
dominance to their special intelligence and racial superiority over Bairu. As Gerald 
45 R. Gray, Black Christtaus and While Missionaries, New Haven, 1990, p. 4. 
46 See Uganda Governmnent, Systems of Chieftainships ofAnkole, Government Press, Entebbe, Uganda, 
1907. 
47 ibid. 
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Prunier says, Europeans were obsessed with their quest to propound anthropological 
theories that tagged Bahima and Bairu to different racial stereotypes. An example of 
this is the Hamitic theory, which was largely based on physical appearance and 
advanced by men like John Speke, Samuel Baker and John Roscoe. In brief they 
advanced the fact that whereas Bairu were indigenous Bantu groups in the 
interlacustrine region, the Bahima were invaders who came from Somalia, Ethiopia, 
Egypt and even Israel. 48 Sir Albert Cook for instance while commenting on the 
Bahima, remarked on "their extraordinary likeness to the old Egyptians" while Alfred 
R. Tucker described a typical Muhima as "a man the very image you would say of 
Rameses II". 49 Therefore the chiefs were recruited along these stereotyped 
assumptions in early colonial days while the European view of the Bairu was of a 
lower and inferior status. They display the: 
very typical Bantu features... they are generally short and thick set with a big head, a jovial expression, 
a wide nose and enormous lips. They are extroverts who like to laugh and lead a simple life. 50 
Consequent of this theory of two races was a sensed inferiority among Bairu but in 
whom a latent explosive rage nurtured, while the Bahima ego was inflated with pride 
and aristocratic intransigence that often made reform of the monarchy more difficult. 
It was not only the colonial administration which widened the gap between 
Bairu and Bahima. Christianity also had a role to play. The introduction of 
Christianity not only strained Bairu-Bahima relations further, but also divided Bairu 
themselves. It strengthened the position of the Bahima. Christianity and colonialism 
came to Ankole almost at the same time in 1898. The Church Missionary Society 
(CMS) missionaries who arrived first concentrated on the Bahima notables at the 
court and subsequently converted the king and other court royals. This was the CMS 
African strategy for as Rev. J. J. Willis, one of the first two Protestant missionaries in 
Ankole and later the Bishop of Uganda, wrote: 
48 Mwambutsya-Ndebesa, op. cit., p. 202. 
49 ibid. 
50 See G. Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis 1959-1994: History of genocide, London: Hurst and Company, 
1995, p. 6-7. 
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There must be concentration on the natural leaders. The supreme importance of this will be seen later. It 
is enough to remind ourselves that the lower the stage of civilisation, the more dependent are the people 
on their leaders; that where in an African tribe, the chief is friendly every facility is given to the 
missionary, and where he is unfriendly, the progress of the gospel is slower and immensely more 
difficult. Native leaders can not always be won but it is always worthwhile making the effort to win 
them. 51 
Though the Omugabe of Ankole, Kahaya, might have accepted Protestantism because 
CMS came first, evidence shows prestige was a more important factor. All the 
surrounding kingdoms, Buganda, Toro and Kooki, had already embraced 
Protestantism. Consequently, the king and nearly all Bahima embraced Protestantism 
as the religion of the king, (eky'omugabe). The Roman Catholics who arrived later in 
1902 amidst opposition from the British administrator Racey52 and with less favour 
from court concentrated their efforts on the majority rural Bairu. While CMS first 
concentrated on the Bahima notables, Catholic missionaries went for the poor masses 
in rural Bairu areas and, by the time CMS came to evangelise Bairu, many had 
already been won over by the White Fathers. Although political conditions were 
against the Catholic Church in the kingdom, several other factors facilitated its 
growth. In his diary, Father Gorju noted: 
The Protestant religion has preceded us here. The Mugabe chose it and Protestantism became the 
religion of Kahaya. Bahima followed him. The Catholic religion from the beginning was the religion of 
the poor and the underdog. It is among them that we are sowing the word of the gospel. 53 
They might have been the poor and the underdog, but, due to the efforts of Catholic 
Fathers, Catholics later formed the biggest single group in the kingdom. When the 
CMS missionaries realised this, it opened their eyes to the Bairu. The population 
figures of 1911 and 1921 support this argument. Though CMS had been over ten years 
51 J. J. Willis, An African Church irr Building, London, CMS, 1925, p. 36. 
52 `1 am of the opinion that one religion should be tolerated in Ankole for it is patent that should 
Roman Catholics be permitted to settle here as well as Protestants there will be trouble beyond 
anything I can Contemplate'; See Racey to the Commissioner, 18 January 1901, file No. C58, 
Uganda National Archives, Entebbe. 
53 Kagume op. cit., p. 45. 
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in Ankole by 1911 and the White Fathers had been there only for eight years, the 
census returns in that year indicated that there were 7,185 Catholics, 6,890 Protestants 
and 443 Muslims. And in 1921 there were 12,803 Catholics, 10,071 Protestants and 
524 Muslims. 54 Catholic numbers were in the eyes of CMS missionaries due to 
Catholics' zeal for evangelism as Rev. W. E. Owen wrote: 
In the abundance of its missionary zeal, the Roman Catholic Church compels our fervent admiration. 55 
The argument above is not about the growth of Christianity in Ankole, which is dealt 
with by people like Alex Kagume and Kasenene. 56 It is about the religio-political 
implications among the Banyankole. Before the coming of denominational 
Christianity, chiefdoms were purely for Bahima. But with the coming of Christianity 
and after the conversion of the king and Bahima notables, administrative positions in 
Ankole became overwhelmingly Protestant rather than Catholic. Protestantism 
became "the king's religion" in one way and in another it was the religion of the 
colonial establishment. Hence without any exception Bahima and Baganda county 
chiefs during the colonial period were Protestants. What Christianity did was to 
enhance and strengthen the Bahima hegemony. 
Following the pattern of mission stations in Ankole, Protestants occupied 
the central areas of Sheema, Igara, Kashari, Kajara and Rwampara while Catholics 
consolidated in the peripheral remote areas of Bunyaruguru, Buhweju, Ibanda and to a 
less extent Isingiro. The reason for this was that the central areas were closer to the 
king's palace and were strong counties under influential chiefs like Mbaguta who 
controlled Sheema and Igara. Secondly though such counties as Sheema and Kajara 
were predominantly Bairu, they had a significant number of Protestant Bahima who 
could have influenced Bairu. 
54 See the "Uganda Census Report" of 1921. 
55 CMS Archives, Birmingham: Rev. W. W. Owen's annual letter, 1909, (Series G3/A7/1898-1934), 
(hereafter, CMS Archives). 
56 Cf. Alex M. Kagume, op. cit. 
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Equally important was the fact that, after the introduction of denominational 
Christianity, colonial District Commissioners generally supported the Protestant 
establishment. Rev. Clayton wrote: 
Our Collector Mr. Racey seems anxious to help us as much as he can. He has just imported three keen 
Christian men from Buganda and has given them Chieftainships in different parts of the country, that 
they may be a good educational influence on the people. They will of course build churches at once at 
their places and will probably act as teachers without pay, so I hope they will be of great use. 
57 
The colonial masters ignored the employment of Catholics in favour of Protestants. 
Even Bairu Protestants were appointed disproportionately to Bairu Catholics in the 
lower ranks of the colonial establishment as messengers, Askaris and Bakungu 
(tribute chiefs). This relegated Bairu Catholics to the cultivation of subsistence crops. 
These different social developments among the Bairu and Bahima were to have 
religio-political implications with Protestant Bairu demanding greater and equal 
participation in an exclusive Bahima establishment. 
However the immediate consequence of denominational Christianity is that 
it produced a pyramidal society with the Bahima elite on top, then Protestant Bairu 
and the Catholic Bairu on the bottom. This continued as the norm until towards 
independence when both Bairu groups dominated the Ankole Eishengyero as a result 
of the direct elections. But after 1930s the situation did not change much. Most chiefs 
were still Bahima though some Bairu Protestants became sub-county chiefs. Either 
way Bairu Catholics remained relegated on the fringes of the system. 58 Such a 
pyramid was very convenient for Bahima because while denominational Christianity 
had dissected Bairu into two rival parts, Bahima had remained united both as an 
ethnic group and as Protestants. The divisions among Bairu reduced and divided any 
likely potential opposition to Bahima. The fact that Bairu Protestants had the "table 
remains", however minimal, meant that for a long time, they regarded themselves 
superior to Bairu Catholics and therefore did not have anything to do with them. 
While among Bahima Christianity symbolised a unity of interests, among the Bairu it 
57 Clayton to parents, Annual letter, 2 June 1901, CMS Archives. 
58 ibid. 
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symbolised divisionism and competition. It is unfortunate but true to say that for 
many years Christianity did not mitigate ethnic inequality but in many ways nurtured 
and reinforced it. And as Martin Doornbos says, such arrangements 
also served the purposes of British control. It was consistent with a policy of'franchise' and self-rule that 
local statuses should also be allocated and arranged as to result in a system which largely rested on its 
"own" checks and mechanisms of control. 59 
It was such religio-political imbalance in Ankole that led the Catholic Bishop Forbes 
to express his disgust as early as 1920. He protested about the Omugabe's 
indiscriminate policy against Catholics in the appointment of chiefs, which were 
exclusively for Protestants: 
It is quite true that the measure applied by government in selecting chiefs is only that of efficiency and 
character, whatever religion they profess. gut what the Omugabe and the Lukiiko are reproached with is 
their systematic opposition against Catholics' obtaining Chieftainships especially their mode of practically 
never proposing Catholics for sanction. Hence the striking disproportion between the Protestant and the 
Catholic chiefs as shown in the following table. The proportion of both Catholics and Protestants in 
Ankole is fairly equal. However at present, out of 12 counties, Protestants hold ten, Catholics 0. Muslim 
1, vacant 1. Out of the 96 sub-counties, Protestants hold 73, Catholics 6, Muslims (Baganda) 15, pagans 
2. Unless it is proved that they are unfit for Chieftainships, have not the Catholics the reason to be 
discontent. 60 
In the response to the Secretary of State concerning the Bishop's letter, the Provincial 
Commissioner accepted the existence of favouritism on the part of the Omugabe and 
Eishengyero but reported: 
The question of bias on the part of the Omugabe and the Lukiiko is well known, but I think it is not so 
much because he and his leading chiefs are keen pillars of the church, but they favour men who are 
Bahima and of their own class. 61 
59 Doornbos, op. cit., p. 95. 
60 See Bishop Forbes letter of 23/11/1920, File Class A 15, Entebbe archives. 
61 See same file as above. 
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I have so far highlighted the role of Christian denominations in propagating ethnic- 
religious conflicts. But how about Islam? What role if any did Islam play in the 
emergence of Ankole? In fact Muslims were not key actors in the religio-political 
events in Ankole until independence. Many of them were Baganda, and kept aloof 
from the conflicts as a Banyankole issue. Islam had come to Ankole before the two 
Christian denominations. As it was in Buganda, Muslim traders and chiefs who had 
come alongside the British colonialists as interpreters, clerks and drivers introduced it 
in Ankole. Despite such advantage, it never won any significant following in Ankole 
and up to now has remained a minority religion. 
Several reasons explain it. Islam lacked credible missionaries. Foreign 
Christian missionaries were revered by local people who were proud to identify with 
them. But Muslims had no missionary groups and lacked full time officials. In 
addition there were no Whites in it. Banyankole were always astonished at what the 
whites "could do" which ranged from making a simple wooden chair to giving an 
injection. Hence they were called abajungu (the smart ones). Many people therefore 
wanted to learn their wisdom and to belong to the religion of these "semi-gods". The 
first Baganda Muslims in Ankole came in 1889 fleeing from the religious wars in 
Buganda. However they came through Kabula and settled in Bukanga, a county which 
is at the extreme end of Ankole. They were not centrally located. According to Bishop 
Kakubi, whose father almost became a Muslim, the first Mosque in Ankole was built 
in Bukanga and up to now that area has the highest number of Muslims. 62 
Islam was propagated by Baganda who were often arrogant and refused to 
speak Runyankole. The few Banyankole who converted to Islam adopted the kiganda 
culture and language in which Islam expressed itself. So Islam meant detribalisation. 
Perhaps the most serious reason why Islam did not spread so quickly in Ankole was 
because, for a long time, it lacked secular schools, which in many ways acted as a 
vent for denominational evangelisation. 63 The adherents of such schools determined 
the religion they were converted to or to which their parents belonged. The only 
Muslim High School was Nyamitanga built in 1920. Even then it had few students 
62 Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, August 25,1996, Ibanda. 
63 Interview: Sheikh Kaduyu, June 12,1996, Mbarara. 
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and insufficient funds to sustain it. This explains in many ways the lack of Muslim 
political leaders in the post independence Ankole. Besides, Banyankole abhorred the 
custom of being circumcised before being accepted into Islam. According to 
Banyankole, circumcision was a shameful thing. After all Islam did not have much to 
offer, as did the Christian denominations. 
1.3.4. Church and the Bairu ministry. 
By 1914, Bahima were not showing much interest in Christian work. Encouraged by 
the results of the White Fathers among the Bairu, CMS also directed its attention to 
them. The results of the Bairu's response to the Anglican gospel had motivated the 
Rev. Boulton Landbury to write in 1922: 
The hope of the Church there seems to be in the despised peasants, the Bairu. These respond to the 
preaching of the gospel; and it is from their ranks that ninety nine percent of the Church's workers are to 
be found. 64 
Despite the fact that the first clergyman, Yoweri Buningwire, was a Muhima 
(ordained 1916), there was to remain a big gap before another Muhima, Eric Sabiiti, 
was ordained in 1933. However the Bairu's response to the gospel had encouraged 
missionaries to put forward a Mwiru, Semei Kashinya, for ordination in 1924.65 The 
two Bahima, Buningwire and Sabiiti, would be the last to be ordained until the fifties. 
Why did Bahima lose interest in the institution which they had first 
embraced and why were they not as keen for church ministry as Bairu later became? 
Church records in Ankole show mainly Bairu ordinations: for instance of Lazaro 
Tibesasa (1931), Sezi Gunura (1933), E. Kamujanduzi (1945). It seems Bahima could 
not bend to the demands involved in church ministry. From the beginning, Bahima 
had realised that church work was a servant-oriented job, which they could not 
associate themselves with. Bairn on the other hand, found church work to be an 
immediate source of salaried employment. They also embraced Christianity as a way 
64 CMS Archives: Rev. Boulton Landbury Annual Letter 1922. 
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towards equality. Bahima seemed content to let Bairu take over in church leadership 
since apart from offering social prestige, Church ministry did not offer high economic 
incentives which Bahima were interested in. They were interested in government jobs, 
which were a continuation of their traditional role as chiefs. Actually they objected to 
people among their own like Sabiiti joining church ministry and instead argued him 
into the civil service: 
From time to time since he [Sabiiti] left Buddo, the government have wanted him in their service; and his 
brother [Katungi] who is one of the big chiefs here had tried to persuade him many times to give up 
mission work and to accept a chieftainship. 66 
It is not clear why Bähima readily accepted Bairu's leadership in the church. It may be 
due to the fact that, even before the advent of Christianity, they had accepted Bairu as 
traditional priests. Bairn monopolised traditional religious offices as diviners and 
healers. 67 While such parallels may have been of some influence, it is vital to note 
that Christianity in Ankole was introduced as a completely new religion, which did 
not build on the traditional order. 68 Bahima despised church work and odd as it was 
for them, they were not surprised that Bairn went for it. This is true for the 
missionaries' efforts to make the Ugandan Church self-reliant was lop-sided. Secure 
as they were, with their provisions supplied mainly from home, missionaries 
emphasised sacrificial service at the expense of sacrificial giving and did little to 
alleviate the appalling financial situation of the African co-workers whose pay 
depended on the amount raised by their churches. The stipends of the clergy in 
Ankole and the Uganda mission were miserable in the missionary times and still are. 
The salaries were raised on the principle defined in the 1913 Synod that: 
Voluntary contributions support the personnel and the involuntary contributions support the material. 
69 
65 CMS Archives: CMS Annual Report, 1924-25. 
66 ibid. 
67 Interview: E. Mukaira, July 24,1996, Bushenyi. 
68 Yoramu Bamunoba, "The Confrontation between Christianity and African traditional Religion in 
Ankole since 1899", Occasional Research papers, 2, Makerere University, 1971. 
69 CMS Archives: Resolutions of the Synod of the Church of Uganda, 8-10 July 1913. 
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For example the stipend of a local clergyman in 1930 was 40 Shillings (£2), a month 
while the local Catechists received 1.3 Shillings (£0.0625) and they did not always 
receive their stipends regularly as congregations often failed to raise the money. 70 
On the surface, Bairu leadership in the Church might seem a perpetuation of 
their traditional role, which confined them to the religious sphere. But on more 
fundamental level, it signified a tremendous change in Bahima-Bairu relations. 
Though Church work was poorly paid, it conferred a high social status originating in 
the reverence traditional Ankole conferred upon traditional priests and more 
significantly, the prestige European missionaries enjoyed. As one elderly man 
confided, he could never be convinced that missionaries whom most Banyankole 
respected as such ever "visited a toilet". 
And indeed they "did not" for the life style of some of them promoted this "super- 
human image" among the Banyankole. For instance in 1902, when Clayton was 
returning from leave, his colleague Willis asked all the chiefs to be present in their 
best Sunday clothes. He borrowed a mule from the British Collector for Clayton "to 
ride in state". 71 Missionaries also kept numerous African domestic servants and at one 
time Clayton boasted of having: 
8 boys... At present 2 cook, 2 do our bedroom washing and ironing and boot cleaning, 2 are table boys 
and cream the milk and do lamps and 2 wash up and do a variety of odd jobs. 72 
It is true that the African clergy did not inherit such pomp, but they were invested 
with sufficient amount of it to enable them to be treated with considerable respect in 
Ankole society. They were not believed to be super-human but they were the local 
experts of the kijungu dini (European religion) as they were able to read, write and put 
on those "godly" robes, the mechanics of which fascinated the poor peasants. Bairu 
clergy ceased to be called by their names and became abarisa or abakadde, both titles 
signifying the high respect they acquired. 73 
70 Interview: Canon Semei Rwabushaija, August 28,1996. 
71 CMS Archives: Clayton letter to Parents, 22 November 1902. 
72 ibid., 14 February 1904. 
73 Interview: Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa, August 4,1997, Kampala. 
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Another significant development was that through the church, Bairu clergy 
and Catechists entered into a new relationship with Bahima chiefs. Since Anglican 
Christianity was the "religion of the king", Bahima chiefs were expected to support 
church workers and to mobilise people to build churches. Though Bahima did not do 
it as enthusiastically as Baganda chiefs did, on the whole, with Bairu initiative, more 
pastorates were opened up in the counties where Bahima County chiefs were. These 
were: Sheema-Kitojo, 1913 (Nuwa Mbaguta), Ibanda, 1918 (Julia Kibubura), Igara- 
Bweranyangi, 1926 (Tophas Togo), and Kajara-Kitunga, 1939, (Semei Ndyazarwa). 74 
By incorporating Bairu and Bahima in one church, Christianity created a 
new group of believers who were distinct from non-Christians. They were largely 
exposed to the ideals of the Christian faith, but due to the social-political imbalance 
this unity remained artificial. The argument here is that Protestantism which had 
initially exalted Bahima later became a stepping stone for Bairu development and 
emancipation. By embracing it, Bairu overwhelmed Bahima in church membership 
and hence capitalised on their numerical strength to use the Church for their 
"liberation". And as we shall be arguing in the next chapters, Bairu's commitment and 
involvement in church work was very significant in the power shift in post 
independence politics. 
74 Ekiiabo ky'Eishenrgyero Ry'Ekanlisa Kagamba, minutes for 2 September 1938, Kitunga 
Archdeaconary. 
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1.4. MISSIONARY SCHOOLS AND LOCAL POLITICS BEFORE 
INDEPENDENCE. 
We now examine the role played by the church mission schools in the spread of 
Christianity and in the local politics in Ankole before independence. For the spread of 
Christianity in Ankole went hand in hand with establishment of missionary 
education. 75 Indeed that is why African scholars have generally viewed missionary 
education as being another form of imperialism. Such scholars are so obsessed with 
the awful excesses of missionaries that they tend to gloss over the fact that missionary 
education was a necessary factor if remote areas of Uganda were to develop. As 
Bishop Kivengere has said, we are not ashamed of what the missionaries imparted to 
us, but of our failure to improve on it. 76 
Missionary schools were not only established as catchment areas for 
converts but also as entry ports in the struggle to "civilise" what Europeans then 
considered "a Dark Continent". Seeing the impact of these schools, the White Fathers 
were quick to declare that: 
... the 
School is undoubtedly the most important and indispensable feature of Catholic missionary 
activity. From the very beginning we understood that in a country like Uganda where all children were 
dependent on pagan parents, or masters, it was only by means of schools, that the missionaries could get 
hold on the people. 77 
This was true indeed for education helped to influence the body, mind and soul of the 
African! The teacher captured the mind; the church catered for the soul, while the 
dispensary healed the body. This is why the early Sunday school chants composed by 
the local Catechists carried strong images about the value of education: 
75 See for instance, Adrian Hastings, A History of Africanr Christianity, 1950-1975, Cambridge 
University Press, 1979, pp. 48-49; 109-110; 150-151; 188-189. 
76 I was present at his address on the golden anniversary of the Revival movement in Ankole in 1987. 
77 Kakubi, J. B., "Missionary Education and Catholic Church in Uganda", A Paper delivered at Gaba 
National Seminary, 1995, p. 3. 
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Hariho omuhigo omuhigo gwerigyenda mushongore ekaramu tugurwanise, [there is a hunt, a hunt for 
education, sharpen your pencils for they are your spears]. 
And at the end of the morning classes the infants would sing: 
Imwe abataregire mukaferwa bingi kuturiba twizire turyabategyeka, [You who do not go to school, you 
are missing a lot. After we have graduated we shall rule you). 78 
The missionaries knew that the best way to civilise natives was to use education to 
liberate them from the superstitions and retrogressive customs. This is why Bishop 
Tucker saw education as serving holistic functions of the church: 
If the term "evangelisation" simply implies the base proclamation of the great fundamentals of 
Christianity and nothing more, then I grant that the communication (between education and evangelism) 
is not apparent. But if we take the term to mean in its highest - and I can not but think its truest sense 
that the good news of the gospel has to do with the body, mind and spirit, then the relationship of 
intellectual and physical training to the great end and object of all missionary effort becomes very 
apparent.. . 
The gospel of Christ is for the whole man. To develop all the physical, mental and spiritual 
powers in the full stature of a manhood is, or should be, the lowest idea the missionary sets before 
himself in his world-wide crusade of righteousness. 79 
The Catholic Archbishop Hinsley in the 1920s had an even more radical view in his 
advice to Catholic priests: 
Advance all your projects to the fullest extent, but where it is impossible to carry on both the immediate 
task of evangelisation and educational work, neglect your churches in order to perfect your schools. 
8° 
With this background we can then assess the impact of missionary education on the 
people of Ankole, and how this in turn influenced the local politics thereafter. 
78 Interview: E. Turihamwe, August 12,1998, Nyamiko. 
79 Alfred Tucker, Eighteen Years in Uganda and East Afica, vol. 1, London: Edward Arnold, 1908, 
p. 236. 
80 John Waliggo, "Education in Uganda", in The New Vision, 12 September 1992, p. 16. 
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As we have pointed out, the CMS missionaries tended to concentrate their efforts at 
the king's court, which in effect meant that they dealt more with Bahima notables, the 
king and his chiefs and their children. Their interest was targeting leaders and their 
goal in education was: to train future leaders of Ankole just as they had done in 
Buganda. They had established schools like Mengo, Buddo, and Gayaza in Buganda 
specifically for the education of chiefs' sons and daughters. It was on the same 
premise that they founded Mbarara High School in Ankole in 1911 to educate the 
children of Bahima chiefs. 81 The school largely served the interests of the Bahima 
until the 1950s when the colonial government set up Ntare School. Hence Mbarara 
High School right from the onset served a dual purpose; to produce Bahima leaders 
and clerks to the colonial government and secondly to produce leaders who would 
influence the future generation with Christian ideals. The Revd. S. R. Skeens alluded 
to this when he wrote: 
... 
Schools... are bonds and discipline is fairly strict and the hope is intertwined that under the good 
Christian influence, these young nobility of the country may learn the very needful lessons of self denial, 
self control and self discipline which will be of inestimable value to their future positions of wide 
spreading influence. 82 
Schools like Mbarara High School were meant to serve, inter alia, as channels 
through which evangelistic strategies could easily be transmitted from the top to the 
bottom of the monarchy state structure. The chiefs would be the political agents in the 
chain of change: hence the need for the CMS to make them its first target for 
education. Bishop Willis outlined the anticipated benefits: 
The chiefs touch the political side of the tribal life. Christian chiefs secure a Christian legislature, and the 
ultimate settlement of all questions on Christian principles. Even though many years pass before practice 
81 A. Tiberondwa, Missionary Teachers as Agents of Colonialism, Lusaka: National Education of 
Zambia, 1978, p. 57. 
82 S. R. Skeens, "Impressions of Missionary work in Uganda", in Uganda Notes, 1906, Makerere 
University Library. 
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corresponds to enactment, it means much that an ideal should have been accepted, and that ideal 
embodied in formal legislation. 
83 
By the 1940s however, Bairu children had been enrolled thanks to the coffee growing, 
which had boosted Bairu income. Cotton growing never took off in Ankole, because it 
is alleged chiefs would roast cottonseeds before they were distributed for planting and 
the whole scheme flopped. 84 Whether or not this widespread story is true, it does 
appear that the Bahima chiefs were not really in support of a cash crop economy 
because it was drastically revolutionising the economic and social relations of 
production in favour of the Bair-u. It will also be recalled that by the 1930s, the British 
colonial government had realised the need to encourage peasant crop production 
rather than migrant labour which the people of Ankole, Kigezi and Rwanda had 
"exported" to Buganda. The colonialists preferred the cash economy because it 
provided a better and new form of trade than the cattle economy. That meant 
therefore that the Bahima traditional cattle monopoly of wealth and power was for the 
first time being threatened. 
The Bairu's newly acquired wealth from cash crops was more transferable 
into school fees than cattle wealth. Though cattle were a guaranteed source of wealth, 
the wealth derived from crops was a viable cash income. Bahima were not willing to 
sell their cattle for fees as Bairu were willing to sell coffee. The former aimed at 
increasing their herds and persistently resisted offers to sell or kill their cattle. By 
1942, we therefore witness increased Bairu enrolment in Mbarara High School of 
which the Headmaster in his report noted: 
In primary V and VI some Bairu boys joined the school and again more in secondary one, often helped 
by scholarships and bursaries. Nevertheless the top class, secondary III had only ten boys, of whom 3 or 
4 came from Buganda and the others were about equally divided between Bairu and Bahima. 
85 
83 J. J Willis, An African Church in Building, London, 1925, p. 84. 
84 Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, August 7,1996, Ishaka. 
85 A. C. Pain, Mbarara High School, p. 8. 
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The Bairu enrolment in School was not only boosted by the cash economy. As the 
Headmaster's report highlights, the Ankole District Council had started granting 
bursaries to pupils who had excelled in performance. In 1938, the Ankole Deanery 
also started providing free education for children of Catechists many of whom were 
Bairn, after the latter started resigning from church ministry to raise school fees for 
their children. The Deanery launched a scholarship grant that tremendously helped to 
encourage Bairn education. 86 
Another factor increased the number of Bairn boys at Mbarara High School. Many 
more primary schools were founded in 1928 in exclusively Bairn areas at Kabwohe, 
Bweranyangi, Ruyonza, Ibanda, Kinoni and Kyamate. Mention ought to be made also 
of Mbaguta's87 contribution to the education of Bairn children. For Mbaguta was a 
liberal Muhima and a keen supporter of CMS work, who went to great pains to pay 
for Bairn children's fees from his own savings. Unlike many Bahima, Mbaguta did not 
discriminate against or shun Bairn, perhaps because of his early experiences with the 
Baganda. His attitude had changed because, as chief of Kabula, where Baganda exiles 
fled in 1888 (fleeing from religious wars in Buganda), the interaction he had with 
non-Bahima for a long time had widened his social horizon, making him less 
parochial. Mbaguta had for instance enlisted some of the exiles into his 
administration, learnt Kiganda culture and language. 88 On his first visit to Ankole in 
1899, Bishop Tucker described him as "a progressive and his house and his 
surroundings were after the Baganda pattern". 89 Mbaguta also forced parents to send 
their children to school. Because the Bahima needed their sons to look after their 
cattle herds, which they cherished more than education, they sent their Bairu servant 
boys instead. Bahima felt they needed no education to look after their cows or to be 
86 Interview: S. Rwabushaija April 9,1996, Ruharo. 
87 He was the Enganzi (Prime minister) of Ankole. Apart from the Omugabe (king), he was, politically, 
the most powerful man in Ankole from the beginning of the century to the 1940s when he died. 
88 See for instance, I. I. Steinhart, Conflict and Collaboration: The Kingdoms of Western Uganda 
1890-1907, Princeton, 1977, p. 150. In fact Mbaguta's generosity had been turned into a joke by the 
Banyankole, "Kworabe noyenda ebyabusha, oze owa Mbaguta" (if you want free things go to 
Mbaguta). 
89 Tucker, op. cit., p. 275. 
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chiefs because it was their birthright. Mbaguta remained a powerful force until 1945 
when he died. 
Mbaguta's interest in educating Bairn boys was partly as result of the alienation he 
had been subjected to by the Bahima. Though a Muhima, he was not from the 
Bahinda clan (the ruling clan among the Bahima). Instead, he belonged to the 
Abashambo clan, which was the ruling clan of the neighbouring Mpororo90 (the 
present day Rukungiri and part of Ntungamo Districts). Being an outsider, he was 
always a victim of the Bahinda-Bashambo strife and rivalry which Martin Doornbos 
discusses at length. 91 It is likely that these differences and conflicts with the Bahinda 
chiefs influenced his relations not only with Bairu, but also with the British 
colonialists and missionaries. As Doornbos observes: 
Basically, therefore, the Bahinda-Bashambo strife could be regarded as one, which accelerated processes 
of colonial formation. 92 
But also the ethnic divide between the Bahororo pastoralists and the Bakiga 
agriculturists was not as distinct as that between the Bahima and the Bairu in 
Ankole. 93 
In 1934, the Governor of Uganda, Sir Bernard Bourdillon, issued an instruction that 
"more attention should be paid towards the appointment of chiefs of a higher moral 
standard as well as more efficiency". 94 Henceforth, formal education became a major 
consideration in the selection of chiefs. And in the same year, all the illiterate Bahima 
chiefs were retired and replaced by Bahima who had acquired some education. 95 As a 
result Mbaguta was retired in 1937. Though Bahima insisted that his replacement 
90 F. Lukyn Williams, "Nuwa Mbaguta, Nganzi of Ankole", Uganda Journal, vol. 10, no. 2,1946, p. 
124. 
91 Doornbos, op. cit. p. 73. 
92 ibid. 
93 P. Mwambutsya, "Colonialism and the Development of peripheral capitalism: A Case Study of 
Ankole of South Western Uganda", MA Thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1987, p. 4. 
94 Sir Bernard Bourdillon, Governor of the Uganda Protectorate; letter to all Provincial and District 
Commissioners, Uganda Protectorate, I July 1934. Uganda Government Archives, Entebbe. 
95 See Kasenene Peter, African traditional Religion and Political Leadership in Ankole, MA Thesis, 
Makerere University, 1977, p. 242. 
35 
must be Omuhima, no suitable candidate could be found. Williams, the District 
Commissioner, had stressed that the new Enganzi of Ankole must have attained a 
certain degree of education either from Mengo, Buddo or Makerere. A compromise 
candidate, Kamugungunu96 was agreed on, but the consequent Enganzi from the 
1940s were to be all Bairu because they had the necessary qualifications. 
Though it was never intended, it was rather ironical that mission schools were among 
the factors that tilted the Bahima-Bairu relations to the advantage of the latter. The 
schools were meant for Bahima but since they did not grab the opportunity, they 
contributed to the demise of their domination. Bairn products of Mbarara High School 
aspired to professionalism. And since by the 1940s chiefly positions were still 
dominated by Bahima, many Bairn went into the teaching profession, which widened 
their social horizons, and they began to aspire for equality and equal representation 
with the Bahima. 
By the 1950s a Bairn elite had emerged with egalitarian ideals of liberty, 
equality and fraternity which they read about in books and which the religion they had 
embraced preached. They began to agitate for political representation in the 
administration for by now the number of educated Bairu had increased beyond that of 
the Bahima especially when more schools were opened in Bairu concentrated areas 
such as Ruyonza in Igara county, Kabwohe in Sheema, Ibanda in Ibanda and Kinoni 
and Kyamate in Rwampara county. Above all, the "Hamitic myth" of European 
anthropologists (which we discussed in our introduction) had made Bairu students 
resentful of the hegemony of the Bahima-Bahinda "foreigners". In short by the time of 
independence, the Bairu had gained the capacity, both economic and intellectual, to 
overturn the Bahima hegemony. 
However missionary education and religion mitigated the Bairu-Bahima 
tension by introducing another more volatile factor: religious sectarianism. 
96 It is believed that he was a Tutsi-Munyarwanda whose parents came to Ankole at the end of the 19"'. 
Century (see chapter six). Son of Rwakashegu who fled to Buganda after the death of Mutambuka 
during the succession wars. Rwakashegu was running away from Ntare V. After the death of Ntare 
V, Mukwenda was installed as king and that is when Kamugungunu returned to Ankole. 
Kamugungunu's clan was Omukurungu. Apart from holding jobs such as sub-chief, County Chief of 
Bunyaruguru and Kashari, he succeeded Mbaguta as Kihimba when the later was promoted to 
Enganzi. Died in 1944. 
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By independence, the Bairu-Bahima friction had in fact become less "ethnic" and 
more "religious". Thus the emergence of the Protestant and Catholic conflicts. It is 
therefore imperative that we also briefly look at the way the work of Catholic 
missionaries especially through education, contributed to this scenario in Ankole's 
politics. 
If there is any mission group that highly regarded the value of education, it 
was the Catholics. Their mission was holistic in approach. Bishop Streicher had 
instructed Fathers Gorju and Varangot upon their arrival in Mbarara: 
The first two things you are asked to do after you arrive at Mbarara are: (a) To open a dispensary in 
order to help the sick and all those who are in need of medicine. (b) To start grouping up children in 
classes and give them instruction. By so doing, you will show your charity in a practical way, make a 
good impression on the people and make yourselves known rapidly. 97 
Despite the hostility from the British colonial administration, by the 1920s Catholic 
schools had attracted many children, because they provided free education. This was 
also partly because Catholics had concentrated on highly populated Bairu areas like 
Buhweju, Bunyaruguru, Ibanda and Isingiro, which tended to be polygamous as they 
needed much labour for cultivation. 98 By 1925, the Catholic Church had some aid 
from Italy which helped them to expand their schools and to build High Schools99 
because Catholic students were not admitted to Mbarara High School, the CMS 
institution. With this aid, schools like Lugazi in Bunyaruguru, Kitabi in Igara, 
Kagamba in Kajara and Ibanda were set up. Effort was also made to stop relying on 
Baganda Catechists. The Bishop preached self-reliance: 
You should gradually replace Baganda Catechists by teachers from Nkore. It will inspire confidence to 
do so... forget Luganda, study the language. 100 
97 Nyamitanga Archives: Bishop Streichees instruction to Fathers Gorju and Verangot, 1905. 
98 Interview: Bonefasi Byanyima, September 6,1996, Ruti-Mbarara. 
99 Interview: Bishop Kakubi, May 18,1996, Kagongo-Ibanda. 
100 Bishop Streicher, op. cit. 
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However, unlike CMS mission education, which was tailored towards the British 
colonial administration needs for manpower, Catholic Seminary education sought to 
combine training for secular vocations and priesthood. 101 They imparted the virtues of 
obedience, prayer and hard work, which they regarded as necessary for shaping the 
individual for priesthood. Seminary education trained Catholics to be disciplined as 
loyal priests, carpenters, artists and masons. And they are still unequalled today in 
these skills since the best Technical schools like Kisubi in Buganda and Nyamitanga 
in Ankole belong exclusively to them. This goal was counter-productive in two ways: 
first it was a disincentive to many students who wanted to join white-collar jobs in the 
civil service. Secondly, it "shut out" Catholics from the administration and politics of 
Ankole for a long time, leaving it a monopoly of the more liberal minded, aggressive 
and shrewd Protestants who were trained and even told, to be the leaders. 
One lasting effect of mission education was the permanent religious 
polarisation it introduced into the politics of Ankole. This division especially affected 
the Bairu, who, in addition to their historical stand off with the Bahima, now suffered 
Catholic-Protestant rivalry and animosity. For the first time in the history of Ankole, 
religion had divided people who had been one for centuries. They were divided 
between Bairu Catholics and Bairu Protestants whose future relations were based on 
religion. In mission schools, seeds of hatred for "the others" were sown. I was told of 
cases where teachers told their pupils to excel and be cleaner than their counter-parts 
on the "opposite hill". 102 Catholic pupils were derogatorily referred to as abarofa, 
dirty ones, or endaho, castrated bulls because celibate priests taught them! These 
poisonous seeds of religious hatred still bedevil Ankole. And this hatred translated 
into political partiality by Bahima Protestant chiefs in the colonial administration who 
neglected or undermined Catholic efforts. In a long letter to the new Protestant chief 
of Rwampara, Catholics had once complained: 
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101 Interview: Bishop Kakubi. 
102 Interview: Yoramu Gucwamaingi, April 15,1996, Ruharo, Mbarara. 
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If we start a school or church, there must be an opposition of the Protestant chief. You will see that this 
is a custom in this county of Rwampara that a Protestant chief must not permit Catholics to start a 
school or church in his area and to use all means to prevent them to do so. 
103 
In a nutshell, since these schools and churches became the breeding ground for future 
leaders in Ankole, we see a dangerous sectarian precedent created in Ankole politics 
with bitter fruits for the Banyankole. When political parties emerged during the run 
up to independence, they were nurtured in churches and one's political ideology 
depended on the school and church one had attended. 
1.5. ETHNIC DOMINATION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR IDENTITY: 
THE KUMANYANA MOVEMENT. 
Missionary education revolutionised Ankole society. In the post war period, the 
crumbling of traditional, socio-political structures was a result of the wind of change 
caused by growing enlightenment and a new cash economy. Traditional relations 
based on inequality, class and birth rather than merit were being tilted in favour of the 
Bairn, who began to challenge the Bahima hegemony through what came to be known 
as the Kumanyana Movement, or getting to know one another. 
The Kumanyana movement, which grew at Mbarara High School in the 1940s, 
was an underground protest by the growing Bairn elite, seeking to redress the ethnic 
domination of the Bahima over Bairn. It was therefore a movement against social 
inequality and segregation, championing equal representation in the political 
establishment. As Doornbos puts it the: 
Protest was in principle concerned with redefining the political framework and the changing distribution 
of power, with enlarging social and economic opportunities and with a search for and assertion of new 
dignity and social identity. 104 
Kumanyana did not arouse any revolutionary fears in the colonial administration 
because it stuck to its agenda of agitating for Bairn rights. Though its membership 
103 Welcome speech by Catholics of Rwampara to the new Saza chief E. Cook, 1954. 
104 Martin Doornbos, op. cit., p. 117. 
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was mainly Bairu Protestants who were graduates of Mbarara High School, it had 
included some Catholics, and a Muslim. Political offices in the Ankole government 
Kumanyana said were not equitably distributed. For instance in 1946, all the Saza 
chiefs, except one, were Bahima Protestants as the following table illustrates: 105 
Table 1: Saza chiefs in Ankole, 1946. '°' 
County Name Religion Ethnicity. 
Sheema Y. Mugyenyi Protestant Muhima 
Rwampara C. Cook " 
Kashari E. Mugooha 
Nyabushozi K. Mworozi 
Buhweju D. Ndibarema 
Ibanda Y. Mpiira 
Kajara C. Kafureka 
Isingiro Y. Ntungwerisho " 
Igara Z. C. K. Mungonya107 Mwiru 
105 Interviews: Murumba, July 10,1996, Rurangaranga, August 2,1996, and Gaharubungo, July 2, 
1996. 
106 See Omugabe's File, Kamukuzi archives. As to who was Omuhima or Omwiru, the list was 
interpreted to me by Anania Murumba at his home Kafunjo, Mbarara, May 4,1997. 
107 Mungonya of the Abasingo clan was born in 1900 (baptised in 1905) to Rutaba son of Muyaga. 
During the succession wars between Ntare and Mukwenda, Muyaga, a Mwiru, demonstrated his 
heroism in support for Ntare. As a result, Muyaga was rewarded with cattle and that is how he came 
to gain favour with the King. Mungonya's mother was a Munyarwanda. However Mungonya's birth 
was surrounded with controversy as the question of the legitimate father arose. Two men Kahuha 
and Rutaba conflicted on the fatherhood of Mungonya. However Mbaguta ruled in favour of Rutaba 
on the grounds that Mungonya's feet resembled Rutaba's. Afterwards Mungonya's grandmother 
Merinde brought him to Mbaguta's court from where he gained court tutelage and was later sent to 
School. At the death of Rutaba, he left all his property to Mungonya. He married Catherine 
Bujangari, a Munyarwanda, around 1930; she was also brought up by Mbaguta right from her 
childhood. Jobs; Taught at Buddo after Makerere College; Headmaster of Mbarara High School; 
Treasurer of Ankole; County Chief Igara and Ibanda; became Enganzi of Ankole in 1953; Minister 
of Lands in the colonial government; Retired in 1960 and died in August 1981; his wife died in 
1982. He also served as the Provincial Head of Laity Church of Uganda. During his service in the 
colonial government he won the MBE & CBE. 
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All this was regardless of the fact, that apart from Nyabushozi, which was at the time 
exclusively Bahima, the rest were Bairu dominated counties. Coupled with this was 
the failure of the Bahima royalists to accommodate the growing number of Bairu 
elite. The appointment of Mungonya, a Mwiru, to the highest office of the Enganzi in 
1949 for instance, infuriated many monarchists for they regarded it as an insult to 
Bagyendanwa, the royal drum. Bahima students at Mbarara High School who wrote a 
protest letter to the colonial office supported them. I os 
According to tradition, if any Mwiru were to be promoted to that office, it could 
not have been Mungonya for he belonged to the Abasingo clan whose ancestors were 
believed to be the cause of the existence of death! At the Omugabe's court, they could 
only carry out menial work but would never be considered even for the lowest 
leadership position of Omukungu, tribute collector. Yet people like Mungonya no 
doubt merited the appointment. He was the first Mwiru to graduate from Makerere 
College in 1936 and had worked in the District Commissioner's Office for four years 
before being appointed County chief of Igara. The colonial office dismissed the 
protests and reminded the monarchists of the Ankole Administration 1947 Secretary 
of States' decree which stressed the importance of appointing educated chiefs in the 
respective offices. 109 This protest by parochial Bahima to the first appointment of a 
Mwiru Enganzi fanned the Bairu Kumanyana cause and increased their demand for 
more representation. Kumanyana marked the beginning of the Bairu revolution 
against the Bahima hold onto Ankole politics. The movement was reinforced by the 
1955 Uganda Local Government Ordinance, which provided for the expansion of 
local administrative units. Hence this gave the Bairu bargaining ground because they 
were the majority. In the local elections that followed, the Bairu inevitably returned 
the majority in the Eishengyero, winning 56 out of the 75 seats. l10 Once the Bairu 
had the majority in the Eishengyero, they could easily influence the appointment and 
transfer of chiefs and other civil servants in the administration and that is why they 
108 Interview: Ezra Kikuri, July 24,1996, Bushenyi. 
109 Mbarara Archives: The Governor's letter to the Omugabe, 12 March 1948, File Administration, 
6/2. 
110 Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, May 28,1996, Ishaka-Bushenyi; see, Mbarara Archives: 
Minutes of the Eishengyero. 
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were able to achieve the appointment of Kesi NganwaH l as the second Mwiru 
Enganzi in 1955 after Mungonya had become minister of Lands in the Central 
Government. 
The Anglican Church was involved in the Kumanyana movement right from 
the start. Most of Kumanyana members were Bairu educated in the Anglican mission 
schools. Apart from lay people like Mungonya and Nganwa, there were churchmen 
like Rev. Eliakim Kamujanduzi (see his biography in chapter two) who was then a 
Vicar at St. James cathedral Ruharo. The fact that it was the Protestant, not the 
Roman Catholic Bairu who led the protest is perhaps due to their educational 
background. The influence of the church therefore was significant: the movement's 
pioneers were also pioneers of the church schools. Hence the church became the 
platform for the movement's meetings. Various churches provided venues for local 
Kumanyana meetings. When the movement started to mobilise people for the election 
of the councils, it usually did so after church services when the rest of the "un wanted" 
members of the congregation had gone. Mainly the church provided the moral 
justification for the movement. Although the membership of priests like 
Kamujanduzi, Laban Tibekinga and Andereya Rushegye was not officially on behalf 
of the church, it reflected its support and presence. These were senior pastors who 
commanded respect among the Bairu. This spiritual element characterised the 
movement throughout its years of activity. 
111 Kesi K. Nganwa (his real name was K. K. Muha) originated from Bunyaruguru but lived in 
Sheema where he was adopted by Kamugungunu. He attended Makerere College, 1933-1935. Jobs; 
Teacher Mbarara High School, Ibanda and Kabwohe. He was appointed Schools Supervisor in 
1952. He became Enganzi in 1955-1961. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. THE CHURCH AND POLITICS IN ANKOLE 
2.0. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I will discuss the religio-political issues that affected Ankole. I will 
look at the politics and the church in two sections. One, for the period between 1955- 
1961, and the other for the period 1962-1970. In the first section I will discuss the 
Catholic-Protestant relations in the Eishengyero, the emergence of political parties 
and the creation of the diocese of Ankole. In the second section, I will discuss the 
UPC split in the post independence Ankole, the collapse of the Ankole monarchy and 
the church and politics after independence. 
2.1. PROTESTANTS AND CATHOLICS IN THE EISHENGYERO POLITICS. 
I have argued that the Kumanyana movement had not only boosted the Bairu 
Protestant's socio-political state, it included and "enlightened" Catholics by making 
them members. I call this enlightenment because Catholics had been at the bottom of 
the ethno-social ladder. With a combined force, Bairu became a force to contend with 
thanks to the Missionary education and the cash crop economy, which boosted their 
income and catapulted some to the same social status as some Bahima. Thus among 
the achievements of the Kumanyana movement was the election of two successive 
Protestant Bairu as the Enganzi of Ankole: Z. C. K. Mungonya (1949) and Kesi 
Nganwa in 1955. 
The election of Nganwa became known as the 1955 Ankole crisis following 
the 1953 Buganda crisis in which Governor Andrew Cohen deported their Kabaka 
Muteesa II to Britain. If the Bahima had tolerated the election of Mungonya, they 
were not prepared to see the election of another Mwiru for the post of Enganzi, which 
traditionally had been theirs. What saved the situation was the entente between 
Protestant and Catholic Bairu, which resulted in a political alliance that defused the 
Bahima agitation. According to the 1949 African Local Government Ordinance, the 
subsequent Enganzi were to be appointed in consultation with the Omugabe, the 
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incumbent Enganzi and the District Commissioner. ' 12 Apart from the District 
Commissioner, the rest had divergent interests in the 1955 crisis. The Omugabe 
backed by Bahima had preferred E. Cook' 13, an illiterate Muhima and county chief of 
Rwampara; but since education had become a factor in the appointments, Nganwa 
who was then supervisor of the Anglican Native Schools was the obvious candidate. 
He was elected the Enganzi and a new era in the politics of Ankole began. 
Nganwa's tenure of office worsened Catholic-Protestant relations. The year 
1955 was not only a crisis because of the Bahima-Bairu antagonism, it became a new 
crisis between Protestant and Catholic Bairu. The reasons were simple. Both 
Catholics and Protestants had "hunted the animal and were supposedly to equally 
share the spoils". 114 Instead Nganwa's political action narrowed towards acquiring 
political positions for the Protestants. Their desire to be rewarded with sinecures was, 
however, thwarted by two conditions. One was that the tenure of posts held by 
Bahima was protected by the civil service regulations and therefore they could only be 
replaced at retirement or some impediment. The other was that Catholics expressed 
an increasing interest in having a share in the political spoils. They had become a 
third political force in Ankole. And through the Eishengyero, however few they were, 
they had been exposed to "modem" political machinations. That is why they had 
considered it in their interest to support Protestant Bairu in the Nganwa election, thus 
bringing the first ever joint Bairu alignment against Bahima. They were disenchanted 
though when they felt that Protestant Bairu had not been "faithful" and were gaining 
political advantage over Catholics despite their support. Protestants argued that they 
had borne the brunt of the struggle for Bairu emancipation and had more qualified 
people to occupy the limited chiefly positions, ' is which justified allocating such posts 
among themselves. "6 Political estrangement and greed, especially from the 
112 Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, June 19,1997, Mbarara. 
113 Probably born when Dr. Cook was visiting Ankole. 
114 Interview: Bishop John Baptist Kakubi, June 22,1996, Ibanda. 
115 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, March 20,1996, Kampala. 
116 After 1955, the changes in the religious background of the higher ranks of chiefs are indicated 
below-based on the Ankole Kingdom government's Establishment Lists which comprise county and 
sub-county chiefs: 
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Protestants, undermined the alliance. The choice of Nganwa as the Enganzi would 
have enhanced ethnic unity among Bairu since he had their combined support. Had 
Nganwa and his Protestant clique heeded the Catholic plea, it is likely that the 
Protestant Bahima-Catholic Bairu alliance would not have emerged. 
The division between Protestant and Catholic Bairu was underlined by another factor: 
the election of the Legislative Council (Legco) members in 1958.117 It became the 
starting point for the Protestant Bahima-Catholic Bairu alliance in Ankole which has 
remained till today. Until 1957, it was the Protestant-dominated Eishengyero, which 
elected Ankole's representatives to Legco. To understand the emergence of this new 
situation, we need to go back to 1953 when on 15 October the Ankole Eishengyero 
was to elect its Legco representatives. Among the five names proposed 115 the first two 
1961 1963 1966 
Protestants 50 52 34 
Catholics 12 14 9 
The 1966 figure includes two catholic county chiefs, as against one in 1963. In Ankole the increase at this 
level tended to be looked upon as strengthening of the catholic representation in government. But 
such perception appears to have obscured the apparent decline of the catholic element among the two 
higher ranks taken together. For Senior officers other than chiefs, the religious distribution during the 
same interval was roughly as follows: 
1961 1963 1966 
Protestants 27 27 27 
Catholics 442 
The nature of this table should be kept in mind throughout the decade. It suggests a further weakening of 
the Catholic component. Generally, data on the religious background of chiefs and other senior officers in 
the Ankole administration up till 1966 continued to show a considerable over representation of 
Protestants. If this data is an insufficient basis to conclude that an actual regression took place in the 
proportion of posts held by Catholics, they nonetheless warrant the deduction that little change was 
initiated since 1955 to modify their under-representation in official positions. (I owe this data to Martin 
Doornbos, 1978, Not All the King's men Inequality as a political Instrument in Ankole, Uganda, The 
Hague: Mouton Publishers, p. 216. 
117 The Eishengyero came as a result of the post war British policy in Uganda, when the colonial 
administration issued the 1949 African Local Government Ordinance, which directed that councils 
be the base for local government and thus be formed from Miruka level to the District level. In 
Ankole, the local councils came to be known as Enkiiko z Engabo, (Peoples Councils) and the 
kingdom council was Gishengyero (Kingdom Parliament). Cf. See Minutes of the first Eishengyero 
meeting of July 1952, Mbarara Archives. 
118 C. B. Katiiti, Z. C. K. Mungonya, E. S. Kapa, A. G. Katate and A. B. Mutashwera. Interview: 
Rwetsiba, March 21,1998, Kampala. 
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were Bairu, Kapa19 was a Munyarwanda, Mutashwera, Omuhima and apart from 
Katate who was a Mwiru Catholic, the rest were all Protestant. The Protestant- 
dominated Eishengyero nominated C. B. Katiiti to Legco and Mungonya until 1955 
when he was appointed Minister of Land Tenure in the Central Government. In 1955, 
Ankole was to have two representatives. Despite the Catholic efforts to send Katate to 
the Legco, they were once again thwarted and instead E. S. Kapa, a Munyarwanda- 
Muhima120 Protestant, was sent to represent Ankole East as Katiiti represented 
Ankole West. 121 
In 1957, the Central government gave districts and kingdoms the option of 
choosing their representatives either by nomination in their Councils as before or 
through direct elections. Catholics preferred the latter method as a chance to secure a 
Catholic majority. The Protestants afraid of the Catholic majority122 preferred to 
nominate Legco members directly since it would ensure their control of the results. 
Since it was the Councils to decide which method to use in the elections, "it gave 
Protestants an advantage to decide which method would favour them. "123 
Consequently the Eishengyero sessions between 29-31 October 1957 were 
characterised by a tug of war which method to use. On 29 October, after a debate that 
lasted for an hour and twenty minutes, the issue was put to the vote. 51 members 
voted for the "present method" while 35 voted for the "Direct elections". 124 The 
Catholic leader, Bazilio Bataringaya, and those who opposed the Eishengyero 
resolution against direct elections walked out in protest. 125 
119 Kapa was the Son of Kitende who came running away from the King of Rwanda and sought refuge 
in Ankole. They however found favour with the Omugabe Kahaya who gave him cows and settled him 
in Ankole. Education; Mbarara High School. Jobs; Treasurer to the Eishengyero; Became Gombolola 
chief but was retired after Independence due to heavy drinking. Married to the daughter of Canon 
Buningwire. 
120 Though he came from Rwanda, he had been assimilated as Muhima. 
121 Interview: William Rwetsiba. 
122 According to the 1959 Census, the Roman Catholics outnumbered the Protestants in Ankole, being 
170.000 to 160.000 respectively, Cf. Stenning, "Salvation in Ankole", p. 261. 
123 Interview: Boneface Byanyima, July 19,1997, Ruti-Mbarara. 
124 Mbarara Archives: Eishengyero File, minute 43/57, on direct elections, 29-31 October 1957. 
125 The following walked out: B. K. Bataringaya, who was the leader of the group, a school teacher 
and a Catholic. He had lost to Katiiti in the Eishengyero election of Ankole's representative to 
Legco in 1955. Later he became the President of the Democratic Party, DP, District branch in 
Ankole, Speaker of the Eishengyero in 1960-63, became the opposition leader after Independence, 
and a Minister in both DP and UPC governments. 
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The composition of the opposition to the Eishengyero resolution revealed a new 
factor. It was not only Bairu Catholics who protested but they were joined and 
supported by Bahima Protestants. That day marked the beginning of the Bahima 
Protestant-Catholic Bairu alliance in Ankole. It became a historical event because for 
the first time an organised opposition in the Eishengyero boycotted its proceedings. In 
a way the Bahima-Catholic alliance reveals how shrewd Protestant Bahima were at 
grasping any opportunity to divide the Bairu. For all the period Bahima dominated the 
political scene in Ankole, they had neglected Catholics. Actually the first time for 
Bahima to mix with Catholic Bairu was in the 1950s when the Eishengyero was 
expanded by direct elections which brought in Bairu as sub-county representatives. 
Otherwise they had hardly met; they did not attend the same schools or churches. 
Since by 1957, Bahima were under pressure from the combined effort of Bairu, they 
were looking for any cracks among the Bairu in which Bahima could wedge their axe 
to crack down their solidarity. Bahima were increasingly vexed at the emerging Bairu 
power. And as the Bahima saying goes, Omuguha gukoma Omwiru n'omwiru 
mugyenzi we, (Bairn are easily manipulated against their fellow Bairn by Bahima), 
Bahima found the desired opportunity in the Legco controversy. Despite the fact that 
previously a Protestant Munyarwanda-Muhima, Kapa, had been favoured against a 
Catholic, Katate, Catholics welcomed the alliance because: 
What we were after was a force that could enforce us to defeat Protestants. We knew we did not have 
much in common with Bahima as they had with the Protestant Bairu for example, but to have Bahima on 
our side was a great advantage. '26 
Apart from the fact that Catholics had opposed election by council, they protested 
because not all the members of the Eishengyero had been summoned to attend the 
proceedings in which the "method" to use was to be debated. Out of the 91 
Eishengyero members at the time, 24 members mostly from Bunyaruguru, a Catholic 
dominated county, were excluded. It seems that the Chairman of the Eishengyero, 
who was at the same time the Enganzi, did not summon them because, since they 
126 Interview: Pulitazio Rwabushongo, May 10,1996, Omunsikye-Nyamitanga 
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were mainly Catholics, they would swell the opposition vote. The Kamukuzi Archives 
are full of letters from Bunyaruguru Eishengyero members complaining to the 
chairman why they were never invited. One such letter came from P. Ikazire reads: 
As a member of the Eishengyero I am very sorry to see that you did not invite me to attend the District 
Council. Did you do it on purpose or not? It is a pity to see that the Eishengyero rejected direct 
elections. 127 
Other letters came from P. Kamugasha, M. Bitarakwate and Kanyamaishwa, which 
the Enganzi denied. The Enganzi replied, with a copy of the letter to the Saza chief of 
Bunyaruguru and the District Commissioner: 
Ref: NOTICES FOR THE EISHENGYERO SESSION ON 29.10.57. 
I refer to your letter on the above subject and wish to inform you that there was no any intention 
whatsoever for refusing to send you notices to attend the Eishengyero meetings as you are alleging. 
Honestly notices were sent to you in good time. I noticed however that they were delayed in Kitunzi's 
office (Saza chief of Bunyaruguru). I had already written to him on this subject, and I was informed that 
they were sent to you as soon as they were found but rather late. 128 
The controversy lay in the fact that the County chief of Bunyaruguru, instead of 
replying to the Enganzi, wrote to all parties affected and copied the letter to the 
Enganzi and the District Commissioner. He rejected claims that any letters to the 
effect were sent to his office and wondered why the Enganzi had not actually 
summoned Bunyaruguru representatives. He retorted: 
Checking in the dispatch box, in which all letters received are entered, I did not find any of these notices, 
not even one calling the acting Saza chief to attend this meeting, there I proved that you were not 
called. 129 
127 Mbarara Archives: County Chiefs File, letter from P. Ikazire to Enganzi. 
128 ibid: letter from Enganzi to Bunyaruguru members of the Eishengyero. 
129 ibid: letter from Saza Chief Bunyaruguru to the members. 
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On 31 October the "opposition" appealed in vain to the Minister of Local Government 
in Entebbe protesting against the Eishengyero's decision on the grounds that: 
1.8 out of the 10 Saza chiefs plus one Minister supported direct elections. 
2. There was no member from Bunyaruguru County except the Saza chief 
3. The chairman did not give ample time to the Councillors to debate the motion. He closed the debate 
when most people still wanted to talk on it 
4. The General Purpose Committee supported direct elections 
5. Most Banyankole supported direct elections130 
Interestingly part of that struggle was the involvement of Catholic women as a 
political pressure group, the first ever in the history of Ankole. On 16 December 1957, 
Catholic women wrote a memorandum to the Omugabe protesting against the 
Eishengyero's decision to block universal suffrage, which would have given them a 
chance to vote. They wrote: 
We, your people present to you here below our suffering, sorrow and grief. We are like a herd of cattle 
wandering about during the dry season devoid of pasture and water and in such a period they have 
nothing to do but simply to look at the herdsmen... Your people outside are cursing. They want to elect 
their own representatives to the Legco. This is really terrible, it is really horrible... as you are the head of 
all people in Ankole, we have every hope that you will do whatever you can in order that we may have 
direct election in Ankole in 1958 because that is what most of your people are after. ] 31 
Despite the cow imagery which they were sure would draw the Omugabe's sympathy 
especially in a "dry season", the Omugabe could not respond to their appeal because 
by then the Bairu, through the Eishengyero, had weakened his position. He could only 
rubber-stamp what the Eishengyero passed. However the Catholics' agitation 
produced results. The Eishengyero redressed the issue and consequently debated "the 
method" again on 16 January 1958. It was put to vote and Protestants won with a 
majority of 50 and 38 against. 132 In the next session, two Protestants, C. B. Katiiti and 
W. W. Rwetsiba were elected to the Legco for 1958. They were Omwiru and 
130 ibid: letter to the Minister of Local Government. 
131 ibid: letter from Miss C. Bonabana to the Omugabe. 
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Omuhima respectively. 133 Rwetsiba was replacing Kapa a Munyarwanda-Muhima"I 
who had died the previous year. 
2.2. POLITICAL PARTIES IN ANKOLE. 
Parties in Uganda started as far back as 1952 when the Uganda National Congress, 
UNC, was formed under the leadership of Ignatious K. Musazi. UNC had actually 
started in the late 1940s as a movement to mobilise farmers in Buganda to encourage 
them into the productive sector, which had been monopolised by the Indians. 135 Apart 
from its predominately Baganda leadership, it was largely a Protestant party reflecting 
the colonial legacy and the Baganda religio-political establishment. In similar 
circumstances, the Democratic Party, DP, was formed in 1954 with an exclusive 
Catholic Baganda executive to counteract the Baganda Protestant establishment at 
Mengo. 136 It was a power protest and discontent against Mengo's denial of the 
appointment of Mattias Mugwanya, a Catholic, and Katikiro of Buganda. So, DP in 
Buganda started as a party to fight for Catholic interests as Prof. Karugire agrees: 
The fact that should surprise us is not that DP was overwhelmingly Catholic in inception and following 
but it took so long to be formed since the genuine grievances of the Catholics were of long standing 
over the whole Protectorate. 137 
In 1958, the Uganda People's Union (UPU) party was formed. Its founders were 
prominent district representatives in Legco. 138 It was formed as a non-Baganda party 
132 Eishengyero File: Minutes, 16-17 January 1958. 
133 Interview: W. W. Rwetsiba, March 16,1998. 
134 Bahima and Banyarwanda are ethnically related. 
135 Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, March 15,1998. 
136 Mengo was the Headquarters of the Kabaka, king of Buganda. Because of the British colonial 
legacy, the monarchy was Protestant. 
137 Cf. R. S. Karugire, 1980, A Political History of Uganda, Nairobi: Heinemann Educational Books, 
(Chapter five). 
138 They were: W. W. Rwetsiba, C. B. Katiiti (Protestants-Ankole), W. W. Nadiope, M. M. Ngobi 
(Protestant & Muslim-Busoga), G. B. K. Magezi (Protestant-Bunyoro), J. K. Babiiha (Catholic- 
Toro), C. J. Obwangor (Catholic-Teso), Y. B. Mungoma (Protestant-Bugisu) and A. Bazanyamaso 
(Protestant-Kigezi), interview: Edward Rurangaranga. 
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to oppose Buganda's political demands of a special status based on the 1900 
Agreement in an Independent Uganda. According to W. W. Rwetsiba who became 
UPU's president in 1958: 
We formed it because we wanted a party that would unite and lead Ugandans to Independence. We had 
realised the divisions that were in the UNC, which was largely tribalistic. In order to confront the 
Baganda monopoly in UNC, we formed a representative party that embraced many tribes and all 
religions. 139 
However, though UNC was largely a Baganda party, by 1957 it had spread beyond 
Buganda borders and had gained some following especially in the northern and 
eastern regions of Uganda. That was how people like Milton Obote from Lango 
district came to be attracted to it. As a party, which championed Africanisation, it 
attracted Obote especially because he had been in Kenya and participated in the 
Unions' agitation for workers rights in the colonial government. '40 UNC never gained 
much influence in Ankole mainly because Banyankole leaders like Katiiti, Rwetsiba, 
who were members of Legco, and Mungonya, a Minister in the Central government, 
had not embraced it. Banyankole in the fifties were trying to restrict the Baganda sub- 
imperialism and therefore any party that was Baganda led was unlikely to have much 
impact. According to Rurangaranga, the only Banyankole who subscribed to UNC 
were 
Chiefs who had been dismissed from their jobs and therefore were redundant such as Christopher 
Kafureka (county chief of Sheema) who disobeyed Omugabe, Clement Ryangombe, a former Gombolola 
chief and a certain Kakuru. So as you can see they were not credible people to entice a following. 141 
In addition the Catholic Church was hostile to UNC even before the dawn of DP in 
Ankole because: 
139 Interview: W. W. Rwetsiba, March 28,1998, Kampala. 
140 ibid. 
141 Interview: Edward Rurangaranga. 
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We suspected it to have some communistic links and to us Catholics that was unacceptable. Though the 
Catholic Bishop was cautious about our involvement in politics, he on several occasions warned us 
Priests to be on the guard against the penetration of Communism which at the time was no other than 
UNC. 142 
Due to the UNC's failure to integrate tribally and religiously, it split in 1958 into two 
wings; the Musazi wing which was mainly Baganda and the Obote wing. In 1959, the 
Obote wing merged with UPU and formed the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) with 
William Rwetsiba as its first President. This merger was intended to neutralise 
Buganda, which had till then refused to integrate itself in the new emerging 
Uganda. '43 In addition to UNC's tribal conservatism, Musazi himself was not a 
shrewd politician, unlike Obote, and therefore could not provide the type of 
leadership the emerging nationalists were looking for. He was not a member of the 
Legco and therefore could not speak about legislative issues. 144 In 1960, Rwetsiba was 
appointed Parliamentary Secretary because the colonial government needed 
experienced officers to prepare them for independence. Subsequently he relinquished 
the party Presidency to Milton Obote. Rwetsiba remained as the chairman, National 
Council of UPC. The merging of UPU and UNC had in a way cut across ethnic, tribal 
and religious divisions but as Doornbos rightly says: 
Their membership was too small and their leadership was too impermanent to be able to attract any 
particular significance to this fact. 145 
It was against this background that parties were introduced in Ankole, DP in 1956 and 
UPC in 1960. Since DP in Buganda had started as a disenchanted, marginalised 
group, it found a fertile ground in Ankole. Since Rubaga (Catholic National 
Headquarters) had direct links with the party, DP was able to use the Catholic 
Church's network of communications. Thus Catholics saw DP as their party, although 
142 Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, April 2,1997, Ibanda. By then he was a priest. 
143 Interview: Rwetsiba, March 28,1998, Kampala. 
144 Musazi could not be nominated in the Legco because Buganda nominated its members through its 
Lukiiko cf Edward Rurangaranga. 
145 Martin Doornbos, 1978, op. cit., p. 147. 
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in Ankole after 1960 Protestant Bahima were joining it as a protest against Bairu 
Protestants. 146 
Mainly former UPU members, Rwetsiba, Katiiti and Mungonya, all Protestant Legco 
representatives introduced UPC in Ankole. It is not surprising therefore that at its 
inception, UPC became largely Protestant since Catholics had already joined DP en 
masse. Secondly UPC in Ankole attracted the Protestant elite, many of whom were 
teachers and former Kumanyana movement leaders. Indeed UPC in Ankole took over 
the Kumanyana organisational framework and its characteristics. Both parties UPC 
and DP entered Ankole's political arena using a Christian denominational affiliation 
to attract membership. 147 As Welbourn put it: 
In so far as the counter-charge could be made, that the UPC was Protestant, it was true probably only in 
the sense that, having dubbed the DP Catholics, the UPC became by definition anti Catholic and 
therefore (in the negative sense which has so long characterised the religious and political differences of 
Uganda) Protestant. 148 
But Bishop Kakubi challenged this view: 
It was true as far as Welbourn was referring to UPC nationally. While the UPC national executive 
comprised of prominent Catholics mainly from the North and Northeast, the Ankole case was different. 
The two religious groups had fallen out of each other even before the introduction of parties. That is 
why Protestant Bairu in Ankole did not actually join DP despite the fact that it was the only party [in 
Ankole] between 1957 and 1960. 
At the time when UPC was introduced in Ankole, another development had taken 
place. Due to the pressure from Catholic DP, Ankole Eishengyero had for the first 
time allowed direct elections in which various sub-counties were to elect 
representatives to the Eishengyero. The 1960 elections were very important for both 
parties because they would forecast the performance of each party in the 1961 Self- 
Government elections. The campaigns for the 1960 Eishengyero elections were 
146 Interview: Bonefasi Byanyima, April 2,1997, Ruti-Mbarara. 
147 Interview: Sezi Busasi, one of the pioneer members of UPC in Ankole, July 12,1997, Nkokonjeru. 
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consequently characterised by counter accusations and confrontations as each party 
tried to justify itself. The campaigns according to their coverage in the local 
newspapers did not really have any policy on which they based their local manifestos 
but like the British in the comedy "Yes Minister", they spent most of the time 
"rubbishing the French"! Various parties promised religious toleration, an indication 
that the religious question was a big issue at the time. Catholics were worried about 
Communism, with which they identified the UPC. And Muslims149 too were anxious 
for the future of Islam in an independent Ankole. 15° 
The Bahima vote was touted and canvassed for by various parties for two reasons. 
Bahima generally were experienced politicians. Secondly their vote would definitely 
swell a party's results. That is what gave DP the confidence. Bahima alliance was 
strengthened in the Democratic Party because they were worried about the progressive 
Bairn Protestants whom they believed were working towards abolishing the Ankole 
monarchy and Bahima power. 151 DP, though it was opposed to the Protestant Mengo 
establishment in Buganda, (of which the Kabaka was part) in Ankole, played "double 
politics" and presented itself as the champion and supporter of the monarchy. Any 
party that came to Ankole on that ticket was likely to attract Bahima. And as Kikuri 
said: 
DP was allying with Bahima claiming to support Obugabe (monarchy). They were not really supporting 
it since in Buganda where DP hailed from, it started as a party opposed to the monarchy. So Bairu 
148 See F. B. Welbourn, Religion and Politics in Uganda, 1949-1962, Nairobi, 1965, p. 21. 
149 The religious factor seems to have been more pronounced in Christian denominations. Muslims 
were mainly spectators, waiting to cast their vote for whichever side would promise a better 
business atmosphere. Most of my informants were not sure on which side Muslims voted. It was the 
first direct elections in Ankole and campaigns had taken too short a time to take note of "scattered 
Muslims who were on the whole not interested in politics". I do not really think it was lack of 
interest in politics other than the feeling that they were not as strongly represented as the Christian 
denominations. Though there were some few Muslims who had contested the Eishengyero 
elections, it was what Sheikh Kaduyu called okushendekyereza abandi, a waste of time. It was later 
in the 1962 elections, as we shall discuss later, that Muslims participated actively and caused a 
great difference. But here we can say that the Muslim floating vote was divided according to the 
individual interest in either party. 
150 See Ageteraine of 9 January 1960. 
151 See Uganda Government, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Ankole District Council and 
District Administration, mimeo, 1969. 
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Catholics only wooed Bahima as a political tactic to defeat Bairu Protestants whom at the time had been 
very opposed to the monarchy. 152 
With this alliance DP won the first direct Eishengyero elections in 1960 and formed 
the Ankole Local Government. 153 As Catholics had demanded before, direct elections 
became the means through which they were able to break the Protestant monopoly in 
the Eishengyero. DP embarked on the programme of "catholicisation" and demanded 
the installation of a Catholic Enganzi. But they could not remove Nganwa, since that 
post had since 1955 been under the Appointments Board. However, DP won the 
National elections in 1961 and Bataringaya, the DP leader in Ankole, became the 
minister of Local Government in the Central Government. His first reform was to give 
Councils and the Eishengyero power to choose their own Enganzi. '54 Hence, on 28 
August 1961, the Eishengyero with a Catholic majority elected John Kabaireho as the 
first Catholic Enganzi: 
Table 2, Religious composition in the Eishengyero, 1960-1962.1-55 
UPCDP 
Religion CPMC HP M BP 
1960 Eishengyero 1 56 3 59 51- 
1963 Eishengyero 2 48 5 46 64- 
1961 N. Assembly -51 4 2-- 
1962 N. Assembly -54 4 2- 
152 Interview: Ezra Kikuri, March 15,1998, Ishaka. 
153 Interview: Francis Butagira, July 19,1996, Mbarara. 
154 See, legal notice, no. 169 of 1961, amendment in the District Council's procedure of 1955. 
155 See Peter Kasenene, op. cit., p. 148. C- Catholics, P- Protestants, M- Muslims, HP Bahima 
Protestants, BP, Protestant Bairu. 
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2.2.1. PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 1961 & 1962. 
At national level, Uganda was preparing for the Self-Government for which parties 
had been formed. 156 The first national elections were held in 1961. DP won and 
formed the Government with Benedicto Kiwanuka, a Catholic, as the Chief Minister 
and leader of Government in Parliament. 157 
In Ankole, DP also won the national Assembly elections. Why? First, was 
the time factor. DP in Ankole was still on its honeymoon after winning the 1960 local 
elections. The period was too short for UPC to reorganise. DP had been in Ankole as 
far back as 1957, which was an advantage. UPC came to Ankole in 1960 just less than 
a year before the National Assembly elections. DP was seen as a Catholic party, with 
the support of the Catholic Church which through its local newspaper Ageteraine 
became its mouthpiece. And according to Dr. Tiberondwa, 
there could have been some Protestants who could have voted DP because they had not discovered its 
strategy. This was so in rural areas where people had not been politicised enough or even reached 
because UPC had just been introduced in Ankole. In addition, political baptisms had not yet been as 
effective as they later became in 1962. It is likely that "pagans" as they called them could have voted DP 
since they were mostly in rural areas. And of course DP had Bahima on their side. 158 
Table 3 illustrates this: 
156 See Low, Karugire, and Tiberondwa. 
157 ibid. 
158 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, May 22,1997, Kampala. 
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Table 3, Successful candidates, constituencies and ethnic composition in 1961.159 
NAME CONSTITUENCY RELI GION PARTY ETHNICITY 
Byanyima Nyabushozi/Kashari Protestant DP Muhima 
Kangaho Ntungamo/Rubare Protestant DP Muhima 
Bataringaya Buhweju/Bunyaruguru Catholic DP Mwiru 
Kareba Isingiro Catholic DP Mwiru 
Katiiti Igara/Sheema Protestant UPC Mwiru 
Ibingira Kajara/Ruhinda Protestant UPC Muhima 
However, the tide changed in 1962. UPC was able to win nationally because of its 
alliance with a Protestant Baganda Kabaka Yekka party (KY) in order to defeat DP. 
The strategy was that Buganda would nominate its representatives directly from the 
Lukiiko (council) which guaranteed the UPC-KY alliance 21 seats even before the 
elections 6O Interestingly the go-between for this alliance was Grace Ibingira, a 
Muhima, whose choice had both political and religious implications. Apart from his 
shrewdness as a politician, he was a member of the Ankole royal family and 
Protestant. In the eyes of the Kabaka therefore, ibingira was received as a well- 
intentioned aristocrat. Yet apart from their desire to defeat DP and perhaps both being 
Protestants, UPC and KY did not really have anything else in common. In October 
1961, Obote's progressive UPC wedded with the traditionalist conservative KY. In 
the April 1962 elections, the coalition edged DP out of the race with these seats: UPC 
37, KY 21 and DP 24.161 This alliance demoralised the Catholic DP nationally. 
In Ankole, there were other reasons why DP was defeated. UPC was boosted by that 
psychological assurance that it was going to win nationally with the KY-UPC 
159 Note that Ibanda county is not included. I did not manage to find information 
about who the candidate was then. 
160 Interview: Rwetsiba, March 12,1998, Kampala. 
161 See Leys Colin, Politicians and Policies: An Essay on Politics in Acholi, Uganda 1962-65. East 
African Publishing House, 1967, p. 6. 
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alliance. By 1962 UPC had spread all over Ankole especially when the Anglican 
Church offered active support, as we shall see later. It had: 
Woken up to the fact that it was a race against religions. DP victory had woken up the Protestant 
hierarchies to the possibility that once Catholics were in power, they would introduce reforms, as they 
did, which would suffocate Protestants thereby altering a system of conducting public affairs that had 
existed unperturbed for many years. 162 
The contribution of Muslims was important for UPC. After the KY-UPC alliance, 
Muslims led by Prince Badru Kakunguru "converted" en masse to UPC. Muslims had 
had a closer relationship with Protestant Bairu than with Catholics. Despite their 
radicalism, Protestant Bairu tended to be liberal and tolerant to Muslims. As we 
argued in Chapter one, most prominent Muslims in the country like Abu Mayanja had 
passed through Protestant schools. And as one anonymous Sheikh said: 
Catholics did not like Muslims. One time I took one of my brothers to ask for a vacancy in a Catholic 
school but when they found out that I was a Muslim, they refused. But Protestants would not mind 
whether we were Muslims or not. Catholics emphasised religion and wanted to convert everybody. But 
Protestants emphasised politics and administration. 
Another Muslim reported that Catholics could not allow Muslims to cross through 
their church compounds with their caps on. This was not the official Catholic stand 
and could have been an isolated incident, nonetheless, it counted against them. The 
fact that Catholics generally liked drinking did not attract Muslims to them. By 1962, 
Muslims had a UPC candidate, Abasi Balinda, who made it to parliament. It is also 
generally held that UPC rigged elections in some places especially by gerrymandering 
constituencies. As Tiberondwa said: 
UPC/KY alliance had a hand in the selection of the electoral commissioners. In a way the Protestant 
conditions towards independence were conducive. And the demarcations of constituencies tended to 
favour UPC. 163 
162 Interview with John Bikangaga, June 6,1996, Makindye. 
163 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, May 22,1997, Kampala. 
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One of the results of DP's victory in 1961 is that there was a purge of Protestant chiefs 
but they had not been entirely eliminated since they had dominated the civil service. 
So when the 1962 elections were due, these chiefs influenced the electorate as 
Returning Officers. And as Kikuri, then UPC, said: 
UPC somehow rigged elections. You see by then, Residing Officers were Protestants and were in charge 
of the elections. Around that time, some Protestant chiefs were still in office. 164 
Even then DP did not perform badly. Indeed it won more seats in Ankole than UPC. 
DP returned four MPs against three for UPC. Rwetsiba confirmed that DP won 
because of the Protestant Bahima votes. For instance Rwetsiba lost to Byanyima in 
Kashari/Nyabushozi constituency though both candidates were Bahima Protestants 
competing in Bahima dominated counties. Rwetsiba says: 
I lost because of the Catholic-Bahima alliance. Bahima could not vote for me despite being the son of 
Canon Buningwire the first clergyman in Ankole. The Omugabe had become DP and so Bahima looked 
up to him than people like us. Secondly Bahima could not vote me in UPC because there were people 
like Bananuka and Nganwa in UPC who represented Bairu emancipation and which Bahima did not like 
at the time. 165 
164 Interview: Ezra Kikuri, July 25,1996, Bushenyi. 
165 Interview: W. Rwetsiba, March 12,1998, Kampala. 
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Table 4: Successful candidates in 1962 elections. 
NAME CONSTITUENCY RELIGION PARTY ETHNICITY 
Byanyima Nyabushozi/Kashari Protestant DP Muhima 
Kangaho Ntungamo/Rushenyi Protestant DP Muhima 
Bataringaya Bunyaruguru/Buhweju Catholic DP Mwiru 
Kangwamu Ibanda Catholic DP Mwiru 
Ibingira Kajara/Ruhinda Protestant UPC Muhima 
Katiiti Igara/Sheema Protestant UPC Mwiru 
Balinda Isingiro Muslim UPC Mwiru 
UPC did not attract Bahima votes even if some influential Bahima such as Ibingira 
and Rwetsiba were among its leaders. Despite past efforts by Bairu to block Bahima, 
it was interesting that a substantial number of leaders in both the Ankole DP and UPC 
in the 1960s were Bahima. In 1962 as we have seen in the table above, Bahima 
obtained nearly half of the Ankole seats in the National Assembly, thus controlling 
three of the seven elective constituencies (UPC 1, DP 2), and enjoyed an influence in 
each party's executive. Actually there was a popular opinion among Bairu that 
Bahima deliberately stirred up Catholics and Protestants, DP and UPC rivalries, to 
keep Bairn divided, and then distributed themselves over the two parties, to control 
both, and therefore assert their political influence once again. 166 
166 See Doornbos, op. cit., p. 149. 
60 
2.3. THE CREATION OF THE ANGLICAN DIOCESE OF ANKOLE. 
In 1957 another important development took place in the life of the church in Ankole. 
A new diocese, comprising of Ankole and Kigezi was created from the Rwenzori 
diocese. The creation of a diocese was timely because in the circumstances that 
ensued, Christians needed a figure like a Bishop for guidance in the uncertain 
political storms of the kingdom although this was not the reason why the Ankole 
diocese was created. By 1950s the church in Uganda, especially in the western region, 
had grown because of the influence of the Revival movement (see chapter three). 
Through Revival, many people were converted and became active members of 
Church of Uganda. Also many people, especially Bairu, had offered themselves for 
church work. Thus as far manpower was concerned, the church in those two regions 
was well covered. 167 The only obstacle, however, was that many of the Bairu who had 
joined church ministry lacked formal education and were not eligible for election as 
bishop. 
The diocese was asked to nominate two names to the Bishop of Uganda. 161 
This became a point of contention between CMS missionaries, Christians and the 
clergy. Canon Bawtree, the Archdeacon for Ankole, and other missionaries preferred 
Eric Sabiiti, a highly educated Muhima and the pioneer member of the Revival 
movement. The majority of Christian representatives and the pastors of Ankole and 
Kigezi turned down Sabiiti in favour of Kosiya Shalita, a Munyarwanda. 
Eric Sabiiti was the first Munyankole to graduate from Makerere in 1926. A 
brother of Ernest Katungi (the last Muhima Enganzi of Ankole), Sabiiti was by 1956 
the only Munyankole senior priest with western education. Ordained in 1933, he 
served as a Curate at Ruharo (1933-38), as a Parish priest at Kinoni (1939-50) and as 
the Rural Dean at Bweranyangi (1951-57). In addition, Sabiiti was a key figure in the 
spread of the Revival movement which he had joined in 1936. If the office of Bishop 
required such qualifications, then Sabiiti was the man. Despite his qualifications, 
which would have guaranteed him a decent job in the civil service, he preferred to 
167 Interview: Canon Rwabushaija, May 29,1996, Ruharo. 
168 Interview: Canon Blasio Itima, May 7,1996, Nshongi-Sheema. 
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serve God in a lowly and humble capacity as a rural priest in Ankole. When I asked 
why he did not take up government jobs when offered, his wife said: 
He was always haunted and challenged by a voice asking him what he had done for the Lord. When he 
was at Buddo as a student, there were three inscriptions on their chapel windows: one had the picture of 
the martyrs, another of Jesus and another of Apollo Kivebulaya, on which were written, "I did this for 
you, what did you do for me". These words continued haunting him throughout his career until later 
when he decided to respond to that voice and join church ministry. 169 
Despite such sacrificial obedience to God's voice and his career as the pioneer of 
educated clergy in the Church of Uganda, Sabiiti's nomination was turned down by 
the diocesan electoral college. Most interviewees emphasised ethnicity as one of the 
leading reasons why he was not considered. The Electoral College felt that, being a 
Muhima, he would not advance the socio-political, ethnic equality between Bahima 
and Bairu at a time when divisions were sharp. 170 There were other unjustified 
accusations against him. In the 1940s he and his brother Katungi (then the Enganzi) 
supported only Bahima advancement in the local government. It is further alleged by 
Bairu that he discriminated against them in favour of Bahima in education. For 
instance, as one anonymous interviewee said, Sabiiti advised: 
The late Kosiya Korutaro, who was the best student in Ankole Primary Leaving exams and had qualified 
to go to Buddo, to go to Nyakasura for the vernacular teachers course. Instead a Muhima, Kirindi, took 
Korutaro's place at Buddo. Such a record could not allow Sabiiti to become a bishop in Ankole. 171 
It is also alleged that Sabiiti discouraged the growing of cash crops like coffee since 
'they did not take people to heaven'. Coffee was the main cash crop for the Bairu. It 
was taken that Sabiiti's preaching was trying to discourage coffee growing in order to 
reduce Bairu's economic progress. The zeal with which he preached against cash 
crops was not proportional to the way he preached against the rearing of cows which 
was a Bahima occupation. Consequently some Banyankole saw Revival as a 
169 Interview: Gerladine Sabiiti, July 11,1996, Kinoni. 
170 Interview: Kirindi, March 11,1998, Mbarara 
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diabolical movement being used to perpetuate conditions of inequality among the 
people. While some were encouraged to own property, others were being told to 
invest in heaven. Many Bairu held this negative opinion about Sabiiti. For instance 
Joseph Bekunda said: 
While Bahima owned property, they advised others not to. They preached against coffee for it would not 
take anyone to heaven. Yet on the other side they preached about good stewardship and good 
management of cows. 172 
Although a popular Bairu response, it was perhaps unfair to Sabiiti. By 1940s when 
Sabiiti is said to have colluded with fellow Bahima, there were fewer Bahima 
converts to Revival than Bairu. It is true those who shaped Revival and gave it 
organisational leadership were Bahima like Sabiiti and Mugimba, but these were few. 
Assuming the accusation that Sabiiti discouraged economic activity to be true, it 
could have been out of the enthusiasm of faith, which characterised that period. 
People like Sabiiti and Mugimba on various occasions turned down chiefly privilege 
as worldly. 173 Canon Semei Rwabushaija gives an objective analysis of that period: 
It was a time of heresy (obuhabe) which almost eroded the movement. Like in the Early church when 
Christians sold their belongings, many Revivalists in Ankole cut and uprooted their coffee plantations, 
sold cows on the assumption that their home was in heaven. It was called being on the highest. It was 
borne by both Bahima and Bairu Revivalists. The difference was only that there were many more Bairu 
in the movement than there were Bahima so the impact could easily be felt among them. 174 
What might be true therefore was that Sabiiti was rejected in Ankole because of his 
"rulokolism "175 (Puritanism). It was not Bairu only who rejected Sabiiti: even Bahima 
like Canon Buningwire, a senior priest in Ankole and a member of the Electoral 
College, did not support him. Though Revival had indeed influenced many people in 
171 Interview anonymous, May 19,1996. 
172 Interview: Joseph Bekunda, September 12,1996, Ibanda. 
173 Interview: Gerladine Sabiiti. See the chapter on Revival. 
174 ibid. 
175 A hybrid anglicised term deriving from Balokole. Interview: Mukaira August 2,1996, Bushenyi. 
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Ankole, the senior clergy both African and missionaries had kept aloof from it and 
often held its followers as heretics. Quite apart from these, it is unlikely that the 
Electoral College of'unsaved people' like Mungonya, Nganwa, Katiiti, Bananuka, and 
Revd. Kamujanduzi and Canon Buningwire176 would have preferred a "saved" bishop. 
Mrs Sabiiti confirmed this as true: 
There was a group of people including Buningwire, which preferred Shalita to us because Buningwire 
did not believe that saved people should lead the church. He really detested open confession, which 
Balokole stressed. 177 
Instead the Electoral College nominated Kosiya Shalita as the first Bishop of 
Ankole/Kigezi. Though he was born and brought up in Ankole, he was indeed a 
Munyarwanda. His parents came to Ankole from Rwanda in search of grazing lands 
just before Shalita was born in 1903. He later went to Mbarara High School (1918- 
1920) and Buddo (1921-23) where he studied and made friends with Eric Sabiiti. 
From Buddo, he went to teach at Kigezi High School (1921-25) after which he 
pioneered a mission station at Gahini in Rwanda his country of origin. After he was 
ordained together with Sabiiti in 1933, he went for pioneer work in Burundi and 
opened a mission station at Matana in 1935. Until 1957, when Shalita was nominated 
Bishop, his church ministry oscillated between Rwanda and Burundi. '78 Shalita was 
preferred to Sabiiti because: 
At the time we wanted a leader who would hold us together. So we chose Shalita though a 
Munyarwanda because he was neither Omuhima nor Omwiru. Even if he had grown up and studied in 
Ankole, he spent most of his service years outside Ankole and therefore had not been influenced by our 
divisions. We wanted some one who would be a bridge between Bairu and Bahima. 179 
176 Source: Canon Rwabushaija and Mzee Murumba. 
177 Interview: Gerladine Sabiiti, July 11,1996. Even if Buningwire, Omuhima would have preferred 
Sabiiti, which he did not, he could not influence his nomination because influence needed a 
majority, which he lacked in the Electoral College. 
178 Shalita's biography read at his funeral. 
179 Interview: Anania Murumba, April 14,1996, Kafunjo-Mbarara. 
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In Shalita, Banyankole saw a non-aligned person. The diocese consisted of the two 
districts of Ankole and Kigezi, and though Shalita did not belong to either, he had 
been brought up in Ankole and worked in Kigezi. So he was not only a "bridge" 
between Bairu and Bahima in Ankole, but also between Ankole and Kigezi. But 
Banyankole's expectations of Shalita were not met. The period between 1957 and 
1969 when he retired, Bishop Shalita faced one of the hardest times in his ministry. I 
shall discuss this in the next sections but what I can say now is that he fell victim to 
Ankole politics. He was entangled in the Bairu-Bahima wrangles that had begun long 
before but were reinforced with the political developments. 
2.4. THE UPC SPLIT: ENKOMBA VS. OMUFUNGURO. 
Even though UPC had won the 1962 National Assembly elections, DP in Ankole still 
controlled the Eishengyero until 1963. In February 1963 UPC won the Local 
Government elections and controlled the Eishengyero until January 1971. Since DP 
had previously bent the law to suit its political agenda (see p. 54), UPC used the same 
law of simple majority to remove the Catholic Enganzi John Kabaireho in favour of 
the Protestant one. By constitution the chairman of the prevailing political party 
would automatically be the Enganzi. In this case it would have meant Grace Ibingira, 
the UPC chairman, a Muhima, would be the Enganzi. But he could not because he 
was already a minister in the Central government. 180 Bananuka, Vice chairman of 
UPC, would have been the alternative candidate for the office but he was thought to 
be too radical against Catholics and Bahima. Protestant Bairu were aware of the DP 
majority which had been strengthened by the Bahima vote. In order to win Bahima 
back, UPC needed a moderate person other than Bananuka. Even then, according to 
Tiberondwa, Bananuka won marginally in the Eishengyero elections and should have 
become the Enganzi. But his nomination was manipulated by Grace Ibingira, then 
Minister of Justice and UPC Secretary General. According to Dr. Tiberondwa who 
was then UPC secretary Ankole: 
180 Interview: Ezra Kikuri, July 25,1996, Bushenyi. I was told that there was a law-limiting officials to 
one office. But I could not get any archival information about it since most of the files were 
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We voted for Bananuka but Grace Ibingira who was Secretary General of UPC and Omuhima, and who 
would have liked to have a softer UPC, supported Kahigiriza. Later there was a political move. Instead 
of announcing Bananuka, Grace Ibingira announced on the radio that Kahigiriza was elected unopposed 
because those who had elected Bananuka had withdrawn their nomination. But that was not so. Ibingira 
simply put it on the air well knowing that it would send out signals, which he himself would not have 
been brave enough to say. 181 
Difficult to grasp though, there were reasons for Ibingira's intervention. However 
committed to UPC Ibingira may have been, he was still a Muhima. Rather than give 
power to the radical Bananuka, Ibingira preferred to associate with moderate Bairu 
like James Kahigiriza who would not pose a challenge to the Bahima. Secondly as 
early as 1963, UPC had already had internal wrangles. Ibingira had opposed John 
Kakonge for the post of Secretary General and Bananuka is believed to have 
supported Kakonge. Because the divisions at the top of the party permeated into 
Ankole politics, it was unlikely that Ibingira would support Bananuka. Also, it seems 
that Ibingira's support for Kahigiriza was a reward for the support Kahigiriza had 
given him over the years. According to Kahigiriza: 
We were friends. I was the one who put Ibingira in politics. When Rwetsiba became Parliamentary 
Secretary, Mungonya and I supported Ibingira against Bataringaya for Legco in 1960. As we were 
coming towards independence, I saw him as a tool not only in the politics of Ankole but also Uganda 
because he was educated. Secondly when he returned from UK in 1959 where he studied law, I was one 
of those who convinced him into UPC. We hastened to take him on our side because we did not want 
Omugabe to influence him into DP. 182 
Even if the majority of Protestants had preferred Bananuka, they accepted Kahigiriza, 
then County chief of Nyabushozi, as a compromise. He was preferred because of his 
ability to accommodate other ethnic groups, an attitude that could have resulted from 
the fact that as a county chief he had worked in various places including Nyabushozi. 
His background also contributed. His ancestors came from Buganda183 and that 
destroyed during the war. 
181 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, July 24,1996, Kampala. 
182 Interview: James Kahigiriza, May 22,1996, Kyamugorani. 
183 ibid. 
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distanced him in the ethnic wars and possibly made him moderate towards other 
ethnic groups. The election of Kahigiriza as Enganzi of Ankole in 1963 marked the 
beginning of the Omufunguro-Enkomba, (moderate vs. conservative) controversy. 
Whereas it had been Catholics vs. Protestants or Bairu vs. Bahima, after 1963, it was 
divisions among the UPC Protestants. 
As a consolation Bananuka was appointed minister of Health and Works in 
the Ankole government. 184 Since the ministry enabled Bananuka to travel extensively, 
he used the opportunity to stir up feeling against Kahigiriza all over Ankole. As early 
as 1964, the opposition to Kahigiriza accused him of "selling" UPC to the DP and 
Bahima. According to Kahigiriza, the only true accusation was that he had refused to 
reshuffle or demote Catholic and Bahima chiefs who still held political and civil 
offices in Ankole: 
When I became Enganzi, my hope was to unite Ankole and one could not do so unless one 
compromised in one way or another. The extent, at which divisions in Ankole were, to heal them, it had 
to be a matter of give and take, which the Bananuka group could not accept. I refused to discriminate 
against Bahima and Catholics and these raised sentiments from some UPC circles that did not want 
others to join them. For instance I made Kasapuri, a Catholic, a county chief and reinstated 400 sub- 
parish chiefs who had been dismissed because they were Catholic DP. 185 
It was his inclusiveness that infuriated UPC intransigents as one of them said: 
Yes Kahigiriza was accommodative and tolerant, but he was doing it at the expense of UPC. He brought 
in DP and allowed them to have equal opportunities with UPC, which they did not do to UPC when they 
were in power. 186 
It seems ironical that UPC was satisfied with its exclusive membership, after it had 
championed the struggle for equality and Bairu emancipation and later been opposed 
to political inclusiveness. The Kahigiriza-Bananuka saga climaxed when in 1965 
184 The local government in kingdom areas differed from other districts. Where they had kings, those 
councils were allowed to have ministers mainly for their local social-economic development. 
185 Interview: James Kahigiriza, July 18,1996, Kyamugorani. 
186 Interview: anonymous, July 12,1996. 
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Kahigiriza transferred Bananuka from Works and Health to Finance. With his 
increasing campaigns against the Enganzi, his leadership was at stake, so he 
transferred Bananuka to give him a less popular role, okumwiha omuhantu. Kahigiriza 
confirmed that: 
As a minister of Health and Works, it gave him more access to the people and therefore chances to 
decampaign me all over the kingdom. He used to disclose important secrets and at one time he almost 
staged a strike against me. So I made him minister of Finance to limit him. 187 
The two factions had intra-government coalitions, with frequent secret meetings and 
separate cliques being built up by each group. They were not really based on any 
constructive ideology. The Enkomba group (radicals) tended to be the Kumanyana 
strand whose radicalism was inherited from their struggle against the Bahima 
oligarchy. That is why they had opposed accommodating alternative ideologies. '88 
The Omufunguro (moderates) ethnic liberalism may have been because many of them 
were new entrants who had not participated in the past ethnic confrontations. There 
was nothing spectacular about their associations in UPC or other factions except that 
they were drawn together by political interests. But the Enkomba faction was 
different: not only were they opposed to DP and Bahima, many of them had been 
schoolmates either at Mbarara High School or in Teacher Training Colleges. The 
Enkomba were members of the Anglican Church and opinion leaders in their 
respective counties. While UPC Enkomba recommended non-accommodation, the 
Omufunguro maintained that times had changed. Omufunguro represented the UPC 
dual perspective towards the Ankole monarchy and the Omugabe and, whether or not 
the party should woo the support of the politically influential Protestant Bahima and 
Bairn who had joined DP. Although Bahima were a minority, they still wielded 
considerable political influence through people like Rwetsiba, Ibingira, Byanyima and 
Bahima county chiefs like Rwakanuma and Rutehenda. That was why Omuf inguro 
187 Interview: Kahigiriza. 
188 They included people like E. Laki, N. Bananuka, P. Kaseeta, A. Rubashoka, B. Ntundubaire, W. 
Muguta, E. Rurangaranga, A. Tiberondwa, Katundu, Katagira, Kweyamba, Makaru, Mutembeya, 
K. Korutaro and Rev. Kamujanduzi. The Omufunguro included people like Kahigiriza, Ezra 
Kikuri, Makaru, Mukaira, Kacooni and DPs who had been converted to UPC. 
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maintained that co-operation and understanding between various factions in Ankole 
was necessary and possible. 
Bananuka's transfer to Finance did not solve the problem and in 1965, he was 
dismissed for "undermining the government". Bananuka's dismissal was seen as a 
grand plan to eliminate the Enkomba, which further alienated them from the 
Kahigiriza group. The former had the upper hand because they were not only strong 
political characters, they also had a strong relationship with the church. They 
dominated church councils and formed a big number on the Diocesan synod. That is 
why they could easily influence Protestants. 
Since Protestants had been divided along those fissures, the period 1966- 
1967 was spent in the struggle to gain majority in the Eishengyero to gain future 
votes, hoping that it was going to determine the choice of the electorate. Such 
competition had a double effect. There was an opposition within UPC which forgot 
about the real opposition DP. But there was no longer any formidable DP opposition 
in the Eishengyero since it was already weakened by "floor crossings" in Obote's 
move to weaken Buganda and to establish a one party system in Uganda. In 1964 
most DPs in Ankole had crossed with Bataringaya, not because they were convinced 
about UPC policies, but because they had been silenced as Bukabeba observed: 
After UPC had become the only party, many people converted to it without necessarily having the good 
will to serve the party. This was mainly because they had been denied any other political platform. So 
the original UPCs called themselves enkomba and the liberals omufunguro as if it was a creed. But on 
the whole, it was an attempt to accommodate alternative thinking. 199 
Both groups began to -take a softer stand towards DP and Bahima who they tried to 
entice to join their groups in UPC. The strength of the two factions in the Eishengyero 
was increasingly becoming 50-50 with about 21 elected members on either side until 
the change of administration after the new republican constitution of 1967. 
However, in 1967, the political wind changed in favour of Bananuka. The 
new republican constitution, which was adopted after the abolition of kingdoms in 
189 Interview: Emmy Bukabeba, June 17,1996, Kakyeka. 
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Uganda, stipulated that only directly elected members would qualify for leadership in 
their respective District administrations. 190 This eliminated James Kahigiriza as 
Enganzi since he had been specially elected at the time of his appointment. He had 
not been a member of the Eishengyero, though he had been a county chief. Bananuka, 
who seemed to have had Obote's support, was elected as the Secretary-General (a 
post which replaced the Enganzi title) of Ankole District. Unfortunately for 
Kahigiriza, Ibingira and other five ministers had been arrested in 1965 on suspicion of 
a coup against the government. It was not really a coup but they had supported a 
motion of no confidence against Obote after the gold scandal in which he together 
with Colonel Idi Amin and Felix Onama had been implicated. 191 
2.5. THE COLLAPSE OF THE ANKOLE MONARCHY. 
The events of 1966 in Buganda changed the political face of Uganda. The clash 
between government forces and the Buganda government resulted in the storming of 
the Lubiri (palace) under the command of Idi Amin and the subsequent escape and 
exile of Kabaka Muteesa. From 1966, Buganda some of whose ministers had already 
been imprisoned in 1965 endured the state of emergency until 1971. The abolition of 
Buganda's monarchy led to the abolition of the kingdoms of Toro, Bunyoro and 
Ankole. 
The monarchy in Ankole was abolished on 8 September 1967 after the ratification by 
parliament of the 1967 constitution, which made Uganda a republic under article 118 
(1) of the 1967 constitution, which read thus: 
The institution of king or Ruler of a kingdom or constitutional head of a district, by whatever name 
called, existing immediately before the commencement of this constitution under the law then in force, is 
hereby abolished. 
190 Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, April 15,1997, Mbarara. 
191 See M. G. Carter, "Uganda's New Constitution", East African Journal, vol. III, no. 4, pp. 23-32. 
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This meant that all kingdoms lost the federal and semi-federal status, enjoyed since 
the dawn of colonialism. According to James Kahigiriza who was at the time the 
Enganzi of Ankole, "we received a phone call from the head office about the abolition 
of the kingdom and that was it. " Whatever symbolised the monarchy was immediately 
removed or changed; office labels, headed paper, and any titles that related to the 
monarchy were discarded. From 8 September 1967, Ankole ceased to be a kingdom. 
The Omugabe was given a month to vacate the palace. 192 And according to Martin 
Doornbos: 
When at the end of September 1967, the Ankole's royal drum, Bagyendanawa [sic], was 
unceremoniously loaded onto a lorry to be taken to storage in government warehouse, the last major 
visible attribute of Ankole kingship was officially consigned to oblivion. 193 
The speed with which monarchical symbols were removed from Ankole should not 
surprise us. Since the 1950s, the Bairu were fighting for emancipation and, as long as 
the monarchy existed, they still felt that they were under the Bahima oligarchy. 
Actually one interviewee confessed: 
We removed them so fast because the independence of Bairu did not start on 9 October 1962 when 
Uganda attained its independence from the British. It started on 8 September 1967 when Milton Obote 
abolished the monarchy. 194 
The "speed" signified the atmosphere at the time. Throughout the sixties, the 
Eishengyero had been under Bairu domination, which was why they were quick to 
respond to the government's call and were brave enough to load Bagyendanwa on the 
lorry to the museum. By 1967, the UPC Enkomba were preparing to come into office 
and hastened to obey government instructions. It was mainly the Enkomba that was 
working towards the abolition of the monarchy, thus the 1967 pronouncement was a 
192 ibid. 
193 Doornbos, op. cit., p. 157 
194 Interview: anonymous, June 11,1997. 
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dream come true. This therefore answers Doornbos' surprise why there were no 
emotional clash of values when the monarchy was abolished. He wonders: 
After all, few things are more powerfully symbolic of corporate existence.... Kingship has been often the 
object of deeply affective values and in many instances has played a crucial role in shaping common 
political identities. Removing this capstone from a political structure might as well leave an emotional 
vacuum not easily filled by alternative secular symbols. On the surface, the abolition of Ankole's 
kingship might have seemed just another illustration of these conditions. 195 
Whereas Doornbos' observation could have been true for the Buganda monarchy, it 
was hardly true because the Ankole monarchy had not "played a crucial role in 
shaping common political identities". The Ankole monarchy had been exclusive. That 
was why Bairu did not mind replacing the monarchy symbols: 
The monarchy symbols had never been our own. We had never identified with them. The monarchy 
culture was quite different from the Bairu culture and that is why Bairu did not feel orphaned at all when 
the royal drum was sent to the museum. 196 
Despite the claim that Bairu got their independence then, the abolition of kingship did 
not necessarily attract much excitement. 197 The indifference was symbolic of the fact 
that by 1960, the Omugabe had lost his powers to the Eishengyero and the central 
government, and had become a figurehead. Banyankole were no longer concerned 
with taking the king's tribute, okutoija, as they were to paying government tax. With 
UPC as their platform, many Bairu questioned the monarchy's usefulness 
as far as monetary terms were concerned. The money, which was always set aside for the upkeep of the 
royal family, was wasteful expenditure. The Omugabe, apart from being a ceremonial figure, was not 
developmental at all, 198 
195 Doornbos op. cit., p. 158. 
196 The interviewee wishes to remain anonymous, April 14,1996. 
197 See The People and Uganda Argus, June through September, 1967. 
198 Interview: Jackson Byamugisha, teacher, April 12,1997, Bujaga. 
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On the other hand Bahima's silence was not a sign of indifference or surrender other 
than retreat. They had lost their symbol. They would have liked to demonstrate 
against the action, as the Baganda, but their numbers were too few. Baganda had 
managed an active resistance against Obote because they were not only centrally 
located, they were also the biggest single tribal group in the country. The abolition of 
the monarchy was a political act and any resistance would have resulted in political 
consequences as Obote had done to the Baganda. Even the circles close to the king 
responded with similar restraint. The ministers and officials of the kingdom were 
concerned about the loss of their offices and privileges they had enjoyed, but that was 
all. As Kahigiriza said: 
However much I hated the abolition of the monarchy, I expected it to happen any time since the sixties. 
I was therefore thankful that it had persisted thus far. 
For the Omugabe, `if the government and the people have found it right that I should 
go, then I will. All that I am anxiously waiting for is an instruction from the 
government on what to do next. ' 199 Those differing opinions from various groups 
indicate that the monarchy had become too weak to be of any significance. For the 
Bairn, kingship was a symbol of the "Egyptian days" (slavery). Despite the 
Omugabe's repeated claims that all Banyankole were equally his subjects, 200 actual 
inequalities persisted. The irony is that while Gasyonga was talking of omuguha 
gw'enyabushatu, it was actually in his reign that Bairn were increasingly alienated. 
Both Bairu and liberal Bahima like Murumba and Mrs Sabiiti agreed: 
199 See The People, 17 June 1967 
200 For example, after the visit to Rwanda, the Omugabe expressed the unity he expected of the 
Banyankole thus, "In Rwanda there are three types of people, namely Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa. 
They work together in co-operation and... their motto is omuguha gw'erryabushatu, (a rope with 
three strands) representing these classes of people in Rwanda. You will agree with me that no 
country should expect progress if there is lack of co-operation and disunity. Division and hatred 
engineered by subversive elements in a country exhibit a gloomy picture and their ends are fatal. I 
should like you to be omuguha gw'enyabushalu. That is when we shall achieve Ankole's will as a 
nation". See the speech by Rubambansi the Omugabe at the opening ceremony of the Eishengyero of 
Ankole, 17 January 1956. 
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Since Gasyonga had become king at a relatively young age, his advisors had akarwara k'ohuhima, 
(racism). Such people like Kirindi, Kabazaire, Mutembeya and Katungi, had built a wall against the 
Bairn and that is when the gulf between the two groups widened. Yet the king was supposed to be for 
all people. 20 
So in Ankole, it was mainly Bahima who regretted the end of kingship. However 
weak it had become, it was still their symbol politically speaking. It symbolised and 
legitimised their unity and identity. This was not an illusion: the retention of the 
monarchy till 1967 had a positive impact for them. Though the king had outlived his 
usefulness, he was still able to give Bahima a unified leadership which enabled them 
to think politically and make constructive alliances by which they were able to 
maintain the majority of candidates in both parties. 
This leads us to the role of the church over the monarchy. The issue was 
challenging for both Churches, Catholic and Protestant. They had Bairu congregations 
opposed to the monarchy and Bahima who were for it. It was easier for the Catholics 
because Bahima were not part of their congregations. Apart from their alliance in DP, 
the monarchy had been a symbol of Catholic retrogression since the Omugabe never 
appointed them to any chiefly positions. Their silence could therefore be construed as 
approval. 
The Protestant Church as an institution did not come out openly to challenge the 
monarchy, but individual Protestants helped its fall. By 1967, the Bairn leaders who 
were working for UPC dominated the Protestant Church. Since most UPC councillors 
were on Church councils and Synod representatives, we can say that the church was 
involved. One of the reasons Bishop Shalita was hated by the Protestant Bairu in 
Ankole was the fact that he identified himself with the monarchy and forgot about 
those who elected him. On one of his confirmation tours, at Kyeizoba parish in 1968, 
the Bishop asked why people did not react when the monarchy was abolished. 
201 Interviewed at various dates. 
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A Christian, Nyamwiragura, responded that `we had waited for the people of Mbarara 
to start so that we could join them. '202 The people of Mbarara referred to being the 
Bishop. 
2.6. CHURCH AND POLITICS AT INDEPENDENCE. 
The involvement of the Church in active politics began with the arrival of parties. It is 
true that religious antagonism between Catholics and Protestants had existed before 
but it was limited to the Eishengyero. Even here the Churches had not been involved 
as institutions in any active way. The Catholic Bishop being French was always 
"cautious of antagonising the British establishment" and the Anglican Church was 
still under CMS leadership until 1957.203 However, with the creation of the new 
diocese of Ankole/Kigezi and the consecration of Bishop Shalita, things changed. The 
new Anglican diocese was created at a time when parties were descending on Ankole, 
dividing people along religious lines. Bishop Shalita's first challenge as Bishop was 
how to relate to such new forces of which he had no past experience, and how to 
shepherd a divided church where Protestant Bahima and Bairu Protestants had 
diverged in politics, despite belonging to the same church. 
I will concentrate on the Anglican Church because after Independence and 
the consequent defeat of DP, the Catholic Church kept a low profile in a rather hostile 
Protestant UPC-dominated regime and concentrated its efforts on self-reliance and 
survival. 204 
One of the reasons Shalita had been preferred was that he would be a "bridge" bishop. 
That in itself was a challenge: how to bridge two ethnic groups which were 
increasingly torn apart by political divisions. Inevitably Bishop Shalita became a 
victim of an identity crisis. What Bairu had not considered in preferring Shalita to 
Sabiiti was that Batutsi Banyarwanda and Bahima are "cousins". They are not only 
united in physical characteristics, they are all pastoralists whose symbol of identity is 
202 Interview: Canon Lazaro Njunwoha, May 26,1996, Bujaga. 
203 Interview: Bishop Amos Betungura, July 2,1996, Ruharo. 
204 Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, July 17,1997. The officer in charge of the archives for reasons 
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cows. So was Shalita going to promote Bairu interests, with which he had nothing in 
common, against his Bahima "cousins" who at the time were being driven against a 
political "cliff'? The first test according to Canon Njunwoha came in 1960 when 
Bairn and Bahima elders met at the Bishop's house for an evening visit: 
After a while the visit turned into a Bairu-Bahima parliament with our host, the Bishop, looking on 
uncertain of what to say. We started abusing each other in front of the bishop bringing back historical 
scores. The late Gunura asserted that Buningwire, a Muhima, had said that even if ten Bairu acquired 
education, one Muhima would rule them. Others referred to the previous period during Mbarara High 
School days when Bahima boys used to pierce Bairu boys with forks. 205 
That was an indication of what was to characterise Shalita's term of office. When DP 
won the Eishengyero elections in 1960, Shalita invited both UPC and DP Protestant 
councillors (UPC Protestant Bairu and DP Protestant Bahima) who had been 
successful in the elections for a thanksgiving service at Ruharo cathedral. This was 
interpreted as the Bishop's siding with DP and marked the beginning of the Protestant 
Bairn UPC opposition to the Bishop. Things went wrong even at that very service in 
the cathedral by a prayer led by Rev. Kashinya, one of the pioneer Bairn Protestants 
famously nicknamed Rurangira Rwa Bweranyangi, the thunderous voice of 
Bweranyangi. To show disgust for the Bishop's invitation of DP Bahima councillors, 
Kashinya prayed: 
Al Ruhanga okubatizibwa kwaitu, nokutebwaho kwaitu, nenyikiriza nibimwe. Kwonka mbwenu reeba 
nabakuru abukutwebembeire bayambuka baza sei. Kwonka iwe Ruhanga totsigaho abashobirwe. 
Obunaku obu Musa yaza aha Rushozi akastigaho aba Israiri, okataho Aroni yarinda abantu bawe. 
Mbwenu otuhereze Aroni omubunaku obutusigirweho (Oh God, our baptism, confirmation and creed is 
one. But unfortunately even our leaders [Shalita] who should be guiding us [politically] have crossed to 
the other side [DP]. But you never abandon the helpless. Just as you provided Aaron to take care of 
your people after Moses had gone to the mountain, we pray that you provide us with Aaron to take care 
of US). 206 
known to him, denied me access to Nyamitanga archives. 
205 Interview: Canon Lazaro Njunwoha. 
206 Both Tiberondwa and Rurangaranga repeated this prayer to me at different times. The wording 
altered a bit but there was a general agreement on most of the words. 
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Because Rev. Kashinya was an elder in Ankole (due to his office and age) his prayer 
was symbolically interpreted as Bairu being orphaned because a Protestant Bishop 
had identified with a Catholic DP victory by including Protestant Bahima DP 
councillors in the thanksgiving service. From then onwards most senior Protestant 
clergy openly supported UPC as a Protestant party fighting for the Bairu cause. 
When Shalita had been consecrated Bishop in 1957, the Omugabe nominated him key 
advisor together with Canon Buningwire. For the Anglican Bishop to be the 
Omugabe's right hand, was probably right at the time. Whatever Shalita's political 
implications might have been, the fact that the Omugabe nominated him as his 
advisor was enough for Shalita to be identified with DP which the Omugabe was. The 
Omugabe and Canon Buningwire were indeed DP because when DP Catholics walked 
out of the Eishengyero in 1958, Canon Buningwire and all the Omugabe's special 
nominees in the Eishengyero walked out with them. For Shalita to be nominated 
Omugabe's advisor was anathema to the Bairu. At worst it indicated that the Bishop 
was no longer "a bridge". 
Another incident was in 1962 after the UPC victory. In the Synod, which sat at Bishop 
Stuart Teachers College, the Bishop, in his charge, congratulated all those who had 
won the election and made it to parliament. Among them was Bonefasi Byanyima, a 
Protestant Muhima, who had won the DP seat for Nyabushozi and Kashari 
constituency. The Synod criticised the Bishop for congratulating Byanyima because 
he was DP. 207 Rev. Kamujanduzi, who likened DP to a certain bird, rukunga (that 
shouts in the wilderness but is never seen) diverted the probable attack against the 
Bishop. He said DP was like that bird and time would come when DP Mll be no 
more. The synod clapped and the session, which had been stalled for a whole morning 
resumed its agenda in the afternoon. In a way the Bishop had a pastoral obligation to 
congratulate the candidates including Byanyima who was not only a Protestant, but 
also the cathedral organist. But in a Synod that had become the Protestant UPC party 
at prayer, the Bishop was misunderstood. Actually nearly all the UPC councillors in 
the Eishengyero and National Assembly, apart from Balinda, a Muslim, were 
members of the Ankole Diocesan Synod. So whenever the Synod was in session there 
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was not much difference from being in the Eishengyero except that the DP members 
were missing: 
Just as they represented various sub-counties in the Eishengyero, they represented their parishes in the 
Synod. They were the elite of the time and by all means people elected them. Despite being die-hard 
politicians, they were keen Christians. They had all passed through missionary schools where Sunday 
attendance was compulsory. They were also able and eloquent people in all ways, which the church 
needed too. They happened to be the same people playing both games. 208 
Shalita was also opposed to "mass baptisms" which had been popularised by 
politicians because they increased votes. In their desire to compete, DP and UPC 
politicians turned church pulpits into political rostrums. As Francis Bwengye said: 
It made it very easy to mobilise people from inside. The church people are the nearest group one can go 
to and organise very quickly and they respond. Secondly because they come from different areas, they 
would transmit the message to other people. The church was the most effective way of publicity. 209 
The reason UPC had advanced for its poor performance in both the 1960 Eishengyero 
and the 1961 national elections was that the Catholic Church, unlike the Church of 
Uganda had supported its politicians. UPC politicians, who were often heads of Laity 
in their respective parishes, were determined to use the Church in the same way. This 
marked the beginning of what came to be known as the period of "mass baptism" in 
both Catholic210 and Protestant churches. It was an effort to increase votes especially 
from the unbaptised people referred to as abakajlri, "pagans". 21" According to Rev. 
Katikuzi, UPC politicians, led by Katiiti and Nganwa, 212 held a rally in Kabwohe, 
207 Interview: Canon Rwabushaija who was in that very Synod. 
208 Interview: Yowasi Makaru, March 19,1998, at his home Butsibo. 
209 Interview: Francis Bwengye, May 22,1997, Kampala. 
2101 am concentrating on the Anglican Church because on the whole Catholics were unwilling to give 
me detailed information on this issue. However there is evidence that they too were involved 
because when UPC won in 1962, it is said that a catholic priest lamented, "Nkabatiza 
n'abakrisatayo babatiza mbwenu bansinga", we all baptised but we have been defeated. 
211 A missionary expression of people without second names preferably-English names like 
Hebblethwaite which meaning I do not even know! 
212 See Busesire local newspaper, 8''' April 1962, Ruharo cathedral Vestry. 
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Sheema, which was well attended by priests, lay readers, Protestant chiefs, teachers 
and other notable people in the area. 213 Apart from emphasising the obvious: that 
parties were the road to development and leadership in independent Uganda, they also 
repeated the reasons why DP had defeated them in the previous elections. Unless the 
Anglican priests demonstrated their support for UPC as Catholic priests had done for 
DP, they were likely to lose again. 214 
In response to the politicians' challenge, the meeting resolved that they 
should return and tell their church members that UPC was indeed their party and they 
should support it. And in order to raise the Protestant membership in Ankole, they 
resolved to try and convert many more people who still followed traditional 
religions. 215 The strategy was that the rural Deans and Parish priests were to cut short 
the period of catechism, so that many more people could be baptised. According to 
Kikuri others were simply baptised with no instruction: 
There was a move to convert people into the church by baptising them without teaching them. Formerly 
out of wedlock children were not baptised, but during that period everybody was baptised to increase 
the number of Protestants so that they could defeat DP. So did the Catholics. Even second wives were 
baptised and there was no testing them. You see there were many pagans in those days and therefore to 
win them on your side was more advantageous. Of course that later added on the numbers of the 
churches and from that time what we used to call "pagans"-people without second names 
disappeared. 216 
The chiefs used their influence in "religio-political evangelism. " By June 1962, this 
conversion plan was already in operation all over the district. Working together with 
priests and other lay leaders, chiefs prompted "pagan families" into baptism. Their 
target was heads of families who would influence the rest of the family. In some cases 
the more zealous chiefs exerted a compulsion by either "starving" the hesitant 
economically or denying them common justice: refusing them permits to take their 
213 Busesire, 16'x' April 1962. 
214 ibid. 
215 In the 1959 census the number of traditionalist adherents in Ankole was 460,000. See, Stenning, 
op. cit., p. 261. 
216 Interview: Ezra Kikuri, March 13,1997, Ishaka. 
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livestock to public markets or to intervene on their behalf in case of a dispute. The 
strategy worked. People started flocking to the churches for baptism. For example in 
Sheema, in one month, (March 1962) Rev. Laban Tibekinga baptised 896 people at 
Kabwohe parish church. 217 In the following months, Rev. F. Begumisa baptised 769 
people in Rubare-Kajara, while at the same time Rev. S. Katikuzi baptised 1000 
people in Ibanda, a Catholic stronghold. 218 The numerical increase determined an 
increased party membership: 
People baptised by a particular denomination meant that they would vote for that particular party. 
Secondly those coming for instruction had previously taken 12 months because they needed to be taught 
how to read and write. But in 1962 numbers mattered because they determined power. ' 19 
While mass baptisms meant that church numbers grew, it created a situation where 
people simply became church goers without having the commitment or faith in the 
religion in which they were baptised: 
Such baptisms had effects on the church. They strengthened UPC and DP for those baptised became 
automatically party members. Secondly by 1970 there was no longer what we used to call abakafire, 
pagans. Sadly people only acquired a name but did not necessarily grasp the essentials of Christianity as 
those who had been instructed before. This could be partly the reason the Protestant Church members 
are always swayed by whichever religions that come. 22° 
Had it not been for the Revival movement which rekindled their faith and challenged 
them into a second commitment, it is likely that the church in Ankole would have 
declined after the party excitement had cooled down. One of the effects of mass 
baptisms was that the Bishop was presented with half-baked catechumens for 
confirmation whom he would reject if they failed to answer the simple biblical and 
doctrinal questions such as the Lord's Prayer, the Creed and the Ten Commandments. 
However genuine the Bishop was, this was interpreted as opposing UPC. As protest 
217 See Ekyababatize (Baptism register book for Kabwohe parish, 1962, Kabwohe Parish office. 
218 Interview: Rev. Katikuzi, July 31,1996, Kyagaju-Kabwohe. See also Baptism Register at Ibanda 
Archdeaconary Office. 
219 Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, July 12,1996, Ishaka. 
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against the Bishop's action, in 1963-64, he was denied entry on his annual visit to 
churches like Kabwohe, Masheruka and Kitunga. People told 
him bluntly to go to Nyamitanga, the Catholic headquarters, where his heart was. For instance at 
Kabwohe, when the Bishop arrived, there were no people to meet him except a few brave ones who 
after telling him why they had closed the church, left. 221 
Such was the atmosphere in which Bishop Shalita worked. Priests who supported him 
were isolated and branded DP. Rev. Rwabihaiga who was alleged to be the bishop's 
supporter was refused entry at Kitunga parish where he had been posted in 1964. 
Instead parishioners ordered the lorry driver to return him to the bishop and preferred 
Canon Kakuma a known UPC supporter. The situation did not improve even after 
UPC had won the elections. It was aggravated by the fact that the Bishop became 
antagonistic to Rev. Kamujanduzi who the Bairu had nicknamed, Rutigita mugara 
rw Ankole, (the strong lion of Ankole) and Ishenkuru Abairu, (the grandfather of 
Bairu). The conflict originated in Kamujanduzi's political involvement and active 
participation in mass baptism, which the Bishop opposed. It seems also that 
Kamujanduzi as Ishenkuru Abairu ignored the Bishop and often overrode his 
decisions. 
Born of poor parents at the beginning of the century, Eriakim Kamujanduzi 
was brought up by a certain county chief Yubu Ntungwerisho who adopted him as a 
servant. But shortly the chief died and a certain man Kemandwa introduced 
Kamujanduzi to Mbaguta. Mbaguta adopted him and sent him to Mbarara High 
School, a dominantly Bahima institution. It was there that Kamujanduzi came to 
confront Bahima hatred and mistreatment of the few Bairu boys at Mbarara High 
School. Kenneth Kakuru, in his father's biography, talks of an incident when 
Kamujanduzi almost killed a Muhima at Mbarara High School in self-defence. He had 
been beaten and in response, he dug a fork into a Muhima boy's stomach. Since then 
Bahima boys at Mbarara High School feared him. Kakuru writes: 
220 Interview: Yowasi Makaru, March 29,1997, Bushenyi. 
221 Interview: Rev. Katikuzi. 
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The first days at Mbarara High School were real hell. Every day he was beaten and abused not only by 
the boys senior to him but also by his fellow new comers. The Bahima boys subjected him to all sorts of 
inhumane treatment. Reason he was a Mwiru and the overwhelming majority of the boys were Bahima. 
He could not understand why they hated him and had never seen such hatred in his life. That year he had 
been admitted together with three other Bairu boys who had to run away and abandoned school because 
they could not stand the Bahima hostility. One was from Ibanda and another from Igara. The bullying 
included carrying Bahima boys on one's back, fetching them water and washing their clothes. Such 
harassment was directed to Bairu only. 222 
Even when Kamujanduzi graduated from Mbarara High School in the early thirties 
and served briefly as a teacher and later joined church ministry, he was confronted 
again by Bahima leadership. Canon Buningwire who came second in authority to the 
CMS missionaries was the rural Dean of Ankole. After his ordination on 24 January 
1945, Kamujanduzi was posted to Buhweju, a very remote area, which according to 
his wife Rose, 
was a way of trying to send us to a forgotten country. People like Buningwire had really overshadowed 
us and did not want to see us near them. It was Bahima regime and they determined our destiny whether 
we wanted it or not. 223 
After six years in Buhweju, Kamujanduzi was posted to Ruharo-Mbarara in 1950, 
succeeding Buningwire who had retired. This was possible, so Mrs Kamujanduzi 
continued, because: 
By then the church council had expanded and people like Nyakatukura (Ibanda), Katukura (Igara), and 
Kaseta (Rwampara) all Bairu had come on the Ankole Deanery Council. They became our spokesmen 
because they realised that we were being segregated. 
That was the background that contributed to Kamujanduzi's extreme impatience with 
Bahima. As his wife said, it was not that he hated them, but if he did not stand up to 
the Bahima, no one else would. By Independence therefore, Kamujanduzi was a 
senior figure in the Ankole church, and a voice which represented emancipated Bairu. 
222 See Kenneth Kakuru's biography of his father, "The Life of Rev. Eliakim Kamujanduzi 1905-1990, 
unpublished paper, 1997, p. 7. 
223 Interview: Mrs Rose Kamujanduzi, July 31,1996, Kyamugorani. 
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His character was demonstrated by his ability to use poetic imagery and proverbs to 
inspire or control an uprising. His sermons were always full of self-esteem 
illuminated by riddles and proverbs. For instance people still remember the sermon he 
preached in 1955 at Ruharo cathedral at a thanksgiving service for Kesi Nganwa who 
had just been appointed the second Mwiru Enganzi in Ankole. His theme was the 
living hope. After marvelling what the power of God in Christ could achieve, he 
assured his audience that all things were possible for those who persistently keep their 
hope in God. He illustrated his point by a story. While he was driving to church that 
morning, another motorist who was driving a big lorry (ekimotoka) in front of him 
and raising dust obstructed him. But Kamujanduzi concentrated on steering, slowed 
down, closed the windows and drove steadily until he reached the junction where the 
lorry continued. He then relaxed and resumed his speed. This was taken as a warning 
to the Bahima that they were frustrating Bairu development, and a call to Bairu to 
take the necessary precautions and struggle on firmly and peacefully. 224 
That was the kind of man Bishop Shalita had to work with. In the absence 
of a "Bishop" to give Bairu political guidance, they turned to Rev. Kamujanduzi. The 
two became so antagonistic in the meetings they both attended that in one of them in 
1965, things were so difficult that the Bishop raised his hand up until someone 
reminded him that he was the chairman! 225 Because Kamujanduzi openly opposed the 
Bishop, he demoted him in 1965 from the office of Rural Dean to a lesser position, 
the equivalent of a sub-parish church in Mbarara town. 226 In protest, Kamujanduzi 
resigned. His resignation sparked off two incidents in the diocese. Christians from 
Rwampara, Kamujanduzi's former deanery, seceded from the diocese and withheld 
their diocesan financial contributions. The situation was saved by Archbishop Brown, 
who, after a series of meetings with Kamujanduzi and his church and Bishop Shalita, 
agreed that Rwampara church should return to the diocese and pay the diocesan quota 
224 Interview: Canon Rwabushaija and Njumwoha. 
225 Canon George Tibesigwa, a story he told us in his Sociology of Religion lecture at Bishop Tucker 
Theological College, Mukono, 1991. 
226 It is the current All Saints church and has since expanded due to the growth of the town. Actually 
it is now the most active church in the Diocese of East Ankole. It is an Archdeaconry centre too. 
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they withheld. 227 In return the diocesan council treated Kamujanduzi's case as a 
retirement not resignation and rewarded him with the appropriate retirement 
benefits. 229 
The second consequence of Rev. Kamujanduzi's resignation was a hastily convened 
meeting of UPC supporters at Kakyeka stadium in Mbarara to protest against the 
Bishop's decision to demote Kamujanduzi. The circumstances under which it was 
held and who actually mobilised people are not clear but as Rurangaranga said: 
The Kakyeka meeting was meant to cast a vote of no confidence in Bishop Shalita. People had 
interpreted his dismissal of Kamujanduzi as hatred for Bairu cause. So the meeting was not only to 
demonstrate Bairu support to Kamujanduzi, it was also to show Shalita that it was UPC which was in 
power and not DP. 229 
The meeting was to find means to reinstate Kamujanduzi. It consisted of some 
members of the diocesan council and Synod who were UPC councillors and 
supporters. Rurangaranga continues: 
Well, you could not distinguish UPC from the Protestant Church. The intention was to call the Synod 
but we did not have those powers. But we had powers to disguise it as a UPC meeting. Either way they 
were the same people. Just like Catholics, when they call a church meeting, it's DP Catholics who turn 
up. 
However the Kakyeka meeting could not reverse the Bishop's decision because they 
had no power to do so. Secondly the Bishop had not dismissed Rev. K. Kamujanduzi 
but had demoted him. The Bishop by constitution had a right to transfer clergy 
anywhere and Kamujanduzi had resigned voluntarily. Nevertheless this group became 
a formidable opposition which four years later resulted in the Bishop's retirement. In 
1968, the diocesan Synod moved a vote of no confidence in the Bishop on a very 
trivial issue that he did not respect his priests. Rev. Keith Katakanya was silenced by 
the Bishop at a Diocesan meeting on a motion about church stewardship and clergy 
227 Interview: Mzee Muguta, who was at the time the Treasurer, May 21,1996, at Kinoni-Rwampara. 
228 See Minute 10/67 (e) of the Diocesan Council meeting of 1967, p. 5. 
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salaries on which Katakanya had dwelt for too long. Had the Revs. Rwabushaija and 
Itima not opposed the motion, the Bishop might have been compelled to resign. 23° 
However that Synod resulted in the formation of a committee of inquiry known as 
Kakuma231 Committee to look into: why Christians were against the Bishop, why there 
was no development in the diocese and the cause of decline in church stewardship 
and clergy salaries. 232 It is understandable that the Church had declined in giving 
because Christians and clergy had put more effort in advertising UPC than they had 
revitalising of the church. The Bishop's whole reign had been fraught with opposition 
that he had little time to plan for development. 
Was Shalita anti development? In the hostile environment that characterised 
his reign he could not "deliver". Canon Rwabushaija, one of Shalita's few Bairu 
supporters, who stood by him admitted: 
Shalita did not have the gift of work. He was not a mover. Actually we used to complain why most 
things were not done as meetings had asked. It is not that he would refuse, but that was his nature. 233 
There are no tangible achievements to point at but those were also the times when 
developmental projects were regarded as "worldly" due to the influence of the 
Revival movement. This could have contributed to the Bishop's general lack of 
interest in development well aware of the general feeling in the Church of Uganda. 
In May 1969, the Committee's report was published and indicated that "the 
Bishop was the sole cause of the general decline of the church; that he was not 
politically motivated and did not give the church the political leadership they wanted; 
because he was not Omwiru, he did not know and appreciate their problems". 234 
Where some churches had closed down and some withheld money, the situation was 
229 Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, July 21,1997, Ishaka. 
230 Interview: Canon Rwabushaija, July 24,1997, Ruharo. 
231 Canon Kakuma was the Archdeacon of Kitunga. According to Rwabushaija, "Kakuma had worked 
in Tanzania with Kivengere and Mugimba. He was a good man, very UPC but objective. He was 
impartial but point blank. " 
232 Interview: Bishop Yoramu Bamunoba, May 18,1997, Kyamugorani. 
233 Interview: Canon Rwabushaija. 
234 ibid. 
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bound to deteriorate. Rather than face a vote of no confidence from a hostile Synod, 
Bishop Shalita, in the synod of August 1969, announced his retirement at the age of 
66: 
... nimbamanyisa nkoku entwaza y'ekanisa eri, mpikize emyaka eragirwe, 
kandi mpaire archbishop 
okuragiiza kwangye, naimwe nimbamanyisa... kundikwenda kuhumura... [I do inform you as is the 
church custom that at the end of this year, I intend to retire]. 235 
Because they had no opportunity to throw the Bishop out of office, some Synod 
members wrote to the Archbishop to hasten Shalita's retirement. They wrote: 
The Bishop of Ankole Diocese ... 
Kosiya Shalita, officially informed the Synod of the diocese sitting at 
Ruharo from 11-15 August 1969 that he had submitted to you his application to retire... Realising that 
what he said was the bare truth... for this reason before the Synod adjourned, a committee was selected 
to appoint a new Bishop in accordance with the regulations of the church. Your Grace, we are therefore 
writing to request you to give a speedy confirmation of Bishop Shalita's application to retire, in order 
that the selected committee may embark on its task of choosing his successor. 236 
However the Archbishop would not be rushed and reminded them of the 
constitutional procedure: 
As you know, according to the constitution, representations concerning the appointment of a new 
Bishop must be considered by the archbishop with the House of Bishops. The next sitting of the House 
of Bishops will be in October and I do not think that I shall be at that meeting for I shall either be in 
hospital or on sick leave. I therefore propose to bring this matter up at the sitting of the House of 
Bishops in January and it will be after January when Bishop Shalita's retirement is accepted by the 
House that I will write to the diocese to tell them that there is a vacancy and then the diocese will start 
thinking about suggesting names to the House of Bishops from whom the man to be your next Bishop 
will be chosen. Your Bishop who has served you for such a long time will no doubt be able to serve for 
some more months and I trust that you will bear with him. 237 
235 See the Bishop's speech, "Okugamba kw'omureberezi omuri Sinodi August 1969" in East Ankole 
Archives, p. 3. 
236 See letter from some members of the synod Messrs P. Kaseeta, E. Laki, A. Rubashoka, B. 
Ntundubeire, W. Muguta to the Archbishop of the Church of Uganda, dated 16th August 1969. The 
same synod had elected the following to form the Electoral College; N. Bananuka, E. Muntuyera, 
Canon S. Kakuma, Rev. F. Karyawhari, Z. Mungonya, and E. Rurangaranga. 
237 See letter from Archbishop Eric Sabiiti to Messrs, Kaseeta, Laki, Rubashoka, Ntundubaire & 
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In order to reassure Bishop Shalita, the Archbishop wrote a personal note to him: 
Now about your retirement, you will have had a copy of the letter I wrote last week to some members of 
your Synod who were hurrying your retirement. I told them that I shall not be at the House of 
bishops... [The Archbishop added in vernacular] Haza orekye kubatina abo mpurire okuruga 
omunshonda ezirikwesigwa ngu nobubariho tibaruho. Mukama aturwanirire, [do not fear them for I 
have heard from all corners that those characters are simply men of straw]. 238 
The Archbishop probably called them "men of straw" to reassure Shalita. In fact they 
were very influential men from the Kumanyana movement. As strong members of the 
Enkomba UPC, they had taken up the Ankole leadership with Bananuka as their 
leader. Whether or not the archbishop was to wait for January, in Ankole the 
Enkomba group started looking around for a candidate who would support UPC 
interests. In June 1970, Rev Amos Betungura, a Mwiru, was nominated Bishop of 
Ankole and consecrated on 12 December 1970. Whereas Shalita had not enjoyed state 
support, the new Bishop's consecration ceremony was heavily subsidised by the UPC 
government including tarmacking the six hundred-yard road to the cathedral. In 
addition the occasion was honoured by the presence of the Vice President and UPC 
executive, which implied that the new Bishop was "one of us". Unfortunately for 
Bishop Betungura, within less than two months of his consecration, Idi Amin 
overthrew the UPC government. If Bishop Shalita fought a war with UPC radicals, 
Bishop Betungura had a more sinister one, the "war" with Amin's regime. 
Muguta dated 26th August 1969. Though Sabiiti had been rejected in Ankole for the see, he was later 
made the Bishop of Tooro from where he later became an Archbishop of Uganda after the retirement 
of Archbishop L. Brown in 1966. 
238 See Archbishop's letter to Bishop Shalita of 30th August 1969. 
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CHAPTER THREE239 
3. THE REVIVAL MOVEMENT, ETHNICITY AND POLITICS. 
3.0. INTRODUCTION. 
If we are looking at the church in Ankole in the sixties, in the context of ecclesiastical 
and political power struggles, one of the most important movements to look at is the 
Revival movement. One cannot understand either the development of the church or its 
relation to politics without understanding this movement. Revival became a very 
important social-religious movement for Bairu and Bahima especially (whether or not 
they were "saved") because it transformed their culture in a way missionary 
Christianity had not. Through "kraal evangelism", mainly by Bairu evangelists like 
Kakudidi, 240 Bahima came to know about the gospel and have interest in the church. 
The East African Revival Movement (sometimes referred to as the 
Balokole241 Revival) is a large-scale movement of renewal, which has operated 
within the Protestant churches of East Africa since 1936. It developed in reaction to 
the superficiality, nominalism and backsliding that had engulfed the church in East 
Africa. At the beginning of this century, western civilisation was beginning to make 
way in Uganda and a formal Christianity became the way of life. 
Revival's beginning appeared insignificant at Mengo in Uganda, where in 
1929 two men, Joe Church and Simoni Nsibambi, deeply conscious of their spiritual 
defeat, prayed together for two days in search of a new beginning for their own 
spiritual edification and for the church. They were from different background and 
239 1 wish to acknowledge that the first three sections of this chapter are a summary of my MPhil. 
dissertation, Revival and Repentance: A Historical and Theological analysis of the East African 
Revival movement in Uganda, Cambridge University, 1995. 
240 He was born in 1905 and saved in 1936. After 1941, he worked as a Catechist in Nyabushozi where 
he remained as a free evangelist with special ministry among the Bahima cattle keepers who were 
formerly marginally touched by the gospel. He was later ordained in 1960 and died in 1992. 
241 Balokole or Abalokole, means literally the saved ones, an illusion to the assurance of their own 
redemption expressed by the revival brethren. Balokole, technically less correct than Abalokole, is 
more widely used. The word was initially used as a pejorative epithet by those outside the 
movement 
though it is no longer used like that now. 
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race, European and African respectively, but with a similar conviction. They longed 
to see a revived people and a revived church. 242 The significance of their meeting 
was that a European missionary and an African were meeting on equal terms and on 
common ground. Since then the Revivalists have regarded the fellowship between 
Africans and the Europeans as the black and white notes of the piano, "the best 
harmony being obtained only when the black and white notes are played together". 243 
Through their preaching and life style and the consequent movement, many people in 
Uganda became committed Christians and from among them some have become 
church leaders. 
3.1. WHAT IS THE EAST AFRICAN REVIVAL MOVEMENT? 
The Balokole Revival is a movement of renewal and reform which originated from 
African Protestants of Uganda, Rwanda-Burundi244, Kenya and Tanzania, influenced 
by members of the Rwanda mission, a small conservative Evangelical mission body 
founded in reaction to the more liberal policy of the Church Missionary Society. 245 
Unlike most comparable African movements (independent Churches) or the 
American and European revivals to which it is historically and theologically linked, 
the East African Revival movement has remained within the establishment of the 
Church in Uganda avoiding schism while losing little of its doctrinal identity. The 
movement did not become another church but preferred to remain within the already 
242 Lindsay Guillebaud, A grain of Mustard See& ne Growth of the Ruanda Mission of CMS, 
London, 1959, pp. 49-53. 
243 Adrian Hastings, 7he Church in Afika 1450 - 1942. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 596,604. 244 From 1919 to 1962, Rwanda-Burundi was under the League of Nations mandate and then a United 
Nations Trust administered as a single unit by Belgium. The two are now separate Independent 
countries. 
245 The Church Missionary Society is Evangelical but not strictly fundamentalist, thus the controversy 
which split CMS, cf Gordon 1971, pp. 461 - 474. Here the termfindwnentalism in a purely descriptive sense to characterise the mission's understanding of the Bible as being literally true and 
wholly of divine inspiration. It does not refer to the doctrinal position which for instance arose 
from the American Protestants in reaction against biblical scholarship and modem theology, See 
g0so, Man Richardson, et a], A New Dicljoizary of Christian neology, London: SCM Press, 1983, 
p. 2. 
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established Church in which they longed to bring a spiritual transformation. 246 
During the sixty or more years of its existence, it has spread to neighbouring countries 
and through many different languages and mission organisations. 247 Its characteristic 
hymns, greetings, teachings and a disciplined, even rigid, life style248 are familiar not 
only to the Protestants with whom they identify but also to the Roman Catholics and 
non-Christians. Revival fellowships249 have been able to carry on their distinctive 
way of life and convictions within the established Protestant congregations, usually 
maintaining a coexistence with the unrevived clergy and laity. Believing themselves 
to be the leaven of the large body of Christians, their uncompromising standards 
(which they term as being on the highest) and personal piety are sometimes resented 
by the nominal Christians who are the targets of their mission field. 250 
To the outsider, the Balokole do not seem particularly attractive. It is only 
when one has known the movement from the inside that one can admire that treasure 
that has enabled them to grow from strength to strength. They have no codified 
teaching, form no leadership structure and are opposed to bureaucracy, though men 
and women have emerged whose authority is clearly acknowledged by those in the 
fellowship. They do not talk of members or membership lists and write no laws or 
charters. 251 They have produced no literature beyond the texts of vernacular hymns 
often taught orally among the brethren. They have no formalised criteria for 
membership although formal and uniform standards all over the country, notably the 
ability to provide an authentic testimony to conversion and repentance, exist for 
246 John V. Taylor, Yhe Growth of Ihe Church in Buganda, an Attempt at Understanding London: 
SCM Press, 1957, pp. 95-99.1 personally have been involved in their evangelistic missions as a 
speaker and participant. 
247 Uganda alone has more than twenty languages and tribes but Revival has managed to penetrate 
them without finding tribal barriers. Mission organisations in Uganda are mainly African 
Evangelistic Enterprise (A. E. E), Fellowship of Christian Unions (FOCUS), Church Missionary 
Society and Scripture Union (SU). 
249 Joe Church, Questfor the Highest. An Autobiographical Account of the East Aftican Revival, 
Exeter: Paternoster Press, 198 1, pp. 128,143,255; cf Bengt Sundkler, Bantu Prophets in South 
Aftica, London: Oxford University Press, 1961, pp. 65,113,129,192-193. 
249 1 use the word fellowship to mean the small groups of the Revival movement which meet regularly 
for prayer, bible study and mutual confession. They usually meet twice a week. 
250 Cf. Mabel Ensor, "Some plain reasons why the movement called, "Balokole" is injurious and 
Retrograde", Pamphlet 1935; Church's title, Questfor the Highest; Max Warren, Revival: An 
Inquiry, London: SCM Press, 1954, pp. 81-90. 
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participation in the circle like fellowship groups where Balokole meet for prayer and 
open confession. Speaking from a "narrow theological" view, the continuities are 
more obvious than the differences. The doctrine centring on the cross and the 
atonement of sin and eschatology feature as strongly as it did during the missionary 
period. Okujunwa, salvation, is the key word of the movement and is embodied in 
most of the African names for Revival. 252 They believe that the new experience in 
Jesus Christ can only be obtained through repentance which is why they stress public 
confession and daily repentance. 
But unlike other African Christian groups, Revival brethren do little to 
distinguish themselves from those among whom they live. They wear no uniform and 
stage no public demonstrations apart from the open air preaching with which they are 
particularly identified. 253 A famous greeting is used in the first line of their letters, 
usually, "I greet you in the name of our Lord and Savour Jesus Christ", and they 
conclude with the phrase, Yours in Christ, and the hymn Tukutendereza Yesu254, 
which they do not mind singing even in market places as a form of greeting, is always 
used when brethren meet. Balokole are identified by their practice of giving 
testimony, "a deeply personal account of conversion with strong evangelical 
overtones"255, in which one narrates "every sin" one can remember to have 
committed. 256 It is here that Europeans, unfamiliar with the movement or with 
evangelical Christianity, often believe that they have been victims of isolated 
instances of religious zeal when confronted by the Revivalists anxious to testify to 
them. 257 
251 Robins, op. cit., p. 7. 
252 Kevin Ward, The Development of Protestant Christianity in Kenya 1910-1940, Cambridge 
University, PhD, dissertation, 1976, pp. 353-354. 
253 See colourfW costumes and public marching preferred by Independent Churches in, David Barret, 
Schism wd Renewal., An Analysis of Six Yhousand Contemporwy Religious Movements, Nairobi: 
Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 4243,74-75,170; Sundkler, op. cit., pp. 208-209,273-274, 
288-289. 
254 Means, "We praise you Jesus", Cf. Warren, 1954, pp. 63,65. 
255 Robins, op. cit., p. 6. 
256 See a well-modified testimony of Bishop Festo Kivengere in, Church 198 1, p. 13; Warren, op. cit., 
pp. 63-65,72-73. 
257 Some Europeans are not taken seriously as saved people because they never repent openly and 
because some of them are known to take alcoholic drinks. 
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The movement does not represent an attempt to combine long held African practices 
such as polygamy, ancestral worship or traditional healing with Christianity. It has in 
most cases rejected indigenous belief and traditional customs more strongly than the 
demands of mission teaching. Yet a closer look at the movement reveals traces of 
African heritage. John V. Taylor agrees strongly on their African charismatic, which 
make it more deeply held than any mission that went before it in the history of 
Uganda: 
Signs like the dreaming of dreams, seeing of visions and ecstatic phenomena, such as trembling and the 
repetition of the gospel hymn Tukutendereze and public confession of sins all emanate from the hilarious 
joy of an African liberated by a supernatural power. 258 
The ordeal by confession, which is demanded by new converts or renewed Christians 
as a test of the reality of their salvation and an initiation into fellowship, is indeed the 
African equivalent of traditional initiation. It is therefore possible to say that the 
movement is a genuine African expression of worship in contrast to institutionalised 
Christianity259 that does not necessarily edify the African in freedom of worship and 
expression. Their theology is explicitly orthodox, biblical and christocentric. Their 
emphasis on the necessity for a conversion experience following the evangelical 
paradigm of intense guilt relieved by open confession and acceptance of Jesus as 
personal saviour is largely consistent with the evangelical wing of the African church 
in whose traditions the movement is historically rooted. Their teaching and practices 
are sufficiently consistent with mainline Protestant emphasis. This enables them to 
function within a wide variety of Protestant denominations throughout East Africa. 
The degree to which formal participation in the life of the Church is emphasised 
depends upon the good relations between them and the Church leadership but on the 
whole they are staunch supporters of their local churches and are good at stewardship. 
Unlike nationalist movements such as Mau Mau in Kenya, the Revival movement did 
not arise because of the anti-colonial desire to take control of the church. In spite of 
258 Taylor, op. cit., p. 101; Hastings, 1994, p. 596. 
259 Ward op. cit., p. 352. 
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its largely African leadership and a history of tensions between Revival leaders and 
European church authorities, the conflicts were more concerned with nominalism 
rather than racial prejudice. More importantly, opposition to racial, ethnic and clan 
based prejudices has become a basic article of Revival teaching with a self- 
description as a people of one clan, abaishemwe. 260 Revival then is a renewing and 
reforming movement in the Church of Uganda with a call for action, reaffirmation of 
commitment, and a resuscitation of worship and conscience both for the church and 
the individual. Revival as it is in Uganda is not a new cult or doctrine. It is not 
schismatic or subversive ecclesiastically or politically, nor is it founded merely on 
emotionalism or enthusiasm. Revival in Uganda is a return to the simplicity of 
apostolic faith in the time of apostasy, for they believe the church had lapsed into 
dead formalism and nominaliSM. 261 
3.2. REVIVAL AS AN AFRICAN EXPRESSION OF FAITH 
Some Europeans dissociate Revival from Afirican-ness but see it as the offspring of 
western Revivalism following in the footsteps of the Pilkington revivaI262 and the 
Keswick convention. Revivalists themselves hardly admit that Revival is an Affican 
form of worship and expression. Western Christianity with which they have since 
identified was opposed to African forms of religious expression as demonic! 
Revivalists as a people running away from their past do not want to share in that past. 
But a closer look at the movement indicates the evidence that Revival is an African 
movement expressing the richness of an African culture. The Banyankole for instance 
used open confession as a means of initiation in traditional religious practice. 263 
260 See Kevin Ward, "Obedient Rebels", The relationship between the early Balokole and the Church 
of Uganda: the Mukono crisis of 1941, in Journal of Religion in Africa vol. XIX, (3), 1989, pp. 
194-227; Taylor, op. cit., p. 98; T. F. C, Bewes, Kikuyu Conflict: Mau Mau and the Christian 
Witness, London: The High Way Press, 1953. 
261 Cf. Adrian Hastings, A History ofAftican Christianity 1950-1975, London: Cambridge University, 
1979, pp. 52-53,155,231-232,257; Taylor, op. cit., 269; Langford-Smith, "Revival in East Affica", 
International Review of Mssions, vol. 43, London: 1954, pp. 77-81. 
262 Cf Kevin Ward, op. cit. 
263 Cf, Derrick Stenning, J, Salvation in Ankole. African Systems of Yhought, International African 
Institute, London: Oxford University, 1965, pp. 258-275. See also, Welbourn & Ogot, B. A., "Some 
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In traditional Ankole, in local cult groups, entenng into which was effected by an 
initiation ceremony, the initiate had to confess the alleged infringements of sexual 
prohibitions and worshipped the tutelary spirits. The initiate went through a ritual of 
being killed and brought back to life before being accepted into the cult. Revival 
usage and traditional practice can therefore be paralleled in terms of ritual confession 
in traditional religious practice. 264 
Public confessions was also an important way by which the African Christian 
declared his severance firom traditional society and his commitment to the new society 
of the revival fellowship. In Kenya, there are similarities too. According to John 
Karanja, public confession "was administered to remove thahu (taboo), to effect 
physical healing". 265 The Revival movement recovered this important dimension of 
Affican religious experience. Within the movement, public confession serves to 
strengthen the Revivalists' resolve to live in accordance with the demands of their new 
faith. The importance of public confession as far as the subject under discussion is 
concerned, is that it helped Bairu and Bahima to confess their deep-seated hatred and 
prejudices between each other. This broke the social and cultural barriers between 
them and gave way for trust between the two groups. 
J. V. Taylor agrees these Affican characteristics make the movement more 
deeply indigenous than any mission: 
There is further use in the movement, which may be peculiarly African, which might be called "ordeal by 
confession", which is demanded of new converts or renewed Christians as a test of the reality of their 
salvation and as an initiation in the fellowship. On these accessions, it seems as though the element of 
"brokenness", humiliation and abandonment to the group is more important than penitence or faith. 266 
Problems of Affican Christianity: Guilt and Shame", in C. B. Baeta, (eds. ), Christianity in Tropical 
Afi-ica, London: OUP for the International Institute, 1968, pp. 182 - 194. 
264 Peter Kasenene seems to infer that the content and form of the confession and testimony in the 
Revival were quite different from that of the traditional religious rituals. In such rituals, Kasenene 
argues, the initiate made his confession and testimony called okwala eibanga, divulging secrets, 
and their publicity was strictly to those who were presiding over the ritual; and the latter were not 
allowed to disclose any of the contents of their initiate's utterances, cf "Aftican traditional religion 
in Ankole", in Occasional Research Papers, 2,1970, Makerere University, p. 42. 
265 John Karanja, The Growth of the Anglican Church in Central Kenya, Cambridge University, Phl), 
Dissertation, 1992, p. 268. 
266 Taylor, op. cit., p. 10 1. 
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In confession in African cultures, there is an efficacy not only in the word that is 
spoken, but also in the word that is heard. The diabolical contest is thus vital. Both 
speaker and hearer embody a circle of functions, whether theistically, magically or 
both to consume the sin confessed. Revival therefore is an African expression of 
Christianity in contrast to the institutional ised church and its doctrines. In fact open 
confession is not only common with the Revival movement, but with the African 
Independent Churches where repentance is purgative in its spiritual sense. Bengt 
Sundkler in his book, The Bantu Prophets in South Africa, describes how: 
around the pool ... the Zionist church arranges its rite, all being essentially purgative. Baptism or 
purification can not take place vithout being preceded by confession of sins. The objection of infant 
baptism is that children can not confess sins. The confession must be complete, nothing may be 
hidden. 267 
And one difference between the Revival and the Christianity which preceded it, is that 
while the missionaries inspired the latter, Revival was organised by Africans and had 
no close European supervision. Until late seventies, the Revival movement had 
condemned most traditional and indigenous practice. It expressed, according to 
Adrian Hastings, "an uncompromising rejection of the sort of assimilation of church 
and world, of Christianity and African custom". It is common that for a movement, he 
goes on: 
which from one point of view is the solidest proof of Afticanisation, something which missionaries could 
not assuredly control and of which many were not unreasonably suspicious, was at the same time a 
movement to reject the Afficanising symbiosis which was inevitably growing momentum in a third 
generation church. 268 
This is probably the reason Hastings says: 
267 Sundkler, op. cit., p. 126; Hastings, 1994, op. cit., pp. 600-602. 
268 Hastings, 1979, op. cit., p. 53. 
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If the Revival brought a much needed new outburst of commitment to the confession of faith and high 
moral standards, and an intense personal loyalty to Christ it also brought conflict, narrowness, spiritual 
arrogance and near schism. 269 
The refusal of African symbols perhaps was through ignorance or missionary 
teaching. The Revivalists had embraced Christianity without being taught how to 
relate it to their own situations. Everything was taken at surface value, including 
alcohol drinking, though I do not think that the African church should regret this 
having seen its effects in Western societies. 
3.3. REVIVAL IN ANKOLE. 
Okulokoka or okujunwa as it is known in Ankole became a factor in changing the 
ethnic tensions between Bairu and Bahima. In the first chapter, I traced the emergence 
of Bairu to positions of influence through the Kurnanyana movement. Inevitably such 
a change caused more rivalry between the two ethnic groups. The Kumanyana 
movement now dominating political power did not only sideline its former allies the 
Catholics, it was also determined to fight what it termed as the kihima influence. By 
1960, the Revival movement, which was bom in 1936, was already well established in 
Ankole, not as a political pressure group but as a movement of spiritual renewal and a 
revolutionary force advocating a brotherhood that transcended ethnic and religious 
differences. The period between 1950-1970 when religio-political confrontation was 
at its worst, the Revivalists in Ankole demonstrated their faith by creating what they 
termed as abaishemwe "a family" in which Bairu and Bahima met on equal terms. 
They stood on the same platform and challenged the traditional rivalry between Bairu 
and Bahima. They distanced themselves from the politics of the sixties because it was 
divisive. The beginning of Revival is not within the framework of this thesis, but it is 
important that we consider its beginnings in Ankole to enable us to appreciate the 
contribution of this Revival in the ethno-political struggles in Ankole. 
269 ibid. 
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As Christianity was championed by Baganda evangelists, Blasio Kigozi, a Muganda 
Revivalist, with Yosiya Kinuka, a Munyankole, and Paul Gahindi, a Munyarwanda, 
brought it to Ankole. Arthur Clarke, the CMS Rural Dean of Ankole, had invited 
them. 270 Clarke was concerned about the declining spiritual commitment in the 
Ankole Church and in 1936 he invited these men to lead a week of prayer and bible 
study for the clergy and evangelists. Revival dates its beginnings in Ankole from that 
week when Mbarara Deanery became "a hill set ablaze". Instead of Bible study, the 
team concentrated on preaching and giving their testimonies about the saving power 
of Christ. During that first meeting many people were revived. Eliaezer Mugimba271 
mentions four men who were to be instrumental in spreading Revival in Ankole. 
These were Edward Kakudidi, Andereya Katebaka, Erisa Mutegaya and Anania 
Murumba, all Bairu. 272 Six months later, the Rural Dean invited the group again for 
follow Up. 273 Unlike before when the team consisted of African Evangelists, this time 
the follow up team included Joe Church, a Muzungu. 274 Joe Church records the 
remarkable response as those who were revived began to experience the equivalent of 
the 1997 Toronto blessing: 
Many had gathered to meet us... and a gathering had been arranged in the church for 5 p. m. We all spoke 
and made an appeal when a thing happened that I had never experienced before. A man began to cry 
out... at the top his voice... He said that he had seen a vision of Christ in the church and he saw the awful 
state of the lost and was overcome with grief for his own past. He asked his friends to help him but he 
could not stop crying. 275 
270 Church, op. cit., p. 121. 
271 Born 1908-1993, he was the son of a sub-county chief in Buhweju. He attended Mbarara High 
School, Buddo (1928-1929), Makerere College (1930-1932) where he trained as a teacher and later 
taught at Mbarara High School. He was saved in 1936 and after being expelled from Bishop Tucker 
Theological College in 194 1, he taught at Katoke in Bukoba, Tanzania, which was then a centre for 
Revival (in Tanzania). After his missionary work in Bukoba, he returned to Ankole and remained a 
lay evangelist. He translated the Bible into Runyankole/Rukiga together with Stanley Smith. 
272 Interview: Eliaezer Mugimba, August 1990. 
273 ibid. 
274 Joe Church and Nsibambi had been pioneers in the movement. The word Muzungu is a Swahili 
means a European. 
275 Church, op. cit., p. 127. 
97 
Neighbouring Mbarara High School caught the infection. Twenty students and their 
teacher Mugimba were converted. They started confessing and returning stolen books 
and dining cutlery. Among the converted students was Zablon Kabaza, a Mwiru 
student, who latter became an international preacher and Missions Co-ordinator for 
the Anglican Province of Uganda. 276 But the spread of Revival at Mbarara High 
School met some resistance from teachers because of the wrong approach by the 
young converts. In their zeal to witness to their teachers, these converts violated 
school rules until the Headmaster, A. C. Pain, complained to the chairman of Board of 
Governors: 
disgusted of their extravagant confessions and.... spiritual exhibitionism... if this happens again the matter 
will have to go to the local board of Governors and either they or I will have to go. 
277 
Like the Harmattan wind, by 1950, Revival had spread to many parts of Ankole. Often 
travelling on foot, the teams of abaishemwe preached from one Anglican station to 
another calling people to repentance. Like St Paul, they established fellowship groups 
whenever they won converts and ensured that new groups were nurtured until they 
were strong enough to stand on their own. Ankole was continually strengthened by the 
Balokole from Kampala which had become the central base. By the 1950s Revival in 
Ankole had attracted a formidable following and Clarke reported "a growing number 
of people who are making a new discovery of the saving power of Jesus Christ". 278 
That the movement was growing rapidly is supported by the fact that as early as 1941, 
Revival had already sent some of its converts to Bishop Tucker College training for 
ordination, five of whom were from Ankole. 279 Unfortunately they never finished 
their training for they were expelled for defying College rules; holding prayer 
meetings and preaching at dawn. 280 Apart from Kakudidi who later went back to 
276 Interview: Zab Kabaza, retired Nfissioner, August 8,1994, Kansanga-Kampala. 
277 C. P. Pain, Mbarara High Schooffiles. 
278 Joe Church papers. His son David Church, in Richmond, London, keeps these. (Hereafter now, 
JCP). 
279 See Table 3, "The Subsequent careers of the rebels" in Kevin Ward, 1989, op. cit., p. 218. Ward 
also discusses the Mukono crisis at length. 
280 Ward, op. cit., pp. 204-206. These were Eliaezer Mugimba, a Muhima, Edward Kakudidi, Zakayo 
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finish his ordination course in 1960, the rest remained lay preachers. Perhaps this was 
God's design. As lay people they could travel extensively without impoverishing their 
Sunday congregations. 
By 1960 Revival's impact in Ankole was threefold. The movement had converted 
many adherents of traditional religion to the benefit of the Anglican Church. Secondly 
the movement had managed to bridge the gap between Bairu and Bahima. Through 
the unreserved work of a Mwiru, lay Evangelist Kakudidi, the gospel penetrated 
Bahima grazing fields. 281 Bahima who had lapsed from Christianity at the beginning 
of the century were won back into the Anglican Church. Thirdly, Revival released 
ethnic tensions in Ankole and challenged European pride and superiority complex. 
Many missionaries had indeed suffered from racial prejudice and pride. As Alex 
Kagume rightly says, before Revival which called for a radical social transformation, 
Europeans had taken: 
their own Christian commitment for granted but closely watched the African Christian regardless of the 
period and intensity of his Christian experience to ensure that his devotion was on the right track. 282 
Such challenge was overdue. Though they were missionaries, some mixed little and 
had little social contact apart from routine church work and administration. It was a 
kind of apartheid283 when as early 1925, the missionaries had a rule that: 
Native classes must not be held in, and natives must not sleep in, CMS houses without special 
permission of the standing committee. 284 
J. V. Taylor was in the 1950s appalled at this social seclusion of the missionaries 
from the natives: 
Kagurnire, Andereya Rushegye and Enock Begyira all Bairu. 
281 Interview: Lugimbirwa Enock; see also Kevin Ward, "Tukutendereza Yesu. The Balokole Revival 
in Uganda", in Z. Nthamburi (ed. ), From Mission to Church: A handbook of Christian Christianity 
in East Africa, Nairobi, 199 1. 
282 Alex Kagume, op. cit., p. 48. 
283 Robins, op. cit., p. 205. 
284 Taylor op. cit., p. 89. 
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The fact that a great deal of this was news to me after ten years work as a missionary is only an 
indication of my own shameful ignorance during that time and the remoteness of the ivory castle in 
which most missionaries in Uganda at any rate, were, and are mostly still confined. 
285 
It was this superiority that Revivalists challenged. They called for the same Christian 
standards from all and confronted the missionaries where they failed. 
3.4. REVIVAL AND ETHNICITY. 
Karugire and Tiberondwa seem to suggest that religion was the sole cause of Ankole's 
problems. In my view, religion was also integrated in the ethnic factor thus making 
the whole system complicated. Religion reinforced the already existing divisions and 
therefore should not be taken as the only single factor that polluted Ankole society. 
When Revival came to Ankole, it did not discriminate but spread among both the 
Bairu and Bahima. It challenged social stratification. Since then Bahima and Bairu 
Revivalists have met on equal terms. The converts from both groups confessed what 
they termed as obwiru and obuhima. 286 Thus my interest in Revival is its ability to 
neutralise ethnic tensions and its success in creating a new clan from those ethnically 
and politically polluted. Drawing its membership from the two ethnic groups, it 
provided a platform of equality on which both groups met in mutual respect and love. 
The human barriers, which might have crippled the movement, were openly 
confessed. 287 Church wrote: 
The fellowship is becoming aware of the marked results of the blessing that we have had. Tribal 
distinctions are being swept away in a way we have never seen before. 288 
It came to be accepted that to be Omulokole meant much more than belonging to an 
ethnic group. As one Revivalist told me, to have joined Revival and failed to confess 
285 John Taylor, "The Ugandan Church Today", in IRM, XLVI, April 1957, p. 136. 
286 The quality of being Omwiru or Omuhima. 
287 Interview: Enock Lugimbirwa, May 22,1996, Ruharo. 
288 Church, op. cit., p. 135. 
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ethnic prejudice led to not being taken seriously in the fellowship. 289 There might 
have been an element of prudence in confessing such prejudices to gain trust and 
acceptance within the fellowship. But we need to consider the extent and gravity of 
ethnic tension in the period 1950-1970. The Bahima had lost power to the Bairu who 
through the UPC were working to abolish the monarchy. It was the Revivalists' 
cohesion which enabled them to remain united when the issue of the monarchy was 
tearing the rest apart. They were not entirely successful but they did a great deal 
towards political reconciliation for harmonious development. They saw Revival as an: 
empowering factor over the ethnic bittcmess and the differences [as] Revival was undermining the 
ideological and moral foundations of ethnic inequalities in Ankole [where it] had traditionally been held 
that inequalities were willed and instituted by Ruhanga (God). 290 
Instead of being obsessed with the evils of social inequality, Revival aimed to bring 
everyone into the movement. This was based on their theology that only those who 
confessed their sins would inherit amagara agatahwaho, eternal life. This helped to 
neptralise ethnic conflicts and social imbalances for to be saved meant to be liberated 
not only from sin but also from cultural limitations and superstitions. Hence Bahima 
Revivalists began to eat such food as chicken, which formerly they had held as taboo. 
Mixed marriages remained limited, but were now acceptable. That is how people like 
Amos Betungura (later Bishop of Ankole) and his brother Butukaine married Bahima 
women although they are real Bairu from Buhanama, the Rwampara hills. It was after 
the coming of Revival that we could accept Karugire's theory of a symbiotic 
relationship when Bahima and Bairu Revivalists accepted ethnic diversity. The Bairu 
learnt the cattle culture and Bahima learnt to diversify and were no longer victims of 
famine whenever catastrophe hit their herds. One Muhima told me how Bairu 
Revivalists taught him how to put on trousers and showed him the importance of 
living a settled life. 291 The nomadic life style: 
289 Interview: Canon Kituna, August 12,1996. 
290 Kagume, op. cit., p. 159. 
291 Interview: G. Rwankuba, April 30,1996, Kashenyi. 
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would not fit into the civilised model of the abaishemwe which followed some aspects of western life 
style... in dress.. . tea drinking instead of milk... clothed in 
imported cloth rather than local garments [and] 
sending children to school to learn in the western style and not in that of their own community. 
292 
However while Revival in the Anglican Church influenced social behaviour, the 
Catholic Church was not as effective in bridging the gap between Bairu and Bahima 
simply because there were no Bahima Catholics. 
3.5. REVIVAL AND POLITICS. 
It is something of a paradox that Ankole, where the Revival movement has had such a 
profound impact, should have been the arena of the greatest acute Catholic-Protestant 
tensions, and the throne of sectarianism. From the start Revival had disassociated 
itself from active political involvement and concentrated on converting people for 
eternal life. Balokole considered politics to be "this-worldly" and discouraged 
committed Christians from politics. Another reason for their indifference could be 
their "withdrawal" from what had become a sort of quasi-establishment, with 
privileged position. Protestantism continued to enjoy this position since most of the 
post independence leaders were Anglicans. The Balokole were conscious that power 
corrupts and preferred to concentrate on evangelism. 
But also Revival converts were not the kind of people attracted to politics. 
Many came from humble backgrounds where politics was not considered. Many of 
them were not educated and could not therefore stand up to the third generation post 
independence leaders. This applied to Bairu and Bahima, even if the later had been 
leaders, because pre-colonial politics was quite different from the politics of the 
sixties. In any case not all Bahima had enjoyed exposure to politics. The ruling class 
was from the minority Bahinda distinct from the rest of the Bahima and hardly any 
Muhinda became a Mulokole. Revival attracted ordinary Bahima and Bairu who had 
nothing to do with Orurembo, palace. The Bahinda remained aloof to okujunwa and 
seemed content with the baptismal Christianity. Revival demanded its followers to 
292 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, May 29,1997, Kampala. 
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deny the world and worldly possessions, a theology of self-denial, which the ruling 
Bahima found difficult to embrace. 
When the Bairu embraced Revival, like Christianity, it gave them a social 
identity and raised them to equality where they could preach and speak on the same 
standing as Bahima. For the Bairu, that was enough politics. In Bairu testimonies, 
words of self-pity are frequent. Words like ninye oha (who am 1) signify satisfaction 
with what has been achieved and no addition is needed. 
Mainly the speed of the pre-independence changes was too sudden and left the 
Revivalists rather confused about how to react to the new political situation. The 
sudden speed with which the events occurred between 1957 and 1961 when the first 
national elections were held was too short. It prevented the Balokole from developing 
a mature response. 
Uneducated as many Revivalists were, such people do not attract social 
emulation, and are less interested in political issues. This was different in Buganda 
where Revival attracted educated monarchists like Nagenda and his brother Kigozi, 
both of whom were Buddo and Makerere graduates. On the contrary in Ankole 
graduates from mission schools, like Grace Ibingira, Rwetsiba, Adonia Tiberondwa, 
Ephraim Kamuntu and others, moved to politics rather than Revival movement. This 
educated class rather saw Revival as a lower social class with which they could not 
easily interact. Until the end of the sixties, when Scripture Union and University 
Christian Unions emerged, influenced by western and American evangelicalism, there 
were hardly any professionals among the Revivalists except for the few teachers like 
Mugimba and Phenehas Nyenda. The Revivalists' literalism and their evangelistic 
approach often deterred educated people who might have been otherwise interested. 
Their emphasis on open confession and their demand for testimony did a lot to bar 
educated people from Revival membership. But they did a tremendous job in the field 
of evangelism especially when there were so few clergy in the thirties and fortieS. 293 
However while I acknowledge their contribution to the life of the church in Ankole, I 
regret that they made little emphasis on the need for better-educated clergy. It is a 
293 1 am using the word elite in the sense that, though they were not highly educated, they knew how to 
read and write amidst an illiterate society. 
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generation conflict because it happened to be at a time when hardly any people 
expected to go on and take degrees through the church. 
On the other hand by 1960, there were some educated Revivalists who probably, if 
they had not been Revivalists, would have participated in political activities and were 
qualified enough to take up political office. These were men like Eliaezer Mugimba, 
Eric Sabiiti and Zablon Kabaza. But their evangelistic zeal was "too hot" to consider 
any other vocation than the pulpit. And those who remained in the teaching profession 
like Kabaza and Festo Kivengere (both had been CMS Schools supervisors), found 
those offices enabled them to find enough time for mission work. The schools 
contacts provided an atmosphere in which Revivalists could congregate and students 
be influenced. They were perhaps justified in not joining other professions. Few as 
they were, people like Mugimba, Sabiiti and Kabaza were the hope for the movement 
and if they had had other work would have crippled the movement. 
According to Enock Lugimbirwa, after political parties were introduced in 
Ankole, Revivalists held a meeting at Ruharo in 1961 to discuss whether to 
participate in politics or not. They agreed that members could join parties and vote, 
yet many refrained from political party membership because they suspected that they 
were likely to be implicated in political "sins". 294 However, it is not really, as 
Kasenene says, that Balokole's principle of truth and justice "coincided with the motto 
[peace, unity and justice] of the Democratic Party, DP, and so most of them, 
especially the Bahima joined and voted for the Democratic Party". 295 Had it been so 
then the more zealous Revivalists would have been staunch supporters of DP which 
they were not. Bahima joined DP as protest against the Bairu Protestants who were 
then political rivals. 
But consideration of Revival political participation depends on how we 
define politics. If politics is the art of organising and managing society, social action 
and the desire for a hannonjous society is part of political development. If this is the 
case, then Balokole were indeed political for they participated in the shaping and 
improvement of a society. Through their sermons, moral values were enforced. 
294 Interview: Enock Lugimbirwa, May 22,1996, Ruharo. 
295 Peter Kasenene, op. cit., p. 115. 
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Alcoholic bars complained of a fall in the number of customers. Local chiefs reported 
that social vices like fighting and rape decreased. 296 We should perhaps add that their 
impartiality in party politics later proved a blessing to the Anglican Church especially 
during Amin's period. As I hope to indicate in chapter four, Ankole became the target 
for Amin's sword simply because it was in Ankole that religio-political confrontation 
was more pronounced. The Revivalists who had taken up the leadership of the church 
gave it cover amidst the political storms that threatened to wreck it. Since most of the 
political activists and religious leaders were either dead or in exile, the Balokole 
faithfully steered the Anglican Church and gave people hope amidst the hopeless 
military administration. 
There is little written material on the subject but some of the interviewees 
confirmed my own conviction that Revivalists did not completely ignore politics. 
Bairu Revivalists were inwardly UPC sympathisers while Bahima Revivalists were 
generally DP. It was unlikely that Bairu Revivalists would have voted DP. They 
hardly had any social contact With the Catholics, who tended to dismiss Revival as 
heretical and a Protestant strategy to convert them. 297 Actually the Catholic Bishop 
Kakubi, who admitted that people like Alfred Mutashwera, a renowned Muhima 
Mulokole, represented the Bahima Protestants on the Ankole Catholic Council 
(whose objective was to enhance the interests of the Democratic Party), confirmed the 
Bahima Revivalists support for DP. 298 
While Revivalists did not form a viable political platform, as individuals they joined 
the interested parties that formed the backbone of their different political identities. I 
say back bone in the sense that they were part of the congregations especially in the 
Anglican church where political baptisms was equally encouraged. 
296 This seems to have been the representative view of some of the post independence chiefs in Ankole. 
Some of them, now converts to the movement, admitted that despite its aggressiveness in its 
approach, there was relatively fewer cases for the chiefs to deal %%ith than those areas where Revival 
was not so strong, cf Murumba, Rwakanuma, Gaharubungo, Kamomo and Kahigiriza. All these 
were former county chiefs in the fifties and sixties. 
297 Interview: John Kakubi, September 21,1997, lbanda. 
298 ibid. 
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3.6. REVIVAL: AN ASSESSMENT. 
As I analyse Revival's impact, I do not intend to limit myself to the post Independence 
period but will look at the movement's evolution. I agree with Alex Kagume that 
Revival in Ankole and elsewhere was a supplement to education and an alternative 
means of civilisation especially for the converts who had not enjoyed the benefits of 
western education. 299 Revival's "civilisation" replaced the traditional education. 
Instead of sitting around the evening fire for instruction and story telling, the 
fellowship groups, often arranged in a similar pattern, provided an alternative to a 
practice which was unfortunately being replaced by the western classroom. In the 
fellowship Balokole did not only concentrate on the Bible, they also spared time to 
emphasise hygiene, good stewardship, family relations and counselling. One 
Revivalist told me that the reason they emphasised hygiene was because they believed 
that "cleanliness was next to godliness". 300 Revivalists were among the first people to 
accept western medicine though at the expense and "death" of traditional medicinal 
herbs. Had such herbs been promoted alongside western medicine, they could have 
been an alternative supplement. I do not hold this against the Revivalists any more 
than I do against the missionaries whose teaching shunned as bad most Affican 
values! 
On the whole Revival signified spiritual commitment and emphasised hard 
work: 
The disconcerting fact is that evangelical Christianity, with its gospel of individual conversion, the good 
news of rescue and the power to be different, not only appeals to, but also creates a bourgeoisie. The 
Revival movement for example calls peasant and herdsmen to rise above the rack, morally and 
spiritually. In a very short time they have inevitably risen above it socially. Money that was spent on 
drink or women or divination is put in the home. In a few years husband and wife are justifiably proud of 
their house, of their children, and of their reputation. Even the simple old village women have a new 
outlook; in relation to the peasant society, they are the evolues of society. A new class is being created, 
fashioned by the gospel in alliance with modem alignment. 
301 
299 Kagume op. cit., p. 165. 
300 Interview: Yuda Nyondo, retired, September 6,1996, Ruharo. 
301 Mark Winter, "The Balokole and the Protestant Ethic-A Critique", Journal of religion in Africa, 
vol. XIV, Leiden, 1983, p. 61. 
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Generally Revival encouraged its members to think of laziness as sinful. As a result 
work was taken as part of their spirituality. They believed in self-sufficiency because 
oweishemwe lashega, (brethren do not beg). Such upward social mobility of most 
Balokole in Ankole is a testimony of their hard work. The association between hard 
work, laziness and Christian keenness is evident in Joe Church's notes, some of which 
testify to the efforts of the Revivalists known to me: 
I wish you could see everyone, from Kosiya Shalita downwards, hard at work cultivating the soil. [And 
in the usual European egoism], We had a great deal of difficulty about getting this started when we first 
came here as the Aftican is, left to his own, bone lazy and those in receipt of mission, they wanted to be 
exempted and did not cultivate as they should. But now we are getting splendid fruits [enjoying without 
working] and they are enjoying the results of the sweat of their brows, and are all the better for it in 
every way... 302 
Of course the Revivalists had the advantage of associating with the missionaries who 
were sparing with their resources. The Revivalists adopted the practice of not being 
"wasteful and extravagant". The 1950s and the 1960s were years of economic boom in 
Uganda from increased coffee and cotton production. In addition, Revivalists' 
children who had gone to school were in the sixties graduating from colleges as the 
country's elite and taking up jobs in independent Uganda. Most leading post 
independence leaders in Ankole and in Uganda were sons of the Revivalists or church 
workers. William Rwetsiba's father was the first clergyman in Ankole, Adonia 
Tiberondwa's mother was a renowned evangelist, Yoweri Museveni, the current 
President of Uganda, Grace Ibingira and Milton Obote (the first executive Prime 
Minister in a post independent Uganda) came from a similar background. 
It is not as Kikuri claims that Revivalists were able to educate their children because 
Balokole children were given priority in admissions to mission controlled schoolS. 303 
The Balokole were quick to take the advantage of the available educational 
opportunities, perceiving their first obligation to be their children's education. It was a 
cause of rapid social transformation in colonial Uganda and the Balokole were among 
302 See Mrs Sharp letters in Kagume op. cit., p. 171. 
303 Interview: Ezra Kikuri, June 12,1997, Bushenyi. 
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those who grasped the opportunity. They regarded education more highly than most 
other social groups in Uganda and so were in the vanguard. Catherine Robins agrees. 
In her 
survey of students in one of the two formerly Protestant schools ... provided additional 
indirect 
confirmation of the effects of the "progressive" economic and social ethic of the brethren particularly as 
it relates to education ... Among a sample 
including all students in the first two years, 65 percent reported 
that one or both of their parents were Balokole. As there is no evidence to suggest systematic over 
selection of children from such families for the available places in the secondary school this ... must 
be 
taken as further evidence of the extraordinary importance attached by the brethren to education. In a 
population. where Balokole comprise no more that 5 -10 percent of the baptised church members, the 
prevalence of their children in secondary schools, which still serve as a major channel of mobility, 
suggest that revival community as a whole is experiencing a process of rapid transformation. 
304 
Lastly and perhaps equally important was Revival's ability to raise the social status of 
women. Ankole culture before the coming of Christianity and Revival was so 
oppressive to women that they were not allowed talking amidst men, or eating foods 
such as goat meat and chicken. One informant told me how his father was opposed to 
his mother's membership in the Revival because he was worried that she would be 
4'uncontrollable". He said to her, naiwe noyenda kuba kyeyombekire, an expression 
that applies to unmarried women because they determine their own pace in the 
absence of a man to do it for them. Thus commenting on the Revival's attitude to 
women, Sundkler asserted: 
Revival has lifted hundreds of women and given them a new role, a new sense of personal worth. I do 
not know of any factor in East Affica, which to that extent has served to emphasise equality between 
sexes. 305 
Monica Wilson also observed of Christianity generally: 
304 Robins, op. cit. P. 362. 
305 Bengt Sundkler, "Worship and Spirituality", in Gray, Fashole-Luke, et al, (eds. ), Christiatfily iii 
Indepeyidwil Aftica, London: Rex Collings, p. 55 1. 
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If the change in social relationships between men and women is to be the greatest world revolution of 
the twentieth century, altering the nature of human relationships more profoundly than the Russian or 
Chinese revolutions or even the emergence of the Third World, then the Churches in Africa are uniquely 
placed to take over a major part in this. 306 
However, whereas as seen above Revival went along away to bridge the ethno- 
political tensions between Bairu and Bahima, for example through the former's hard 
work and education for their children, both of which raised their socio-economic 
status and even through such other teachings as "walking in light" and public 
confessions, it may be argued that the ethnicity element never died in both groups. For 
example, one of the signs that would have indicated that the ethno-centrism element 
especially among the Bahima died, as a result of their total commitment to the gospel 
of Revival, would have been intermarriage. However as far as the researcher is aware, 
there were no Bahima men Revivalists who married Revivalist Bairu women even 
when Bairu would have been more than ready to many Bahima for socio-economic 
status reasons. A further proof of the point in question is that even when by the sixties 
marriages between Revivalists were arranged by the Revival fellowship meetings and 
not individuals, few Bahima women accepted Bairu men. 
Another proof that Revival never completely eradicated ethno-centrism in 
each of the Bairu and Bahima camps, is the fact that with the advent of party politics, 
the majority of Bahima Protestants allied with Catholics to vote DP and in order to 
alienate Bairu Protestants. As far as Bahima were concerned, the Catholic Bairu were 
not a threat to the Bahima because, having used them as ladders to achieve their 
ethnic interests, the former would be thrown back to join fellow Protestant Bairu 
under the later's subjugation. The tactic was that by joining the Catholics, the Bahima 
would reduce Protestant numbers thereby increasing the Catholic numbers to defeat 
the Protestant Bairu. This kihima political manoeuvre made the Protestant Bairu 
Revivalists fall back to their fellow Protestant UPC Bairu in order to defend 
themselves against the said alliance. 
306 Monica Wilson, "Co-operation and Conflict: The Eastern Cape Frontier", in M. Wilson and L. 
Thompson (eds. ), South Aftica to 1870, Oxford, 1969, p. 266. 
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A recent indication that confirms the failure of Revival to uproot the ethno- 
political centrism from the two ethnic groups is when in 1992 during the Synod, the 
Bahima, minority as they are, demanded for a separate diocese in the Northeast of 
Ankole diocese. True the majority of the inhabitants in this part of Ankole are not 
Bahima. However on the pretext that this area comprising two counties of Kazo and 
Nyabushozi is traditionally known to be a Bahima area, the later hoped they would 
gain an upper hand in the administration of the new diocese. The thinking behind this 
was that such a new diocese would be a forerunner of their own civic/political district 
in which they would be free from the Bairu majority dominance. 
It may be observed therefore that Revival has not entirely succeeded in 
bridging the ethnic differences between the Bairu and the Bahima mainly because 
each of the two groups has a distinct culture from the other and is proud to preserve it. 
Having argued thus, the ethnic differences in Ankole have not been as grave as it is in 
Rwanda mainly because of two reasons; the positive influence of the church and 
Revival in particular and the upward social mobility of Bairu thanks to the cash 
economy. In a way they no longer see Bahima as a privileged class. In fact Bairu see 
themselves as having superseded Bahima economically and this has neutralised what 
would have been otherwise an explosive situation of the 1940s. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. DISASTER FOR THE CHURCH IN ANKOLE: THE AMIN PERIOD 
1971-1979. 
4.0. INTRODUCTION. 
Amin's regime had a lasting impact on the politics of the country, and Ankole in 
particular. Political opponents, both real and imagined, were eliminated, especially 
prominent UPC and some DP supporters while others fled into exile. Though initially 
populist and received with widespread jubilation, Amin soon showed his true colours. 
Perhaps that is why in Ankole, Amin was received with mixed feelings, for, as Ezra 
Kikuri307 comments, the people of Ankole were already too divided to choose 
between Obote and Amin: there were political party (UPC-DP) divisions, UPC 
liberals vs. UPC radicals, as well as the Bair-u-Bahima power struggles. 
Amin's rule stifled the religious, ethnic and political party bickering that had 
characterised the Obote era. For Amin soon began to surround himself with his own 
Kakwa, Madi and Lugbara tribesmen, in the army and government, as well as 
Muslims, and Sudanese-Nubian mercenaries. For the first time in the history of 
Christianity in Ankole, Catholics and Protestants were united against a common 
enemy. Political conflicts and party loyalties were forgotten and the Bairu-Bahima 
conflict in Ankole was shelved in AmiTfs massacres by the dreaded State Research 
Bureau which was carrying out political, ethnic and religious (Christian) persecution. 
In this chapter therefore, I argue that whereas initially various forces had 
welcomed Amin in Ankole, as early as 1972, they began to withdraw after many 
Banyankole were killed. Secondly, contrary to the popular view that the Catholic 
Church welcomed Amin due to its DP inclinations, it was as reserved about Amin as 
the Anglican church. The two Churches were uncertain how the Muslim leader was 
likely to treat Christianity. The Anglican Church had more reason to be sceptical of 
Amin for he had toppled an establishment of which they had been a part. And though 
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Muslims welcomed and supported Amin, this does not mean that all Muslims in 
Ankole consequently participated in the murder of Amin's opponents. It is true that 
Amin persecuted political opponents who happened to be Christians, but by 1974, 
Amin had identified the Christian church, as being against his regime. Consequently 
he charged against it and the collision resulted in the death of the Anglican 
Archbishop Luwum. Hence Amin's indiscriminate persecution of people in Ankole 
brought down religio-political and ethnic antagonisms and brought all the vulnerable 
groups into a strong opposition to the regime. 
4.0.1. THE PERILOUS ASCENT TO POWER. 
What caused Amin's usurpation of power in Uganda? Four major factors can be cited. 
The role of the military in the 1966 crisis which brought the army to the fore. In his 
bid to subdue Buganda and other opponents, Obote had arrested Grace lbingira and 
four other ministers because Daudi Ochieng (Member of Parliament) sought a vote of 
no confidence against Obote's government after the gold scandal. Obote had hastily 
promoted Colonel Amin, his most trusted Officer, to Army Chief of Staff in direct 
command. 308 When Idi Amin and the army engaged in the bloody attack on the 
Kabakaýs Lubiri (Palace) on May 24,1966, massacred loyalists and overthrew the 
Mengo government by force of arms, Obote created a dangerous precedent. He taught 
the army the means of repression which they later applied against him. It gave Idi 
Amin (then promoted to Major General) power to challenge Obote when occasion 
offered. His policies, particularly his 1969 "move to the left", a socialist manifesto 
which resulted in the "Common Man's Charter" met with great suspicion from the 
local middle class, his political opponents and the international community that was 
already sensitive to the cold war Soviet-Western tensions. As Garth Glentworth notes, 
the Army was quick to exploit these suspicions: 
307 Interview: Ezra Kikuri. 
308 See for instance-, Campbell Horace, 1, our Emays on neo-colonialism in Uganda: The military 
Dictatorship ofAmin, CNTU, Ontario, 1975; S. Karugire, A Political History of Uganda, Nairobi: 
Heinemann Educational Books, 1980; James Mittleman, Ideology and Politics in Uganda: From 
Obole to Amin, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
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Amin and his ffiends in the army, Cabinet Ministers like Felix Onama in Defence, Senior Public Servants, 
politicians and party officials - all of them saw the "move to the left" as a strategy to exclude them from 
access to power, wealth and status, as a threat to their personal safety and as a series of steps to increase 
the domination of Obote's own tribe, the Langi, and to a lesser extent the Acholi, over other tribes .... 
309 
Obote's divide and rule tactics promoted tribal hostility between the Langi and the 
Acholi and the other groups, both in the army and civil service. Similar sectarian 
scheming had brought Amin, an illiterate non-commissioned officer, to a position in 
which he influenced the chain of command. Because of Amin's threat, Obote 
promoted his tribesmen. In the end, supporters of Amin and Obote were headed for 
bloody confrontation. In his testimony to the Commission of Inquiry into Human 
Rights Violation in Uganda, Adimola reports that after 1966, both Obote and Amin 
started recruiting clansmen into the national army, which created conflicting camps. 
He asserts that it was this division that led to the military coup of 1971.310 Major 
General Francis Nyangweso and General Mustafa Adrisi (who was Amin's Vice 
President in 1977) confirm the existence of this division in the army, and that Amin's 
faction architected the CoUp. 311 Mustafa Adrisi in his testimony says: 
Ainin had been sent to Cairo to represent government at the burial of Nasser. During his absence, Obote 
convened a meeting of Langi and Acholi officers where Amin was accused of killing Okaya. It was 
therefore resolved that Amin should be killed.... We were informed of such a meeting by the late Oboth 
Ofumbi. We rang Amin in Cairo. When lie returned we waited for, and received him at Entebbe Airport 
and escorted him to the Command Post.... So, when Obote was going to Singapore, he left orders that 
he wanted to find Amin dead. So a plot was hatched by Langis and Acholis in the Army to have Amin 
arrested and killed but Amin had his own intelligence and discovered the plot on time. Only Langi and 
the Acholis were armed and they started secret meetings. We became suspicious. West Nilers started 
beating up those in meetings and dispersing them.... West Nile boys went and used nails to start the 
309 Garth Glentworth and Ian Hancock, "Obote and Amin: Change and Continuity in Modem Uganda 
Politics", in African Affairs, October 1973, p. 247. 
3 10 Rt, 11 tj niI, Mi of Justice and . por, of the Commission of Inquiry into Violatio of 
H ma R gh s nistry 
Constitutional Affairs, Kampala, 1994, pp. 23-24, (Hereafter Commission of Inquiry). 
311 ibid. 
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engines of APCs for breaking the door to the armoury. So we got armed and that marked the end of 
Obote's government. 312 
Finally, it can be noted from the above testimony that Amin's coup was also a bid to 
save his neck. It was not only because of his factional intrigues that he felt threatened 
but also because of his dubious deals and the stealing of the army funds. The Auditor- 
General's report had unearthed the embezzlement of 3040 million shillings from 
army funds and Amin and Felix Onama were required to account for the money upon 
Obote's return from the Commonwealth conference in Singapore. 313 On 24 January 
1971, Obote's plan to have Amin arrested failed. The following day, on 25 January 
1971, Amin took power and issued 18 reasons for the coup d'etat. The long list 
accused Milton Obote of abuse of human rights, biased tribal promotions, 
disappearance of people, abolition of kingdoms, detention without trial and many 
others. It is ironical that none of the remedies promised were fulfilled. Amin 
capitalised on Obote's unpopularity and hoped to be accepted on that ground. But the 
18 reasons seen from now appear to have been Amin's manifesto for his dictatorship. 
The only purpose they served throughout his rule was to provide a yardstick by which 
his crimes against humanity could be judged. 
4.0.2. MIXED REACTION IN ANKOLE. 
Amin's take over was received with widespread jubilation especially in Buganda. The 
Baganda had every reason to celebrate the ousting of a man who not long ago had 
attacked their Kabaka's palace, massacred royalty, abolished their kingdom, erased 
their privileges, subjected Buganda to a state of emergency and condemned their king 
to exile in London where he later died. 314 No doubt Obote had desecrated their 
kingdom and Amin, the man who had led the palace attack, was now their Messiah. 
The Anglican Bishop of West Buganda was quick to describe Amin as a "redeemer" 
312 ibid., pp. 4243. 
313 E. Muhima, 7he Fellowship of Suffering. - A 7heological Interpretation of Chrislian Suffering under 
Amin, PhD dissertation, Northwestern University, 1981, p. 15. 
314 See Kirunda-Kivejinja, 1995, Uganda: 7he Crisis of Confidence, Kampala: Progressive Puhlishing 
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and "the light of God. "315 Perhaps to make the Baganda forget his own role in the 
demise of their Kingdom, Amin ended the six-year martial law in Buganda, and in 
May 1971316, returned the body of Kabaka Muteesa 11 for burial with full honours and 
a lot of pomp; five days of national mourning were declared. As Judith Listowel has 
put it, Amin knew he had to appease the Baganda, so "the Kabaka's funeral was very 
important and his personal prestige depended not only on its taking place but also on 
its being done well. "317 
In Ankole, however, the population was apparently so divided that Amin 
was received more with mixed feelings than outright celebration, especially among 
the elite who had been very active in the partisan politics of the sixties. I stress the 
elite because of the nature of politics in Ankole then. Though the Protestant elite in 
Buganda had been thoroughly alienated by 1971, there was a substantial group of 
Protestant politicians, especially the Bairu, in Ankole who still supported Obote. And 
one of the reasons why the history of the two areas is different is that Amin seemed to 
have had a problem with what to do with that big, powerful influential group of 
people with many followers. While there was ready-made support in Buganda, Amin 
needed to work hard to gain similar support in Ankole. Amin's mixed reception was 
the result of the religio-political cleavages that had divided the Ankole society. 
Certainly DP members in Ankole, mainly Bairu Catholics and Bahima 
Protestants, had cause to celebrate the ascent of Amin for they had been suppressed in 
Ankole politics. As one anonymous DP supporter said, DP as a party quietly 
welcomed Amin's coup as its opportunity to return to the political forum. While UPC 
in Ankole was going underground for fear of political repression, DP had resurfaced 
with a hope that it would start influencing political events. 318 But this was a short- 
lived expectation. Amin soon banned all political parties. The UPC liberals 
(Omufunguro) had also celebrated Obote's exit, for by the time of the Amin coup they 
House. 
315 See, 7he New Day newspaper of 27 January 1971, quoted in Muhima op. cit., p. 27. 
316 See Adam, Seftel. 1994, Uganda: Me Bloodwained Pearl of Africa and its Struggle for Peace, 
Kampala: Fountain Publishers, pp. 94-95. 
317 Judith Listowel, 1973, Amin, New York: fUP Books, p. 85. 
318 Interview: Anonymous, June 12,1997, Ruti-Mbarara. 
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had almost become another "opposition party" within a party. This therefore explains 
why certain groups welcomed Amin's coup in Ankole on one hand and why the 
reaction of the Banyankole can be described as "mixed". Dr. Tiberondwa recounts the 
scenario after the coup: 
When Amin took over, the militant UPC led by Bananuka was associated with Obote who was 
overthrown. The Kahigiriza group, which had been more dilute UPC, tended to be closer to Amin and 
he was closer to them because Amin had overthrown Obote who had leaned more towards the UPC 
Enkomba in Ankole. The Kahigiriza group tended to support Amin's coup. 
319 
Actually Bahima pastoralists gave Idi Amin 700 cattle as a sign of appreciation when 
he visited Ankole in August 1971.320 The Ankole elders (a newly coined category of 
hand-picked notables assumed to represent public opinion) in their memorandum to 
Idi Amin on 23 August 1971 in Mbarara, talked of an even grander reception for the 
take over: 
Your Excellency, permit us also to take this opportunity on behalf of the people of Ankole to thank you 
for the honour you did us and the love you showed us by visiting our district only a few days ago. Your 
visit, which had been long and anxiously awaited, was hailed by thousands of people in Ankole, as it 
enabled you to see for yourself the undoubted support that your Excellency commands in the district. 
321 
'Me magnitude of the "undoubted support" seems to be exaggerated. This is not 
surprising. Some of the Elders question the authenticity of this memorandum. 322 "The 
undoubted support" gives the impression that Amin was overwhelmingly welcomed in 
Ankole. Though the various groups may have welcomed him as an alternative to UPC 
and Protestantism, they were also aware that Amin had never been in their camp. He 
was never DP, a Catholic, a Muhima or even a UPC Omufunguro. 
319 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, June 25,1997, Kampala. 
320 Interviews: Yowasi Makaru, 29 March 1997 and Ezra Kikuri. See also Rev Aaron Mwesigye's, 
(then a primary school boy) poem praising Amin's heroism when the later visited Kazo Primary 
School in 1971. 
3 21 Uganda News, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kampala, 24 August 197 1. Quoted from 
M. Doornbos, Regalia Galore: 7he Decline and Fclipse of A nkole Kingship, Nairobi: East Aftican 
Literature Bureau, 1975, p, 14 1. 
322 It is thought that Amin influenced the authorship of these Elders' Memoranda to "decampain" the 
Buganda demands for the monarchy restoration. 
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4.1. AMIN, THE MONARCHY AND POLITICAL PARTIES. 
One of the things on Amin's agenda was to suspend political party activities. 
323 He 
specifically targeted political parties and the renewed agitation of Baganda 
monarchists for the restoration of the abolished Kingdoms. It was clear from the 
outset that Amin neither supported the monarchists nor any multi-party system 
although he was quick to arrange, for public relations purposes, a grandiose funeral 
for the Kabaka of Buganda. He declared that the people would be '... free to join any 
political party and will be free to vote for the people they want. 1324 In their 
memorandum to General Idi Amin Dada on 24 August 1971, the elders, Bataka, of 
Buganda, boldly pointed out that: 
Baganda had never known what independence is until you liberated us on 25th January 1971. This is 
why we went wild with joy and jubilation. 325 
They pointed out their major grievances against Obote. He had abolished their 
Kingdom and "ordered us not to mourn over our dead king and used guns to disperse 
those who had gone to pray for the dead at Namirembe. "326 The Baganda resented 
Obote so much that they hailed Idi Amin as a saviour, and Amin, well knowing that 
he had been the chief agent of Obote's aggression on Mengo, had to appease them. 
Bishop Yoramu Bamunoba says: 
The Baganda were excited because they expected the return of the monarchy. That is why Amin 
returned the Kabaka's body immediately. The Baganda had thought that the return of the Kabaka's body 
was a sign of good will for the monarchy. But Amin was foresighted enough and disassociated himself 
from it. In any case he had been behind the destruction of the Lubiri. 327 
323 See M. Doornbos, op. cit., p. 142. 
324 See point No. 4, in Ifis 18 points; see also Multima, op. cit., p. 18. 
325 Uganda News, Ministry of Information and broadcasting, Kampala: 24 August 197 1. Quoted in 
Martin Doombos, op. cit., p. 144. 
326 ibid, p. 145. 
327 Yoramu Bamunoba, Interview, 24 June 1997. 
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That is why the Baganda had expressed concern in August 1971, over- 
... the very 
important issue being spoken about, almost in a propaganda form, particularly in our two 
English daily papers, over the radio and UTV, against the restoration of kingship in Buganda. 
328 
It seems to me that Amin was mobilising for anti-monarchy sentiments to eclipse 
Buganda! s demands as a national issue versus parochial nationalism. He got the 
support he needed: the elders of Kigezi in their strongly worded memorandum 
completely disassociated themselves from Buganda's desire to restore the monarchy, 
calling it "a retrogressive step.,, 329 In Ankole, the elderS330 (1971) were quick to 
repudiate the Baganda plea for the monarchy: 
Your Excellency, in our view, the question concerning the restoration of kingdoms is one of those 
crucial matters, which we feet should not be raised or even discussed in the second Republic of Uganda 
because of the folloNkring reasons: 
(a) It is your declared policy that all political activities are suspended at the present time. The restoration 
of the kingdoms would most likely revive political divisions and factionalism contrary to the declared 
policy of govermnent. It is our view that if Uganda is to develop as a strong united sovereign nation, any 
divisive tendencies must not be allowed to emerge. (b) The country at the moment faces a very heavy 
deficit, the country's financial position can not therefore sustain any expenditure connected with the 
restoration of the kingdoms. In addition, the kingship imposes all sorts of indirect taxation, all of which 
are undesirable. 
(c) Present circumstances demand that all our efforts and resources in the second Republic of Uganda 
should be concentrated on the economic and social reforms of, the country for the benefit of many, 
instead of being used to enhance the prestige of a few individuals. (d) The people in district Idngdoms 
have in the past shown a tendency of divide and rule loyalty between their former rulers and central 
government. For the military Government to consolidate its programme of re-organising unimpeded a 
situation which tends to create divided loyalty among the people must be avoided at all costs. (e) The 18 
points declared by the soldiers on the take over of government included the statement that Uganda will 
continue to be a Republic. This was further repeated at the State House, Entebbe, where the 
328 See M. Doombos, op. cit., p. 144. 
329 ibid, p. 150. 
330 We need to note that the idea of Elders in Ankole is rather a vague term because it can be a 
changing combination of different groups according to the political situation at the time. For 
instance the elders surrounding the Omugabe were different from the elders who are involved in 
modem politics. 
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representatives of the royal famýilies were, present. it would be going back on the soldier's word if we 
started talking about the restoration of kingdoms. Government must not give in to pressures of this 
kind. 331 
Whether or not the above strong worded message represented popular will, or was 
purely sponsored by Amin for propagandist purposes against Buganda, is hard to 
establish, but what is clear from its signatories is that it was representative of Ankole's 
political leadership; Bairu and Bahima, Protestants, Catholics, and Muslims as well as 
various party functionaries. Significant is the fact that the former Omugabe of Ankole 
gave it his blessing. To quote Doornbos: 
... the 
Ankole memorandum's greatest significance lay perhaps not in argumentation or even its 
endorsement, but in the fact that the representatives who subn-dtted it to General Amin included Ankole's 
ex-Omugabe, Gasyonga H. This rather unique fact - an ex-king requesting the non-restoration of 
kingship-appears important no matter which of two possible motives might have been at play: whether it 
was Gasyonga! s own will and initiative to be included among the party, or whether others had pressed 
him to lend his name on it. 332 
The king could have acted out of fear, for Idi Amin had been to visit him at his home 
and had reportedly offered him some unspecified assistance, before he denounced the 
monarchy. 333 it may therefore be a political gimmick from Amin. He was like 
President Kongi, in Wole Soyinkaýs Kongi's Harvesi, who wanted the traditional king, 
Oba Danlola, to hand over the symbolic Yam to him after the harvest as a sign of 
political submission. 
As in Buganda, Idi Amin made gestures to appease the Ankole monarchists who hated 
the previous regime. He was often reported in the press courting the company of 
Omugabe Gasyonga and he appointed Prince Bangye, the Omugabe's son, as an 
Ambassador though barely a year later, the latter quit the diplomatic service when 
331 Uganda Arews, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Kampala, Uganda, 24h August 1971, 
quoted in Doombos, op. cit., pp. 195-197. Some of these elders are still living but were not ready to 
comment about the authenticity of this quotation. Rather than deny it, many simply said that they 
did not remember it. 
332 ibid, pp. 193-194. 
333 Interview: Yowasi Makaru, June 16,1997, Butsibo. 
119 
Amin murdered his younger brother, Ruhinda, a lawyer, in 1972.334 James Kahiginza, 
the ex-Enganzi and a die-hard monarchist, was made the Chairman of Uganda Land 
Board. These gestures to monarchists were sheer political opportunism, for Amin had 
declared in the press that he would never restore the kingdoms as long as he was 
President of Uganda. 335 Although he courted the Omugabe, it is clear that he 
expected an anti-monarchy response from Ankole. Unlike Buganda, Amin knew that 
Ankole needed no convincing. He was aware of the Bairu Protestants' hatred for the 
monarchy and, since they formed the majority of the Ankole society, Amin was 
prepared to use it for his own political advantage. Therefore, when Amin sought to 
subject Bugan&s monarchy demands to a nation-wide democratic debate, and urged 
Buganda to lobby for support in District Councils of the fortner kingdoms, he was 
already sure of success in his plan to thwart Buganda! s hopes and abolish the 
Kabakaship. 
Amin summoned all the former traditional rulers and elders from all parts 
of the country to State House Entebbe. Many went with their traditional drums ready 
for a celebration, expecting that he had called them to announce the restoration of 
their old glories. After a very lavish meal, monarchists had the rude shock of hearing 
Lt. Col. Ocima read a statement, allegedly on behalf of soldiers in the Uganda armed 
forces, giving full power to General Amin to r-ule for at least five years and spelling 
out clearly that there would be no return of Kings and Kingdoms. According to 
Bukabeba, "their drums which had come sounding to State House, went back as heavy 
loads on their backs or as chairs in the lorries and Vans in which they travelled. "336 
From then on, enthusiasm began to wane among the monarchists. 
We need not be surprised that Amin had no interest in restoring the monarchies. He 
hailed from a district where traditional chiefs did not have the same influence and 
power as kings. If Amin were to restore the monarchy, then he would have been 
undermining his own political base. It is unlikely that monarchists would have given 
him the same respect as they would their king. Amin had courted monarchists when in 
334 James H. Nfittleman, IdeoloSyandPoliticsiii Uganda: From Obole to Amin, Ithaca: Comclia 
University Press, 1975, p. 237. 
335 Uganda Argus, II October 1971. 
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need of support. They had been oppressed under the previous regime and if he could 
identify with them, then in return they would support him. But after he had 
established himself, Amin realised that he no longer needed them. His power base 
now was his tribe, his religion and to a large extent his mentors, the Arab world. 
We now turn our attention to a brief discussion of Idi Amin's attitude to 
political parties, notably UPC and DP. In a meeting with all Permanent Secretaries 
and Heads of Security two days after his take over, Amin had initially promised that 
he would restore those political parties which Obote had banned, and that Obote's 
UPC would be allowed to participate. Even ex-President Obote was free to return 
home as a private citizen. 337 Consequently, 55 political detainees of the previous 
regime, including the five former ministers, were all released. The significance of this 
release lies in the fact that Grace Ibingira, a Munyankole monarchist and a very close 
relation of the Omugabe of Ankole, was one of them. However, at the time of his 
arrest in 1965 Ibingira's political manoeuvres to install Kahigiriza as the Enganzi of 
Ankole against the popular wish had made him unpopular, and therefore his release 
was greeted with little enthusiasm especially among the UPC radicals. But for the 
Bahima, the release of lbingira was a sign of good will fTom Amin and consolidated 
their trust in him. Ibingira was immediately appointed Uganda! s Ambassador and 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Though Amin might have appointed 
seasoned politicians like Ibingira or Ben Kiwanuka338 on their own merit, it was true 
that he did it in order to keep them within his shooting range, for, as events were to 
prove soon, Amin would vouchsafe no form of dissension. 
On 15 March 1971, he issued the Suspension of Political Activities Decree, which 
went against the 18 reasons in which he had accused Obote of, "the lack of freedom in 
the airing of different views on political and social matters.,, 339 On the whole people 
3 36 Interview: Emmy Bukabeba, May 22,1997, Kakyeka. 
337 See Muhima, op. cit., pp. 18- 19. 
338 Kiwanuka who Amin had appointed the Chief Justice of Uganda immediately after his release was 
killed on Friday 22 September 1972, a week after the abortive guerrilla invasion from Tanzania. See 
his biography by AJbert Bade, Betwdicto Kiwantika: The Afan mid his Politics, Kampala: Fountain 
Publishers, p. 160. 
339 See Jan Jelmert Jorgensen, Uganda: A Afodeni History, London: Billing and Sons, 198 1, Chapter 6. 
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in Ankole were rather indifferent to the ban on political parties. 340 The fear and force 
of the previous regime and the conflicts between the parties had left them 
uninterested. 341 When parties were banned, in Ankole, Amin was hailed as a 
champion of unity by a society exhausted by the political skirmishes of the past. With 
the UPC ruling party in hiding, DP had no cause to protest since it was already 
powerless. According to Bonefasi Byanyima: 
We hailed Amin the more when he banned parties for we, as DP had nothing to lose, at least for the time 
being. We welcomed it as an opportunity to reorganise in the hope that we would later emerge in a 
strong position. 342 
That opportune moment never came. The ban remained in effect until 1980 when 
ftesh elections were held under a new regime. Instead of seeing the ban imposed on 
parties as Amin's move to suffocate freedom of expression, people in Ankole 
welcomed it as a positive alternative to what they had been subjected to. Under the 
new law, not more than three people were to be seen together at any one given time 
except of course if they were a family. The banning of parties in Ankole created two 
positive results. One was that people shelved their political differences and got on 
well together. Secondly, people who had previously been politicians and who had not 
gone into exile or been killed began to be actively involved in church activities. 343 
Such were politicians like Yowasi Makaru and Francis Bagarukayo (later ordained). 
340 Interview: Joram Kahenano, July 22,1997, Kampala. 
341 Interview: Rev. George Nkoba, May 4,1997, Ibanda. 
342 Interview: Bonefasi Byanyima, June 16,1997, Ruti-Mbarara. 
343 Interview: Bishop William Magambo, August 15,1997, Bweranyangi. 
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4.2. AMIN AND THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. 
When we were analysing the various forces that did or did not welcome Amin's 
regime in Ankole, we said that DP welcomed it. Since DP was associated with the 
Catholic Church, we might assume that the Catholic Church344 in Ankole also 
welcomed Amin. But both the Catholic and Anglican churches were apprehensive of 
a Muslim leader of 'what we had come to take for granted as a Christian country' as 
one Bishop put it. On the other hand, Amin's ascent to power was not a surprise to the 
church. According to Bishop John Kakubi, it had received so many shocks over 
political antagonisms that nothing Amin could do would surprise them. However, the 
church seemed to have given Amin the benefit of the doubt especially when he 
advertised himself as a "God fearing man, '345 and when five days after his coup, he 
held a conference at which he urged the religious leaders to admonish him if he went 
wrong. Bishop Amos Betungura, the Anglican Bishop at the time, said that though the 
church was initially reserved about Amin and doubtful about his usurpation of power: 
We were consoled by the fact that, that Muslim leader unlike others did not shy away from confirming to 
the country that he believed in God. This was rare of leaders we had in the past. 346 
Even Bishop Kivengere, a man who later became Amin's stem critic, could not hide 
his admiration of the optimism he found in the country on his return from his 
Evangelistic mission in Papua, New Guinea: 
The Anglican Archbishop told me with some amazement that the new Muslim President had urged all 
Ugandans to be faithful in worship at their churches or Mosque. He said to the archbishop with a thumb 
344 DP and the Catholic Church have often been seen to be the same thing but this is wrong. The 
Catholic Church is an institution whose followers happen to identify with DP. Thus the distinction 
in this case is a structural one since the two are governed governed differently. 
345 See Louise M. Pirouet, "Religion in Uganda under Amin", in Jinirnal of Religion in Afirica A7, 
1980, p. 17; See also Garth Glentworth and Ian Hancock, "Obote and Amin: Change and 
Continuity in Modem Uganda Politics", in African Affairs, October, 1973, p. 247, and "Speech by 
HE, The president Idi Amin Dada, on the Occasion of Meeting religious Leaders of Church of 
Uganda at Namirembe", 26 April, 1971; Also in Akena Adoko, From Obote to Obole, New Delhi: 
Vicas Publishing House, 1993, p. 142. 
346 Interview: Bishop Betungura, August 12,1997, Ruharo. 
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on the back, "Archbishop, I want your help and advice. If you see anything wrong, come to me at once. " 
We were astonished and pleased. 347 
Perhaps surprisingly, it was the Anglican Church in Ankole which was first to send a 
congratulatory message to the new regime: 
At the meeting of the Diocesan Council Executive Committee of the Ankole Diocese sitting at St. James' 
Cathedral, Ruharo, on 5th, Apffl, 19711 and acting in the name of the Diocese, and on behalf of the 
Diocesan Council, we, the members of the Executive, passed a unanimous resolu6on congratulating 
your Excellency,... on your successfiil take-over of the government of Uganda. The Committee recorded, 
with sincere loyalty to your Excellency, a vote of humble and deep appreciation of your God-fearing 
spirit, which is very predominant in your philosophy of life and administration. The Committee noted, 
with respect, Your Excellency's love of God in your life and practice, and your Excellency's principles of 
non-victin-ýisation and forgiveness. 348 
And another local Parish in Bushenyi went on to liken Idi Amin to Moses who had 
rescued the Israelites from bondage: 
I Rev. W. Tibategyeza together with the Christians of this Parish, Kyanyakatura, congratulate and 
welcomes [sic] you with your Anned forces for having taken over the government of Uganda. In 
Scripture it says, "When God saw that his people of Israel were suffering during the reign of Pharaoh, 
He sent Moses to save them. " Now you are the one who is sent by God to save the people of Uganda 
fTom slaveiy. Indeed you Dada has saved us. Thanks be to God. 349 
One would have expected the Catholic Church to respond first because of its 
association with DP. in any case the Catholic Cardinal at Rubaga. had already praised 
Amin: 
347 Festo Kivengere, (Bishop), I Love Idi Amin, London: Cox & Wyman Ltd., 1977, p. 18. 
348 See, 'Ankole Diocese Executive Committee Back the New Government, in Government File 
GND/R12, EAD, Mbarara. 
349 Same File as above. By then Ankole Diocese had not been divided into two. This Parish now 
belongs to West Ankole Diocese - Bushenyi (created in January 1977 just two weeks before the 
death of Archbishop Luwum). 
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The Major General has saved us and he has forgiven all people who wronged him and nothing like 
bloodshed has taken place ever since the take over. 350 
In fact in this regard the Cardinal was deceived: there were many people especially 
the Langi and the Acholl who lost their lives immediately after the coup. But the 
Cardinal could have meant the blood of the Baganda who had been subjected to a 
state of emergency in the previous regime. According to Bishop Kakubl, the Catholic 
Church in Ankole sent no congratulation because: 
the Cardinal had already sent it so I did not see the need to send another one. Catholics usually speak 
with one voice especially when it comes to political issues and when the Cardinal speaks he speaks for 
the whole Catholic Church. 351 
It is true that Catholic solidarity is a fact but it may be also true that Bishop Kakubi 
did not fall for Amin. Perhaps Catholic hesitancy to recognise Amin could have been 
because Catholics had seen Muslims as allies with Protestants and were not certain 
how Amin would act. On the other hand the Anglican congratulation of the President 
did not really signify support to his regime. According to Rev. Yoramu Bamunoba, 
who was the Synod Secretary at the time: 
We had to be seen doing something otherwise we would have been misunderstood that we did not 
support the President. We did it out of courtesy rather than out of conviction. 352 
That was indeed the case since the Anglican Church especially in Ankole had been 
part of the UPC establishment. Whereas the Anglican diocese of West Buganda 
(which never supported Obote) had praised Amin immediately after the coup, 353 the 
Anglican Church in Ankole responded in April, two months later, an expression of its 
hesitation to accept Amin as the President of the country. But Amin's achievements in 
3 50 See Uganda Argus, 2 February 197 1. 
351 Interview: Bishop Kakubi. 
352 Interview: Bishop Yoramu Bamunobaý September 19,1997, Kyamugorani. 
353 See Uganda Argus, op. cit. 
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the first year of his reign brought him closer to the church's front pews though he was 
never admitted in the sanctuary. 354 Within his first year, Amin had achieved what his 
predecessor had failed to do. His countrywide tours not only brought him closer to the 
people; they were an opportunity to visit religious institutions whose support he 
needed. On his tour to Ankole in August 1971, Amin made a point of attending 
services at Nyamitanga and Ruharo, the Catholic and Protestant cathedrals. In Ankole 
Amin needed to win the support of these churches which were known to support DP 
and UPC respectively. At Nyamitanga Cathedral Amin solicited the support of the 
Catholics by condemning Obote's abuse of human rights, and imprisoning gallant 
Ugandans such as Ben Kiwanuka. Part of his speech in the Cathedral read: 
I do not need to remind you how Milton Obote harassed Ugandans and denied them their bom-right 
freedom. He imprisoned many of our people including Ben Kiwanuka who you very well know. My rule 
vAll not allow such actions again. We are all God's* people and therefore should not be harassed because 
we chose differently. 355 
The phrases "our people" could have been intended to remind the Catholics of their 
relationship with Ben Kiwanuka, first Prime Minister and DP president in the country. 
By stressing that people had the right to choose differently, Amin was reminding 
Catholics how the UPC had subjected them to a one party state. The speech appealed 
to Catholic feelings in Ankole. He repeated his famous dictum: 
Our new Republic of Uganda will be guided by a firm belief in the equality and brotherhood of man and 
in peace and good will to all. Therefore, our new Republic will allow total religious freedom to 
everybody without any fear or favour. 3 56 
354 The sanctuary is used metaphorically that Amin was never really loved by the Christian Churches. 
Asked why that was the case, Bishop Betungura simply said something to the effect that "a Muslim 
does not take Holy Communion"! 
355 See Bishop's File, ? olitical Affairs', P/3,1970-1977. This file is with Bishop Kakubi at his 
retirement home in Ibanda. 
3 56 Ugatida Argus, 25 August 197 1. This is a statement Amin had made on 30 January 197 1 when he 
addressed religious leaders just five days after the coup. He seems to have continuously used it as a 
catch word especially on religious functions 
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Amin used such religious occasions to advertise his religious convictions for he was 
sure of the strength of religion here. Ankole is generally a religious society, and Amin 
thought he could attract it to himself by rehearsing his religious commitment. Indeed 
the above quotation is very revealing. Equality, peace and brotherhood are the virtues 
which DP had been promoting and which had been appropriated by Catholics. Amin's 
use of similar words suggested he was the champion of similar virtues. Even then 
Amin's speech did not attract the same response from the Catholic Bishop in Ankole 
as it had done in Buganda. In his welcome speech to the President, Bishop Kakubi 
chose a neutral stance: 
Your Excellency, within this short time since you took over the leadership of this country, you have 
demonstrated your desire to know and talk to your people. We pray for you that this will continue to be 
the case in the years that God will give you to rule this country. Your desire for unity and impartiality is 
the desire for the church too. 357 
Asked why Bishop Kakubi's speech did not have the same tone as the Cardinal's, 
Kakubi expressed his suspicion about Amin's genuine religious convictions. The 
Bishop was afraid that as a Muslim leader Amin was unlikely to tolerate freedom of 
worship. Islam was a minority religion and the Bishop thought it was likely that Amin 
would want to promote it unduly. What seemed to have scared him was the way Amin 
was interfering in religious internal matters to the extent of setting up a Department of 
Religious Affairs as early as May 1971. The "affairs" in question was the Kabale 
conference, which Amin organised to solve the likely schism threatening the Anglican 
Church. Two dioceses of Namirembe and West Buganda were threatening to secede 
from the rest of the Province. 358 According to Bishop Kakubi that was an indicator of 
what was to come: 
3 57 See Bishop's File, op. cit. 
358 See Amin's Speech, Conference ofReligious Leaders - Kabale, 19th. May 1971, in Government 
File No. V. EAD. Mbarara. The participants from Ankole were; Bishop Amos Betungura, Rev. 
Bamutungire, Venerable. Eliphaz Muhoozi, Mr. Z. C. Mungonya, A. R. Mutashwera, and Rev. J. 
Bamunoba from COU, and the Catholics were: Rev. Fathers; B. Kamugyene, E. Nkaijanabwo, G. 
Loire, S. Lea, J. Raijmans and Mgr. Hillary Tibanyenda. Source, Religious File MNS, H 5, 
Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara. 
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Even before his atrocities, we began to be cautious of Amin especially when he began organising 
religion. He held a religious conference in Kabale, which ended up in Kampala. That to me did not augur 
well. For a Head of State to come to organise religion is scaring. What scared me most as we were in 
the International Conference centre, behind me were Sheikhs who thought I did not understand 
Luganda, and I over heard them talking among themselves, Mulelce kutya, eno government yaffe, [do 
not be worried this is our government]. It seared me to see people identifying themselves as Muslims. 
We were not surprised when later Christians started changing over to Islam'359 
Despite the Bishop's reservations, it is likely that Amin's desire to arbitrate between 
the two warring dioceses of Buganda and the rest of the Anglican Province was 
genuine. The internal wrangles within the Anglican Church if left unsolved could 
have spread and perhaps be exploited by the anti-government forces to create 
instability. It was a calculated move to %&rin the support of the religious groups for a 
president who cherished unity. However, the Bishop's fears were justified. As early as 
February 1971, it appears that Amin had calculated that the creation of the 
Department of Religious Affairs would bring religious bodies under his control. In the 
same month, Bishop Kakubi wrote to the Ministerial Committee that was responsible 
for setting up this department expressing his indignation: 
If a Ministry were set up, it might create misunderstanding that the religious groups were in some sense 
established and therefore might expect direct maintenance. This would also be likely to create 
rnisapprehension with regard to the authority of the government over the religious bodies. The obvious 
difficulty with this ministry ... is that it might easily open the door to direct government intervention in the 
internal business of the churches.... It might also end in favouritism being shown to one religious group, 
i. e. that of the Minister whoever he may be. 360 
Few realised the implications of such a department and that is why people like Prof. 
John Mbiti welcomed the idea. Writing to the Secretary of the Ministerial Committee, 
Ministry of Religious Affairs in February 1971, Mbiti said: 
359 Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, August 16,1997, lbanda. 
360 See, Bishop's File, Government Correspondences, B/GC, This file is with Bishop Kakubi at 
Kagongo, Tbanda. 
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I see this Nfinistry as providing an exciting Platform where the religious heritage, values, commitments 
and sacrifices of the different religious traditions, can be pooled together and better utilised for the good 
of the nation. It also provides an opportunity for closer co-operation and understanding between 
government and the religious communities, in the service of this country. We are very fortunate in that 
our leaders are religious people, and Africans are not embarrassed about expressing their religious life in 
practical terms. It is consistent with that heritage, therefore, to have a Ministry of Religious Affairs. 361 
The speech, which President Amin gave at the Anglican cathedral at Ruharo that 
same day, carried a different message. Unlike in Nyamitanga, the Roman Catholic 
cathedral, where he repeated his religious dictum, at Ruharo, he warned the 
Protestants against involvement in acts of sabotage. The Anglican Church had sent 
him a congratulatory message, but that did not erase Amin's fears of the church as a 
silent force whose loyalty lay elsewhere. As Yoweri Museveni came to reveal later 
there Were some Protestants in Ankole who had already started an underground 
opposition to Amin's regime. That is why Amin warned of being, 
Most regrettably aware that there are a few people who have sought to cover up certain unreligious 
activities with nothing in mind but the promotion of their own personal, political, tribal or sectional ends, 
under the umbrella of religion. Government will not tolerate such activities. 362 
Such a strong warning from the Head of State, on his first tour, was an indicator of the 
reception he expected from the Protestant Church. Amin knew how closely linked to 
UPC it had been. Thus the "few people" he talked about made him suspicious that the 
Ankole Church had not severed those ties with Obote but was encouraging his return, 
as evidenced by the rebel invasion in Ankole in 1972. Amin was suspicious of Bishop 
Amos Betungura whose consecration had been supported by Ankole UPC branch two 
months before the coup. The fact that UPC had identified with him and been 
overthrown, put the new Bishop in diff-Iculty. 363 If we bear in mind that Amin's visit 
to Ankole was just eight months after the Bishop's consecration, then we can 
361 Prof John Mbiti, 'Uganda Government Proposal to set up a Mnistry of Religious Affairs', File 
JPM/5 Namirembe Archives. 
362 See'Speech by H. E. The President, General Idi Amin Dada, 25 August. 1971, in Bishop's File, 
Government Correspondences, East Ankole Diocese, Ruharo, GC/2/34. 
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appreciate why Amin spoke inside the cathedral like that. Actually, throughout the 
Amin regime, the government suspected Bishop Betungura for his UPC connections. 
We may argue therefore that, though the Churches in Ankole seemed to 
have welcomed Amin, they were suspicious of his regime. We could say that the 
churches and the government were mutually suspicious; the churches suspecting a 
Muslim leader and his attitude to Christianity and the Muslim leader uncertain of 
being accepted within the Christian circles in Ankole. But the period between January 
1971 to August 1972 seems to have been a relaxed one in Ankole without much 
political activity taking place. Things had settled down, political parties had been 
banned and the monarchists had given up. There were no reported killings or 
abductions of people. It is the September 1972 guerrilla invasion that ended the 
honeymoon. 
4.3. MUSLIMS IN ANKOLE. 3M 
Understandably, Muslims in Ankole welcomed Amin. There were ecstatic 
celebrations in many Muslim centres, some of which lasted for a week. Muslim- 
concentrated areas like Itendero, Ishaka (Bushenyi) and Kakoba (Mbarara) 
demonstrated their support for the regime by singing matali. They were the only 
group that was conspicuous in identifying with Amin. Though other groups like DP or 
Bahima monarchists were happy to see Obote overthrown, the new man whom the 
coup had returned had less in common with them. In addition Banyankole are 
generally not as excitable as the Baganda, and many of the Ankole Muslims are 
Baganda. The Muslims had cause to celebrate. They welcomed Amin in the hope that 
363 Interview: Yoramu Gucwamaingi, July 18,1997, Ruharo. 
364 The writer regrets to say that this section relies mainly on the interviews conducted more than on 
any other primary material one would have expected. There is hardly any primary material related 
to Muslims in Ankole. The religious files I managed to get mainly contained letters between the 
Christian Bishops (Betungura and Kakubi) and Governor Bashir. The lack of any written 
information on Muslims is due to the fact that though they were in power and had taken up all the 
Local Government positions, they had not been used to the information culture and therefore did 
not see any need to keep records. In any case nearly all of them including the Governor were 
illiterates who were catapulted into those offices on the basis of their religion. Secondly they had no 
cause to write since they were enjoying State patronage. The Christian Bishops only wrote because 
they were protesting against the mistreatment their followers were being subjected to. 
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their underdog position would at last be remedied. When Amin took power, there was 
hardly a Muslim in any of the local government offices, In spite of the fact that 
Muslims had been Protestant allies since independence. As Dixon Kamukama put it, 
they had only been "kingmakers"365 always allying with Protestants to beat Catholics 
so that Protestants could continue ruling. 
Chapter two explained this alliance. What we can add is that though 
historical disadvantages militated against the spread of Islam in Ankole, they were 
easily accepted in Protestant Schools, but not in Catholic institutions. Despite this 
alliance, they were too few to make any meaningful political impact. The best they 
could do was to ally with the Protestants. To see this situation change with Amin, a 
Muslim, delighted them all the more because he was not a member of the small 
Muslim elite educated in Christian schoolS. 366 Amin represented the crude Muslim 
who had received basic koranic instructions on their knees and on the veranda of a 
village Mullah. That is why they rejoiced with enthusiasm following the coup. They 
saw in Amin's regime a chance to advance in Ankole politics, no longer in limbo. This 
could be the reason why Amin did not arrest Muslims for political offences in Ankole 
even though they had supported UPC. In fact the District Khadi's speech on August 
1971, when Amin visited Ankole, not only welcomed him, it also hinted that it was 
now their time to come to the forefront. The speech, which was read in Luganda, 
Islam's lingua ftanca in Ankole, went thus: 
Tulina essanyu lingi okulaba nti naffe tusobola kuweleza speech kurnukolo ngagunno. Ornubiro 
ebyenyurna, twatulanga mabega netuwuliliza, nayye olwalelo twebaza katonda nti ffena tutude warnu, 
[We are very grateffil to see that even we can give a speech on such occasion. In the past we used to sit 
behind in the crowd as observers but now we thank God that we are all seated togetheri. 
367 
365 Interview: Dixon Kamukama, May 15,1997, Makerere University. This does not in any way mean 
that Muslims had any veto in who was to be made a king in Ankole. Kamukama. uses the phrase 
rather metaphorically to mean that Muslims only swelled up the Protestant votes whenever there 
was to be an election. 
366 Interview with Bishop Bakyenga, August 16,1996, Nyamitanga. 
367 Speech by the District Khadi, Ankole District on the visit of President Amin, in, Religious Affairs 
File, RA, R/2,1971, Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara. 
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Even then their hopes of political favours were only realised after the September 1972 
guerrilla invasion when Amin brandished his sword at many Banyankole and expelled 
Asians. It was those two events that enabled Amin to sway the religious balance in 
favour of Muslims. After that Muslims were identified with the hated regime and 
suspected as informers and collaborators to a regime which killed many people. Since 
Amin doubted the support of Christians, he turned to Muslims. Consequently many of 
them were catapulted into positions of responsibility without the relevant 
qualifications. Many of them did not know even how to write their names. They 
assumed office because of their religion and allegiance to Amin. The only sector they 
never controlled was education. They could become county chiefs despite their 
illiteracy, but they could not conduct a science lesson in a classroom. In any case 
there were very few Muslim teachers. The teaching profession had never appealed to 
Muslims because it is not business oriented. Until 1979, when Amin was overthrown, 
Muslims occupied all local government positions except the one county of 
Bunyaruguru, which remained under the leadership of F. Ford, a Catholic 
Munyarwanda as the table below illustrates. 
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Table 5: A LIST OF COUNTY CHIOEFS IN ANKOLE 1973-1979.368 
County Majority 
Religion 
County chief 
before 1971 
County Chiefs 
after 1972 
Igara Protestants Protestant Muslim 
Sheema Protestants Protestant Muslim 
Buhweju Catholics Catholic Muslim 
Kajara Protestants Protestant Muslim 
Bunyaruguru. Catholics Catholic Catholic 
Rwanipara Protestants Protestant Muslim 
lbanda Catholics Protestant Muslim 
Kashari Catholics Protestant Muslim 
Nyabushozi Protestants Protestant Muslim 
Isingiro Protestants Protestant Muslim 
Nearly all these chiefs were picked from petty ddukas (shops) and had no relevant 
background. Muslim dominance could be seen as simply a reflection of what had 
happened before. Hence we are not blaming Amin for initiating the process since 
according to Gingyera-Pinycwa: 
. religion and politics were 
[already] like Siamese twins that saw the light of day at the same time ... the 
two had not been really separated even when independence came some eighty years later. 
369 
The difference was that Protestants had not been indiscriminately appointed. They 
had made their way through education. Many Local Government Officials were 
professionals, mainly teachers, who later joined politics after independence. 
368 Interview: Ezra Kikuri. I have not tabulated the over eighty sub-counties for they were all 
controlled by Muslims. Unfortunately I could not establish the names of the various County chiefs 
due to lack of records. Interviewees. gave conflicting information so that the writer decided to leave 
them altogether. 
369 Apollo Afillon Oboie and his Times, London: NOK Publishers, 1978, p. 23. 
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The expulsion of Asians in August 1972, became a factor in the elevation of 
Muslims in Ankole. After the expulsion (which Amin said was a revelation from 
God), most of their business was distributed to either soldiers or Muslims, who were 
already small-scale traders. The expulsion of Asians was welcomed by many people 
for, as Amin had said, local businessmen got the opportunity to take over in real 
business previously an Asian monopoly. 370 As a result Muslims found themselves in 
well-stocked shops without the knowledge to manage them. They had become the 
Mafuta mingiS371, in a society which was beginning to feel the pangs of the economic 
problems the regime was creating. To be a Muslim in Ankole in the seventies carried 
not only political favour but also social and economic benefits, as having easy access 
to the essential commodities like sugar, soap, salt and fuel which were rationed. 
Phrases like Haji ndiwano, (a way of identifying oneself to a fellow Muslim 
distributing the rations) came to signify the extent to which they had made themselves 
felt. As early as 1972, Muslims could order a government official to act on their 
behalf as a letter from the District Commissioner to Eliphaz Laki, the County Chief of 
Rwampara, indicates: 
I have been asked by the Chief of Ankole Muslims Haji Ruhinda to thank you for the good work and co- 
operation you rendered to them during the course of their meeting in your County on l9th. May 1972.1 
personally was happy to hear a good report of you and your subordinates and I want you to keep up 
with this spirit. 372 
In another similar incident, the District Commissioner had to write a letter to the 
Town Clerk Mbarara, on 20 May 1976, copied to the Commanding Officer, 
reprimanding him because the entrance to the main Mosque in Mbarara town was not 
yet repaired: 
3 70 Interview: Joseph Mugisha, June, 13,1997, Bujaga. 
3 71 Literally meaning 'much fat'. In this case it was a sarcastic nickname referring to the wealth of the 
businessmen and the opportunity to get fat. 
372 Mbarara Archives: Letter from the District Commissioner to Mr. Laki, in, County Chiefs File, 
MSN, 5/2. 
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I have been made to understand that the entrance of the main Mosque has for a very long time been a 
state of disrepair. That the Mosque authorities have been approaching you but all in vain. This letter 
therefore serves to direct you to respond to that Mosque as soon as you can. I hope you will take this as 
a matter of urgency. 373 
These issues became the cause of resentment from the rest of the society for they saw 
Muslims as conniving with Amin's regime. Many Christians in Ankole disappeared 
under a regime in which Muslims controlled most of the local government offices and 
so Muslims were seen as part of a wider group in Amin's notorious State Research 
Bureau. Of course in such an uncertain regime, people killed their enemies just for 
personal vengeance. And as Ezra Kikurt said, a quarrel over a wife or over a piece of 
land with a neighbour could result in one's disappearance which would all be blamed 
on Amin's soldiers. 
Also Muslims used State patronage to propagate the Islamic faith. I am 
stressing the State patronage because Amin behaved as if Islam was the official 
religion in the country. At many of their Islamic functions, Amin would send greeting 
cards to all Islamic centres to be distributed to prominent Muslims as a letter from 
Amin's Principal Private Secretary to the District Commissioner, Mbarara confirms: 
I am sending you ten (10) greeting cards on this EL-FITR day from his Excellency, for distribution to 
prominent Muslims in your district. You might need the help of the District Khadi in your area. 374 
It is true they did not coerce converts into Islam, though they used the State benefits to 
convert Christians. The glamorous Maulidis where Muslims usually meet socially and 
to hear Islamic teaching came to be synonymous with such conversions. Such 
occasions were celebrated with a lot of feasting especially on food like rice and 
chicken which were rare treats in those days. Hence the converts were bribed by 
material benefits. Indeed there were some individual conversions due to Muslim 
businessmen and chiefs, but Maulidis remained the main occasions. Yoramu 
Bamunoba confirms this: 
373Mbarara Archives: Religious File, letter No. 14. 
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at one time a general feast was held at Mitooma. (part of Igara County then), at which Mawlid was led 
by Sheikh Masudi. About 150 Banyankole were circumcised on the spot. 
375 
The Maulidis that were held in Simba barracks, Mbarara, in December 1973,455 
people converted to Islam. 376 The political atmosphere was so favourable that 
Muslims capitallsed on it to win adherents. Others converted to gain political office. 
Force may not have been used though some situations came close to it. For instance, a 
letter written by J. K. Hitler, Officer in Charge of Nyabuhikye Prisons (Ibanda), to the 
District Khadi, and copied to the District Commissioner, Mbarara, joyfully announced 
the conversion of six men to Islam after an Islamic crusade in the Prison: 
Nina esanyu kukutegeza nti wetwali k-uwulila ekigambo kya katonda ... abantu 
6 (mukaga) mukomela 
lyafe basazewo 
... olcuyingira edini yobu ISILAMU [I am happy to tell you that while on our evangelistic 
crusades here in the prison, six people accepted to become Muslirnsj. 377 
Some of those prisoners could have been under duress or hoping they would be 
released if they converted to Islam. Having said that, not many Christians were 
converted to Islam, for Banyankole have always been prejudiced against it. Those 
who converted to Islam were termed as the alefulefu, people on the edge of society. 
Actually many of those converts to Islam had lapsed from Christianity and were no 
longer committed Christians. Islam was resisted and did not have much influence in 
Ankole partly because of the influence of the Revival movement and also because 
Islam has always been associated with Baganda. Nearly all Muslims speak Luganda 
which in Ankole was associated with abayaye or petty thieves and 'lumpen 
proletariat'. And circumcision, which Islam emphasises, is repugnant to Banyankole 
culture. 
374 Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara: Religious File No. MSN, 2/2, letter No. 119. 
375 Quoted in, Abdu Kasozi, 7he Spread of Islam in Uganda, Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1986, 
P. 91. 
376 ibid., p. 117. 
377 Kamukuzi Archives: Letter to the District Khadi, Converts to Islam, Religious File, Ref No. MSN. 
I. 
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But Sheikh Kaduyu, who became District Khadi in 1972, seemed to have had close 
relations with the Christian Bishops. He fought hard to disassociate Islam from State 
entanglement. The Bishops'files at Nyamitanga and Ruharo are full of jointly written 
letters, with the District Khadi to the Provincial Governor, condemning: 
the increasing insecurity which has led to the death of many people... There seems to be some sort of 
indiscriminate death all over the district and as religious leaders we are rather concerned. We hope and 
pray that this is your concern too and will advise ways to protect people whose lives are threatened. 378 
Actually the two Bishops confirmed that the District Khadi was a source of 
encouragement and worked hard to defend them when they were accused of sabotage 
and sending money to Tanzania to support the guerrilla activity. In the tribunal which 
Governor Bashir had chaired implicating Bishop Betungura in an attempt to topple the 
government (he was accused of importing guns, which were actually bicycles for the 
priests), Sheikh Kaduyu wrote a moving letter to the Governor describing the Bishop 
as one Kaduyu had: 
known [him] from my early school days. He is a man I am not afraid of defending even in such a very 
sensitive issue that involves the security of our country. Mr Governor, I stand to be charged with the 
Bishop if at any time you have cause to doubt my testimony. I implore you, do not hurt him. 3 79 
Whatever could have moved the Islamic Sheikh to defend the Bishop in a case of the 
alleged conspiracy against the state is not known. Perhaps the Sheikh's Protestant 
background still "linked me with the Christian church. 11380 
3 78 See Bishop's File, letter No. 6/ 1/1, East Ankole Diocese, 1975. 
379 Same file as above, letter No. 22. 
380 Interview with Sheikh Kaduyu, May 12,1997. Though his narne sounds a kiganda one, Kaduyu is 
a Munyankole from Kyeizoba, Igara, a country well known for its Protestantism. His grand parents 
were and some of his uncles are Christians. Ms father was converted to Islam as a young boy when 
he worked for a Muslim driver as a turn boy on a lorry, which transported Matooke from Mbarara 
to Kampala. The name Kaduyu was a nickname which he acquired during his school days, 
otherwise his real name was, Mpabaitsi. But the nickname later proved to have a good omen 
especially in Islamic circles and he therefore chose to keep it. Its Kiganda identity opened for him 
chances to climb up the Islamic ladder for he was always mistaken as a Muganda. 
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Whereas it is true that Muslims identified with Amin's regime, they did not all 
participate in his machinations. Those who did were a few ruthless opportunists, who 
took advantage of the regime to satisfy their vices. There were many Muslims like 
Kaduyu who were as concerned about the district as Christians were. Amin's 
henchmen, who mainly came from Northern Uganda and worked in Mbarara 
especially as army officers could have given a false impression that all Muslims were 
equally to blame for Amin's actions, a conclusion that is definitely wrong. 
4.4. THE 1972 GUERRILLA WAR IN ANKOLE. 
If the Churches had suspected Amin, or Amin suspected the churches in Ankole, the 
September 17,1972, guerrilla invasion marked a new era in which both parties waged 
a "cold war" against the other. I am not concerned with the details of this war for 
Yoweri Museveni discusses them in his book Sowing the Mustard Seed. My concern 
is the devastating effect the war left on Ankole when Amin killed people under the 
pretext that they had supported the guerrillas. This war, a landmark in the history of 
Artkole, was a guerrilla counter attack from some of Obote's men with whom he had 
escaped into exile in Tanzania. Though the invaders were mainly from the Langi and 
Acholi tribes, there were also among them UPC Bairu Protestants who had gone into 
exile. 
After the guerrillas failed to capture Mbarara town, and their consequent 
repulsion by the government forces, Amin took vengeance on Ankole. It was a 
massacre that left many orphans and widows and soured the relationship between the 
Church and government. If Amin was looking for an excuse the invasion provided 
him a scapegoat on which to vent malevolence against the UPC. Amin had rounded 
up and imprisoned some Banyankole immediately after the coup, but that was simply 
a political "scare crow" as Ezra Kikuri put it. But the number of people who were 
killed after the invasion left Ankole helpless. The guerrillas provoked his wrath, for 
indeed they represented Obote, and moreover Yoweri Museveni, a Munyankole, was 
one of the guerrilla Commanders. Amin who had always doubted the Banyankole 
loyalty linked the invasion with the resurrection of UPC. That is why it was mainly 
Protestant Bairu who became victims after the failure of the September 1972 
invasion. It is difficult to understand why the Tanzanian government allowed such a 
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dangerous scheme to be launched from their territory when they were not sure of its 
success. Museveni alleges that Obote had assured the Tanzanian government that 
Ugandans would support him: 
My understanding was that Obote fed them with wrong information, wl&h gave the impression that 
there was a large fifth column of his supporters within Ugandan population at large, as well as within the 
anny. According to this interpretation, a limited attack from outside would precipitate an internal 
uprising that would overthrow Amin. 381 
Following the failure of the invasion, Amin's soldiers murdered people including 
prominent politicians, Churchmen and businessmen. 382 Others fled into exile. In 
Ankole the prime target was the UPC Enkomba faction, mainly Batru Protestants. 
These were young radicals who had pioneered the Kumanyana movement at Mbarara 
High School in the 1940s and had championed the struggle against the Bahima 
oligarchy. Prominent Catholic politicians like Francis Tibayungwa, 383 the former 
Administrative Secretary of Ankole District Administration, and Bazilio Bataringaya 
who had crossed to UPC and been made Minister of Internal Affairs by Obote, were 
also'murdered. As the Minister of Internal Affairs, it is said that Bataringaya. had 
chaired meetings planning to stop Amin's coup in 1971. He was dismembered alive 
outside Mbarara and his severed head was displayed on a pole. His wife too was 
381 Y. K. Museveni, SotvingfheA-fuslardSeed. - AeStruggleforFreedomand Democracy in Uganda, 
London: Macmillan, pp. 57,67. 
382 Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, A. Tiberondwa, Y. Bamunoba and Y. Makaru. They were 
Nekemia Bananuka, the first Secretary General of Ankole District Administration, Eliphaz Laki, 
County Chief of Rwampara, Blasio Ntundubeire, County Chief of Kajara, Alfred Rubashoka, 
Gombolola Chief of Bumbaire-Bushenyi, Revd. Rwabatabazi, a priest of Kabingo, Jonasani 
Mutembeya of Sheema and Yuda Katundu, Education Officer. 
383 It is alleged that he was killed because the guerrillas captured as a result of the Mbarara invasion in 
1972 were found with Ankole graduated tax tickets. Tibayungwa as the Chief Executive Officer of 
Ankole District Administration was the one responsible for issuing them. So he was suspected as 
the one who issued them out! Others say that the conflict over land between the Church of Uganda 
(Ankole) and the Muslims was the cause of Tibayungwaýs death. As the Administrative Secretary, 
Tibayungwa had ruled the case in favour of the Christians, for they were the rightful owners. 
Muslims held it against him and when opportunity struck, they falsely accused him, (See for 
instance, the Administrative Secretary's letter, Ref No. MSN. 5 to M/S Abdu Rwaheru & Co., 18 
May 1972. 
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killed soon after allegedly, by Lt. Colonel Juma Bashir, the Muslim Governor of 
Southern Province whose Headquarters were at Mbarara. 384 
When he was massacring people in Ankole and elsewhere, very few people 
believed that those who died were actually involved in political sabotage. Many 
thought they died because they were Protestant UpC. 385 But Museveni confinns that 
some prominent UPC in Ankole had opposed Amin's dictatorship: 
I was joined by four comrades, Eliphaz Laki, the Saza Chief of Rwampara county, Ankole,... [and] Yuda 
Katundu- We crossed into Tanzania at Murongo on 27 January [1971]. We travelled in Laki's 
Volkswagen. We were driven to State House, Dar es Salaam, where we found Milton Obote and briefed 
him on the situation. He appeared pleased that we had come... "386 
Many of these were rounded up and subsequently killed immediately after the 
abortive coup. While Eliphaz Laki and Nekemlya Bananuka were conspirators with 
the rebels, it is also true that Kahigiriza's Omufunguro were their chief conspirators. 
Museveni confirms this, as one of the major impediment to their early anti-Amin 
struggle: 
We, who were mainly working underground in 1971 and 1972, soon discovered how dangerous it was 
for us as there were plenty of informers around. Our political opposition to Amin, because it was on 
niatters of principle, was misunderstood by many to mean that we were pro-Obote. Consequently, the 
anti-Obote forces also opposed us until quite late in the struggle against Amin. In Ankole, for instance, 
during 1971 and 1972,1 had to be carefW of both DP supporters and the supporters of Kahigiriza's 
faction of the UPC cafled the 0mufunguro - meaning a dilute UpC. 
387 
Museveni continues: 
At the time the political situation in Ankole, and indeed the whole of Uganda, was very difficult for 
underground workers like us. Because of the confusion that Obote had sown in the country, creating and 
384 Interview: E. Rurangaranga, July 9,1997, Ishaka. 
385 Interview: S. Katwire, retired teacher, May 4,1996, Bushenyi. 
386 Y. K. Muscveni, op. cit., pp. 48-48. 
387 Ibid, p. 42. 
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perpetuating factional and sectarian politics, Amin's take over had been popular... not so much because 
people liked him, but because many had resented Obote bitterly especially in Buganda. Since the public 
was not properly informed, anyone who opposed Amin was thought to be an Obote supporter and this 
created problems for us in any areas including Ankole, Buganda and Busoga. In Ankole all the former 
DP supporters and Kahigiriza faction of UPC welcomed the take-over and regarded us as enemies. 
Operating in some of these areas was, therefore, very dangerous. 388 
Mwarnbutsya-Ndebesa corroborates this when he recalls that in Ntungamo, for 
instance, it was the DP strongman Kazoora who introduced Amin to the people. 389 
This explains why Amin initially did not persecute the Protestant Bahima and Bairu 
Catholics. This alliance was short lived for Amin soon killed people in Ankole 
indiscriminately. Amin's machinery threatened the unarmed and life became cheap. 
An unfavourable opinion from his forces was enough to take away a human life. This 
should not surprise us because most of the army had been recruited on an ethnic and 
tribal bias. They had joined the forces not to make sacrifices for the country, but in 
order to protect their ethnic or tribal interests or to make money and drive expensive 
cars. 
Why did the guerrillas invade through Ankole? Ankole is a society of 
contradictions where the interplay of religio-political forces is stronger than any other 
part of Uganda. Whereas other areas take time for opposition to mount, in Ankole 
opposition is always there. 390 The guerrillas knew they would find some support in 
such a district. Museveni and Muntuyera who were Banyankole led the guerrillas 
though the bulk of the fighters were from northern Uganda. Men like Museveni had 
been collaborating with the UPC in Ankole. That is why many Protestant UPC 
Banyankole were killed after that invasion. The guerrillas went to an area where they 
expected support since the alternative Lango or Acholi were far north. In any case 
there was the hostile Masaka-Buganda which they could not easily have penetrated by 
1972. The Baganda still held Idi Amin dearly and only began to change after the death 
of Ben Kiwanuka in 1972. Ankole UPC although underground was still a force to 
388 ibid, pp. 50-5 1. 
389 Interview: Ndebesa-Mwambutsya, 26 March 1997, Makerere University. 
390 Interview: Emmy Bukabeba, August 29,1996, Kakyeka. 
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reckon with. The guerrillas hoped UPC would stage an uprising against Amin. The 
invasion failed and resulted in the annihilation of many Banyankole. Many people 
were publicly executed in their hometowns "as a lesson to those who might have 
harboured similar sentiments of sabotage., '391 In March 1973, James Karuhanga392 
was publicly executed in front of his parents in Mbarara, although he had been 
captured in Kyambogo, near Kampala. 
The invasion failed because the guerrillas over-estimated their support in 
Ankole. It was too early for the invasion. The UPC contradictions and divisions were 
still alive and people still held bitter grievances towards the UPC Enkomba. That was 
why the populace reported most of the guerrillas that had scattered. Apart from 
Yoweri Museveni who scouted the area during the 18 months before the invasion393, 
no other guerrillas are known to have attempted to alert the people. Ezra Kikuri says 
that the guerrillas struck without warning or preparation: 
That kind of welcome would have been there if they had organised it. But they did not prepare the 
ground property so they came in unexpectedly. Their supporters did not know about them and even if 
they did they had not been facilitated. With that lacking many of the guerrillas were actually tracked by 
the people and reported to the govemment soldiers. 394 
Bishop Kakubi, asked whether the churches would have supported the guerrillas, said 
that they had not known about the invasion but if the Churches had known, they might 
have supported them since by 1972 Amin had alienated the Churches: 
3 91 Interview: Yowasi Makaru, March 24,1997, Bushenyi. 
392 James Karuhanga was Munyankole UPC Youth Winger and a Lecturer at National teachers 
College, Kyambogo. He was also a relative of Edward Rurangaranga, himself a victim of Amin's 
torture. Museveni talks well of him as one of the first intellectuals with whom they were planning a 
guerrilla war against Amin. 
393 See Yoweri Museveni's book, 77ye Mu. vlard Seed. He gives an account of how he used to scout the 
Southern parts of Ankole from Tanzania in the early days of Amin. 
394 Interview: Ezra Kikuri, March 24,1997, Bushenyi. 
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You see as early as 1972 we were already suspected of collecting money to send to Tanzania. Both 
churches no longer used words like Israel. We were not allowed to visit parishes without notifying the 
Governor. So that is why we would probably have welcomed the guerrillas. 395 
Apart ftom Bataringaya and Tibayungwa who were Catholics, the rest killed were 
prominent Bairu Protestants. The Anglican Church felt the persecution more than the 
Catholics. They had embraced UPC and been in leadership and therefore threatened 
opposition to Idi Amin. The Catholic Bishop said: 
It was the Protestants who had long necks and when Amin's machete came levelling, it could not miss 
them. Catholics were like the under growth in a densely populated forest. And as you know the storm 
falls fast on the tall trees before the short ones are affected. That is what happened. 396 
But according to Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa the people killed 
were prominent Christians and experienced government officials. Usuafly when the church is looking for 
councillors, it considers people who are eloquent, outstanding who will support the church. These 
people had been brought up in missionary schools where Sunday attendance was a part of the school 
curriculum. 397 
Amin's killings in Ankole made one major impact: people united as Banyankole 
against a common enemy; Amin and his regiMe. 398 Amin could intimidate people 
into submission but the conditions he created as a result generated resolve among the 
people and hatred for what Museveni called a 'gang of ignoramuses ... 1399 But also 
such killings deprived the church of its rich Christian pillars and therefore affected the 
Anglican Church especially, economically. These were the elite of the time and their 
elimination left a big gap, which the church was not prepared to fill soon. 
395 Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, March 22,1997, lbanda. 
396 ibid. 
397 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa. July 18,1997, Kampala. 
398 Interview: Mzee Murumba, July 10,1996, Kafunjo. 
398 Interview: Tiberondwa. March 14,1997. Murumba, June 11,1997. 
399 Museveni, op. cit., p. 74. 
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4.5. THE BANNING OF PROTESTANT SECTS. 
On II June, 1973, Amin's government issued the Penal (Unlawful Societies) Order, 
1973, Statutory instrument No. 63, banning 12 religious organisations declared 
"societies dangerous to peace and order in Uganda. 11400 Later, on 21 February 1975, 
Statutory instrument No. 11 increased the banned religious Societies to 14.401 Only the 
traditional churches: the Anglican Church of Uganda, the Roman Catholic Church 
and the Greek Orthodox Church, were allowed to operate. The small independent and 
Pentecostal groups were regarded with suspicion because of their foreign connections. 
On one occasion, the Muslim county Chief of Kashari, Ankole, arrested a Pentecostal 
congregation and after much interrogation, he released them to 'go back and do your 
work, but do not be confused by this religion brought in by the CIA1.402 The 
traditional churches were feared for a different reason; the fact that they were deeply 
indigenous, popular institutions which commanded the loyalty of many Ugandans. 
But when Amin took over, they, especially the Anglican Church, had been weakened 
by internal factionalism and a failure to confront what Ezra Kikun calls 'the erosion 
of human rights during Obote's regime. '403 Religious rivalries, the impact of the 
Catholic-Protestant tensions on party politics, helped to create the very conditions 
which somehow led to the military coup. Even then, the strength of the churches 
threatened Amin with that immovable presence when all other institutions; political 
parties, judiciary, monarchy, had collapsed. 404 The churches were the embodiment of 
people's discontent with Amin's arbitrary rule. Hence Amin accused them, (Anglican 
400 See Penal (Unlawful S,, cieties) Order, 1973, Statutory 11strr., ment, No. 63,11 June 1973. 
401 See Penal (unlawful Societies) Order, 1975, Statutory InstrumentAro. H, 21 Echruary 1975. The 
schedule of the penal order included the foflowing: United Pentecostal Churches, Elim Pentecostal 
Evangelistic fellowship of Uganda; Elim Pentecostal Evangelistic fellowship of Africa; Pentecostal 
Assemblies of God; Uganda Church of Christ, Campus Crusade for Christ, International Bible 
Students Association; the navigators of Colorado; The Uganda-East African yearly meeting 
(Quakers), Ch, ild Evangelism of Uganda; Emmaus Bible School; Legio Maria of Afiica; Jehovah's 
Witnesses, Conseil National De Liberation Front Commun populaire (National Council for Popular 
Liberation Movement or Lumumba Liberation Movement). 
402 Interview: Pastor James Mukasa, June 27,1997, Mbarara. 
403 Interview: Ezra Kikuri, July 14,1997, Mbarara. 
404 Interview: John Bikangaga, August 3,1997, Makindye. 
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and Catholic) of using their Sunday collections to support the guerrillas. 405 The two 
Bishops complained about this accusation to the Provincial Governor Bashir 
expressing: 
surprise to hear that our places of worship were being used as political platforms. We would like to 
know whether this is specifically true or it is a suspicion, or misunderstanding, or if there are some 
pockets thereof and where? 406 
The independent Churches in Ankole were very scattered institutions with no 
significant impact on society. Those easily identified were in towns like Mbarara. 
These churches like the Full Gospel Church and Deliverance churches are rather 
similar in organisation and teaching which is why in Ankole, they are all called 
Mungumwema, a Swahili word which means, "God is good". All Christians saw 
themselves as vulnerable and united. Moreover many of the Pentecostals were lapsed 
Anglicans who opposed traditionalism and its inability to appeal to the youth. Not all 
of the banned sects rejoined the Anglican Church though. Some went underground 
and continued recruiting while others welcomed the ban as a test of their faith and 
hence a source of their strength. Pastor Nowe confirmed: 
We never used a word of advertising, yet we continued to grow. The only promotion was by word of 
mouth. What was very interesting to us was that some of those soldiers from the Mbarara barracks who 
had pulled our churches down would come to our prayer meetings at night to pray with us. So even 
during the time of the ban we felt we were able to have a Christian witness ministry ... 
407 
In urban centres like Mbarara, which is surrounded by various institutions, the District 
Commissioner warned the authorities to ensure that: 
405 Interview: Canon Semei Rwabushaija, September 9,1997, Ruharo. 
406 See'A Joint Letter to the Provincial Governor, Southern Province, ' Government Correspondences, 
BP, EA/GC/2/34, Mbarara. 
407 Interview: Pastor Nowe, June 12,1997. 
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... these societies do not continue to operate in your areas. We are aware that some of the groups are 
working underground. May I remind you that it is your responsibility to arrest those people and to 
punish them according to the law. 408 
Since nearly all the local government officers were Muslims, the persecution was 
indiscriminate because they could not distinguish the difference between Pentecostal 
groups and Anglican small congregations. 409 The Church of Uganda, however, did 
not protest against the banning of these free churches for the ban was now sending 
back people to their communion. Some Bishops even praised the government for 
having done a good thing to ban them. The government's decision had shown the 
Anglican Church ought to have been strict with its followers and deterred them from 
joining such sects. 
Idi Amin banned Pentecostal sects not as Protestants, but from fear. One 
might under-estimate such churches as fragmented fellowships but the fact was that 
they had no traceable leadership and therefore any one who had intentions of political 
organisations could operate under them. That is why Amin actually left there churches 
which were structurally organised and whose leadership he could trace for 
accountability. By 1974, religious organisations were required to submit programmes 
of activities to the District Commissioners and Governors for permission. A case is 
when the District Commissioner, East Ankole, protested to the Anglican and Catholic 
bishops of Ankole and Mbarara Dioceses that they had not notified his office about 
the Martyrs Day celebrations of 3 June, 1974, in order 'to enable some government 
Officials to attend the historic religious festivals-1410 Martyrs Day had not been 
especially important but in the 70s it became a symbol of persecution of the church. 
The churches identified with those Martyrs killed by the State. That is why the 
government was so anxious about such occasions. The two Bishops responded to the 
Governor educating him on church procedure: 
408 See Circular Ref No MSN. I/ I by the District Commissioner, East Ankole, 20 March 1975. 
409 Interview: Y. Bamunoba, 23 July 1997. See also circular Ref No. MSM 1/1 by the District 
Commissioner, East Ankole, to all County and Gombolola chiefs, clarifying the fate of members of 
the Gospel Mission to Uganda, II April, 1975. 
4 10 General Circular, Ref. No. I/I by the District Commissioner, East Ankole, 4 June 1974. 
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For the celebrations this martyr's [sic] day every year we do not (as for other Christian Festivals) have to 
issue official programmes inviting Government officials to attend the service. The Government officials 
and other Christians, and other people, who are interested, come to church on their own initiative to 
share in the worship of God in a normal way. It was in this understanding that we took the celebration of 
this Day on 3rd June ... 
411 
In the same tone the Catholic Bishop also wrote to the Governor: 
I took it, as it has always been in the past, that the initiative for government representation to our 
religious services on such big events would have come from your side. It has, moreover, not been our 
custom to invite people for our religious services, as such, in Church. 412 
Amin's government wanted to keep a close watch over the activities of the Church 
because of the fear that they were raising money for the anti-goverrurnent rebels in 
Tanzania. Amin's ban on Protestant denominations was not intended to create 
converts for Islam. There are no known Pentecostals in Ankole who converted to 
Islam. Their doctrinal and literal interpretation of the Bible makes them to see people 
of the other faiths as "unspiritual". They already likened Amin to the beast in the 
book of Revelation. The Catholic Church was not affected by the ban. The banned 
groups were breakaway groups from the Anglican Church and it was to them that 
some returned. It is very rare for Catholics to turn to a different denomination. Their 
doctrinal teaching and emphasis on obedience to the church hierarchy produces this. 
Catholics associated Pentecostal denominations with Protestantism with which they 
were at odds. It is true that Pentecostal groups may have contributed to the growth of 
the Anglican Church in Ankole though we can not say the same of the Catholic 
church whose factors of growth were discussed in chapter one. 
411 See Religious File, Protestants, MSN, Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara. 
412 Kamukuzi Archives: See Religious File, (Catholics), MSN 1/1. 
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4.6. THE CREATION OF A NEW ANGLICAN DIOCESE - 1977. 
On 30 January 1977, just two weeks before the death of Luwum, a new Anglican 
Diocese of West Ankole was created from the former Ankole Diocese. Unfortunately 
I could not get the minute on which this Diocese was created, (most files in Ankole 
were destroyed during the 1979 war) but I interviewed the very people that were on 
the Ankole Church Council responsible for the creation of this new Diocese. 413 
According to Bishop Betungura, the need for a new diocese coincided with the 
creation of the District in 1974 whose Headquarters was in Bushenyl-West Ankole. 
For Amin to control Ankole (and other districts) whose political support he was not 
sure of, he reduced its geographical influence by creating a new district where he 
planted either his own tribesmen or Muslim henchmen. According to Bishop 
Betungura, the establishment of the district necessitated the creation of a new diocese, 
a colonial pattern where most parishes would be adjacent to the county or sub-county 
Headquarters. The Catholic Church did not operate in this way and the Catholic 
Diocese still covers the whole of Ankole. Asked why, Bishop Kakubi said: 
You see if we divided our forces, then we would never have been able to do anything. The Anglican 
Church could afford to create many parishes because it had the support of the government officials, 
which would always contribute on their fund-raising. We depend on our numbers to boost us if we are 
to make any meaningful developments. 414 
But whether or not the creation of a new diocese during Amin's regime would have 
increased income is doubtful. Maybe the Church of Uganda's House of Bishops was 
rejuvenated by the new members and a new Bishop in West Ankole supported Bishop 
Betungura who was harassed by the Muslim Governor in Mbarara. 
Canon Rwabushaija emphasised the factor that the church was growing and needed 
another diocese. By 1977, Ankole Diocese had grown from 30 parishes and three 
413 These included; Bishop Amos Betungura, Canon Rwabushaija, Canon Blasio Itima, and Canon 
Muhoozi. 
414 Interview: Bishop Kakubi, March 22,1997, Ibanda. 
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Archdeaconaries in 1970 to sixty parishes and six Archdeaconnes. 415 Parishes were 
too large. The Canon quoted cases where a parish covered a whole sub-county or 
where an Archdeaconry covered three counties. He himself was responsible for the 
counties of Rwampara, Isingiro and Kajara. Also the political mass baptisms of the 
sixties meant that people, who had been coerced into being baptised, had by mid 
seventies become strong Christians, especially because of the influence of the Revival 
movement. A positive result of the politically motivated baptisms was the increased 
numbers of Christians and by the seventies the church was beginning to embrace 
society rather than just being a minority within society. People gradually got 
acculturated into it. 
Also westem Ankole is a densely populated area. The two main counties, 
Igara. and Sheema, are heavily populated4)6 and form the core of Protestantism in 
Ankole. In the following the synod, Bishop Betungura. was concerned about the weak 
415 Interview: Canon S. Rwabushaija, September 9,1997, Ruharo. 
416 Ankole's (Bushenyi & Mbararn districts) Population Growth 1959-1980. 
County 1959 1969 1980 % increase 1959-1980 
Sheema 79,680 115,301 151,009 90 
Igara 107,859 139,924 146,799 36 
Buhweju 20,114 25,401 34,929 74 
Bunyaruguru 14,305 26,946 52,161 267 
Kajara 81,331 103,111 139,771 72 
Bushenyi Total 303,289 410,683 524,669 73 
fbanda 38,944 80,799 127,782 228 
Kashari 41,744 85,869 118,017 183 
Rwampara 107,859 147,826 188,165 74 
Isingiro 34,985 98,774 176,351 404 
Nyabushozi 12,665 37,224 77,838 515 
Mbarara total 236,197 450,462 688,152 191 
Ankole total 539,486 861,145 1212821 125 
Igara! s population declined by the 1980 Census because many people had migrated to Sheema in the 
seventies in search for fertile lands. On the contrary, the counties of Kashari, Nyabushozi and 
Isingiro which used to be sparsely populated realised a higher percentage in population growth due to 
the influx of Banyarwanda since the sixties. For purposes of comparison, Mbarara municipality has 
been added to the 1980 total for Kashari county in which it lies. The population of Mbarara 
Municipality was 16,078 in 1969 and 23,255 in 1980. See Nelson Kasfir, "Land and peasants in 
western Uganda: Bushenyi and Mbarara districts", in H. B. Hansen and M. Twaddle (eds. ), Uganda 
Now: Between Decay and Development, London: James Currey Ltd, 1988, p. 163. 
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financial situation in which the diocese was left and called for extra giving since his 
diocese could no longer depend on the rich Protestant concentrated counties of West 
Ankole. He said: 
... we of East Ankole have very few people compared to West Ankole. There are 
few people in Kashari 
since people have migrated to Buganda, you know Nyabushozi is always sparsely populated, lbanda and 
Isingiro are mainly Catholics, Rwampara is simply mountainous with few people. Therefore I urge you 
to improve your giving so that we are not left behind. 417 
Political conditions were also in favour of a new Diocese. By 1974, the International 
Community had imposed an economic embargo on Uganda and the consequent 
olutalo Iwenfuna (economic war) affected the church. Essential commodities 
especially fuel were rationed and the Anglican bishop was finding it very hard to 
cover that massive diocese with rationed fuel. The Catholic bishop who covered a 
similar area did not see the need for a new diocese. He had fewer well-financed 
parishes because of big congregations and donations from abroad. 418 Counties like 
Sheema and Igara, UPC concentration areas, where middle ranking politicians lived, 
agitated for a new diocese on the grounds that it would protect them from Amin. That 
is why the creation of this Diocese in the very heartland of UPC was very sensitive to 
the government. 
The consecration of Bishop Bamunoba, in January 30 also became a 
landmark in the history of the Church of Uganda. It was the last official engagement 
at which Luwum as the Primate of C. O. U officiated. What were these events? 1977 
was the year in which the Church of Uganda celebrated its Centenary. Preparations, 
which had started as early as 1975, worried the government. Fund-raising events and 
Centenary preparations were monitored and the wearing of Centenary badges was 
frowned upon by government agents who thought that they were some kind of a 
"Passover sign" with an underground political MotiVe. 419 In West Ankole, wearing the 
417 See the Bishop's Charge, in Sinodi Y'Obureberezi Bwa East Ankole Church of Uganda, August 
1977. 
418 Interview: Bishop Kakubi, March 22,1997, lbanda 
419 Interview: Bishop Betungura, September 9,1997, Ruharo. 
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Centenary badges was the cause of harassment which prompted Bishop Amos 
Betungura, to write to encourage priests: 
As Christians we might be having such enemies who would like to intimidate us by saying that we should 
not go ahead preparing for the Centenary celebrations and as such there are feelings of insecurity, 
uncertainty, and distrust and the fear of what might happen later. If these sorts of feelings ramify among 
our Christian communities in our towns and villages, then our plans for the Centenary celebrations are 
likely to be thwarted.... go ahead with all your plans and call upon your Christians to do the same. 
420 
The consecration also attracted local support from Christians who had not had cause 
to celebrate for seven years. The consecration became an occasion for Christians to 
express their solidarity and satisfaction of having achieved something. 
Another factor was the political identity of the new Bishop. Rev. Bamunoba 
as the Principal of Bishop Stuart College, the Anglican founded Teacher Training 
College in Mbarara, had been suspected of anti-government activities by 1972 and 
harassed: 
It was one of the reasons why I had to leave Mbarara. and go for further training at Makerere. At least 
that protected me for not many people knew my where abouts. Actually there was a rumour that I had 
gone into exile. 421 
The cause of contention on the consecration day though was Bishop Kivengere's 
sermon. He had by 1977 become a source of inspiration to the Christian church in 
Uganda. He was one of the few bishops who dared confront Amin. The fact that he 
was the preacher at the consecration of Bishop Bamunoba was an act of defiance. 
Kivengere, a renowned evangelist, had based his sermon on Acts 20: 22-28 the 
designated epistle for Sunday January 30,1977. The Bishop's sermon had warned: 
government officials of their accountability before God for their deeds and calling attention to the 
robbery, violence and killings, which seemed to have official sanction. 
422 
420 A Circular letter to all Priests, 27th. November 1976, Bishop's File, East Ankole Diocese. 
421 Interview: Bishop Y. Bamunoba., June 20,1997. 
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He castigated those who had misused their: 
authority, taking things by force ... If you misuse the authority 
God gave you, God is going to judge you, 
because he is the one who gave it to you. Some use their authority to get things for themselves. Some 
use it to grow fat, then they need more room and push others around. 
423 
There was a military man with a big tummy in the front row, who also rocked with 
laughter at the mention of growing fat and the need for more room. Obviously the 
Bishop was not attacking particular individuals: 
... it was not an attack on anyone. I was preaching 
in ffeedorn and afterwards the government people 
were very warm, even soldiers spoke to me very warmly. My Governor Muslim fliend said, 'Thank you 
for your speech'. 424 
Though Bishop Kivengere was not attacking personalities at the occasion, he was 
aware of the fact that the seventies were a period of the economic war and the scarcity 
of commodities had led Muslims to be a privileged class and therefore were in many 
ways the "only people" capable of growing fat. The consecration attracted people of 
many faiths though not many people from abroad. As Bishop Kivengere said: 
... there 
in front of me were military men, policemen, government administrators ... 
Muslim Sheikhs, my 
ftiend the Muslim Governor, Intelligence officers, and a special representative of President Amin, who 
had given greetings. 425 
The content of the Bishop's sermon may have influenced Amin's reaction but this was 
less significant than the fact that it happened in Bushenyi a UPC stronghold. Also 
there had been a failed coup of 25 January (1977) that week and all events could be 
422 Kevin Ward, Church of Uganda amidst Conflict: 7he Interplay between Church andpolitics in 
Uganda since 1962, in Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle (eds. ), Religion wid Politics in 
East Africa, London: James Currey, 1995, p. 86. 
423 Part of Kivengere's sermon in his book, I Love Idi Amin, p. 44. 
424 ibid, p. 45. 
425 ibid. The Muslim friend was Governor Juma Bashir, who on several occasions had clashed with 
Bishop Kivengere. The Bishop uses "Muslim fitiend" rather sarcastically. 
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misinterpreted. 426 The Special President's representative referred to by Bishop 
Kivengere was also a problem. Amin had by 1977 ceased attending church functions 
and therefore had delegated Hon. Katagira, then Minister of Labour, to represent him. 
Amin would not have attended the function because of the already mentioned coup 
attempt in Kampala. The President's representative was not programmed to give a 
speech but merely to give greetings before the Archbishop's speech. This was seen as 
a breach of protocol. According to the Governor, the Minister represented the 
President and should have spoken last. Governor Jurna Bashir of Southern Province 
whose Headquarters were at Mbarara later accused Bishop Betungura of "a deliberate 
plan" to show contempt to the President. It means, the Governor wrote: 
... that the Archbishop is higher than the Hon. Minister who was representing 
His Excellency. So it 
means that even if it was His Excellency himself you would ask him to address first and then the 
Archbishop later 
.... 
427 
In a similar strongly worded letter Bishop Betungura reminded the Governor that he 
had indeed followed the correct procedure since: 
at a Church function the Archbishop was the guest of Honour. Our mind was that as it was a religious 
ceremony we needed not use formal way of doing things. 428 
Betungura was held responsible because he was the father of the new diocese. Who 
should have spoken last or first at a church function was not the issue. it was that the 
two institutions were at odds. By ignoring protocol the Bishop was making a passive 
protest since at no church function has the Archbishop spoken after the President. 
The Governoes letter complained of the Bishops' disrespect to the Minister even at 
lunch time: 
426 Adam Seftel (ed., )Uganda: Ae Bloodstained Pearl ofAftica And its Sinigglefor peace, Kampala: 
Fountain Publishers, 1994, pp. 72ff. 
427 See letter by the Governor, Southern Province, ref No. C. SP. NUS. I to the Bishop, East Ankole 
Diocese and All Religious Leaders, Southern province, 21 February 1977. 
428 Kamukuzi Archives: 'Consecration of the Bishop of West Ankole and Inauguration of West Ankole 
Diocese, 'Religious File, NO. 11. K/COU. 
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How can a Presidential representative go in the dining room to wait for a Bishop or Archbishop and they 
go on changing their robes while chatting and then the representative of his Excellency is waiting in the 
dining room without being served ... even when the Minister was 
being served after the Archbishop and 
Bishops came in, you find (sic) some Bishops standing on (sic) the Minister when he is having a meal 
and others asking him to help them with salt.... I do not call this ignorance, but is a deliberate plan. 429 
The relationship between the Church and the State was so strained that such trivial 
issues became important. 
4.7. THE DEATH OF LUWUM AND THE GROWTH OF THE CHURCH IN 
ANKOLE. 
Sunday 30 January 1977, the day on which Yoramu Bamunoba was consecrated first 
Bishop of West Ankole was later described by Bishop Kivengere in his book I Love 
Idi Amin, as the "Palm Sunday"430 for Janan Luwum. Two weeks later, the 
Archbishop was murdered in mysterious circumstances. Janan Luwum became the 
Anglican Primate in 1974. Many interviewees agree that as the successor of Eric 
Sabiiti, Luwum was elected with the whole support of the Anglican Church, 
something very unusual in the COU which tends to elect archbishops who are popular 
with the regime. 431 But according to Kevin Ward: 
whatever the general assessment, it does not apply to the election of Janan Luwum as archbishop of 
Uganda in 1974. In fact here the church set itself firmly against the stream, 432 
though they did not realise what a torrent the stream would become. Luwum came 
from an Acholi tribe that Amin had persecuted as early as 1971. Though it was good 
for the church not to think in political terms, the election of Luwum suggested the 
COU was demonstrating its solidarity with Acholi. Well, Luwum was elected because 
429 ibid: Letter by Governor Bashir Jurna. 
430 Margaret Ford in her book, Janair Lit"im, also uses the same metaphor. 
431 See Weekly Topic, 8 April 1987. 
432 Kevin Ward, op. cit., p. 83. 
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he was felt to be spiritually and intellectually, the most competent person433, but 
Amin could interpret Luwum's election as the COU's choosing a man to lead an 
opposition against him. The choice of Luwum reveals that the church did not forecast 
the political climate for by 1974 when Luwum was elected, Amin was already 
showing enmity. According to Gerladine Sabiiti, the wife of Luwum's predecessor: 
that is why we decided to retire. Arnin's unpredictable character forced us to make an earlier decision. 
He would ring us at night and blame us for certain things, which we really had no knowledge about. At 
one time he tried to force us not to use the word Israel but we resisted. So when we realised the kind of 
man he was likely to be, I advised my husband that it was high time that we retired. 434 
From the first week of the coup, Acholi and Langi had been massacred and the 1972 
guerrilla invasion made it worse. Maybe if the COU elected a different figure, like 
Dunstan Nsubuga, a Muganda and a senior Bishop, the situation might have been 
different. But Luwum's qualities made him a spiritual leader and according to Bishop 
Betungura, "one who we all looked up to, to steer us in the right direction. "435 By 
1974, Amin had already warned the Church against using biblical words like Israel, 
Churches had been accused of collecting money to support the guerrilla movement. 
The three years of Luwum's office were nothing but a tug of war between him and the 
government. When he died, the nation was shocked, but not surprised. Both Phares 
Mutibwa and Kevin Ward agree that the 25 January 1977 plot may have been part of 
the reason. It was a conspiracy in which many Langi and Acholi were involved. 
Though Luwum was not personally involved, he could have been informed by his 
fellow tribesmen. According to Mutibwa: 
When the Archbishop was asked to join the group, he declined, saying that as a churchman, his concern 
was with preaching and not fighting.... What led to Luwum's death was the fact that he did not tell Amin 
of this plot... Amin then personally accused Luwum of fAing to warn him of the danger ... which meant 
that the archbishop wanted to see him overthrown. 436 
433 ibid. 
434 Interview: Gerladine Sabiiti, July 11,1996, Kinoni. 
435 Betungura, September 9,1997, Ruharo. 
436 p. Mutibwa, Ugandafince IndepeiOence, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, p. 112. 
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Ward concurs about Luwum's possible knowledge: 
It seems certain that there was a plot to overthrow Idi An-ýn and that the Acholi were involved. As an 
Acholi elder, Luwum may have known something about what was going on, though as a Church leader, 
he is unlikely to have been directly involved. 437 
It is unlikely that Archbishop Luwum had arms as Idi Amin alleged. As a spokesman 
for the church he pleaded for people Amin had arrested. He was active in asking 
government and intelligence officials to try and trace the victims so that they did not 
simply "disappear. '1438 Luwum was acting on behalf of the victims from all parts of 
Uganda, but his protecting of Langi and Acholi was central. 439 Hence, Luwum as an 
Acholi was falsely identified with the Acholi opposition to Amin. It is unlikely that he 
was ever involved in any plot against the government. His strong 'Bulokole' 
(spirituality) commitment, undoubtedly the mainstay of his spiritual life, makes it 
unlikely that he would involve himself in conspiracy. 440 The archbishop's response to 
the soldiers who searched his house in the early morning of February 5,1977, is the 
testimony of a man of peace: 
I did not come to Namirembe for the Acholi or the Langi but I was the archbishop of Uganda ... 
Our 
house was God's house. We pray for the President. We preach the Gospel and pray for others. That is 
our work, not keeping arms. 441 
By 1977, Amin had identified the Christian church: 
as an uncompromising force against him. Not that it was fighting him politically, but because it was 
concerned with the abuse of human rights, that is why he persecuted it. Indeed Idi Amin was persecuting 
the church. 442 
437 Kevin Ward, op. cit., p. 84. 
438 Interview: John Bikangaga, June 7,1997; See also Kevin Ward, op. cit. 
439 Kevin Ward, "Church of Uganda Amidst Conflict", in Holger Hansen and Michael Twaddle, 
Religion and Politics in Fast Africa, Kampala: Fountain Nblishers, 1995, p. 83. 
440 ibid. 
441 Report of a very sefious incident at the archbishop's house in the early hours of Saturday, 5th. 
February, 1977, 'AACC Newsletter 3,3,23 February (1977) Special Edition: The Churches mourn 
the loss of Archbishop Janan Luwum, (Quoted in Kevin. op. cit. p. 84. ) 
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It is not for this thesis to say whether or not Luwurn was as a religious martyr. What it 
can say is that he stood up and did not compromise his faith. We could perhaps call 
him both a religious and political martyr because he did not shrink from the values he 
stood for and his death focused International attention. His death strengthened the 
church and awakened the conscience of the civilised world to what was going on in 
Uganda. Having said that, Luwum's death caught the church off guard. Since his death 
most Bishops were scared of taking that office to the effect that Luwum's successor 
was not necessarily the best qualified for the job. He was chosen because of his 
relation with Amin that he could protect the church. Consequently the Anglican 
Church was weakened administratively and has not come to grips with the leadership 
question as yet. 
442 Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, March 22,1997, lbanda. 
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4.7.1 THE GROWTH OF THE CHURCH. 
The irony of Amin's actions is that the Church emerged stronger. As Dr. Tom Tuma 
says, persecution does not kill a religious movement: 
It is common in church history. When there is persecution, people's commitment to the faith strengthens. 
The reason is that where there is danger, they rally to their God. It is the danger they see outside that 
drives them to God for protection. It is part of human behaviour. Persecution does not kill a religious 
movement. 443 
The first effect was that people streamed to their churches. Since the death of the 
Archbishop the only source of comfort was the church. After the Archbishop's death, 
Ankole was full of fear of who would die next. Preachers began to preach 
eschatological, sermons. People shelved their differences realising how vulnerable 
they were. Bishop Kakubi testifies to this Protestant-Catholic bond: 
It helped us to strengthen our relationship. We had never been so close ... 
We became very good 
neighbours. Our ecumenism was strong. Indeed persecution became our bond. 444 
Bishop Kakubi says that the Catholic Church increased in numbers. The Catholic 
pansh church in Mbarara town opened all night for prayers. A new I o'clock Service 
started because the normal morning service could not accommodate the numbers. The 
Centenary celebrations of June 1977 (Anglican) and February 1979 (Catholic) 
provided more opportunities for evangelism. Churches were flooded with worshipers. 
Many people felt the call to ministry. Perhaps as a demonstration against Amin, 
people offered themselves for training and the number of church ministers did not 
drop. This was more quickly felt in the Anglican Church, which does not require a 
long and rigorous Seminary training. The Church of Uganda's open system of 
recruitment helped to keep the numbers of entrants up. 
443 Interview: Rev. Dr. Tom Tuma, March 25,1997, Kampala. 
444 Interview: Bishop Kakubi, March 22,1997. 
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There was the economic factor too. Many of those who became ministers in the 70's 
were primary school teachers. They were already trained and only needed a short 
theological course to initiate them. But also the teaching profession was badly 
affected. Teachers resigned to go into petty business. But the clergy stipends became 
attractive as the church expanded. And donations such as bicycles, second hand 
clothes from abroad, attracted some to "feel the call for ministry. "445 
4.8. THE CHURCH ON THE EVE OF THE 1979 LIBERATION WAR. 
By 1979, the Christian church in Ankole was under suspicion of collusion with the 
invading forces. The invading force from Tanzania began by liberating the Southern 
parts of Ankole, which border Tanzania. Idi Amin had always accused the churches of 
aiding guerrillas. Now it had to choose between Amin and the invading army, still a 
long way from Mbarara. Well, they hoped he would fall since there were resignations 
in the army, which were losing to the invading forces. Government officials in 
Mbarara and Bushenyi, many of who were Muslim, Nubians or Kakwa, had by 
January 1979 abandoned their offices and fled. But they left a strong and ruthless 
army in Mbarara, which terrorised people and tooted property. The invading 
Tanzanian forces captured Mbarara in February 1979 and Ankole was liberated. 
According to Museveni: 
we captured it easily because there was no resistance. Amin's soldiers had been intimidated by our own 
weight of fire and the noise of our guns, which they sought, were powerful. 446 
The liberators had learnt from the lessons of September 1972 and were well equipped 
and did not need to rely on the general uprising. Amin had no longer support from 
Uganda, including Buganda. After the capture and liberation of Kampala the south- 
west was secure. 1979 was seen in Ankole, as heralding a new era of peace and 
tranquillity. Kampala had fallen on II April 1979, on a Good Friday. It was natural 
445 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa and Ernmy Bukabeba. 
446 Museveni, op. cit. p. 95. 
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for Christians and preachers on Easter day to link the liberating power of the risen 
Lord with the momentous events at the time. 
However, two issues worried the Church. According to Bishop Betungura, 
one was the rate at which Christians, both Catholics and Protestants, looted towns and 
institutions; and how Christians were now attacking Muslims. Christians were looting 
property not only in towns but also in institutions such as churches. Both Bishops 
Kakubi and Betungura lamented this moral degeneration. 447 This looting did not 
involve Muslims since many of them had fled into hiding, and their homes were the 
first targets. It was a dramatic enactment of how people celebrated liberation from 
oppression. As a philosopher quoted by Mut1bwa said: 
What is valuable is a certain ordering of things, and civilisation has to do not with things but with the 
invisible ties that join one thing to another. 448 
What linked Idi Amin's regime to the liberated church was a continued vicious circle 
of chaos, a permanent "disordering of things. " Amin's regime had caused such 
degeneration that it affected people's values. What came to be valued was how 
quickly one could become rich. It was not a period of decency but of decadence and 
decay. Money was valued more than education. The young generation had learned to 
devalue education and it was no longer the passport to success. Once, it was the 
ambition of young people to acquire University education. Now what was valued 
instead was money regardless of how it was made. New slang like okugwa omubinlu 
(falling into things without much effort) appeared as school dropouts reached 
positions of influence often through bribery. University graduates became a laughing 
stock. A typical remark was; 'our friend will never make it in life, she is marrying a 
University graduate. ' An editorial in the Star Newspaper of July 6 July 1987 explains: 
the professionals are not entirely to blame for this aberration. Unprofessionalism in most professions is a 
result of the emergence of the marfula mingi culture in the 1970s, which stressed more the acquisition of 
material wealth than the means through which that wealth was acquired. The principle guiding was 'the 
447 Interview: Amos Betungura, September 9,1997, Ruharo 
160 
end justifies the means. ' This culture and the economic hardships that afflicted the salary-earners 
systematically led to the erosion of professional etWcs. Everyone's concern was to try desperately to beat 
the inflation. Out of all this also came ft-ustration among the salaried people who resorted to excessive 
drinking and shabbiness; and of course, the ten per cent commission became a normal thing. The total 
sum of all this has been the erosion of the pride of the work of professionals in the country. 
This was behind the looting in Ankole, the desire to acquire wealth and to sit 
confortably on chairs, even if looted. What worried the Church was the excitement 
enjoyed by the looters. They were as unconcerned as the children who had got so used 
to seeing human corpses around that it became normal for them to jump over them. 
Looting became the first obstacle, which the church had to face. The revenge inflicted 
on Muslims was also a concern. For a church which had taken pride of being built on 
the foundations of the Revival movement, looting and the killing of Muslims in 
Itendero-Sheema, was a blow to its reputation. 
4.9. THE ITENDERO MUSLIM KELLINGS. 
The fall of Idi Amin's regime meant the fall of Muslims. It was a common sight in 
Ankole (and the writer witnessed it) to see slashed banana plantations, burnt down 
houses and animal corpses which belonged to Muslims. Itendero and Ishaka were 
centres of Muslims in Ankole and suffered more than any other part. 
According to Yusufu Mubiru, the people of Kiziba parish (Itendero) led by 
two men Muchungu and Rwenzire, both Christians, organised a meeting at Kiziba 
Primaty School to which about sixty Muslims were invited. They were told that if 
they were to stay in the area, certain named Muslims must pay a fine of a cow and 
two jerry-cans of local beer within two weeks or they would suffer. Muslims 
complied. But those who did not comply were attacked and their property was 
destroyed. According to Y. Kabazi, the killing of Muslims at Itendero happened after 
a group of Muslims had taken revenge for the malicious damage to their property by 
attacking and brutally injuring Kamisha Oust a local resident), a Christian and 
resident of Kiziba village. He died shortly after being admitted to Mbarara Hospital. 
449 Quoted in Mutibwa, op. cit. p. 125 
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In retaliation, a group of Christian villagers went around Kiziba armed with spears, 
machetes, ropes, and arrested Muslims, including women and children. They were 
arrested and they were to be taken to prison. But they were instead tied and led to the 
river Rwizi where many of them were killed. Those who survived were forced to 
drink alcohol, cat pork or pay heavy fines to avenge the death of Karnisha. To Haji 
Magezi: 
the two punishments were equally the same. Those killed and those who were forced to eat pork or take 
alcohol were equally brutalised. For a Muslim to be forced to eat pork, taboo, is the same as being 
killed. 449 
Those who were forced to eat pork at least survived to tell the story, but his bitterness 
shows how Muslims viewed the situation. 450 After the killings at River Rwizi, 
Muslims in Sheema and elsewhere lived in perpetual fear. More than 200 Muslims 
were imprisoned between May and July 1979.451 Acts of cruelty such as ripping a 
woman's womb and rape are mentioned in a letter written by a one Mohammed 
Sebbada to the World Islamic Society in 1986. It gives a tragic account of the 
hardships and suffering experienced by Muslims in Itendero and the whole of that 
sub-county. 452 
What caused this violence to a people that had been neighbours? Itendero, 
unlike elsewhere in Ankole, is a multi-cultural society. Its population is mainly of 
immigrants from other counties like Igara and Rwampara who migrated in search of 
fertile land. Sheema County is fertile and favours the growing of Matooke (bananas). 
At the peak of the economic war many immigrants made banana growing their main 
source of income. Itendero was also a centre for Muslims who originally came from 
449 Interview: Magezi, businessman, July 31,1996, Kabwohe. 
450 ibid. 
451 See 7he Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights: Findings, 
Conclusions and Recommendations, June 1986-Octoher 1994, p. 94. 
452 The letter is appended in Abasi Kiyimba! s booklet; Is the 1979 Muslim Blood-Bath in Bushenyi 
History: A Review of the Genocide that was called Liberation. We must stress though that the 
writer found that booklet very controversial and most of its information exaggerated. A more 
balanced report was Mex Kagume's, The Confrontation of Christians andMuslims in Itendero, 
1979, but it was unfortunately lost and the author can not trace it. 
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Buganda originally as administrators, clerks and interpreters in colonial days. They 
retained Luganda as their language and did not integrate culturally which alienated 
them from the rest of the society. People still refer to them as abasilamu ba Itendero, 
(Muslims of Itendero) showing their separateness. The Christian inhabitants of the 
area saw Muslims as allies of Amin and responsible for the disappearance of many 
Christians. The Muslims were also a fairly well-to-do minority group. This affluence 
was attributed to the favourable treatment they had received from Idi Amin's 
regime. 453 
Also the returning exiles who took over the govemment told the horror 
stories of torture and brutality and their miraculous escape from Amin which in a way 
revived people's desire for revenge. Edward Rurangaranga for instance tells how in 
1972, he was tortured and shot in the leg as he tried to escape from Amin's captors. 
He fell into the river Rwizi and was washed off shore and ran into exile. 
Rurangaranga was not personally involved in the killing but his experiences 
empowered the inhabitants of Itendero. It is said that at a public rally held at Kibingo 
sub-county Headquarters on II April 1979, the day on which Kampala was captured, 
Rurangaranga, then one of the members of the Uganda National Liberation Front 
(UNLF), and Assistant District Commissioner of Bushenyi, addressed a rally where he 
told the gathering of the experience he and others had had under Amin and "his 
people" (which was interpreted to mean Muslims). At the end of the rally, in his usual 
metaphorical language, Rurangaranga said, tutemire omuh kiri aharimwe kukongora 
amalagi, (we have felled the tree and it is up to you people to cut off the branches), 
which was taken to mean that Amin was the tree and the Muslims were the branches. 
Rurangaranga says that he was quoted out of context. According to him: 
453 This is not to say that it was only the Muslims who were rich. There were Christians who had 
equafly acquired wealth opportunistically and had become part of the pot-bellied generation. They 
too used to be referred to as "Hajis". During Amin's time it was fashionable to put on excess weight 
as a sign of wealth. 
163 
the tree was Amin and the branches were Aminism - corruption, murder, stealing which I was calling on 
people to resist and fight. All these were vices, which had polluted Ankole society and were due to 
Anýn's influence. My statement did not mean Muslims at all. It was misquoted. 
454 
It is not my intention to exonerate politicians but when the Kiziba massacres were 
committed Rurangaranga had returned to Tanzania to see his family. This is 
confirmed by Commander Frank Guma, then one of the "Liberators" in 1979, and now 
an Officer in NRA: 
I was dispatched to arrest Rurangaranga but the latter had escaped to Tanzania and when he returned, 
his apprehension was made difficult by his strong connections with the government in power, which had 
tumed the issue political. 455 
Yoweri Museveni and Yowasi Makaru were also implicated. According to Abdallah 
Katende, a vAtness to the Commission ofInquiry: 
Yowasi Makaru had gone around fining Muslims by asking for cows and goats and was made County 
Chief of Sheerna and later allocated buses though he had no sound economic base. 456 
But many interviewees in Kabwohe and Itendero (both towns in the area) exonerated 
Makaru for any involvement in the Itendero killings, including a Muslim, Abasi 
Balinda, who spoke highly of Makaru's protection of the Muslims. He said Makaru 
was: 
a true Mulokole and an elder in our community and would never have been involved in such dirty 
activities. 457 
Makaru is a well-respected Mulokole all over Ankole. For many years he had been 
returned unopposed as the Head of Laity for West Ankole Diocese. Recently he was 
elected as the District Local Council Chairman of Bushenyi in Museveni's 
454 Interview: Rurangaranga. 
455 Commission, op. cit. 
456 Commission, op. cit. p. 96. 
457 Interview: Abasi Balinda, July 31,1996, Kabwohe. 
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government. Had Makaru been as ruthless as the witness said, it is unlikely that the 
people of Bushenyi and above all Museveni would have supported him. Makaru has 
never been County Chief of Sheema. He has an established Dairy farm and is above 
the poverty line. So he would not need pork or beer from the Muslims which he 
himself does not drink. The Commission of Inquiry exonerated Museveni as a man 
who for many years fought against oppression. According to Musevern: 
I fought in Ankole and if I were against Muslims, my soldiers would have purged them during the height 
of the war rather than send villagers later to do the dirty job. 458 
Indeed Museveni headed a delegation of six Ministers including the Attorney General 
to assess the situation in Itendero where he repeated the need for reconciliation. 459 
What is not clear is what happened to the victims and whether the government 
protected them or the perpetrators were arrested. In the same week, Kaboggoza- 
Musoke, then DC of Ankole, met many Muslims who were still fleeing from the area: 
While on my way from Mbarara to Bushenyi, I came across several Muslim families running away on 
foot with children and luggage from Bushenyi for Ruharo Nfission in Mbarara. 460 
Muslims property, especially land, which is highly prized in such a densely populated 
banana growing area like Itendero might have been an incentive. Muslims abandoned 
or sold their bibanja (land held under customary tenure) at give away prices and fled 
to areas like Kyazanga and Kampala. One interviewee who preferred to remain 
anonymous told how: 
following the months of the massacres many of us flew to Masaka and Kyua ga. Starvation was our 
common experience. Fear and despair was our routine. At home agitators of the killings were busy 
acquiring our land and houses. Most of us sold our property under duress. 
45 8 Commissioll, op. cit. p. 9 1. 
459 Interview: Abasi Balinda. 
460 Interview: Kaboggoza-Musoke, March 27,1997, Kampala. 
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It is very easy to ask why the government at the time hesitated to take decisive action 
against the perpetrators. In all my interviews, there was no mention of any 
intervention from the Christian churches, which had formerly championed the fight 
for human rights. Did the church and the government sanction or give a silent support 
to such atrocities? The period between April-July 1979 was a period of anarchy. The 
"liberation excitement" was a factor in itself. Even if the government or the Church 
had wanted to protect Muslims it would have been difficult because there was no 
credible and effective govenunent to take action: 
there was no government to talk of The goverrunent in Kampala had its own problems and in Ankole, 
the war was still going on. There was no effective communication and army trucks were the only means 
of transport. 461 
461 Interview: Yowasi Makaru, April 29,1997, Bushenyi. 
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4.10. CONCLUSION. 
I agree with Kasozi that 'Amin was Muslim, but it is wrong to assume that Islam 
guided his activities or that the whole of the Muslim community participated in 
formulating his policies. 1462 It is possible that some of the victims in Itendero had 
terrorised people during Amin's time. But the Itendero incident was a sad reflection 
on the Christian community especially when among the victims were women, 
children and the elderly. Some of these victims of mob justice were ordinary 
Muslims, poor peasants, who may not have benefited from Amin's regime any more 
than Christians. The killing and displacement of these people was political revenge 
and sectarianism, unleashed unjustly on a group of people who had suffered because 
of Amin. Such killings have far-reaching consequences. They create suspicion 
between people who fear the next political eruption might make them victims. People 
taking the law into their hands set a dangerous precedent and poison a society. It also 
calls for an honest and careful synthesis of the extent to which Christianity has really 
penetrated Ankole society and to what extent it has influenced its actions. 
Lastly, though persecuted, the Christian church emerged stronger, singing 
"Onward Christian soldiers. " Amin had tried to make Christianity a minor religion but 
Uganda remained predominantly a Christian country, with less than 10% MUSliMS. 463 
The historical antagonism and hatred between Catholics and Protestants had given 
way to unity. The church grew militant and when beaten into silence supported the 
guerrilla forces at least in prayer. 464 But, while some Muslims exploited their 
462 Abdu Kasozi, 7he Spread Of Islam in Uganda, Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 115, 
(Kasozi quotes Uganda Argus of I October 1968 as the source of his information). 
463 ibid., p. 14. The actual number of Muslims in Uganda is not known. Arye Oded, Is1wn in 
Qganda, (1974). (Jerusalem, p. 315-316) suggests that there was a substantial increase in the number 
of Muslims in Uganda during Amin's rule. But the 3 Million he suggests is exaggerated. Though 
there were conversions in An-dn's regime, Islam also had lost many of its followers after the 
expulsion of Asians. Many of them were Muslims, The Uganda Muslim Supreme Council is 
currently making preparations for a Muslim Census throughout the country. Until the results of this 
census are known, their Percentage will remain a speculation. See, Ali Kettani, Journal Institute Of 
hfjjsjiM Minority Affairs, Vol - 4,1994; 
Abasi Kiyimba, 'The Problem of Muslim Education in 
Uganda, ' in JIMW, vol. 7, no. 1, London, V )86, p. 252. 
464 Interview: i3ishop Kakubi, March 22,1997, lbanda. 
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favourable position under Amin, their religion ought not to be blamed. The ordinary 
Muslim was not responsible and the violence continued in the succeeding regimes. 
It is true the ethnic factor was shelved dunng Amin's regime, but Muslims who 
traditionally are Baganda have never integrated in Kinyankole culture and therefore 
have always been seen as outsiders. In light of this therefore, as far as ethno-political 
relations are concerned, the Christians are still suspicious about Muslim involvement 
in politics due to Amin's expenence. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5. THE OBOTE H REGIME (1980-1985) AND THE EARLY YEARS OF NRM: 
THEIR EFFECTS ON THE RELIGIO-POLITICAL LIFE IN ANKOLE. 
5.0. INTRODUCTION. 
The post liberation spirit was the optimism that Uganda, and Ankole in particular, 
would learn from past experience. Persecution had resulted in unity when various 
religious and ethnic groups shelved their differences. This was demonstrated by the 
spirit in which people welcomed the liberators regardless of their past alliances. 
Catholics and Protestants encouraged their sons to join the liberation war. Obviously 
among the liberators who came to Ankole were Banyankole like Yoweri Museveni, 
Adonia Tiberondwa, Edward Rurangaranga, and Kabogorwa whom Amin had exiled. 
What many of these exiles did not realise was the extent to which society had changed 
due to the effects of the past regime: moral decadence shattered economy and the 
devaluation of life. They hoped to make a new beginning despitq the enormous task 
ahead. I remember the very first rally and speech Kabogorwa gave in July 1979 at 
Bwizibwera, Kashari. He condemned sectarian politics and taught us a song: Zahuka, 
zahuk, a Uganda, Uganda zahuka osime Nyakusinga, (Arise, anse Uganda and thank 
God who has liberated you). However, such optimism did not reflect the returnees' 
real plans on the ground especially when it came to electing chiefs to replace the 
previous regime. It was largely the returnees who were responsible for the 
reintroduction of sectarian politics which Amin's regime had contained. Without a 
fault of their own nearly all the prominent leaders in the liberation war were 
Protestants. Understandably, it was mainly the UPC Bairu Protestants in Ankole who 
had fallen victim of Amin's regime. Even then, their domination of the liberation 
force worried Catholics: 
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In a way we were a bit scared by this Protestant composition because if you remember they were the 
same people who had given DP hard time in the 1960s. The sight of people like Rurangaranga and 
others did not augur well for us. Even at that very early stage, we began to be scared of another 
Protestant hegemony once again. 465 
But for Bishop Kakubi: 
Personally I did not mind about the Protestant composition since I knew its history. I was only optimistic 
that we had all drawn lessons from An-tin's regime and were ready to start afresh. 466 
But the political events in Kampala and the consequent fall of President Yusufu Lule 
within sixty-eight days showed the lack of unity among the liberators. In Ankole old 
sectarian identities began to surface in the very first months of the liberation. As 
Kafureka had feared, the very first chiefs to replace Muslims were either Protestants 
or fon-ner UPC or both. 467 Kafureka added: 
This, as far as we were concerned, was their first test. If they had passed it then Ankole would have been 
different from what it became in the 1980s. But they did not. 468 
This was mainly in Bushenyi district as the table below illustrates: 
465 Interview: Dononsio Kafureka, February 8,1998, Nyan-ýitanga- 
466 Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, February 16,1998, lbanda. 
467 Interview: Dononsio Kafureka. 
468 Ibid. 
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Table 6: County chiefs after the fall of Amin, mid 1979.469 
County Name -- FReligion. Party 
Igara. Evan Katafire Protestant UPC 
Sheema Byakyaro Protestant UPC 
Kajara Erica Kubiriba Protestant UPC 
Bunyaruguru Tibunyebire Catholic DP 
Rushenyi Obadia Nkabahita Protestant UPC 
Tiberondwa justifies such appointments because 
the fighting group was basically UPC. You will find that the wave of chiefs was former UPC and mostly 
Protestants. Though Amin had suppressed parties people had kept their party identity. Actually for us in 
UPC we were determined to take over power so that whatever was being done, it was a strategy for the 
future. 470 
Political appointments once again marked the divisions where Catholics conceived 
the liberation as a Protestant affair. Edward Rurangaranga who was the District 
Commissioner and responsible for appointments said: 
Because we had to put up a caretaker structure before we could think of balancing the equation. In any 
case we had to give such offices to people whom we knew very well. Coincidentally, they happened to 
be Protestants and former UPCs. I agree that we should have acted otherwise, but it was due to the 
urgency at the time. 471 
"Before we could think of balancing the equation" is symbolic. In Ankole, it meant 
religious and ethnic inclusiveness. Surely, he needed to balance the equation at the 
very beginning. And this was where the opportunity was lost. The Anglican Church in 
469 This list is compiled from the recollections of an Interview with Sam Turihamwe, March 12,1998, 
Nyamiko. These were the immediate appointments for the period June 1979-December 1980. 
470 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, September 12,1997, Kampala. 
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Ankole also gave the impression that they had been part of the armed struggle to oust 
Idi Amin. Some liberators like Rurangaranga were accompanying the Bishop on his 
Diocesan tours. As Francis Bwengye observed: 
Even in that short period, some of these Protestant returnees started touring with the Bishop of West 
Ankole in order to greet the people. Whereas this was good, it gave an impression that it was a 
Protestant monopoly since they never had any opportunity to visit the Catholic Church. 472 
But Bishop Bamunoba claimed they were not taken around the diocese because they 
were politicians. Rather they were former Synod members returned from exile: 
Whatever interpretation it was given my own objective to take some of them with me during my tours in 
1979 was a testimony to many Banyankole that God had protected these exiles. People needed to see 
them since they had only heard about them. People were eager to hear their stories. 473 
But as Adonia Tiberondwa put it, such stories could be used as propaganda: 
Churches organised thanksgiving ceremonies for us after our return where we really got platform to tell 
our experiences in exile. You know such stories are good weapons to play on people's instincts. We 
easily won peoples' sympathies. With the Church's support we had an advantage over others because we 
had that ready made sympathetic audience. 474 
Indeed at the elections a year later, many successful candidates had church backing. 
The Dean of St. James Cathedral Mbarara, in a letter dated January 12,1980 to the 
District Commissioner Mbarara (DC), invited the DC to take part in the thanksgiving 
service in honour of Edward Rurangaranga who had returned from exile. The Dean 
wrote: 
Major Edward Rurangaranga had been almost killed in Mbarara by bandits of Amin and God saved 
hirn, also having been a member of our Synod and our teacher at Ruharo in the past. There arose a 
471 Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, September 8,1997, Ishaka. 
472 Interview: Francis Bwengye, July 29,1997, Kampala. 
473 Interview: Bishop Yoramu Bamunoba, February 21,1998, Kyamugorani. 
474 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, March 12,1998, Kampala. 
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desire to hold a simple thanksgiving ceremony organised by the Cathedral chapter and the Bishop. You 
are cordially invited to come and participate with us in this noble cause. 475 
The Dean also explained that people such as Rurangaranga had been Synod members 
and therefore the church could not ignore them. He said, they were "our children" 
whom we were obliged to receive back. The dilemma though was the motive behind 
those open hands. The church "was sure that the return of men such as Tiberondwa 
and others meant good will for the church, "476 the resumption of official recognition. 
Although such people were welcomed as "our children", within Protestant circles, it is 
likely that among the Bahima, they were received with suspicion. These were largely 
Bairu Protestants who had indeed participated in the abolition of the monarchy in the 
sixties. While their return could have been welcomed as a liberation from a 
murderous regime, on the other hand it could have meant complete loss of hope in the 
return of their cherished monarchy. No wonder during Obote's regime, Bahima and 
Banyarwanda were always suspected of being anti-government especially when the 
guerrilla movement broke out. 
5.1. OBOTE'S RETURN AND THE 1980 ELECTIONS. 
It was the declared policy of the Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) to ban 
parties for two years. The National Consultative Council (NCC) under the UNLF 
leadership favoured the holding of elections under the UNLF rather than a return to 
political parties. Reviving political parties, they argued, would jeopardise unity and 
lead to the resurgence of sectarian politics. Consequently in April 1980, the Secretary 
of the Political and Diplomatic Commission released a Government statement: 
The decision by the NCC that all elections be held under the umbrella of the UNLF provided that all 
legally qualified Ugandans are free to stand for election to all public offices means that no political party 
vvill be permitted. All Ugandans including supporters of former political parties are free to stand ... but 
475 See letter from Dean of St James Cathedral to the District Commissioner, Mbarara in Government 
file, No. 116, East Ankole Archives. 
476 Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, February 17,1998, Ibanda. 
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only as individuals. They %krill not be permitted to stand on their party platforms or manifestos [other 
than] the marýfesto of LJMLF ... 
477 
Both DP and UPC had opposed the umbrella politics (Omutaka gwa UNLF) and 
wanted to contest the elections as parties. 478 UPC in particular insisted that political 
parties be re-instituted. Otherwise, apart from parties, there was no way in which 
Obote would have returned and contested the elections. UPC, which had the majority 
in the NCC and the army, deposed Godfrey Bmaisa as President in May 1980 and 
instituted a Military Commission headed by a UPC stalwart Paul Muwanga. As 
Tiberondwa said: 
Without that strategy, we would never have succeeded in bringing Obote back. President Binaisa was 
determined to block him. But you see blocking Obote meant blocking UPC and that would have been 
chaos for Uganda. So we decided to topple him peacefully and institute a UPC establishment through 
the Mlitary Commission. 479 
With the institution of the Military Commission in May 1980, the idea of holding 
elections under the LNLF was dropped and on May 27,1980, Obote returned to 
Uganda through Ankole. 
Why did Milton Obote choose to land in Bushenyi and not in Buganda or 
Lango his home area? it was a political statement of symbolic power with symbolic 
resonance. Obote used his return as a campaign tool, declaring candidature and 
rousing public sentiments at his "heroic second-coming" as a liberator. That explains 
the massive Press coverage he received. The Uganda Times, the official mouthpiece 
of the government then, reported: 
In an emotional landing at Mbarara airstrip, Obote donned in a UPC black, red, blue short sleeved shirt, 
kissed the ground and shed tears ... 
480 
477 Kamukuzi Archives: See Government Statement of 30'h. April. 1980, in UNLF File, letter No. 96. 
478 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, March 12,1998, Kampala. 
479 Ibid. 
480 See, 7he Uganda Times, 28 May 1980, p. 1. 
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Obote knew that Bushenyi had been UPC's stronghold. It was mainly Bushenyi 
people who almost single-handed orgamscd Obote's return. According to Adonia 
Tiberondwa: 
I was directly involved in that exercise. We wanted Obote to return and I led the mission. With the late 
Kosia Korutaro the former UPC Chairman in the sixties, Bashasha and Ruhombe, we flew to Tanzania 
and we gave an open invitation to Obote to come to Bushenyi. You see the Tanzanian forces were in full 
support and we had Paul Muwanga on our side. 481 
It was mainly returnees from exile who championed the return of Obote. Obote knew 
that whereas support for him was guaranteed in Northern Uganda, his homeland, 
Buganda and much of the Western Uganda had to be wooed. He knew the hatred of 
Buganda for having abolished their monarchy and could not set his first foot on its 
land, which he desecrated. 482 Obote chose to return to Uganda through Ankole 
because by doing so he alienated Buganda and made it appear insignificant. 483 Thus 
the return to Uganda through Ankole was a political strategy to show the entire world 
the kind of support Obote had as opposed to Buganda's opposition. As Ezra Kikuri 
says: 
Obote's return had a great impact because even on the very day of 27 May 1980, the fijnction attracted 
the entire nation and the international media. If I can remember very well, I do not remember having 
seen any bigger crowd than that since. 484 
In a way the horrors of Amin's regime were so bad that people were looking for an 
alternative to Amin. That is why when Obote returned to Ankole, the "whole nation" 
received him. In any case by the time Obote was overthrown in 1971, things in 
Uganda had not deteriorated as badly as they did during Amin's regime. But not 
everyone who came supported Obote. There were those who came out of curiosity 
481 Interview: with Adonia Tiberondwa. 
482 Interview: Joram Kahenano, July 22,1997, Kampala. 
483 Cf Holger B. Hansen and Mchael Twaddle, Uganda Now: Between Decay and De velopment, 
London: James Currey, 1998, p. 284. 
484 Interview: Ezra Kikuri, July 14,1997, Bushenyi. 
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especially the youths who had heard about Obote as a legend. To many of these, the 
politics of UPC or DP did not mean much because they grew up during Amin's 
regime. To some of these youths however, they were soon to get their political 
education as UPC Youth Wingers. There were those who were his former opponents 
like the DP but who like the biblical Thomas had come to confirm whether it was 
really Obote. To their dismay he was! Anyway, 27 May 1980 became the launching 
pad for the resurrection of the UPC party. As part of the crowd then, I have a vivid 
recollection of the day's events. Obote was not only received as the Party President, 
but on that day: 
John Babiiha who had been the Vice President of UPC formally handed over to Obote the UPC 
constitution to take over the leadership of the party from where he had left it 
Obote had left not only as a Party President, but also the President of Uganda. So, 
they saw him as President again. But to have said that Obote would start from where 
he had left off was unfortunate. He had left a divided country, torn apart by religious 
and party loyalties which many people did not want to see again. 
It is not easy though to assess the role of the church in Obote's return. We 
can only draw conclusions based on the interviews and the way different churches 
received the liberators. And this we have already discussed. Of course the vast 
majority of the members of the Anglican Church seemed delighted that Obote had 
returned because, as it were, he represented a cause. And this is supported by a letter 
from the Anglican Bishop of East Ankole Diocese who in reply to the invitation to 
attend the 27 May 1980 occasion, regretted his absence: 
I am so very sorry that this welcoming day for Doctor Obote A. M. was arranged to be on the same day 
as that when the Archbishop of Uganda had arranged for us all Bishops of the Province for a House of 
Bishop's meeting at Narnirembe, Kampala. I shall miss this great opportunity of meeting our old friend 
and former President. 485 
485 See letter from Bishop Amos Betungura to Edward Rurangaranga, in Government File, letter 
No. 118, East Ankole Diocese. 
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Indeed Obote was "our old friend" for whom the Bishop had suffered during Amin's 
period. Apart from that the churches were not part of the occasion officially though it 
was Protestant UPC politicians who were at the centre of it all. This could be the only 
parallel that can be drawn. As far as Ankole Catholics were concerned, they were only 
part of the crowd but not represented in the higher echelons of the occasion. 4116 The 
arrival of Obote marked another chapter in the history of Ankole. It was the launching 
day for UPC as a Party and shortly afterwards in June, multiparty campaigns began. 
5.2. THE 1980 MULTIPARTY ELECTIONS: A LAPSE TO THE FORMER 
ETHNO-POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS FACTIONALISM. 
The Military Commission declared in June 1980 that party politics was the only way 
to democracy. Consequently Ankole and Uganda generally revived traditional parties 
based on the old religious base. Ankole once again was a microcosm of the national 
scene: ethnic and religious fissures re-emerged letting out the historical magma of 
pent-up hatred and idiosyncrasies. Bairu Catholics and Bahima Protestants joined 
forces again in DP, while the Protestant Bairu joined UPC. The political scene during 
and after the campaigns was a reflection of the 1960s. This meant that the very reason 
people joined or rejected UPC or DP in the 1960s was the same they were likely to 
embrace twenty years later. Obote had hinted on a similar thing when in Bushenyi he 
said, we shall startfrom where we stopped, which was only too true 
Campaigns in Ankole took on a religious complexion with UPC Protestant 
candidates seeking favour with the Anglican Church while DP went for the Catholic 
Church. Both churches became platforms for politicians to come and greet the people. 
In comparison the Anglican priests seem to have held a stronger hand than the 
Catholics because of the Protestant membership in the government. And as Francis 
Bwengye, a Catholic politician, observed: 
496 Please note that were high ranking Catholics in the UPC party like the late John Babiiha (UPC 
Vice President) but these were ftom outside Ankole. 
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Anglican clergy are more politicised because most of them had been lay people unlike the Catholics who 
fight from their childhood go through the life of a Seminary and are not supposed to look outside. The 
Anglican Priest either had been a teacher, even a businessman or has been politicised through the 
society. Some of them even had been chiefs, so when they join the church, they definitely keep their 
political beliefs. 487 
The difference between the politics of the 1960s and 1980 was that the members of 
the former Omufunguro Protestant UPC either joined DP or UPM after having been 
fed up with Obote's divisive politics. William Mukaira said: 
Our phflosophy had not changed at all. In the sixties we called for party accommodation failure of which 
we were about to defect had the coup not taken place. Since UPC was not ready to reform in the 1980 
elections, all we could do was to join other parties, which were ready to receive us. 
Though UPC members dismissed Mukaira's group as defecting because they could 
not compete in the UPC of the 1980s, there were genuine former UPC members 
whose desire was unity in Ankole. But as it turned out, UPC in Ankole became 
predominantly a party of the old guards and former Enkomba of the 1960s. The 
Omufunguro alliance with DP and UPM marked the divisions within the UPC even at 
this stage. The fact that none of the Omufunguro was exiled meant that UPC returnees 
suspected they had collaborated with Amin. Whereas their defection to DP was a 
demonstration against UPC, they may have also felt guilt for their welcome to Amin. 
By joining DP and other parties, they hoped to weaken UPC and demonstrate their 
dissatisfaction with it though this was not effective. The UPC returnees were not only 
backed by the army, they became powerful and exercised their influence in the 
churclfs establishment. The Omufunguro therefore crossed as individuals only, seen 
as disgruntled individuals selling out to the Catholics and DP. 
The Uganda Patriotic Movement (UPM) was formed in June 1980. We shall not go 
into the details of its formation at the national level. But what is of interest to this 
thesis is that its leader, Yoweri Museveni, a Muhima Protestant, was from Ankole. He 
487 Interview: Francis Bwengye, July 29,1997, Kampala 
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had been one of the key commanders of the liberation war and had participated in the 
campaign against Idi Amin since 1971.488Museveni said: 
We formed UPM not because we wanted to form a party for its own sake or because we wanted to lead 
a political party, but because it was a necessity imposed on us by those elements that worked for the 
disintegration of UNLF. 489 
UPC and DP members believed that Museveni formed UPM because he was 
ambitious to rule. According to Tiberondwa and Francis Bwengye, Museveni had in 
exile disassociated himself from Obote and formed his own Military wing 
FRONASA: 
And whenever Museveni was not elected chairman of any of our committees, he was not satisfied. So 
when we returned from e)dle, he could not be accommodated under DP for there was no way he could 
have led DP or UPC. So he formed something of his own which he led. He knew that it would not take 
him very far but at least he was its leader. 490 
My attempts to interview Museveni failed. However I was able to read his book, The 
Mustard Seed, which together with interviews was the source of my information on 
UPM. Museveni could not lead DP, traditionally a Baganda and Catholic party, both 
of which Museveni was not. UPM was in a way a protest party of mainly the young 
UPC Protestants and DP Catholics who were disenchanted with UPC and DP 
parochialism. Many like Museveni and Kategaya had been educated at Dar es Salaam 
University. They had liberal views and no religious bias which contributed to UPM's 
poor performance in Ankole where people voted according to their religious 
affiliation. Also people like Museveni, Kategaya, Rugunda, and others had been UPC 
Youth Wingers who had fallen out of favour with the leadership. They realised that 
their chances to reach leadership roles were limited because of UPC's failure to groom 
the youth for leadership. 491 Because Museveni wished for a non-aligned party, UPM 
488 See his book, The Mustard Seed 
489 Uganda Times, 17 June 1980, p. 4. 
490 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa. 
491 Interview: Ndiwa-Ndikora, July 23,1997, Mbarara. 
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did not have much impact in Ankole. UPC and DP had started in the fifties while 
UPM only had three months to impress itself upon Banyankole. As Hon. Eriya 
Kategaya said, time was not long enough. 492 
Banyankole could not identify with UPM because they were already linked 
to their highly organised traditional parties. Catholics and Protestant Bahima 
identified with DP and therefore Museveni would have to work extremely hard if he 
was to have any impact. Though he was an Army Commander in the liberation war, 
he was not well known in Ankole. People used to refer to him as Akashaya kokucwa 
efumu, (the small man of proverbs) in a sense despising him. Even if Museveni was a 
Muhima, he was not from a traditional prestigious ruling family. He was seen as an 
in-comer and therefore regarded as a nonentity in Ankole politics. And Catholics 
might see him as a former UPC Protestant who would not preserve their interests. 493 
As Kategaya said: 
Some of those old parties like UPC and DP had their foundations in religions. I remember in Rukungiri 
where I attended one of the rallies and an old man asked us, 'UPC is for Protestants, DP is for Catholics, 
what is your religion?, ' asicing about UpM. 494 
On religious and ethnic considerations, one might have expected Bahima to support 
Museveni, but they were entrenched in DP, and disregarded Museveni. And as Ndiwa- 
Ndikora reflected: 
In Nyabushozi, Bahima also have their own problems. They used to think that for anybody to lead, he 
had to come from a prominent family, a kind ofMwana wani (son of so and so). They think it should be 
the son of a former chief who should lead. So Museveni lost on that ticket. 495 
The DP candidate in Nyabushozi was Sam Kuteesa, a member of the ruling Bahinda 
clan while most UPM candidates in Ankole were mainly Bairu Protestants like 
Kategaya, Mushega, Mwebesa and others who were former UPC members and did not 
492 Interview: Hon. Eriya Kategaya, February 9,1998, Kampala. 
493 Interview: Francis Bwengye, July 29,1997, Kampala. 
494 Interview: Hon Eriya Kategaya, February 9,1998, Kampala. 
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attract Bahima notables who were already entrenched in DP. Though its leader 
Museveni was Omuhima, UPM was not a party based on ethno-religious politics, at 
least on the surface. Its objectives were to: 
Change the status quo of the sixties. We thought that UPM would appeal to all those nationalists whose 
desire was to seek the unity of our country. We knew that it would take time, but we were determined 
to press on and we did. 496 
These three, UPC, DP and UPM, were the parties that battled it out in the December 
1980 elections. At this time what became known as the Seven Diocesan Schools were 
opened in West Ankole Diocese. The idea had been planned by Bishop Bamunoba but 
not possible under Amin. Now these schools: Ruyonza, Kyeizoba, Masheruka, 
Ruhinda, Rugarama, Kitagata and Rubare were opened in every county in Bushenyi 
district. Because these schools had to raise money, they became another excuse for 
UPC Protestant candidates to advertise themselves. The church and politicians had a 
symbiotic relationship as Bishop Bamunoba said: 
UPC supported my schools because they also needed church support. You see if they were invited as 
guest of honour to a school fund-raising during the campaigns, it really meant a lot. Politicians could not 
refuse to organise our fund-raisings because through that way, they also attracted parents for votes. 497 
In 1980, Ankole had less than eight secondary schools which could not absorb 
primary school leavers. Their foundation reduced the number of school dropouts 
affected by the stiff competition for the few vacancies. The good will of politicians to 
support these schools was also part and parcel of their strategy to attract votes. 
495 Interview: Ndiwa-Ndikora, July 23,1997, Mbarara. 
496 Interview: Hon. Kategaya, February 9,1997, Mbarara. 
497 Interview: Bishop Yoramu Bamunoba, September 7,1997, Kyamugorani. 
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53. THE ELECTIONS. 
Despite the intimidation that characterised the campaigns in some parts of Ankole, 
the polls attracted many people. UPC claimed a significant victory and sent a bigger 
number of representatives to parliament. The question that I shall attempt to answer is 
whether UPC really won the 1980 elections in Ankole. The popular view is that UPC 
rigged the elections. This was put forward by DP, UPM and some liberal UPC 
although the Commonwealth observers declared it "a valid expression of the people's 
choice" and a "free and fair" exerciSe. 498 How could the UPC ng the elections? 
First was the gerrymandering of the electoral constituencies to make it hard 
for other parties to win in areas where they had obvious majority support. The pro- 
UPC electoral commission demarcated the constituencies in such a way that areas of 
DP and UPM concentration could be added onto predominantly UPC areas to 
neutralise them. Nyabushozi where Museveni (UPM) lost is an intriguing example for 
it is a predominantly Bahima Protestant area. Given that Museveni was not an 
enthusiastic supporter of the monarchy, and he was contending with a more 
establishment Muhima, Sam Kuteesa of DP, still the gerrymandering of Nyabushozi 
(Mbarara North constituency) was a key factor. Museveni writes: 
My own constituency in Nyabushozi was genymandered. Taking advantage of the fact that voting was 
likely to be on a religious basis, the sub-counties of Nyak-asharara, Sanga and Kashongi were removed 
from Nyabushozi and made part of another constituency. These sub-counties were mainly 
Protestant ... and were exchanged for lbanda which is occupied by Catholics. Both UPC and DP were 
involved in these practices in my area as both parties had an interest in making it difficult for me to 
win. 499 
Despite Museveni's claims though, it is unlikely that he would have won even if there 
was no rigging because of the factors already analysed. Actually the results shown 
below are plus for him given the fact that he was contesting with two impeccable 
personalities who represented the two ethnic groups in Nyabushozi. Sam Kuteesa 
498 See The Uganda Time. 5,15 December 1980, p. 1. 
499 Y. K, Museveni, op. cit., p. i ig. 
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obviously drew the Bahima votes because of his "accident of birth" while Yoramu 
Gucwamaingi drew the Bairu migrant votes in Nyabushozi. Museveni as the 
middleman drew the stray votes so to say and it was indeed an achievement on his 
part that he scored thus: DP (Sam Kuteesa), 15,657, UPC (Yoramu Gucwamaingi), 
12,747, UPM (Yowen Museveni), 12,682.500 The rigging in this case could only arise 
in the fact that the sub-counties name above, which were Protestant dominated, were 
added to Mbarara Central Constituency in order to strengthen the UPC candidate, Dr. 
Edward Rubaihayo who was likely to be threatened by Catholic DPs in Mbarara. Of 
course the transfer of these sub-counties denied Musevem of the migrant votes. But 
these migants to Nyabushozi were mainly Bairu who originally hailed from UPC 
counties like Igara, Sheema, Rwampara and some Bakiga due to land shortage and 
therefore were unlikely to vote Musevem. That is actually the reason UPC polled 
second to DP in Nyabushozi thus relegating Museveni to the last position. 
Bunyaruguru (Bushenyl North Constituency) was another fraudulent case. Despite 
being a Catholic dominated area, a UPC and moreover, a little known, candidate, Dr. 
Joseph Muhangi won because of the fraudulent importation of people from other 
districts. Although Dr. Tiberondwa claims it was partly because UPC had 
concentrated a lot of energy against Francis Bwengye, the DP candidate, still he 
confesses: 
Even then there were some irregularities. Actually when you look at the number of votes cast in 
Bunyarugunj for UPC, they seem to be much more than the Protestants who could possibly be in that 
area. 501 
The total votes for Bunyaruguru were: UPC (Dr. Joseph Muhangi), 22,744, DP 
(Francis Bwengye), 19,383, UPM (Victor Bigirwenda), 593. Francis Bwengye also 
added: 
500 See Results of the 1980 Electoral Commission, p. 149. 
501 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa. 
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In areas like Sheema, Rwampara and Igara, UPC could have won but not in Bunyaruguru and lbanda 
because they were Catholic concentrations and yet UPC won in Bunyaruguru. 502 
Bwengye goes on to summarise the methods which UPC used to win the elections: 
Doctoring the voters' registers and putting in under-age people, registering dead people so that others 
could vote for them, exchanging ballot boxes depending on which one was heavier. I really witnessed 
this. People suspected of being Catholics were rubbed off from the registers and all Polling Assistants 
and chiefs were UPC. In some of the stations the total votes exceeded the total number of people in the 
registers. DP was not allowed to have observers 
All electoral officials were UPC; the electoral Commission, the Returning Officers, 
Polling Assistants and even chiefs who had been appointed by the returning Protestant 
exiles. According to the directive from the Ministry of Public Service and Cabinet 
AffairS503 chiefs were required to be impartial in the exercise. But instead many of 
them participated in favour of UPC against DP supporters. Writing a petition to the 
District Commissioner, Mbarara, the DP chairman, Mbarara branch, Mr. P. Kavuma 
complained: 
I have received some reports that some of your chiefs ... 
have not been impartial in dealing with political 
parties. Chiefs are deeply involved in harassing DP supporters and some have actually been imprisoned. 
If need be, we can actually quote incidents. 504 
This is not surprising for as Ndiwa-Ndikora, retired District Commissioner, Mbarara 
District, says: 
County chiefs in Ankole were mainly Protestants, apart from Bunyaruguru, which was traditionally for a 
Catholic Mwiru. 505 
502 Interview: Francis Bwengye. 
503 See Circular Standing Instruction No. I of 1980 issued by the Ministry of Public Service and 
Cabinet Affairs, dated 30 June 1980, and the Directive (C. 10486) issued by the Minister Mr. W. 
Okwenje on 5 September 1980 barring civil servants from involvement in partisan politics. 
504 See a letter from the Chairman, Democratic Party Office, Mbarara Branch to the District 
Commissioner, Mbarara, 18 August 1980. 
505 Interview: Ndiwa-Ndikora, July 23,1997, Mbarara. 
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The Electoral Commission Report records cases of intimidation of voters and 
opposition candidates being held and delayed at army roadblocks. 506 Of course not all 
results were rigged. There were some constituencies where UPC won comfortably 
such as Bushenyi Central (Tiberondwa), Kanyomozi and Francis Butagira in 
Rwarnpara, Mbarara. Whatever it was, UPC formed the government that lead the 
country from December 1980 until July 1985 when it was once again toppled by its 
own army. 
5.4. THE CHURCH AND POLITICS IN ANKOLE. 
We have already alluded to the frenzy the Anglican Church fell into at the arrival of 
its exiled heavyweights who had been members of Synods and church councils at 
different levels. The majority of the returnees were Anglicans and therefore the 
Catholic Church could see a return to the UPC reign of the sixties of which Catholics 
had only bitter memories. Secondly the activities of the Catholic Church were 
severely frustrated, even curtailed, while the UPC politicians favoured the Anglican 
Church. This was very apparent when it came to fund-raising. Whereas all churches 
were required to seek legal permission before holding any function, for the Anglican 
Church it was only a theoretical requirement. As Bishop Bamunoba put it quite 
frankly: 
If you were in Bushenyi, for instance, one did not need permission from a Protestant District 
Commissioner. After all, these people wanted platform and therefore such fund-raisings were opportune 
moments. Yet for the Catholics, they had to apply because they did not have sympatfiýisers in the higher 
hierarchy. 507 
Consequently church functions served UPC's propaganda with explicit church 
support. You could not draw the line between the individual Christian and the 
506 See Report on the Results of the 1980 elections by the Electoral Commission, p. 72. Mr Ndiwa- 
Ndikora in an interview also said that in Kasese, for example, a DP candidate was reported to have 
been killed before he reached a polling station. 
507 Interview: Bishop Y. Bamunoba, September 7,1997, Kyamugorani. 
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politician. Francis Bwengye recalls a case when he was embarrassed at a church fund- 
raising for Ruhinda Secondary School in Bushenyi: 
I remember when I went to a fund-raising at a Protestant School and offered a cheque equivalent to 
about 20 bicycles. But then Rurangaranga stood up and asked people if they accepted a DP cheque. 
People kept quiet because money is money. Kamuntu stood up and cooled the situation saying that 
money is money whether it is from DP or UPC. But Rurangaranga made a disparaging statement, that 
since when did people of "the other side" [abaseri, meaning Catholics] help us to build? 508 
The two churches not only gave their politicians a forum in churches to "preach" but 
also church leaders "campaigned" for their parties and guided their flock for whom to 
vote and which party to support. Some politicians could get saved in order to win the 
trust of the church and Christians. That explains why a party like UPM, which had no 
religious appendage, was suspect. As Tiberondwa said: 
You see we were Protestants and naturally we found ourselves participating willingly on church 
councils. And we can not rule out the fact that we used the church platform to get votes. If you are 
involved in church activities and members of your local church know you, naturally they tend to prefer 
you when it comes to the time of voting. 509 
Furthermore the Anglican Church and UPC politicians used building schools and 
churches as a vote-catcher. Fund-raising functions as we have seen provided the 
forum for politicians to campaign. Later on politicians would "give" Secondary 
Schools to their localities by converting Primary Schools and would ensure that these 
Schools got government grants. The church might have been moved and motivated by 
the need for funds to build schools for which the UPC politicians readily provided, 
but it certainly did not mind giving a hand in building the UPC political kingdom on 
earth. Asked in which way did the politicians woo the church for votes, Tiberondwa 
replied: 
508 Interview: Francis Bwengye, July 29,1997, Kampala. 
S09 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, August 4,1997, Kampala. 
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You go for church functions, fund-raising for schools, which are church founded. In that way you are 
pulling the church closer to you. You invite church leaders to your home; you buy a door or window for 
the church. It was actually through monetary connections that politicians tended to identify with the 
church. 510 
That was the relationship between the Anglican Church and the politicians. 
Politicians got votes through church support while they were able to meet its financial 
obligations in return. Tiberondwa asserts that during the UPC period in the eighties, 
there were more churches and schools built than ever before. The same cannot be said 
of the Catholic Church in the same period. Catholics developed, built schools and 
churches at their own pace without any prompting force. Thus a comparison between 
the two institution reveals two factors. Whereas the Anglican Church had what we 
could term as a quantitative development, the Catholics had a qualitative one as 
Bishop Balcyenga said: 
You see we Catholics are not like you Anglicans. Since we lacked that political privilege, we learnt to 
live by ourselves and to use the means available to us. Through qualitative planning, we were able to 
achieve much without waiting for politicians to come and do it for us. You could say that the Anglican 
Church was more active than we were. But it is mainly due to the character of the two churches because 
the Catholic Church is generally very gentle and not as shouty of what it does as the Anglican Church 
does. 511 
I have dwelt on the Anglican Church because the Catholic Church was not an active 
actor in politics especially after the elections. With most of the Catholic candidates 
defeated, it concentrated on giving pastoral leadership to its flock leaving the political 
platform to the Anglican Church. 
The UPC victory of December 1980 had been followed by the emergence of the 
guerrilla war as early as February 1981. This put the Catholic Church in Ankole in a 
very difficult position. Because its followers were largely DP, they were suspected of 
collaboration. Consequently, there was harassment of Catholics by UPC chiefs in 
their zeal to combat the rebel activity (not prominent in Ankole anyway). From 198 1- 
510 ibid 
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1985 when the UPC government was overthrown, there was a tug of war between 
UPC Protestant chiefs and Catholics. In a letter from the Parish Priest of Butare- 
Buhweju to the District Commissioner, Bushenyi, Fr. B. Clechet complained: 
Some Catholics [are] obliged to build the Protestant churches. Even when Bishop Kakubi came to visit 
the parish, he asked the chiefs to stop to do so. But they are still obliged. People are threaten (sic] if they 
are not married or baptised in the Protestant church even if they are Catholics. This happen [sic] mainly 
in Bihanga Gomborora. These ... are contrary to the 
freedom of religion which citizen [sic] of Uganda 
should have. 512 
Indeed that was contrary to the 1967 Constitution article 16 (1) that stipulated that: 
Except in his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of conscience, 
and for the purposes of this article, the said freedom includes freedom of thought and of religion, 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom to either alone or in the community with others 
and both in public and private to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, 
practice and observance. 
The priest's concern necessitated an emergency meeting between the UPC N4P for 
Buhweju (Bushenyi East), Chris Rwakasisi, religious leaders from both Christian 
churches in the area and party functionaries. The meeting's revelations in which both 
Catholics and Protestants were represented were interesting. Contrary to the 
postulations that Catholics were forced to convert to Protestantism and build 
Protestant schools, according to Paul Babishisha: 
People were crossing voluntarily although there were some misguided people who erroneously equated 
UPC with the Church of Uganda [Anglican] and that in order not to remain suspects, they had to change 
their religion in order to conform to their erroneous belief. 5 13 
511 Interview: Bishop Paul Bakyenga, February 14,1998, Nyamitanga. 
5 12 See letter from Rev. Father of Butare Parish Buhweju to the District Commissioner Bushenyi dated 
8'h. October 198 1, in Religious File, letter No. 69, Bushenyi District Administration Archives. 
513 See minutes of the Joint meeting held at Kashenyi-Buhweju on 20"' December 1981 at 7.30 p. m. by 
Hon. Chris Rwakasisi MIP to probe into the allegations of forced baptisms. 
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A very difficult quotation to analyse indeed! Buhweju County is a very densely 
Catholic populated area where crossing to Protestantism should not have been 
necessary or even attractive. However the phrase "in order not to remain suspects" 
reveals that there was a political misunderstanding between the UPC chiefs and 
Catholics in the area as early as 1981.1 do not really think that Catholics had already 
identified with the guerrilla movement then. But their vote for DP was the only 
evidence to connect them with subversive activities. With continuous harassment 
from chiefs, it might have forced Catholics to sympathise with the rebels. The 
correspondence between the Catholic Church and the government officials continues 
to implicate the Catholic Church in subversive activities. In a letter from the Minister 
of State in the President's Office to Fr. Lemmey of Mushanga Parish- Sheema, dated 
19 April 1982, the Minister warned: 
I would like to advise that your activities should be confined within spiritual limitations and leave party 
of government machinery to operate without religious leaders' interference. I am taking exception of 
your running around to secure release of suspects and your utterances in UPC offices. Kindly be advised 
that all matters related to security of this nation is paramount. 514 
The suspects might or might not have been guerrilla sympathisers. Organising 
occasions such as a wedding party or baptism service could be seen as anti- 
government. And since many accused were Catholic I)Ps, their priests had a pastoral 
obligation to plead for them. But as the guerrilla movement intensified in Buganda, 
minor incidents in Ankole were magnified. Such confrontation with the state 
hampered the church's activities. It had to seek permission for any of its functions 
otherwise it could easily be suspected of collaboration with the guerrillas. Of course 
the Anglican Church was not exempted, but as Ndiwa-Ndikora said: 
It was something that people took for granted but otherwise it was a rule that all churches apply for 
permission. But tell me, if Dr. Tiberondwa is the head of Laity for the Diocese, how can that church 
apply for permission. After all he would be the NT for the area initiating the fund-raising. 5 15 
514 Bushenyi District Administration Archive: letter No. 68 by Chris Rwakasisi, in Religious File. 
515 Interview: Ndiwa-Ndikora, February 16,1998, Mbarara. 
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A letter from the parish priest of Kitabi-Igara. to the District Commissioner, Bushenyi, 
reveals the kind of tension. He complained of similar harassment by chiefs: 
I have to complain against the county chief of Igara Mr. W. Nk-witsana talking badly about the parish 
work of Kitabi in front of the chiefs of Bumbaire sub-county at a meeting held on 15th. May 1982. The 
chief was against certain issues in the Parish-collecting money and foodstuffs for building a new 
church. 516 
In the Religious Correspondence File Bushenyl District Administration Archives, 
there are several similar letters about the confrontation of the Catholic Church and 
District authorities, each side accusing the other of interfering in state-church 
relations. Yet the patronage between the Anglican Church and District authorities in 
Ankole was different. In a letter from the office of the District Commissioner, 
Bushenyl, to the County Chief of Igara, entitled: THE VISIT OF THE BISHOP OF 
OKLAHOMA, USA, TO WEST ANKOLE DIOCESE, he writes: 
This is to inform you that the Bishop of Oklahoma, USA will be paying a visit to West Ankole Diocese 
from 17 May 1982 to 28 May 1982. In order to give him a rousing and warm welcome, I am asking you 
to ask your chiefs around to mobilise people to build one or two arches along Katungu-Bweranyangi 
road. I know the chiefs are busy preparing for May 27 Anniversary celebrations, 1982, but let us assist 
the Bishop of West Ankole also. 517 
To share in the 'rousing' district benefits depended on which side either- church was. 
While one church had wann partnership, the other was accused of subversive 
activities. And while there was no longer any Catholic DP NVs to talk of in Ankole 
(for many had been exiled)518, the Anglican Bishop of East Ankole Diocese, Ruharo, 
was inviting the UP Bushenyi Central Constituency to preach a sermon in the 
cathedral. He writes: 
516 Bushenyi District Administration Archives: letter from Fr. Franz Pgaff, Kitabi parish to the District 
Commissioner Bushenyi dated 22 May 1982, in Religious File. 
517 See letter in the Religious Correspondence File, Bushenyi. 
518 Francis Bwengye, in his book, 7he Agony of Uganda, (Regency Press, London, 1985), gives a long 
list of exiled people, see pp. 357-373. 
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Although we divided the old Diocese of Ankole into East and West Dioceses, we have now realised that 
we should create ways of some uniting factors by asking some Christians from the Diocese of West 
Ankole especially lay men like Hon. Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa to preach a sermon for us on 2"d January 
1983.519 
Table 7: Candidates for the various constituencies in Bushenyi and Mbarara. The 
** means candidates are Protestants and # means Catholics. 
Constituer C DP UPM520 
Bushenyl North Dr. Joseph Muhangi** AT Bwengye# V. Bigirwenda# 
West E. Rurangaranga** J. Kabaireho# Otaftire-Kahinda-# 
Central Dr. A. Tiberondwa** A. Baryaruha** Jason Mwebesa** 
East Chris Rwakasisi** Prof Kabwegyere# Dr. Mushanga** 
South Y. Kanyomozi** D. Muterere# K. Ruhemba** 
Mbarara N. West G. K. Kahangi** B. Buzabo# A. Kabyama# 
North Y. Gucwamaingi** Sam Kuteesa** Y. Museveni** 
Central Dr. P. Rubaihayo** H. Katembeko# F. Kamugira** 
West Francis Butagira** F. Mwebesa# J. Katatumba# 
South-West R. Kagurusi** V. K. Baguma# E. Kategaya** 
South-East E. Gumisiriza** 1. Katetegirwe# Deo Tinakog 
Such a line up widened the gap between Bairu Protestants, Bairu Catholics and DP 
Bahirna Protestants. It was not only a religio-political issue but also an ethnic 
problem. Bahima saw the re-emergence of Bairu UPC Protestants as a continuation of 
the sixties, a period with which they only remembered with bitter memories. For the 
Muslims many of them kept a low profile because they were still being associated 
519 See invitation letters refs. EA/GC/2/37 to Hon. Francis Butagira, MIP Mbarara West Constituency 
and to the District Commissioner to come and listen to Tiberondwa's sermon! 
520 Source "Results of the 1980 Electoral Commission", booklet. 
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with the defacant Idi Amin's regime. In any case prominent Muslims were still in 
exile. 
5.5. THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT AND ITS IMPACT. 
The main argument of this chapter has been that the period 1980-1985, which came to 
be famously known as Obote 11 regime, had many parallels with the sixties in Ankole. 
And the main reason that I have advanced was that it was mainly the same actors that 
controlled the political stage in the drama and politics of the 1980s. After the 
elections chiefs right from the Omulongole to the District Commissioner had to be 
UPC and mainly Protestants. A look at the list of county chiefs in both Bushenyi and 
Mbarara Districts confirms it: 
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Table 8: County chiefs in Bushenyi and Mbarara districts 
Bushenyi Distriet. 521 
- County - FName FReligion FP arty 
Igara W. Nkwitsana Protestant UPC 
Kajara 0. Nkabahita. Protestant UPC 
Sheema E. Byakyaro Protestant UPC 
Buhweju Kerere Catholic UPC 
Bunyaruguru Turyamureba Protestant UPC 
Rubinda Bamutina Catholic UPC 
Mbarara District 
Kashari E. Mpambara Protestant UPC 
Nyabushozi E. Katabarwa Protestant UPC 
fbanda Kahonda Protestant UPC 
Isingiro Kupa Muslim UPC 
Rwampara ------ ------- 
Ruhama ----- ------ 
Anyone suspected of DP sympathies like Katafire, former county chief Igara, was 
dropped. Yet these were Civil Service positions which should have had nothing to do 
with political appointments. Even if it was intended to strengthen UPC in the District, 
it also alienated the Catholic DP who conceived of the whole alignment as a 
continuation of the Protestant hegemony. The period after the elections until when 
UPC was deposed, unless one was UPC, one could not get a job. What such 
521 Source Yowasi Makaru who was on the District Administration Committee. 
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discrimination caused was the emergence of the guerrilla war just two months after 
the elections. Museveni discusses the reasons why he waged a guerrilla war in his 
book The Mustard Seed but this kind of discrimination increased support. 
The guerrilla movement started on 26 February 1981 less than two months 
after the elections. Museveni had always hinted at it during UPM rallies that 'UPC 
kweribe obururu nituza omukishaka' (if UPC rigs the elections we shall go to the 
bush). UPC rigged the elections and Museveni went to the bush. The question we 
want to attempt here is why Musevem, a Munyankole, did not stage his war against 
the UPC government in Ankole but rather chose to start from Buganda in what came 
to be infamously known as the Luwero triangle. The reasons were historical, as they 
were political and geographical. Baganda hated Obote and demonstrated their hatred 
by voting as a block for DP. The guerrillas knew that Buganda was a very fertile 
ground for sustaining a war. Ankole's bonds with UPC could not be severed for, as we 
have argued in chapter two, UPC was seen as a liberator for the Bairu and that is why 
Bahima had joined DP and some UPM when it was formed in June 1980. Therefore 
when UPM went to the bush after faring so miserably in the elections, Ankole did not 
take it seriously. For the Bairu, it was an affair of the minority Bahima-Banyarwanda 
and frustrated UPC Omufunguro, who could soon be pursued, crushed in the bush and 
left there as Obote had promised during one of his campaign rallies. Politically 
therefore Ankole was a dangerous ground. Not even Nyabushozi, Museveni's home, 
was safe since DP sentiments were still strong. And as Kikuri said: 
There was no way the guerrilla movement could have started in Ankole and succeeded. UPC in Ankole 
was highly mobilised. It was everywhere; civil servants, police, schools and even children were singing 
LJPC. So to start a guerrilla war in such an area would have been like committing suicide. There was no 
good will and it was unlikely that DP would have provided the cover because UPC in Ankole was 
indeed stronger and sharper than DP. 522 
Yet in Buganda which was politically disenchanted and bitter about UPC's rigging of 
the elections which DP had hoped to win, the political climate was ripe for the 
guerrillas to exploit. Geographically, Buganda housed the capital city and seat of 
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government: the proximity factor. The fertile soil and thick forests in Luwero and 
Mpigi gave Buganda an added advantage. Also Luwero's climate and plenty of 
grazing land in Bululi and Bulemezi had attracted large populations of Bahima and 
Banyarwanda pastoralists from Ankole, a potential source of food (milk and meat) 
and protection for the guerrillas. Undoubtedly therefore, the National Resistance 
guerrillas had made a major strategic decision which soon paid dividends. 
Even if the war did not begin from Ankole, its effects were felt there, though not as 
badly as in Buganda. Once the war began in 1981, UPC immediately became 
aggressive, arresting its opponents. And that is how DP Catholics in Ankole came to 
be identified with the guerrilla movement. Such political blunders played in the 
guerrillas' favour. First they persecuted DP supporters (who happened to be 
Catholics) on suspicion that they were sympathising with and even giving material 
support to the NRA rebels. Intimidation and harassment were one of the immediate 
effects to be felt by non-UPC supporters. Youth vigilantes could not distinguish 
between church functions and rebel activities. The case of Kagamba, a Catholic 
parish in Bushenyi, is a typical example. The Parish Pnest, R. Grandmalson, even 
after seeking Police permission for their Church Jubilee fund-raising activities, 
reported that their people had been imprisoned in spite of the official permission: 
After Easter Kagamba will have its jubilee of twenty-five years, and also there will be Ordination of the 
Priesthood of Reverend George-William Mbangira ... For this reason we kindly ask you to allow us to 
organise a collection in our Parish to that effect. To avoid any misunderstanding regarding the collection 
and the use of that money, I Arill be grateful if you could give us permission in writing ... 
523 
"To avoid misunderstanding" was indeed a pregnant and poignant expression of the 
suspicion between the Catholic Church and the District authorities. Although the 
letter was copied to the Administrative Secretary and the District Commissioner, 
Bushenyi, they did not restrain their chief who later imprisoned some of those who 
participated in the fund-raising. When the parish priest wrote a petition, the 
Administrative Secretary instead sought to know from the c hief the circumstances 
522 Interview: Ezra Kikuri, February 18,1998, Bushenyi. 
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surrounding the arrest and the action that had been taken. Grandmaison's petition 
addressed to the Gombolola chief Rubare and copied to high authorities read: 
I am very much surprised to hear that people who were collecting money for the jubilee of Kagamba 
Parish 
... with pertnission of Police (copy attached) 
had been arrested and put in jail ... 
Each Saza Chief 
and each Gombolola chief have received a copy of these I send to you now. And also each collector had 
been during the collection in possession of a special identification card issued by us. I hope that these 
people will be released immediately without further intervention. 524 
In November 1981, DP executives of Mbarara District complained to the UPC 
chairman, Mbarara, of the unwarranted interference in their office by UPC Youth 
Wingers who had broken into the DP office, ransacked it, damaged property and on 
another occasion occupied it claiming they had taken it over. The DP chairman 
complained: 
Apart from the widespread harassment and intin-ddation perpetrated on the DP supporters, some 
members of the UPC particularly the Youth have persistently and violently attacked the DP office on the 
High Street Mbarara and damaged some property belonging to the party. Sometime in October 198 1, a 
group of UPC Youth broke into the back room of the said office, and occupied it claiming that they had 
taken it over.... Again on the 9h. November 1981 ... came 
back and broke the door of the front entrance, 
entered the office, smashed our cupboard and tore a number of files. We think that the Democratic Party 
has also a role to play and it is because of this consideration that at National level and in other Districts 
any authority has not hampered the activities of our party. There is no reason why Mbarara should be an 
exception. 525 
In response the UPC chairman wrote: 
I understand that, that office was not serving its intended purpose. Instead it was used as a store of 
inflammable substances like Diesel, oils and petrol which were dangerous to the building. In view of this 
523 See a letter from Rev. Fr. R. Grandmaison to the O. C Police Bushenyi dated I February 1983. 
524 Bushenyi District Administration Archives: letter from Rev. Fr. Grandmaison's to the Gomborora 
chief of Rubare in Religious File No. 16. 
525 See Memorandum to the Chairman UPC Mbarara District from the Democratic Party office, signed 
by M. Tubwebire, H. Katembeko, Mrs. G. Byanyima and other on 14 November 198 1. 
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very reason, the Youths felt very concerned and took such action as a rescue operation... You are 
therefore, advised to use it as an office but not anything else contrary to the intended purpose. 526 
It was not that DP was well treated at the national level. Political events in Kampala 
were more traumatic than in Ankole. But the difference was that at the national scene, 
UPC had very strong Catholics on its executive, people like Kalule-Settala and Prof 
Ojok, then Minister of Education. Even in the North, many Catholics supported 
Obote. In Ankole the Catholic Church was unlikely to support Obote, because, as 
Bwengye said: 
The Catholic Church in Uganda looks up to its national leadership for guidance. And because Baganda 
had solidly blocked Obote, the Catholic Church in Ankole would only give UPC a cosmetic welcome. 527 
Such harassment of DP supporters in Ankole aroused opposition from the Catholic 
Church and hastened them to the government's opposition. There was a double effect 
in such persecution. As far as the security officials in Ankole were concerned, they 
were not persecuting Catholics, rather as they argued, they were apprehending DP 
guerrilla sympathisers. Actually Ndiwa-Ndikora who was the District Commissioner 
alluded to such harassment. He attributed DP and Catholic intimidation to 
overzealous Youth Wingers who would fabricate accusations: 
There was a very strong UPC %kring. We knew that when some of these people had nothing to report 
they concocted such incidents. In most cases they were lies and it was always up to the leader to assess 
it. That is the challenge we face in leadership. 528 
The Kamukuzi Archives are full of letters from the UPC Office Mbarara accusing the 
Youth Wingers of misconduct. One of such letters reads: 
526 Kamukuzi Archives: letter from Francis Buringa, UPC District Chairman Mbarara to the 
Chairman Democratic Party Mbarara dated 20 December 1982. 
527 Interview: Francis Bwengye, July 29,1997, Kampala. 
528 Interview: Ndiwa-Ndikoraý July 23,1997, Mbarara. 
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Being a Youth Winger or having trained as a Police Constabulary, is not Passport to harassment and 
mistreating people and taking away their property. Your role as you were told is to become the "eyes" 
and "ears" of the government but not to override and boss the existing authority in the area whatever 
cadre. You are therefore directed to repent, reform and live to the standards expected of a Youth 
Winger. 529 
DP harassment was intensified by another factor; the indiscriminate expulsion and 
persecution of the Banyarwanda. I hope to discuss in detail the history of this anti- 
Banyarwanda xenophobia in the next chapter. Suffice it to mention here that because 
the Banyarwanda migrants and refugees who settled in Ankole had tended to identify 
with the Bahima and therefore with the DP, UPC harboured grievances against it. 530 
Worse still several of their sons had run to the bush with Museveni to fight 
govemment. 
What then were the overall effects of the guenilla war on Ankole? Ankole was less 
affected by the war than Buganda. But there was unwarranted persecution of DP 
supporters, Catholics, Bahima and Banyarwanda. In fact, some people like Kananura, 
Mbiringi and Rutehenda's sons suspected as guerrillas were killed. 531 The 
Banyarwanda were expelled while DP Catholics were alienated and suspected of 
supporting rebels especially when Andrew Kayiira's Uganda Freedom Movement 
(UFM) started recruiting from Isingiro and Buhweju both Catholic populated areas. 532 
Many were imprisoned without trial like James Kahigiriza, a former UPC 
Omufunguro in the sixties who had joined DP in the 1980 elections. He was detained 
between February-March 1982 for allegedly holding a meeting to overthrow the 
government and train guerrillas". 533 The "treasonable" meeting they referred to was to 
arrange for his daughter's wedding! The other major development was the demise of 
UPC and the collapse of Obote's government as a result of the split, which divided 
UPC between "Science" and "Syndicate" which we now tum to. 
529 Kamukuzi Archives: Refugees flie, letter No. 23 ftom Baineomugisha to Youth Wingers Mugyenyi 
and Mugisha. 
530 See Report of the Commission of the Inquiry into Violation of Human Rights, p. 504. 
531 Interview: Yorokamu Gucwamaingi, February 22,1998, Ruharo. 
532 Interview: Bishop John Kakubi, February, March 22,1997, lbanda. 
533 See Kahigiriza's testimony to the Commission of Inquiry, p. 106-7. 
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5.6. THE "SCIENCE" AND "SYNDICATE" CONTROVERSY. 
Dr Adonia Tiberondwa put it quite honestly that "politicians never learn". When a 
political organisation has silenced its opposition, the tendency is for it to start fighting 
itself So with UPC. Its usual internal feuding was up again. In the 1960s it was the 
Enkomba vs. Omufunguro, and now in the 1980s it became UPC "Science" vs. UPC 
"Syndicate". What was all this renewed factional i sation about and how did it all begin 
in Ankole again? As we discussed in chapter two, in the sixties UPC had split up into 
radicals and liberals basically on policy issues. On the one hand was the question of 
how to relate to the Obugabe, the Omugabe and the Bahima monarchists, while on the 
other was UPC policy towards DP Catholic converts to UPC. The former, the 
Enkomba, wanted UPC as a party only for UPC while the latter wanted an inclusive 
brand for all interested Banyankole regardless of their creed. That was a more 
legitimate political disagreement. But not so in the 1980s. The division between UPC 
Science and Syndicate was purely a symptom of a Party whose absolute thirst for 
power was corrupting it absolutely. What we see is a rivalry for power tearing the 
party apart. And this time it was the UPC Erikomba of the 1960s tearing itself up 
further, since the Omufunguro faction had mainly cast its lot with DP and UPM in the 
1980 elections. 
According to Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa the split in UPC was based on 
whether or not education should be the key qualification for leadership. That is why 
"Science" was for the educated UPCs like Prof Kamuntu, Dr. Tiberondwa, 
Kanyomozi, Butagira and others while "Syndicate" was composed of radicals, less 
educated, mainly old timers like Rurangaranga, Rwakasisi and otherS. 534 What 
sparked off the fresh factional isation was the conflict between Professor Ephraim 
Kamuntu and Rurangaranga in 1982 as Tiberondwa says: 
Rurangaranga was trying to sideline Kamuntu so that he does not surface as a political leader. Kamuntu 
was also alleged to have had some UPM connections from the beginning. So Rurangaranga did not want 
Kamuntu to surface for he would be a dangerous rival since they came from the same constituency. Yet 
534 Interviews: Adonia Tiberondwa and Bishop Yoramu Bamunoba. 
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some of us felt that Kamuntu was a very brilliant man whom we could not afford to throw away like that 
and think that we were building Ankole. That is how the saga started. 535 
So why Science and Syndicate? According to Bishop Bamunoba, the word 
"Syndicate" came from one of the UPC academicians who said uneducated people 
whose education is limited to "Syndicate papers"536 confuse pollt, CS. 537 It seems the 
incompetence of some half-baked UPC leaders in handling and analysing issues 
4' scientifically" was increasingly vexing the UPC learned intellectuals. And yet they 
were not willing to surrender power. For instance the Syndicate group could not give 
a job to a non-UPC. They could not tolerate opposition. They were adamant and 
wanted UPC and government for UPC only. Hence the talk of "twarire", (we have 
already eaten), became a UPC clichd in Ankole. The "Science" goup called for 
political accommodation and respect for others despite their creed or political 
inclinations. Their desire according to Francis Butagira, 
was to show the difference between Amin's regime and us who had overthrown him. So that is why we 
called for accommodation regardless of whether one voted DP or UPC. In any case that is what political 
pluralism is all about. 538 
In Ankole, the divisions increased and people began to dissent. In Mbarara Central 
Constituency Makatu, who was chairman UPC for Mbarara District engineered a vote 
of no confidence in Rubaihayo, the NV, accusing him of associating with DP 
supporters like Kahigiriza and selling the Party to the opposition. During a meeting 
convened by L. R. Makatu, which Rubaihayo did not attend, the UPC Mbarara 
Central Constituency Conference in its Resolution No. IB declared: 
53 5 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, September 20,1997, Kampala. 
536 The Bishop does not use the word syndicate as a bombastic language to mean Mafia or a gang but 
rather people %kith low education but are good manipulators which is perhaps typical of the UPC 
Syndicate group in the 1980s. Syndicate papers does not reafly mean anything else other than low 
qualifications and should not therefore be confused with some of the American newspapers. 
537 Interview: Bishop Bamunoba, February 23,1998, Kyamugorani. 
538 Interview: Francis Butagira, July 31,1996, Mbarara. 
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We the members of the UPC Mbarara Central Parliamentary Constituency Conference assembled at 
Bwizibwera on this first day of December, 1984, having reviewed the activities that have been taking 
place in our constituency since October 1980 we do hereby, condemn and disassociate ourselves from 
the Chairman's activities that have been outlined in the review presented by the Youth Leader. We 
further reject any activities that are likely to cause or foster divisions hence endangering our great Party, 
the Uganda People's Congress in this Constituency. We therefore resolve and it is hereby resolved that 
the vote of no confidence in Dr. Patrick Rutimbanzugu Rubaihayo, Chairman Mbarara Central 
Constituency, which has been moved by the branch be adopted and thus ... Rubaihayo 
immediately ceases 
to be the chairman of UPC in this constituency. 
We further resolve that Dr. Patrick Rutimbanzugu Rubaihayo immediately hands over the office of 
the constituency and all the official documents and property attached to that office, including a proper 
account of all the funds (including the Constituency Development Fund) that have been received by that 
Office since 1980.539 
At the same meeting L. R. Makatu was elected Chairman Mbarara Central 
Constituency. This was the result of a long-standing power struggle between the two 
leaders. A strong document had earlier been circulated by "patriotic observers", 
James Bakamwanga and Patrick Habwomugisha, listing nine accusations against 
Rubaihayo as "proof'that he had sold out to the DP. Therefore: 
AD the above activities show who Rubaihayo is. The fact is that he is not with UPC or Government... he 
is against both. 540 
Dr. Rubaihayo in April 1984 had unilaterally sacked Makatu accusing him of divisive 
politics. The strongly worded letter dated 12 April 1984 reads in part: 
I am writing to infann you that I have. in my capacity as Chainnan, reluctantly have to relieve you of 
your duties as Vice Chairman of the Constituency with immediate effect. I have been forced to come to 
this decision because of the divisive politics that you have introduced into the Constituency... 541 
539 Quoted from the Report of the Proceedings of the Parliamentary Constituency Conference for 
Mbarara Central, I December 1984. 
540 Quoted from ajoint letter signed by James Bakamwanga. and Patrick Habwomugisha to the 
Secretary General of the Uganda People's Congress, Kampala, I December 1984. 
541 Rubaihayo's letter to Laza o Makatu, 12 April 1984. 
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Things became so difficult that some "Science" members were thinking of exile to 
avoid worse penalties. When the Science group was calling for accommodation, the 
Syndicate group accused it of conniving with DP and the guerrillas. The science 
group was not really undermining its own party. It opposed UPC arbitrary arrests, 
discrimination for jobs and disrespect for human rights. The DP and UPM, welcomed 
the "Science/Syndicate" schism because; as Francis Bwengye said, 'UPC spent much 
of the time fighting itself that "Science/Syndicate" was more dangerous to fellow 
UPCs than they were to DP'. Such intra-party divisions had adverse effects. People 
identified themselves with their MPs group and their division became worse than they 
were in the party executive. Before people had collectively worked for UPC as a 
party, but they were no longer one. Obote, the UPC national leader, could not stop 
these fissure and consequently they spread nationally thus dividing the UPC executive 
and MPs. But as Tiberondwa observed: 
Despite our divisions none of us were really against him. He appeared indifferent and that is how he 
could manage to keep all of us hooked onto him. Of course in the end that led to bitterness among the 
ministers, a situation which began to be exploited by the opponents of the party. 542 
This hastened the disintegration of UPC and its demise. Obote tended to sympathise 
with the Syndicate while Paul Muwanga supported Science. In effect it meant that 
Muwanga sympathised with Obote's enemies and those who sought to undermine 
him. No wonder when Tito Okello toppled Obote in July 1985, Muwanga joined the 
new government. 
How was the church involved? Did it intervene? Bishop Bamunoba 
confesses that the church showed divisions. The clergy took sides although they kept 
quiet about it. Church councils could not maintain unity when UPC politicians were 
members. In Bushenyi for instance the Science group were closer to the church as 
committed Christians, earning themselves another name of Ab'ekani. va, (people of the 
church) by the Syndicate UPC who in consequence stood apart. The Anglican Church 
542 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, September 20,1997, Kampala. 
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played a passive role and feared to speak against the conflicts. Observers like Yoramu 
Gucwamaingi felt the Anglican Church could have played a more uniting role: 
It could have united those parties concerned and settled their differences. But you see even the church 
leaders themselves were not unýited. The two Protestant Bishops were not well organised and the 
Catholic Bishop could only watch what he assumed was a UPC-Protestant wrangle, which it was 
really. 543 
Francis Bwengye too agreed that the Catholic Bishop stood aloof in the conflict since 
it was a 'Protestant affair'. Bishop Betungura was suspected of being pro-Musevem 
since his wife was a Muhima and Bishop Bamunoba was thought to identify with 
'Science'. 544 The church that had become militant under Amin was now numbed by 
the in-house war that was dividing up its flock. What was more, the politicians started 
fighting in church projects with each faction wanting to own and use them for their 
propaganda. For instance Bishop Betungura's Bwizibwera-Rutooma Gravity Water 
project was stalled by the Rubaihayo-Kabogorwa conflict, to the extent that 
Rubaihayo wrote to donors to withhold the aid. 545 These conflicts strengthened the 
guerrilla movement and the Democratic Party. If the elections of 1985 had taken place 
as scheduled, DP might have won. But UPC was overthrown by its own army. This 
time the faction in the army that staged the coup in July 1985 had a strong Catholic 
element and chanted DP slogans. That could indicate the Catholic Church's support 
for the guerrilla war of Yoweri Museveni in the Luwero Triangle. 
543 Interview: Yorokamu Gucwamaingi, February 22,1998, Ruharo. 
544 Interview: Francis Bwengye, July 29,1997, Kampala. 
545 See Report of the Proceedings of the Parliamentary Constituency Conference for Mbarara, Central. 
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5.7. NRM AND THE CHURCH IN ANKOLE. 
Our analysis of the religio-political invents in Ankole show repetitive mistakes which 
UPC should have learnt from. But since it did not, they led to its downfall. The 
Museveni guerrillas overthrew General Tito Okello in turn in February 1986. The 
various guerrilla factions that participated in these actions are not relevant here. What 
we are concerned with is what was happening in Ankole. 
The forces that jubilated at the fall of Milton Obote in 1971 rejoiced again 
in July 1985. The forces at play in 1985/6 were Catholic-DP, Protestant UPC (which 
had split into Science/Syndicate) and Bahima-Banyarwanda. Apart from the UPC 
Protestants, the rest welcomed the victory of Museveni in 1985. DP found the fall of 
the UPC a relief Bahima-Banyarwanda who had voted DP and UPM suffered when 
Museveni went to the bush. Many had supported him and consequently drew the 
wrath of the UPC Youth Wingers! The UPC Science group was already exhausted by 
the internal fissures and was glad of change. 
Thus, when the NRM forces took over the government in February 1986, all 
these forces welcomed them, especially in Mbarara district which had a large number 
of Bahima-Banyarwanda population and Catholics. Among the issues which needed 
urgent attention, was the question of Banyarwanda property which people had 
acquired under the previous regime. Banyarwanda had been designated refugees but 
now they had returned not only as "masters" in Ankole, but also dominating the 
national army and government. Catholics in lbanda and Buhweju counties attacked 
and destroyed Protestant property, hacking down banana plantations and cows of the 
known Protestant UPC supporters. Others defecated in Protestant churches which was 
shocking. 
Secondly, was the question of the NRM relationship with the church in 
Ankole. Initially NRM was cynical and anti-church in all its rhetoric. As we argued 
before, the traditional churches had not supported UPM during the 1980 elections. 
NRM, whose political cadres were predominantly UPM and DP, connected the 
Anglican Church with UPC which it was fighting. In any case the Anglican Church 
had continued steadfastly without condemning the "evils" which gave an impression 
that it condoned them. In Nyabushozi where many of the Bahima-Banyarwanda NRM 
cadres hailed from, the Anglican church declined in the initial period of the NRM 
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regime. Their ideology preached against giving church dues on the pretext that the 
church leaders would embezzle them and referred to Church leaders as abashuma, 
(thieves). They did not see the need for going to church since God could be 
worshipped anywhere. 
With such an attitude towards the Anglican Church, it also adopted a let's-wait-and- 
see- kind of reception to NRM. The irony was that most of NRM cadres and high- 
ranking officers were Protestants. But some of them were Protestant only because 
they had been baptised in the Anglican Church and kept the name without the faith. 
To many especially the Youths those formative years in the bush alienated them 
further away from the church. As a result Protestant UPCs who were mainly Bairu 
withdrew and kept askance as far as the NRM initial period in Ankole was concerned. 
That explains why after 1986, the DPs, Catholics, the Bahima and Banyarwanda 
tended to "own" the NRM revolution and dominated the first Resistance Councils in 
Ankole. Minorities like Bahima-Banyarwanda who were silenced by UPC regime 
suddenly rose into the political limelight as their turn to 'eat'. This caused concern 
among the Protestants and resulted in a meeting between the Minister of State in the 
President's Office, Eriya Kategaya, and the Mbarara District Elders where the 
relationship between the Catholics and the Protestants, Bairu and Bahima in Ankole 
was discussed: 
This has very seriously affected local NRM Committees propaganda that UPC members are not allowed 
to stand for an election on the committees, thus eliminating all Protestants who were in UPC ... out of 
these committees. 546 
Though NRM ushered in a new era of peace especially in the Western and Central 
Uganda, people returned to their old ways. The same minutes discussed "Tribal issues 
in Political Involvement", "Bairu and Bahima hatred has come back". 547 But these 
were quickly condemned by NRM cadres for obvious reasons. NRM would have 
started on a wrong note if it were seen to condone ethnic differences. As a group 
546 Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara See minutes of the meeting between the Minister of State in the 
President's office and Mbarara Elders (undated, but could have been 1986 since that was when 
Eriya Kategaya held that position) in NRM file. 
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without religious or ethnic connections in the 80's, it could not be claimed by any of 
the factions. That helped to neutralise religio-political sentiments that had surfaced. 
Protestant UPC as expected had to be alienated by some of those forces that we have 
mentioned before because of the role some of them played in the previous regime. But 
UPC Protestants were called ebipinga, and thought to support Force Obote Back 
(FOBA), a pro-Obote movement in Kenya. However unlikely, they were so accused 
because of their UPC connections. In a letter dated 16 December 1986, protesting 
against allegations of FOBA association, the Rev. E. Rwebyambu, from Nyabuhikye 
parish, Bwengure, wrote to the Catholic District Administrator, Sarapio Karashani: 
Ok-unmvisiza akag3me Icunyeta FOBA 
Sebo nakuhandikira nyine obusasi bwingyi ahabwenshonga eyagambwaho aharuguru. Omubaruha iwe 
eyoyine omu office yawe erikuruga ornugomborora ya Rubindi erukugamba ebitakwatirine tinyine 
kakwate na FOBA kandi tindimuba ... Ruhanga akakutaho 
kuba omurinzi Varnagara g'abantu ba 
Mbarara District 
... Kandi kundabe ninturwa ediini yangye, Mukama asiimwe. 
(I am sorry to write to you 
because of the above reason. The letter, which you have from Rubindi Sub-county, is accusing me of 
being a member of FOBA. I write to disassociate myself from such accusations. I have never been and 
never will be a FOBA ... If I am being accused because of my religion, then praise the lord). 
548 
He says that he was being harassed because of his religion. Rubindi sub-county is a 
Catholic area and vengeance for the hard times they suffered was likely protest. 
There was also the need to return Banyarwanda property confiscated in 1982. Some 
UPC members had benefited and in some instances even churches were incriminated. 
In 1986 the District Commissioner, Mbarara, wrote to the Bishop of East Ankole: 
You vAll remember my Lord Bishop that during the visit of ME the president of the Republic of Uganda 
to N4barara District, the Elders presented to him a memorandum. In ... other things they raised the 
issue 
of expropriated property belonging to such displaced persons. It was further said that some of that 
property had either been sold and proceeds donated ... The purpose of this letter is to find out from your 
Lordship if there are such cases involving the Church of Uganda and whatever measures you 
547 ibid, p. 1. 
548 Letter from Rev. E. Rwebyambu to the District Administrator, Mbarara. 
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contemplate in amicably restoring such property to the former owners or paying compensation for value 
transferred. 549 
And the bishop replied: 
As far as this office of the Diocese of East Ankole, Church of Uganda is concerned and as far as I am 
concerned as the Bishop of this Diocese, I did disassociate myself and the Diocesan office from taking 
over, or accepting any offer of land, property etc .... 
from any person whatsoever, nor from the 
Rwandese refugees... If at all there were property or land given to any parish church, the recipient 
should have acted in disobedience to my order and should be the only one to meet the consequences, 
with his congregation ... Therefore, again I state that my 
diocesan office has nothing to do with matter 
concerned. S5() 
Indeed the Bishop had been distrusted by the UPC because he would not have 
anything to do with the alienation of Banyarwanda property. 
However, by 1988, the relationship between NRM and the COU eased. The 
church realised that while NRM leaders had generally exhibited a 'Marxist' anti- 
church attitude, the government was not necessarily "pro-Catholics" either. The 
Kategaya-Mbarara Elders meeting which discussed Protestant discrimination had an 
impact. As a result Protestants joined in NRM programmes in the district. Moreover 
the Catholic-DP excitement had cooled down especially when they realised that the 
top NRM brass at national level were not only Banyankole, but were also Protestants 
such as Kategaya, Mushega, Mugisha-Muntu and others. Thus we see the Anglican 
Church coming out of its cocoon and trying to seek a common ground in the NRM 
politics. In a confidential letter of 2 July 1987 from the Bishop of East Ankole, 
inviting the President to come and attend the Ankole Church jubilee convention of 12- 
16 August 1987, the Bishop wrote: 
I am writing this letter to you, as a letter from a church leader of your mother church, in Ankole, you as 
a Christian who knows very well the East Affican Revival and its coming to Ankole ... Secondly, I am 
549 Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara Letter from the District Commissioner to the Bishop of East Ankole 
Diocese, Ref MIG. 2. 
550 Reply from Bishop Betungura to the District Commissioner, Mbarara dated, 22 May 1986. 
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inviting your Excellency to come at anytime during the convention meetings ... at any time you arrive, the 
programme would be halted and you give a word to a congregation of about 10.000 persons. " 
On the other hand NRM realised that it needed the support of the church which was 
so entrenched among the people. The experience of the 1989 Resistance Council and 
NRC elections made them realise that the church still had much influence. In the 
NRC elections for instance, Mbarara district voted in people who were either MPs in 
Obote regime or were UPC and DP as the table below indicates: 
Table 9: Mbarara NRC members 1989.552 
Name -j constitueney Religion Former Party 
John Ntimba Mbarara municipality Catholic DP 
Francis Butagira Rwampara Protestant UPC 
Kijaji Isingiro, Catholic DP 
John Barigye Kashari Protestant --- 
John Nasasira Kazo Protestant j, jp WLJpM553 
Elly Karuhanga Nyabushozi Protestant NRMJUPM 
Dr. Mugyenyi Bukanga Catholic DP 
NRM's gradual thaw was marked by their softness of tongue towards the church. As a 
gesture of good will, the President started giving newly enthroned Bishops gifts of 
cars and attended church functions. NRM had under-rated the impact of the Christian 
church in Ankole and Uganda. Since the introduction of Christianity in the last 
551 Letter from Bishop Betungura to His Excellency, the president of Uganda, Mr. Yoweri Museveni, 
in Government File, East Ankole Diocesan. 
552 Interview: Y. Gucwamaingi, June 19,1997, Nkokonjeru. 
553 Please note that the 1989 elections were held under the ambrella of NRM and so there were no 
parties to talk of Secondly, I could not establish which party Barigye was because he spent most 
of his time in exile since 1973 (see chapter 7). To say that he rnight have been DP because he was 
Omuhima, would simply be an assumption. Note also that NRM was not a party, so people like 
Nasasira and Karuhanga are indicated thus because they did not contest in the 1980 parties and 
were not known at all. Since both are Bahima, we can probably assume that they were UPM but 
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century, the church had played a leading role in shaping Ugandan society. It pioneered 
schools, hospitals and agriculture. It was the first institution to "civilise" Banyankole, 
and such a bond could not be broken by NRM in such a short penod. This is what it 
realised and hence redefined its approach. The Directorate of Information and Mass 
Mobilisation, NRM Secretariat, wrote in May 1989: 
We have also noted with great appreciation your contributions in the struggles for return to sanity to our 
"ing society. .. 
To speed up the process in order to achieve total peace, we feel there is need to 
harmonise the working relationship of the state and the religious organisations in this country. For this 
reason, the NRM Secretariat would like to convene 4 day national Seminar for religious leaders in the 
country, to give the government leaders and religious leaders an opportunity for intimate discussions and 
frank exchange of opinions on various matters 
As Museveni often said, what was important was to separate the misleading from the 
misled. The Anglican Church and UPC were not synonymous. NRM also reallsed that 
the church exercises closer control on the people than the government because of its 
daily contact with people and the value placed on sacraments like baptism and 
marriage, which are still highly cherished in Ankole society. 
who unlike the rest were not voted in on the ticket of their previous party identity. 
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5.8. CONCLUSION. 
The period 1980-1989 was in some ways a reflection of the politics of the 1960s. 
Intrigues, factions, manoeuvres and persecution of opponents was the old creed of the 
UPC era. Once again the Anglican Church was soiled by UPC sins, ethnic divisions 
were again harped on, but these were almost over-ridden by party and religious 
affiliations. In Ankole for example, when the UPC won the elections and took power, 
it was not as if Bairu had defeated Bahima but UPC Protestant had once again 
trounced the DP Catholics. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6. THE BANYARWANDA REFUGEES AND THE ETHNO-POLITICAL 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CHURCH (1959-1985). 
6.0. THE WAVES AND PATTERNS OF BANYARWANDA SETTLEMENT. 
The Banyarwanda trek to Ankole, and Uganda in general, came in waves: there are 
pre-colonial settlers who came as a result of the wars of territorial conquest in the late 
l9th century. During the reign of Umwami Ruganzu Bwimba and Kigeri Mukubanga, 
several small chiefdoms were brought under one unified kingdom with Rwanda-Rwa- 
Gasabo as the nucleus of the Abanyiginya State, which was finally consolidated by 
Ruganzu Ndori. 554 Wars of territorial conquest and cattle raiding were common 
between Rwanda and Mpororo and Umwami Rwabugiri made considerable territorial 
gains from Mpororo in the late 19th century and many Banyarwanda subsequently 
settled in present Ntungamo diStriCt. 555 Yet there were others who ran away from 
forced labour during the colonial period556; others were migrant labourers who came 
in the 1920's to 1940's; the Revivalists who came in the 1940s; and the refugees who 
ran away from Rwanda because of the Bahutu uprising of 1959. In addition the 
Banyarwanda from Bufumbira in Kisoro district became Ugandans in 1910 after the 
Anglo-German boundary agreement. 
In the case of the first category, it is certainly true that they had no contact 
with Christianity which had not even been introduced into Ankole society when they 
arrived. They would have brought their traditional religions with them. But they could 
also have acquired the local traditions of the people that they found in the area. 
557 
These Banyarwanda herders still occupy the area neighbouring the border with 
554 G. Prunier, op. cit., pp. 14n., 15-16,20-24,45,85,245,370. 
555 For a detailed account of the Banyiginya state expansionism, see Dixon Karnukama, 1993, The 
Rwartda Conflict: Its Roots and Regional Implications, Kampala: Fountain Publishers, pp. 9-11. 
556 See Audrey Richards, Economic development and Tribal Change. - A Mudy of immigrant labour in 
Buganda, Cambridge: Heffer, 1959. 
557 Interview: J. Bara, May 18,1996, Mbarara. 
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Rwanda. As early as 1907, these Batutsi were already part of the Ankole elite, along 
with other foreigners like Banyakaragwe from Bukoba, Baganda and Batooro 
(Babiito). 558 With time many Batutsi migrated to areas like Rukungirl where they 
became known as the Abahororo. In the sixties, they migrated to Nyabushozi as part 
of the Bahima clique although with a Rwanda origin. 
The Bahutu economic immigrants came to Uganda from early 1920's to the 
1950's in search of employment on cash crop plantations. During this period, Uganda's 
economic strength was being boosted by the number of plantations of tea at 
Kyarnuhunga (Bushenyl), sugar in Busoga and coffee growing in Ankole and 
Buganda. Since the colonial government needed cheap labour there were few 
restrictions. Some settled in Ankole but the majority settled in Buganda and these 
were largely Bahutu. It is estimated that by 1995 these immigrants and their 
descendants had reached about 700,000.559 as the table below illustrates. 
558 M. Doornbos, op. cit., p. 75; also interview. A. Murumba, Bishop Amos Betungura. 
559 G. Prunier, op. cit., p. 64. 
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Table 10: Rwandese entering Uganda via Kagitumba bridge560 
Year rri als Departure 
1927 30,000 - 
1929 40,000 - 
1930 23,000 - 
1935 15,000 - 
1939 13,331 2,912 
1940 71,682 20,708 
1943 38,572 22,451 
1945 41,509 17,365 
1946 38,113 24,501 
What religion these Banyarwanda, were is hard to tell. They could have had no contact 
with Christianity or they may have been Catholics because of the Belgium Rwanda 
background. Actually areas like Isingiro and Kikagate where they first settled are 
Catholic strongholds. But generally these immigrants did not make much impact on 
the churches because they were sojourners who were expected to return home once 
their labour contract was over. After independence they seem to have settled and were 
absorbed in society. These Bahutu settled mainly in Buganda because, in the pre- 
independence Uganda, Buganda was emerging as the economic giant due to its central 
position, which favoured industrial isation and the plantation economy. This was the 
560 Cf. Source, Jason W. Clay, 'The Eviction of Banyarwanda. The Story behind the refugees crises in 
Southwestern Uganda", Cultural Survival, August Vol. 14, Cambridge, MA, USX p. 12. These 
figures are mainly of Banyarwanda who proceeded to Buganda. While similar flgures are not 
available for Ankole area, it is likely that since some Rwandese crossed the border at the Kagitumba 
bridge, they probably began to settle in Southern Ankole areas. We should also note that the 
figures given are for one of the border crossing points between Rwanda and Uganda, the others 
being Katuna and Kyanika. The last two entry points whose flgures are not given are densely 
populated areas as opposed to Kagitumba, which had a sparsely populated hinterland (before the 
refugees) of Mutara and Kagcra National Park. Hence the figures of Banyarwanda entering Uganda 
generally must have been about 3 or 4 times the number given in the table. 
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main difference between Banyarwanda who settled in Ankole and those in Buganda 
for the latter were largely Bahutu who tended gradually to merge in Buganda clans. 
I do not know why the dynamics of Bahutu in Buganda often identified with the 
Buffalo clan but it could be that Buffalo clan in Buganda is quite an important and big 
clan. It is also typical of that kind of clientage where minorities tend to identify with 
strong groups in a new society. As for the Batutsi in Ankole, they did not need to 
"buy" themselves in because they were already accepted and were part of the Ankole 
society. In any case clans in Ankole are less important. 
The third group to come to Uganda in the early forties were converted at Gahini in the 
East African Revival movement. They were mainly Protestants from North Rwanda 
where CMS was trying to open mission stations. Most of these Revivalists settled at 
Namutamba in Buganda. They were attracted to that area because the pioneers of the 
Revival movement such as Nagenda and Nsibambi offered land to the new 
converts. 561 
Lastly was the Bahutu revolution in Rwanda which forced many Batutsi into 
exile in 1959. Many of these exiles were victims of the hostilities that had emerged 
between the colonial Belgians and the Batutsi monarchy on the one hand and the 
Batutsi and the Bahutu intelligentsia on the other. During the post war period, there 
was a drastic change in the policy of the colonial government and the Catholic Church 
increased favouritism of the Bahutu elite in education and administration. Batutsi 
were the victims of the hostilities that had emerged between the two ethnic groups. 
We can not tell exactly how many refugees escaped the 1959 crisis apart from taking 
the UNHCR estimates. It only counted those who were in camps yet according to the 
accounts of the refugees then, many simply moved over the border dispersing to 
different places. Between 1959 and 1964 it is estimated that there were 336.000 
refugees distributed as followS. 562 
561 Interview: Zab Kabaza, August 28,1994, Kampala. 
562 Prunier, op. cit., pp. 61-63; See also Virginia Bond, Identity Crisis: Banyarwanda Refugees in 
Uganda, MA Dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1988, p. 2. 
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Burundi 200,000 
Uganda 78,000 
Tanzania 36,000 
Zaire 22,000 
By 1990, the number of Banyarwanda who still identified themselves as "refugees" 
had risen to 600,000-700,000563, and Uganda probably had about 200,000- 
300,000564. By 1990, the Banyarwanda in Uganda were estimated to be over I 
million constituting the fourth of the five largest ethnic groups. 565 This is an 
estimation for no census has been daring enough to include ethnic affiliation in its 
range of questions. What makes us come to these estimates is the fact that Ankole 
borders Rwanda and many refugees came here. They already had ties with the Ankole 
Banyarwanda, in the counties of Isingiro, Ruhama and Kikagate. Therefore it would 
have been nearer for the refugees to occupy Ankole rather than to continue to other 
districts. 
The refugees were confined in camps under a camp commandant, and were 
subjected to strict control. The first camps were at Orukinga and Nakivale settlements 
in Mbarara. 566 But following the increasing influx of refugees from Rwanda, and the 
population pressure their cattle herds exerted on the land, other camps were opened in 
Kahungye, Kyangwali, Kyaka I and Kyaka It and Rwamwanja in Toro and lbuga in 
Kasese. Who moved where appears to have been determined by their date of arrival in 
Uganda, the whereabouts of their close kin and the number of cattle they came with. 
The UNHCR which was involved in settling the refugees appear not to have taken 
account of the fact that the majority of the refuges were pastoralists, and therefore 
handed each family or perhaps a group of persons, agricultural tools and seeds and 
encouraged them to clear the land. 567 As cattle multiplied, many moved in search of 
563 Prunier, op. cit., pp. 61-63. 
564 D. Kamukarna, op. cit., p. 3; See also M. Mamdani, op. cit., pp. 26-27. 
565 Virginia Bond, op. cit., p. 13. Of the Ugandan figure, Ankole probably could claim to have 
absorbed at least three-quarters of the total figure. 
566 Interview: Sezi Busasi, May 6,1997, Nkokonjeru. 
567 Interview: John Mugasa, May 12,1997, Kampala. Until 1974, he lived in the Oruchinga camp, 
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pasture and water. Many finally settled as far away as Ntungamo, Kashari and 
Nyabushozi counties in Ankole and others continued up to Luwero, Mubende, Lira, 
Apac, Soroti and Kumi distnctS. 568 Educated refugees found jobs as low rank civil 
servants, while others were employed as labourers or herdsmen on farms. 
Ankole was preferred because it was sparsely populated which accounted 
for the camps. The government thought that it would be appropriate and perhaps 
accessible if the refuges were to return home. 569 It seems to me that many 
Banyankole and even the Uganda government had thought that the refuge problem 
was just a temporary issue. The Banyarwanda refugees did not, however, achieve as 
high a degree of integration as did the migrants. Once the latter had accumulated 
capital from the farm plantations and factories, they settled among locals, acquired 
land and were assimilated through marriage. They acquired local names and clan 
affiliations. 570 Moreover, many of the economic migrants were Bahutu who had much 
in common with the local people. Tiberondwa. says: 
They simply came and integrated. You see many of these Bahutu did not have any political experience. 
All they needed were jobs. Secondly they did not come in masses but only trickled into the country and 
that was unlikely to cause any impact. 5 71 
Not so for the Batutsi refugees who, despite being very exclusive in their 
relationships, had profound influence and impact on the locals. They had been 
political leaders and had a programme to return to their mother country. They 
remained a consolidated group venerating their King Kigeli even in exile. 572 
Nevertheless, the destiny of Banyarwanda immigrants, refugees and assimilated alike, 
when his son, who was employed in Amin's government, bought him a piece of land away from 
the camp. 
568 Bond op. cit. 
569 Interview: Adorýa Tiberondwa. 
570 Note that clan identity is not as important in Ankole as it is in Buganda. While a big number of 
Bahutu settled in Buganda, some settled in Ankole especially in Kikagate and the Southern parts of 
Isingiro on their return from Buganda. 
571 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, September 20,1997, Kampala. 
572 ibid. 
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did not turn out to be different, as Mamdani suggests. 573 For instance when the 
government of Obote turned against the refugees in Ankole, in 1982-83, as we shall 
see, the immigrants including those who settled in Mpororo during King Rwabugiri's 
raids on Ankole, and the Bafumbira of Uganda, were all bundled on the same truck. 
That is why in the 1995 Ugandan Constitution, the Ugandan Banyarwanda of 
Bufumbira resolved to be identified as a distinct tribe of Bafumbira and their 
language as Rufumbira lest they be indiscriminately persecuted in future. 
6.1. THE BATUTSI: LIFE IN EXILE. 
When in 1959 Batutsi refugees first arrived in Ankole, they were welcomed because 
of vanous factors. Firstly, the Batutsi refugees evoked sympathy from the local people 
because of the horrific pogrom they had been subjected to in Rwanda. They thought 
the refugee problem was temporary. As Karnukama said: 
the local populace often rendered a hospitable hand in food and other items. This was through local 
state functionaries or through individual efforts. This generosity came after the realisation that the 
refugees were politically, socially and economically helpless. The local people also thought that the 
refugees were likely to return home in a short time. 574 
Besides Ankole had more available land in the sixties than neighbouring Districts in 
South Western Uganda. Also, the refugees found many migrant and indigenous 
Ugandan Banyarwanda whom they were either related to or could easily identify with. 
The Batutsi kingship ties with the Bahima and the connections between Bairu and 
Bahutu agriculturists made for easy integration. 575 Many of these Batutsi were well 
versed with the cattle culture of Ankole and therefore were competitively absorbed as 
farm labourers. This also tallied with the Banyarwanda's ability to learn Runyankole 
language. Language had the effect of reducing the cultural distance between the two 
573 M. Mamdani, Politics and Class formation in Uganda, London: 1976, pp. 26-27. 
574 Interview: D. Karnukama, July 12,1996, Makerere University. 
575 Ibid, See also V. Bond, op. cit., p. 15. See also Martin R. Doornbos, "Ankole", in Rene 
Lemarchand (ed., ), African Kingships in Perspective, London: 1977, p. 209, Footnote. 23. 
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groups and accelerated the refugees' assimilation into the wider social structure of 
Ankole. Both Runyankole and Runyarwanda are Bantu languages, which are 
linguistically interrelated. Whereas in Buganda, Banyarwanda acquired kiganda 
names (to disguise themselves though their accent often betrayed them. This applied 
to the first generation immigrants), in Ankole they kept kinyarwanda, names with 
which they could easily be distinguished. Many coffee, tea and sugar plantations in 
Ankole, Buganda and Eastern Uganda needed Banyarwanda labour. Wealthy banana 
plantation farmers (especially in Buganda) and cattle owners employed Banyarwanda 
in Ankole, Lango Teso (where they became known as balalo), Buganda and 
Karamoja. Bairu and Bahima had also flocked to these regions for employment, so 
local people could not distinguish between the Banyarwanda and Banyankole. That 
explains why in Buganda, Northern and North Eastern parts of Uganda, up till this day 
people from south-westem Uganda are referred to as "Banyarwanda". 
Through UNHCR and Ugandan government scholarships, the refugees were 
able to educate their children. They enjoyed a degree of protection. The Alien 
Refugee Act of 1963 (Section 22 of the Uganda Citizenship Act), for instance, had 
introduced Runyarwanda. into the official language list. It was therefore relatively 
easy for them to find schools and jobs which encouraged a new wave of Batutsi 
immigrants in 1970's who were denied education in Rwanda by the "Ten Percent rule" 
quota system. This based school and University enrolment on the size of a particular 
ethnic group. 576 Unlike the pre-independence immigrants, the Batutsi refugees 
arrived at a time when Uganda was facing new challenges, in which these refugees 
were later to be entangled. This was especially true of the acute conflicts in 
Ankole. 577 
It seems that by 1967, the refugees were seen as identifying with their 
kinsmen the Bahima and the Catholic Church, and were consequently regarded as a 
political liability by the UPC government. Refugees were seen as likely to swell the 
Bahima and Catholic numbers in future elections. It could be due to these reasons that 
576 This law was popularly known as the "Ten percent rule, " that is, Batutsi employees or students 
should not account for more than ten percent of the total number because they accounted for Ten 
percent of the population at independence. 
577 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, September 20,1997, Kampala. 
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Obote attempted a refugee census in 1969.578 But this never materialised partly 
because of the insecurity that surrounded that period and also because he was 
overthrown in January 197 1. 
The refugees were indeed mostly Catholics. Their king Kigen was Catholic 
and in Rwanda the Catholic Church was part of the quasi-establishment. Though 
Catholics, I suspect that for many Batutsi religion was not really important. If we 
think of Bahima in Ankole at the same time, many were Anglicans though on the 
whole in the 1960s religion was not a major force apart from the few Bahima 
Revivalists. Equally the Batuts] alliance to Catholicism may have been weak. 
Therefore, it could be that a lot of their formative influence Christian-wise was in 
Uganda rather than Rwanda. Even in Uganda, Batutsi did not for a long time show 
enthusiasm for either Anglicanism or Roman Catholicism. 
What was the contribution of the Christian churches to the refugees? Both 
churches in the sixties received and welcomed refugees when they first arrived in 
Ankole. The Catholic Church especially welcomed them as likely to boost their 
numbers and hoping perhaps that they swell the DP vote. 579 In short there was 
genuine desire to help but it had perhaps side advantages. 
At the time the refugees arrived in Ankole, the Anglican Bishop was 
Shalita, himself a Mututsi but already under suspicion from the Protestant Bairu for 
allegedly sympathising with DP- And the Ankole King, though he was a Protestant, 
was under Protestant Bairu pressure because of his DP inclinations. The Omugabe 
could not give the support the Bishop needed in order to influence the Bairu who were 
a force in the Eishengyero and on church councils. The Catholic Church's quick 
response to the refugees may have discouraged the Protestant Church. The general 
feeling was they were Catholics therefore likely to sympathise with DP. Having said 
this, the Anglican Church was not indifferent to the refugees' plight. With in its ever- 
limited resources, it extended a humanitarian hand. Canon Rwabushaija confinns: 
578 ibid. 
579 Interview: Bishop Bakyenga, June 6,1997, Nyamitanga. 
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We did not look at the Banyarwanda from their religious perspective. We had a moral obligation to 
assist the reffigees and within our means and limits we provided what we could afford though it was not 
much anyway. 580 
Unfortunately Bishop Shalita died a month before my fieldwork and I was not able to 
interview him on this issue. However, Canon Rwabushaija and Canon Njunwoha 
agree that the Anglican Church provided some relief items especially food, though 
they were quick to stress the resistance from the forces already mentioned. The 
Protestant church, having realised its inability to provide much tangible support to the 
refugees, encouraged its congregations to render individual support. 
By and large the refugees who settled in Ank-ole were not interested in 
religion. The circumstances from which the refugees had escaped might have been a 
cause of their disinterest in religious matters. One Mututsi, who fled to Uganda after 
the 1959 bloodshed, said the refugees detested the Belgians and the Catholic religion 
which they regarded as their enemy and traitor to their monarchy. When they crossed 
to Uganda, some of them threw away their rosaries, Withdrew their allegiance to the 
faith and since the Protestant Church was the 'King's religion' both in Ankole and 
Buganda they allied With it. 581 Perhaps this may explain why many Banyarwanda did 
not wholly embrace Revival whose message emphasised equality and forgiveness. 
Kevin Ward says: 
What I would have imagined is that those cattle keepers of Tutsi origin once they began to see that 
Christianity was an important thing would tend to go to the Anglican church rather than the Catholic 
church which was probably for Bairu rather than Bahima. 582 
While Batutsi refugees in Buganda may have become Anglicans, it was not the case 
with the Batutsi refugees of Ankole. At the time the refugees arrived in Ankole, the 
Anglican Church had been tarnished by ethnic and political conflicts between Bairu 
and Bahima. It is very unlikely therefore that the Bahima would have convinced their 
580 Interview: Semei Rwabushaija, September 7,1997, Ruharo. 
581 Interview: Mzee Paulo Kayongo, September 19,1996, Nakasongola. 
582 Interview: Kevin Ward, December 15,1997, Leeds. 
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kinsmen, the Batutsi refugees, to convert to an establishment that was edging them 
out of their positions of influence. As we have argued in chapter two, the refugees 
arrived at a time when Protestant Bahima had already allied with Bairu Catholics. 
Importantly, Bahima could not influence Banyarwanda. into Protestantism because 
they already had another unifying factor: ethnicity which was thicker than religion. 
Bahima saw the refugees as likely to support DP which Protestant Bahima were 
supporting. It could be here that Bahima influenced the refugees, if they were to exert 
any impressive political pressure against the Protestant Bairu. Nevertheless this is not 
to ignore completely the fact that there were some Banyarwanda who converted to 
Protestantism. Some of them like Kareeba and Kapa (who became the Treasurer of 
Ankole) did. 583 But these were a few ambitious individuals VAth the desire to become 
prominent in the Ankole kingdom administration. As Catholics could not become 
chiefs in a Protestant establishment, so some converted to Protestantism. 534 These 
few tended to give a false impression that there were as many Banyarwanda 
Protestants as Catholics. This is because the few Protestants who had taken on 
political offices tended to distort the picture proportionally since one man loomed 
higher over many. Such conversion reduced drastically after 1967 when the monarchy 
was abolished for the Protestant Bairu were unlikely to favour Banyarwanda in the 
political alignment that emerged. And during the whole of Idi Amin's regime, 
Banyarwanda did not need to identify with any religion since Amin had given them a 
blanket cover. 
This also raises a question why Banyarwanda refugees were not attracted to 
church ministry in Ankole. Many of them were nominal Catholics but could not be 
priested since in the Catholic Church priesthood is through Seminary training. They 
were already older than the church would admit. Priesthood in the Catholic Church is 
not a calling that comes after retirement, as is sometimes the case with the Anglican 
Church. It is a process in which individuals are identified and prepared at an early age 
tIT, pugh the various seminary stages. 585 As for the Anglican Church the Banyarwanda 
583 Interview: Edward Rurangaranga. 
584 Interview: Mzee Murumba, July 10,1996, Kaftinjo. 
585 Interview: Bishop Bakyenga, June 6,1997, Nyarnitanga. 
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had arrived at a time when Shalita was the Bishop of Ankole but unlikely to recruit 
them into ministry because of Bairu opposition. In a period of "political baptisms" the 
Anglican Church was careful not to recruit candidates who might support DP. The 
Anglican Church receives its recruits for priesthood through the recommendation of 
Parish councils, or through churchmen who suggest candidates, mwana wani, to the 
Bishop. Banyarwanda were in camps and it was not easy to identify possible 
candidates. On the contrary, in Buganda, Banyarwanda were enthusiastic towards 
church ministry for quite a number of Anglican Catechists in Buganda have a 
Rwandan origin. 586 This could be that the Dioceses of Mukono and West Buganda in 
which many of these Banyarwanda are, were largely not pastoralist areas and 
therefore the Church provided a different occupation and identity in ministry. Also it 
is often true immigrant communities feet that because they do not have the same 
advantages as the local people in terms of employment into the civil service, they 
should tend to shift their focus to church ministry. 
The point is that, once their pastoral way of life was untenable, they often join the 
ministry of the Church with great enthusiasm as in Buganda. But this did not apply in 
Ankole. Like Bahima, they had been rulers and regarded ministry with low esteem. 
The refugees preferred working in a greater social status where they could remain 
aloof while planning their return. This explains why they were not easily influenced 
by the Revival movement as were the rest of Banyankole although Revival began in 
Gahini Rwanda (see chapter 3). The Batutsi who came to Ankole did not have any 
Revival contact because it broke out in Gahmi, the northern part of Rwanda, mainly 
inhabited by the Bahutu. The Batutsi were largely from the south where British CMS 
missionaries and Baganda evangelists did not really concentrate perhaps due to the 
French Catholic missionaries' presence. 587 Therefore Batutsi refugees' first 
experience of Revival could have been during their exile in Uganda. The Catholic 
Church especially in the sixties was rather hostile to the Revival movement which 
they saw as essentially a Protestant affair and therefore disassociated its followers 
586 Interview: Kevin Ward, December 15,1997, Leeds. 
587 Cf Grace P'Karamura, Revival and Repentance: A Hinorical and Aeological Significance of the 
Revival Movement in Uganda, MIMI. Dissertation, Cambridge University, 1995. 
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from it. Catholics did not only regard Revival as a heretical movement, but it was also 
held sceptically as a political movement whose hidden intentions were to recruit 
membership for the Anglican church. 588 We need also to note that apart from the 
Catholic factor many of the Batutsi in Rwanda were rulers and such a people tendto 
hold in scepticism new ideas and refrain from any outside influence. It is the 
disadvantaged groups like the Bairu or Bahutu who embraced Revival as a platform of 
social equality, identity and integrity. Yet for the Batutsi they had already that 
inherited social status and were rather more concerned with how to maintain it. 
All these factors led to increasingly hostile relations with Obote's 
government. However at the climax of Obote's hostility, he was toppled. No wonder 
then that many Banyarwanda registered their loyalty to Amin's regime where they 
were massively recruited into the notorious State Research Bureau (SRB), and various 
high positions in government establishment. Though their involvement with Amin's 
regime later became a scapegoat for their expulsion in Ankole, one can say that their 
support for Amin was largely out of their desire to survive. And as Bukabeba said: 
The Banyarwanda's support to Amin's regime could have been done by any other group in similar 
circumstances. They had been alienated by UPC and did not have any bonds that linked them to people 
that Amin was killing. Their motive was survival and since Arain could give it they had to go for it. 
589 
Amin's regime gave them opportunities for education and to live normally. That was 
when many refugees began leaving the camps for better opportunities. Their 
daughters married politicians and army officers in government who gave them the 
much needed patronage and protection. Consequently, they managed to spread to 
many parts of Uganda generally. This encouraged more migrant Banyarwanda in 
search of education and better living standards. Thus by the end of Amin's regime, 
Banyarwanda had become a strong force to reckon with in the politics of Uganda and 
Ankole in particular. 
588 Interview: Dononsio Kaganda, July 13,1997, Nyamitanga. 
589 Interview: Emmy Bukabeba, February 13,1998, Kakyeka. 
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6.2. THE 1981-84 BANYARWANDA CRISIS IN ANKOLE AND ITS 
AFTERMATH. 
It was clear by the early 1980s that the Banyarwanda question was an increasing 
problem. And for Obote's second regime which thrived on divide and rule politics, the 
issue was bound to be explosive, especially after Banyarwanda were accused of 
supporting DP and UPM in the 1980 elections. 590 There was no proof that they had, 
merely the assumption that as Catholics they voted DP. And their situation was 
worsened when Museveni and the 26 fighters (who included some Banyarwanda) 
declared a guerrilla war against Obote in 198 1. This was one of the reasons why the 
UPC political structures especially National State Agency (NASA) led a campaign to 
expel Banyarwanda. 
There are several factors that led to the rise of xenophobia against Banyarwanda. 
After two decades, it was clear that the refugees were there to stay. On the contrary, 
the Rwanda government disowned them on the pretext that Rwanda was already over- 
populated. Habyalimana's (Rwandan president) famous analogy was: "If the glass is 
full, where do you put more water? 1,591 On meeting Paul Muwanga, the Vice 
President of Uganda, on the refugee question, Habyarimana sarcastically commented 
that the so-called refugees were Banyankole who had occupied Rwanda through the 
early wars of conquest and when Rwanda gained its independence they chose to 
return home. The Vice President responded: 
If you are talking about Uganda, be carefW with your words. I told him [Habyarimana] that we had more 
than one million Banyarwanda here and if we were to send them back, he would have a problem. 592 
590 Interview: Ezra Kikuri, July 14,1997, Bushenyi. 
591 Kevin Aliro Ogen, "After 30 Years it was time to go home", in 7he Monitor, Kampala: 15 April, 
1994, p. 16. 
592 See "Record of the Meeting between HE. The Vice President/Minister of Defence, Hon. Paulo 
Muwanga and the Bishops of the Church of Uganda, at the Request of the Bishops, Held in the Vice 
President's Office at State Lodge, Nakasero, on Friday 22nd October 1982. 
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Besides, whereas in Tanzania they were granted citizenship, and in Zaire citizenship 
could be granted and withdrawn the next day, in Uganda no attempt at all was made 
to give them nationality. Though many of them thought that they had become citizens 
of Uganda at Independence in 1962 because they had lived in Uganda for a long time, 
this was not so. The provisions of article 7(l) of the Independence Constitution 
stipulated that, "any citizen of the United Kingdom or its colonies or any British 
protected person having been born in Uganda on or before the 8th. October 1962 and 
either of whose parents was born in Uganda" became a citizen of Uganda on 9th 
October 1962. Banyarwanda in this case came from a Belgian colony and were 
therefore not British protected persons but 'aliens'. 593 It was, to borrow Professor 
Mamdani's analogy, a typical case of social seclusion: 
set apart, treated apart, remaining apart ... once a refugee, always a refugee hence the child and grand 
child of a refugee in Uganda was also a refugee ... 
594 
Chris Rwakasisi was asked during his anti-Banyarwanda crusades in Ankole in 1982- 
83 whether it was fair to expel all the early immigrants and the refugees who came in 
1959 who were bonafide residents. In his characteristic rhetoric, he retorted: 
If a dog produces a puppy in a cattle kraal, does it become a cow or does it remain a dog? 595 
That explains why Banyarwanda both disguised themselves as Baganda, Banyankole, 
and Batooro. Either way they 'bribed' their way to go to school and also benefited 
593 Section 8 of the 1962 Constitution gave a chance to any person who had been living in Uganda but 
who had not become a Ugandan citizen by virtue of Section 7 to become one by lodging an 
application before 9th October 1964, (within two years of Independence). Section 9 stipulated that 
every person born in Uganda after the 8th October 1962 shall become a citizen of Uganda at the 
date of his birth only if either of any of his parents is a citizen of Uganda. This section, stringent as it 
may look, was even incorporated within the 1967 Constitution. Section 12 of the 1962 Constitution 
and Section 6 of the 1967 Constitution prohibited dual citizenship. Therefore an interpretation of 
these Constitutional provisions on the citizenship is that an alien and his cHdren and grand 
children living in Uganda continuously remained alien in perpetuity unless there was intermarriage 
with a Ugandan citizen somewhere along the line or unless an application for registration for 
Ugandan citizenship was lodged and accepted. 
594 M. Mamdani, op. cit., p. 26. 
595 Interview: Mzee Bara, Mbarara, August 8,1996, Nkokonjeru. 
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from the government and UNHCR scholarships. This, in a country where many local 
people could not afford school fees for their children's education, attracted envy. 
Nevertheless the success of the refugees though true for some individuals, should not 
be exaggerated because: 
... being excluded from the local labour market, which was monopolised by the nationals, pushed the 
refugees to try new professional paths where the characteristics of their communities (dissemination in 
various countries, high mobility, strong ties to solidarity) could be helpful. A limited number of 
individuals acquired a reputation for professional and financial success, which was often quite 
exaggeratedly extended to the whole community... But one should point out that many people remained 
in precarious social and economic situations. widows and families with a single female parent, lone 
young adults, people left behind in the camps and groups in conflict situations with the local 
populations. 596 
Secondly, was the land issue in Ankole. Batutsi had settled on the free lands in 
Ankole, often bought off the local people's bibanja (free hold land) and established 
themselves which roused envy among the locaIS, 597 as one said: 
You cannot trust a Munyarwanda. He would come seeking and begging for a small plot on which to 
camp. You give it to him and after two years, he takes you to court claiming that all your land is his. 598 
The Ankole. population had increased naturally and with the influx of Banyarwanda 
and Bakiga, there was land shortage. This left Banyankole with less land to cultivate 
and they hoped to gain more land by driving out the Banyarwanda. Muhuta M. 
Akintore, himself a Munyarwanda, says that it Is not true that Banyarwanda. could not 
own land in Uganda. The restriction was on non-Africans but the refugees, being 
Africans, could lawfully purchase, lease and occupy land without the need of any 
596 Andr6' Guichaoua, quoted in Prunier, op. cit., p. 65. 
597 See also Nelson Kasfir, "Lands and Peasants in Western Uganda: Bushenyi and Mbarara Districts", 
in H. B. Hansen and M. Twaddle, Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development, London: James 
Currey, 1988, pp. 158-174. Kasfir gives a very good analysis of the land situation in Ankole and the 
various factors that have risen due to the uneven distribution of land since the 1901 Ankole 
Agreement. See also Martin Doornbos, "Land Tenure and Political Conflict in Ankole, Uganda", 
Journal of Developing Studies, 12,1,1975, pp. 62-65. 
598 Interview: Timothy Banduho, April 18,1997, Nyakajojo. 
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ministerial consent. 59Q This however is entirely wTong "ah III that by lens tile 
govc; f rancia incant all those who came to Uganda for business such as investment and 
not refugees who came seeking asylum. When the refugees moved out of their 
settlements to occupy land, it was not because the government allowed them. 600 It 
was because of the general laxity in Amin's administration. Their only legal area was 
in the gazettcd settlements. In the seventics and eighties corruption affected every 
department and the refugees acquired land by bribery. The government could not 
distinguish who was and was not a refugee and the local chiefs, couid be bribecl to 
endorse application formS. 601 
Fhe refugees soon got deeply entangled in local partisan politics in Ankole. 
They were seen as part of a Bahima plot to increase numbers. So they were being sent 
away partly because: 
of that historical animosity. For a Munyarwanda being associated with a Muhima who was an oppressor, 
given the opportunity the Bairu would have loved to send Banyarwanda away in order to isolate 
Bahima. 602 
In the 1980s, the Banyarwanda (mainly the Batutsi refugees) were seen to take sides 
in local conflicts. This excluded the Bahutu because they trekked in Ankole one by 
one and they were easily absorbed. Also, they were not skilled or politically exposed 
to leadership so they kept a low profile in politics. Besides that, their being 
predominantly Catholic was also a disincentive, for Bairu Catholics had little political 
influence in Ankole. The case of the Batutsi refugees, however, was different. These 
had been traditionally rulers and wealthy lords like their Bahima colleagues, and 
599 Muhuta Akintore, Human Rights Piolation in Ugantla: A case Study of Expulsiun Ofpeuple of the 
Rwandese Ethnicityfrom Mbarara District in 1982, dissertation for the Diploma in Public 
Administration, Makerere University, 1995, pp. 17-18. 
600 Interview: James Kahigiriza, March 16,1996. Kahigiriza from Mbarara, was the Chairman of 
Uganda Lands Commission during Amin's regime. 
601 Interview: Ndiwa Ndikora, July 23,1997, Mbarara. 
602 1-4,,, --. butsya, March 26,1997, Makerere University. 
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could not be subservient. They influenced Ankole politics through an alliancc with 
Bahima, which alienated them further from the Banyankole. 603 
As for Milton Obote, he knew ever since he returned from the exile in 1980 that 
the Banyarwanda refugees were for all intents and purposes a political liability. in 
1980, he tried to stop them from voting in the general elections without success. 604 
Edward Rurangaranga said: 
Those who had been affected by boundaries definitely voted. But the latter Banyarwanda refugees 
because they were Catholics voted DP especially in the 1980 elections. It was rather hard to stop them 
because we had just come from I anzai-ýa and we had not enough resources ieave alone a well orgallised 
government system constituted to look into the issue of Banyarwanda's voting. In any case many of 
these had already gone out of their camps and it was very difficult to identify them. 605 
Obote saw them as opponents either as against UPC or actively supporting the NRM 
guerrilla war which started after the elections. Yoweri Museveni, the guerrilla leader, 
was associated with the Banyarwanda and, on several occasions the UPC propaganda 
accused him of being a foreigner meddling in Uganda's affairs. 60(113ut as it turned out, 
Banyarwanda were not only meddling in Uganda's affairs but they were actually 
involved in the bush war which toppled the UPC government. Some ofthem rose to 
high rank in the NRA, like the late Major General Fred RwigyeMa6(17 who became 
Deputy Army Commander, and Major General Paul Kagame who served as deputy 
Director of Military Intelligence in the NRM government before leading the attack on 
Rwanda where he is now Vice President. Some Banyarwanda had been part of 
Musevem's FRONASA, the guerrilla group which he had created in 1973, and fought 
alongside the Tanzanian forces to oust Amin in 1979.608 
603 Interview: Dixon. Kamukama, May 15,1996, Makerere University. 
604 Interview: Francis Bwengye, July 29,1997, Kampala. 
605 Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, July 12,1997, Ishaka. 
606 Cf Louise Pirouet, "Refugees in and from Uganda in the post colonial period", in H. B. Hansen and 
M. Twaddle, Uganda Ncrw: Between Decay wid Development, London. - James Currey, 1988, p. 243. 
See also, Clay, op. cit., pp. 28-34; 0. ýfaw Bulletin, 1, November 1982. 
607 He was killed on the second day of RPF's (Rwandese Patriotic Front) invasion of Rwanda in 
October 1990 bv his own rivals in the RPF. See Prunier. op. cit.. pp. 93-95. 
608 Interview: Emmy Bukabeba, August 29,1996, Kakyeka. 
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The expulsion was [ndiscnminate. Feeling that the UPC Youth Wingers had 
government support, they even attacked local Bahima or Bafumbira who were not 
refugees. There was much looting, stealing cattle and land grabbing. The Youth 
Wingers were fanatical, often uneducated, with no money, who were only recruited 
because they were UPC supporters or vice versa. This explains the speed with which 
they effected their assignments. Little did UPC reallse that by persecuting refugees in 
Ankole in 1982-83 and expelling them to Rwanda, they were forcing many young 
men and women to join Museveni's guerrilla fighters. 
The UPC government got the much needed pretext to expel Banyarwanda 
when in October 1982 government officials investigating cattle raiding in the South of 
Ankole were killed. UPC Youth Wingers attacked Banyarwanda, killing, destroying 
homes and crops and looting property and cattle. Not all rounded up were refugees as 
Bishop Kakubi said: 
Feeling they had government support, they even went after the local Banyarwanda, the Banyankole and 
even some Bakiga. The point was to loot, steal cattle and illegally occupy land. There were some killings 
and many rapes. Heads of cattle were stolen and people went to the old settlements where they found 
themselves in quasi detention conditions. Others fled towards the border in an attempt to get back into 
Rwanda. Those who managed to cross were interned in camps on the other side. But those who fared 
the worst were those who got caught up at the border of Uganda and Rwanda. 
609 
In 1982, there was an increase in cattle theft in Ankole in the counties of Isingiro, 
Ruhama and Ntungamo where there was a significant number of Banyarwanda. Many 
families lost cattle and the Banyarwanda were accused of stealing them, (it was 
Banyankole's cattle, not Banyarwanda's that disappeared). 61() The Kamukuzi Archives 
are full of implicating letters from the concerned county chiefs to the DC complaining 
of cattle thefts in those areas. For example: 
Further to my reporting cattle thefts in my county more thefts took place as indicated below. 
609 Interview: Bishop John Baptist Kakubi, March 22,1997, Ibanda. Bishop Kakubi read me this 
quotation ftom a book whose reference I unfortunately misplaced and cannot quote from it directly. 
6 10 Interview: Ndiwa-Ndikora, July 23,1997, Mbarara. 
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9- 12 - 82 L. Banyenzaki's heads of cattle taken by armed smugglers. 
15 - 12- 82 Mrs. Keti Baryamwijuka's 9 heads of cattle taken by art-ned smugglers 
Sir, cattle smuggling exercise has tremendously increased ... since the Banyarwanda resettled 
in the refugee camps of Orushingi [sic. Orukinga] and Nakivale. It is confirmed that all smugglers 
engaged in the exercise are Banyarwanda ... 
611 
It is believed that the stolen cattle reached unspecified markets in Rwanda and 
Tanzania and the money from the sales supported the bush war. 612 
The wrath against Banyarwanda was activated in 1982 when two Youth 
Wingers, Matsiko and Wazarwaht, and a policeman, were killed during the exercise 
against the cattle thefts. It was said that Banyarwanda told the soldiers that the 
advancing constabulary was actually guerrillas. 613 Their death sparked off the 
subsequent acts of revenge against Banyarwanda. Bishop Betungura who conducted 
the funeral service of these Youth Wingers recalls how politicians were telling and 
instigating mourners in inflammatory language to the effect that the Banyarwanda had 
killed Wazarwahi and must be punished. 614 After this incident the Youth Wingers 
attacked not only Banyarwanda but also Bahima. Consequently, many Banyarwanda 
and Bahima joined NRA "for survival to escape harassment and incrimination by the 
Obote regime.,, 615 It was from this experience of the guerrilla struggle that 
Banyarwanda were helped to form and consolidate the vision for their eventual return 
home using military skills if that became necessary, as it did on Ist October 1990. 
This attack on Rwanda was indeed a matter of time, consider-ing that when the NRA 
came into power in January 1986, it had about 3000 Banyarwanda fighters among its 
14,000 strong force and the number had grown to 8000 out of 80,000 - 100,000 NRA 
soldiers by 1990.616 
611 See A letter from the County Chief of Isingiro, in Refugees File, G/CR 1, letter No. 6. See also 
similar letters dated, 20th. November 1982,15 May 1983 and many others reporting on cattle theft 
and the security situation in the areas mentioned above, Kamukuzi archives Mbarara. 
612 Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, February 15,1998, Ishaka. 
613 ibid. 
614 Interview: Amos Betungura, September 9,1997, Ruharo. 
615 Kevin Aliro Ogen, op. cit., p. 16. 
616 Prunier, op. cit., pp. 70-71.1 tried unsuccessfully to ascertain these figures with the Ministry of 
Defence, Kampala and therefore had to adopt them as Prunier has them. 
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6.3. WAS THE EXPULSION A GOVERNMENT POLICY? 
Were the Banyankole responsible for the expulsion or was it a government policy? 
Both Banyarwanda and Banyankole interviewed agree that the expulsion of 
Banyarwanda was government policy. For Milton Obote often made inflammatory 
speeches, which implicated Banyarwanda as a liability. In the government owned 
Paper, the Uganda Times, of January 11,1982, Milton Obote is quoted as saying 
Banyarwanda committed most atrocities during Amin's era. Obviously such utterances 
by the Head of State would fuel local hostility. And what activated the government's 
hostility was the fact that Banyarwanda supported and fought in the bush war. So their 
expulsion was political. By expelling Banyarwanda, the government hoped to 
suffocate the NRM source of recruitment but in fact it fuelled it. 
Government officials understood Banyarwanda expulsion as government 
backed. The District Commissioner of Mbarara, Ndiwa Ndikora, understood the 
whole exercise of the expulsion of Banyarwanda. to be a government policy which he 
had dutifully implemented: 
Yes it was and I had reasons to believe so. Nearly all the MPs in the areas where the expulsion was 
being carried out did not protest against it. None of the Ws concerned ever came to me or wrote to me 
advising against the Banyarwanda expulsion. In any case the Mnister of State in the President's Office 
was busy fencing land from where Banyarwanda had been evicted. 617 
The former MP for Rwampara, Francis Butagira, and a former Speaker of the 
National Assembly, concurs that the MP for 1\4barara Central Constituency stated in a 
public meeting in Mbarara that it was government directive to push all Banyarwanda 
into gazetted camps from where "genuine citizens" could be sorted out. 618 So local 
authorities carried out the exercise vigorously since some MPs had blessed it. A letter 
from the Youth League, UPC branch Ankole, of 20 October 1982, written through the 
District Commissioner and the Administrative Secretary, Mbarara District, to the 
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Local Government, stressed the importance of the 
617 Intervicw: Nuwa-Ndikora, July 17,1997, Mbarara. 
231 
previous District Council's minutes in which the motion to expel the refuges had been 
unanimously passed: 
In its meeting held on 24 to 25 August 1982. Ref of Min, 17/82 of second session of Mbarara District 
Council which was held on 13th to 16th July 1982 under motions and requests the Council unanimously 
resolved that the refuges should be forced to go back into their camps and that their movements should 
be checked and restricted. It was passed unanimously. 619 
Another letter from the MP for Mbarara Central Constituency to the District Police 
Commander (and copied to other relevant district officials but mainly to the Youth 
leader, Stephen Muslime) reads: 
RE: REVENUE FROM CONFISCATED GOODS. 
I wish to remind you of our discussion (DPC/Dr. Rubaihayo, NIP for Mbarara Central Constituency) 
about the above subject. The Vice President decided that all monies from any sales of goods confiscated 
from smugglers must go into a special account to be opened and run by the Youth League. This 
directive operates irrespective of which group apprehends the smugglers. Vehicles should be handed 
over to the military who will pay for them, and the proceeds banked on the Youth Account. 620 
It is from such evidence that we can assert that the government was involved in 
instigating and implementing the anti-Banyarwanda attacks. Banyarwanda may have 
been involved in smuggling and stealing cattle, though this did not apply to them all. 
Culprits should have been individually arrested. In any case why should the Youth 
League who eventually became active in the whole exercise have been beneficiaries 
of the money that accrued from the confiscated property? By all intents they were 
being financially motivated to carry out the otherwise difficult exercise as Mukaira 
observed: 
The Youth were the fight force to use. They are strong and have the desire to accomplish a task which 
others would be hesitant to attempt. They think after their actions. Many of them wanted to be seen as 
618 See Commi. uiott of Inquiry, p. 498. 
619 Kamukuzi Archives. The Banyarwanda File, B/I. 
620 ibid. 
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loyal to the government which they thought was behind the whole exercise. In any case they were being 
paid for the job done well. 621 
In fact a letter from the Secretary Youth League, Mbarara, to the District 
Commissioner confirms that all funds from the refugees were used to run the UPC 
Youth Wing office: 
RE: Claim of Shs. 42,070/= 
This money was spent on Youths when on their struggle in Isingiro [the refugee area]. Another part was 
spent when taking information to Kampala and Masaka. 622 
The fact that the Secretary's claim mentions that the money was spent on their 
struggle in the refugee area, is an expression of what went on in the camps. And since 
they were promised rewards from the confiscated properties, it is easy to understand 
the speed and cruelty with which the exercise was executed. There is evidence that 
the government was involved right from the Vice President. Dr. Rubaihayo's letter to 
the District Commissioner and other UPC functionaries in Ankole like the army, 
police and the local chiefs indicates this. When MPs like Tiberondwa and Butagira 
resisted, they were branded guerrilla sympathisers, which was a very serious 
allegation at the time. 623 Butagira was sent abroad on official duty to minimise his 
interference. 624 
What also implicates the government was the low profile it maintained over a 
sensitive issue, which had at the time attracted international attention. The Minister of 
Internal Affairs called it 'a local matter' which Banyankole could handle 
themselves, 625 while the Vice President said it was 'an unfortunate incident' in which 
Banyankole took the law into their hands. 626 On 19 October 1982627, a Government 
621 Interview with Mukaira, July 17,1997, Bushenyi. 
622 Kamukuzi Archives: Youth/DC File, YD/C 1. 
623 Interview with Adonia Tiberondwa, May 26,1996, Bushenyi. 
624 Interview with Francis Butagira, April 12,1996, Mbarara. 
625 Uganda Times, 27 October 1982. 
626 Commission of Inquiry, op. cit., p. 502. 
627 See Uganda Times. 
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spokesman announced that the Rwandese refugees had panicked and fled after a 
minor shooting incident. The Prime Minister Otema Allimadi said Rwandese refugees 
had voluntarily repatriated themselves. The President was in Italy when it happened 
but he remained silent on the issue for a whole month after he had returned. 
Addressing the District Council at Mbarara later, he stated that the refugees had fled 
on mere rumours: 
I am extremely concerned about the recent developments on that subject. I am concerned because the 
recent developments constituted violation of the laws of Uganda and the citizenship rights of some of 
the persons who fled from their homes. Secondly, I am concerned that aliens, including Rwandese 
refugees, who left their homes because of rumours of various kinds, did so in circumstances, which gave 
the impression that, they were actuafly forced to flee. 628 
And as if to resurrect old scores, Obote went on to remind the Councillors about the: 
... unhappy events which can be cited against well known non citizens within your districts. Some of 
these events led to loss of lives and loss of property including cattle. The recent events are accepted to 
have been occasioned by stealing of cattle, which led to the loss of lives and which in turn led to the 
large number of non-Ugandans taking flight into Rwanda and others going into the refugee settlements. 
These events were extremely unfortunate. What must be done is to reassert the authority and majesty of 
the law. 629 
What is not clear though was whether the re-assertion of the law was meant to protect 
the refugees or the politicians. But from the tone of the President's speech, he seemed 
to have been sympathetic with the latter as the loss of lives the President is referring 
to is not Banyarwanda! s but the lives of the two Youth Wingers and a policeman who 
were killed during the expulsion. In a six-page speech, it was only on the last page 
and in one paragraph that he dissociated the government from the Banyarwanda issue. 
In order to mollify international concern, he concluded: 
628 See Obote's speech, " Communication from the President to the District Councils of Bushenyi, 
Kabale, Kabalore, Kasese, Mbarara and Rukungiri, assembled in Mbarara town on Friday, 29th 
October, 1982", in Government File, A/DC, No. 14, Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara. 
629 ibid, p. 5. 
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I want to assure the Chairman, Councillors, Ugandans and the rest of the world that there was no 
governmental approval, scheme or decision for persons of Rwandese origin to be uprooted from amidst 
the Ugandan population. I want also to assure all that [sic] the rest of the country as well as the whole 
world, that the government of Uganda will not pursue any such policy. 630 
Having said that, the President appointed Lazaro Makatu a UPC stalwart in Ankole, as 
Chairman of the Committee, to sort out Rwandese refugees from citizenS631, an 
appointment which was a contradiction of Banyarwanda harassment. The newly 
appointed Chairman declared the Rwandese were dangerous criminals, killers, 
smugglers and saboteurs in spite of the generosity of the locals. 632 Six days later the 
same Chairman is said to have thanked the Youth Wingers for a job well done and 
asked them to be patient till the District Council worked out the best way of dividing 
the Banyarwanda. properties: 
I summoned you to inform you that the battle to collect and return the refugees to their places is over, 
and to thank you for the work you have done ... What remains now 
is to scrutinise refugees that might 
have stayed behind and rid villages of refugees ... I am glad to tell you that the exercise was performed 
perfectly well even if there were sporadic incidents, which did not please us, e. g. our two youths and one 
policeman were killed... This is not negligible. The good thing is that we won the battle through the 
blood of our fTiends above... Go and preach the gospel and inform the people that we have won the 
battle. Let them follow as we know our destination and we have already started seeing sunshine there... I 
am warning everyone to avoid the property of the Banyarwanda. Be patient and the District Council will 
determine a way for you to share these properties. To dispel all rumours and loose talk, the President's 
speech from the start to the end does not state anywhere that refugees and aliens should return to the 
lands they occupied. 633 
The government knew it was not a mere local issue. It knew its sensitivity and kept 
quiet. Obote knew how to exploit ethnic differences. If he could keep them occupied 
with their local differences, then he would have time for other things. UPC divisions 
630 ibid, p. 6 
63 1 Commis-vion of Inquiry, op. cit., p. 509. 
632 ibid. 
633 See Government File No. 2, G/CM, letter no. 16, Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara; See also Louise 
Pirouet, "Refugees in and from Uganda in the post-colonial period", in Holger Bernt Hansen and 
Michael Twaddle, 1988, Uganda Now: Between Decay and Development, London: James Currey, 
pp. 244-245. 
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in Ankole were threatening to wreck the party and Obote therefore saw the 
Banyarwanda issue as something that would distract them. 634 Instead of punishing 
Bahima and Banyarwanda for not having supported him, he used the local 
functionaries. And indeed when the Minister of State in the President's office met 
religious leaders, he hinted: 
What has happened in Mbarara is a matter of historical concern. People like Archbishop Sabiiti were in a 
position to ease this situation 50 years ago. People like you Bishop Shalita and Kivengere should have 
done it 20 years ago. On the contrary, it has been led to build up as I have bluntly spoken in my public 
rallies, that had it not been for good Protectorate Government and subsequently the UPC Government, 
the Bahima would have been chased to Rwanda before the Banyarwanda. I hope I am wrong but I am 
convinced I am right that what is obtaining in Ankole today can not be solved in Kampala. 635 
For the State Minister to have referred to Sabiiti or Shalita and even Bishop Festo 
Kivengere, often accused of being DP and NRM supporters, showed that the Minister 
was suggesting both Bahima and Banyarwanda were the same lot and deserved to be 
'sent back'to Rwanda, refugees or not. 
Importantly the underlying factor was ethnic but political interests 
magnified this. Bahima are not Banyarwanda but are true Ugandan nationals who did 
not in any way deserve to have "been chased to Rwanda". Though the Minister is 
emphasising the Bishops' failure to reconcile Banyankole ethnic groups, UPC 
government never did anything about it. If the UPC had advanced itself as a non- 
partisan party, these ethnic conflicts would have ended. Banyarwanda were expelled 
because their political interests clashed with the interests of the UPC government, 
their involvement in the guerrilla war, their stealing of cattle and the greed of those 
who wanted to grab their property. For instance in the area known as Akashanda, 
Kashari County, a government Minister established a big dairy farm on the lands 
634 Interview with John Bikangaga, June 28,1997, Makindye. 
63 5 See "Record of the meeting between HE. the Vice president/Minister of Defence, Hon. Paul 
Muwanga and some Bishops of the Church of Uganda, at the request of the Bishops, held in the 
Vice President's Office at State Lodge, Nakasero, on Friday 22nd October 1982", in Government 
File, op. cit., p. 4. 
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where Banyarwanda had been evicted. His animals were later destroyed and the land 
repossessed by the former occupants after the fall of the UPC government in 1985. 
6.4. THE CHURCH AND THE BANYARWANDA QUESTION. 
What then was the role of the churches during the Banyarwanda expulsion in 1982? 
Like in the sixties, the 1982 period was rather a complex one for both churches in 
Ankole. They were caught between the two forces; the government and their moral 
obligation. The Anglican Church is still being blamed for the indifference with which 
it handled the Banyarwanda expulsion. Bishop Betungura admitted: 
we did not do what was expected of us though we tried what we could. The 1980s were a difficult 
period for me as a bishop in Ankole for there were many forces that were pulling me apart. For that 
matter, I was given no room enough in which I could exercise my freedom and authority as a 
Bishop. 636 
At the time the refugees were expelled from Ankole in 1982, the Anglican Church 
had resumed its quasi-establishment picture reminiscent of what it was like in the 
1960s. It could not condemn the unfair expulsion when it enjoyed government 
patronage. Rather like the Baganda who do not "talk when they are eating", the 
Anglican Church could not speak for the refugees because it had been stuffed with 
political spoils. The refugees had not won the church's sympathy since UPC 
propaganda had alienated them from the rest of the society because of their role in the 
guerrilla war. Priests like Bishop Kakubi and Revd Canon Elisha Kyamugambi who 
would have defended the refugees had lost many cows with evidence implicating 
Banyarwanda. The County chief of Gayaza, Isingiro writing to the District 
Commissioner says: 
636 Interview: Amos Betungura, July 16,1996, Ruharo. 
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This is to report to you that Banyarwanda cattle smugglers ... crossed to our district and a number of 
animals stolen from Rugaaga and Kashumba sub-county as stated below.... [Also] Unknown numbers of 
heads of cattle fi-om Bishop Kakubi-were taken. 637 
Perhaps this explains the view many priests interviewed take about the expulsion. 
They did not particularly like the way in which it was done, but say: 
I think the element was fight though the method was wrong. You see the Banyarwanda who came to 
Ankole were mainly Batutsi and many allied with Bahima and they were part of the notorious Amin's 
Research Bureau. Also they were so secretive and could not easily mix with the people they found. They 
stole other people's land and always conflicted ýxrith their neighbours. 638 
Bishop Betungura was identified with Banyarwanda. when he tried to condemn the 
expulsion and the inhuman manner in which the refugees were treated. He was 
accused, nitumanya ahori nabo aborikukwatviza (we know where you belong and 
those that you support) by the Youth Wingers. 639 This limited the Bishop's support for 
the refugees. Nevertheless he was able to stand against any usurpation of 
Banyarwanda, property by his churches and schools. Some of these institutions may 
have accepted Banyarwanda property such as iron sheets and doors from politicians 
and chiefs. But the Bishop's circular letter to all Priests in the Diocese warned them 
against accepting such property: 
It has already been brought to my attention that some of you have accepted iron sheets, doors etc. from 
your local chiefs. I am writing to warn you against any property that belongs to the Banyarwanda. If 
there is any priest who has accepted such things, he must return them immediately. 640 
637 See Government File/ County Chiefs, letter N. 16, Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara. This should not 
be misunderstood that both Kakubi and Kyamugambi supported the expulsion. On the contrary, 
Bishop Kak-ubi was known to have supported Banyarwanda when they were being expelled. As for 
Revd. Eliasha Kyamugambi, now Bishop, he was a student at Ridley Hall Cambridge at the time of 
the expulsion. 
638 The Interviewee is still active in Church ministry therefore we shall not mention his name. 
639 Interview: Bishop Betungura, May 21,1996, Ruharo. 
640 Refugees File, EAD/6, letter no. 6, East Ankole Diocese. 
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Bishop Betungura did not join the three Bishops Kivengere, Ruhindi and Shalita (by 
then retired) in their delegation to the Vice President about the refugees. These 
Bishops had on their own initiative requested an audience with government officials 
to resolve the Banyarwanda question. Unlike other Bishops in the region, they were 
closely linked with the refugees. They were Banyarwanda or Bahima and Bishop 
Shalita was among the victims who were harassed, though he had lived in Ankole for 
many years and was in fact the first Bishop of Ankole. Asked why such an elderly 
Bishop should have been victimised, Edward Rurangaranga. then Minister of State in 
the Prime Minister's Office stated: 
You see people posed as Bahima whereas they were Banyarwanda. But people like Shalita and 
Kivengere were affected because they were accommodating and harbouring bandits. I remember when 
as a Nfinister, I went to visit Bishop Kivengere at his AEE house in Nairobi. As we neared his house, he 
all over a sudden changed his mind and took me to a hotel instead. Reason there were guerrillas in his 
house. 641 
Chris Rwakasisi, Minister of State, asked why it was those Bishops, and from 
Dioceses where the refugee situation was not as serious as it was in Ankole, who 
decided to seek audience with the Vice President: 
I just wanted to know all these are religious leaders. There are Bishops ftom the area affected-Kivengere 
is from Kabale. He says he had a spill-over. Was Bishop Betungura sick or anything? Is he keeping a 
blind eye? Bishop Kakubi-does he never possess a human heart? Bishop Bernabas [Catholic Bishop of 
Kabale diocese]- those should also be affected by the spill-over, why are you not with them? 642 
The Minister wished to imply that if the problem was so great as these Bishops were 
saying, why were Religious leaders from the affected areas not complaining. It was 
rather an indirect way of identifying the Bishops with the Banyarwanda and the 
guerrilla war. Throughout the whole meeting, the Vice President continued to remind 
641 Interview: Edward Rurangaranga, July 12,1996, Mbarara. 
642 See Record of the meeting between HE. The Vice President/Knister of Defence, Hon. Paulo 
Muwanga and some Bishops of the Church of Uganda, at the request of the Bishops, held in the 
Vice president's Office at the State Lodge Nakasero, on Friday 22nd October 1982, in Refugees File, 
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the three Bishops that they should not take the occasion for propaganda, perhaps 
referring to Bishop Kivengere who had an international evangelistic ministry and 
could influence the international community. It was not that the other Bishops did not 
want to be part of the delegation. The Catholic Bishops had already issued a Pastoral 
letter condemning the inhuman treatment of the refugees. 643 Bishop Kakubi and the 
Catholic Church had already identified with the refugees plight and there was nothing 
else it could have done to halt the expulsion. The Catholic Church was concerned 
because the refugees formed the bulk of its congregation. May be that was why it was 
effective in supplying relief aid to them. Though it preferred to do more, it was under 
pressure from the government because of DP connections. The Catholic Bishop 
therefore was inhibited from being too outspoken. Also the regional Bishops who 
were confronted with the refugees' question did not speak as one voice. Each Bishop 
handled the Banyarwanda issue individually and with different interests, hence 
scattered efforts which could not impress any impact on the govemment. 
What effects did the Banyarwanda expulsion have on the Churches in 
Ankole? Congregations dropped drastically especially in Catholic churches. 644 
In places like Isingiro, Kikagate and Rubare where Banyarwanda. were many, 
Anglican and Catholic churches almost closed645 since the strength of these parishes 
was drawn largely from Banyarwanda population. 646 There was also a drastic fall in 
Church income. The Churches'moral and prophetic voice was tested more than ever. 
They should have spoken for the voiceless and the oppressed but on the whole they 
did not. Some evicted people congregated at church centres, hoping that it would be a 
sanctuary. But church leaders seem to have been afraid that the government would not 
GC/BF, document No. 6, Kamukuzi Archives, Mbarara. 
643 Interview: Bishop Bakyenga, May 3,1996. Unfortunately I could not get access to this letter due 
to the reasons already stated in the archival analysis. 
644 Interview: Bishop Kakubi, May 21,1997, lbanda. 
645 This by any means does not contradict my argument all along that the refugees (Batutsi) were 
indifferent to religion. These were the first generation refugees who preferred to keep their identity 
political-wrise. But as I argued also, these counties of Isingiro, Kikagate and Rubare had been 
occupied by Banyarwanda migrants years before the refugee problem. It is these that had integrated 
in society and embraced Christianity. However, the architects of the expulsion could not distinguish 
the refugees from the migrants - they were ail expelled. That is how the 
Churches in those areas came to be affected. 
646 See Mugisha Samuel, 1987, The Impact of Political Conj7ict on the Church ity Kazo Sub-County, 
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restrain the local UPC fanatics. Even local people were afraid that if they showed 
concem they too would be accused. 
Ankole Uganda, 1979-1986, Diploma in Theology dissertation, Makerere University. 
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6.5. CONCLUSION. 
The expulsion of Banyarwanda not only tarnished the government's image, but also 
implicated the Christian church questioning its ability to defend human rights. 
Banyarwanda in the sixties had been looked at as a liability to the UPC government 
and their situation was not made any safer when in 1980 they were identified with DP, 
the guerrilla war, and the stealing of cattle in Ankole. They were victimised because 
they were closely identified with the Bahima. This was only a secondary element 
reactivated by the political factor. Obote was confident he could find a political 
reason in favour of Banyankole who had helped his second coming. It was a national 
issue prompted by national leaders only that the programme was executed locally. 
Banyarwanda's failure to integrate into the Ankole culture contributed to their plight. 
They were right to be proud of their heritage and wish to keep their culture and 
language, as Gad Gasatura urges647, but, as Francis Mwesigwa said, African culture 
has no room for social seclusion. It would have also paid dividends if they had been 
more cautious of the circumstances that surrounded them. On the other hand 
Banyarwanda were caught between two ethnic cultures: Bairu and Bahima, and they 
naturally aligned with the latter because of their cultural links. Had the Banyarwanda 
not entered a divided Ankole, they might have embraced the Banyankole culture and 
perhaps their situation would have been very different from that of 1982. 
647 See Commission of Inquiry, op. cit., p. 50 1. 
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CRAPTER SEVEN 
7. THE KINGSHIP (OBUGABE) AS A FACTOR IN ETHNICITY, POLITICS 
AND RELIGION IN ANKOLE, 1990-1993. 
7.0. THE POLITICS OF KING MAKING IN UGANDA. 
The restoration of monarchies by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) 
government was undoubtedly a landmark in Uganda's history. Kingdoms were 
abolished under the republican constitution of 1967. Between 1993) and 1994, many 
districts had their kingdoms restored including Buganda, Bunyoro and Toro. Even 
Busoga in 1996 regained itsKyabazinga', the titular head of the Basoga chiefs. While 
these kingdoms especially Buganda were restored with relative ease and support from 
the government, it proved impossible to restore the Ankole monarchy because of the 
opposition it encountered from within Ankole itself and among ministers in the 
central government. 
In this chapter therefore, I intend to discuss the factors that hindered the 
restoration of the Ankole monarchy. I argue that ethnicity and politics were the 
contending forces in the politics of king-making in Ankole as discussed in chapter 
one. Uganda was coming towards the 1994 Constituent Assembly (CA) elections after 
which the elected members were to debate the Odoki Commission's Draft 
Constitution. Since the Constitution was to determine the nature of government in 
Uganda, monarchists especially from Buganda used it as a bargaining factor. If 
Museveni would restore the Buganda monarchy before the CA elections in 1994, then 
Baganda would in turn elect pro-NRM Constituent Assembly delegates. In Ankole it 
was the reverse. What was going to determine NRM government's success was the 
extent it disassociated itself from the restoration of the Ankole monarchy. Museveni 
did not want to antagonise the Banyankole so NRM supported the restoration of the 
monarchy in Buganda but opposed it in Ankole. 
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7.1. THE ODOKI COMMISSION IN ANKOLE. 
In discussing the Ankole monarchy, we need to consider the background under which 
the monarchies in Uganda were to be reinstated. At the end of 1988, the National 
Resistance Council (NRC) set up a Commission of experts whose objective was to 
ascertain how people wanted to be governed. Its membership and tenure of office was 
established under sections I and 2 of the Uganda Constitutional Commission Statute 
(No. 5 of 1988). Its members were chosen from a wide variety of interests and 
backgrounds. They includedjudges, lawyers, a priest, historians, political scientists, a 
medical doctor, financial and military experts. 648 On 4 March 1989, they were sworn 
in as the "Uganda Constitutional Commission" (UCC) to review the Constitution, 
make proposals for a new Constitution and prepare a Draft Constitution. It became 
known as the Odoki Commission, after its chairman Justice Benjamin J. Odoki. 649 
This thesis does not intend to discuss the initial procedures and 
arrangements of UCC. It is only interested in its findings in Ankole. By the time the 
Commission went into the field in 1989, the NRM government had set up the 
Resistance Councils (RC) infrastructure at village, parish, sub-county and district 
level. They had become the means through which people elected their leaders from 
village level up to the NRC. The Odoki Commission was not only looking at the 
monarchy question, because that was a minor issue. It was commissioned mainly to 
draft a Constitution, which would be acceptable to all ranges of opinion throughout 
Uganda. What the monarchists wanted was to put the monarchy question on the 
agenda. This was largely a kiganda issue, but having been raised, it became an issue 
for other societies, as the Odoki Commission observed: 
From subsequent seminars at sub-county level, in educational institutions and for professional as well as 
interest groups, the topic of traditional rulers appeared to us to be a national issue which people wanted 
to be determined as part of the constitution-making process. The reasons given for this view included 
the fact that traditional rulers were enshrined in the 1962 and 1966 constitutions. They were abolished 
by the 1967 Constitution. The new constitution could not leave this issue out. Besides, the overall 
648 See Uganda Coitsfifulional Commissiott Reporl, p. 3, hereafter UCC. 
649 Interview: Justice Odoki, March 12,1999, Kampala. 
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motive for the making of the new constitution was to give Ugandans a rare opportunity to express 
themselves freely on any issue connected with creation of a better society for all. Since a cross-section of 
society were deeply concerned about traditional rulers whether for their restoration or their continued 
abolition, it was important that the topic became a constitutional issue. 650 
Just as it became a constitutional issue, so it became a controversial one. According to 
Justice Odoki, wherever the Commission went, people were sharply divided. Those 
for it argued that its inclusion in the constitution was essential to its permanent 
existence as the experience of ýhe 1967 (when Obote abolished kingdoms) had shown. 
To avoid such a thing happening again, they preferred generally to include the issue of 
the traditional rulers as part of the fundamental right to culture. It would ensure the 
permanency of such institution and its distancing from constitutional politics. Others 
thought that traditional rulers should be left out of the new constitution because they 
were no longer useful nor relevant. 651 The Odoki Commission found this latter view 
mainly in Ankole in 1991. They met RC officials, elders, professionals, students and 
individuals. Unlike in districts of Buganda where people had expressed "love and 
interest" in the restoration of the monarchy, it met "hostile" reactions whenever they 
asked about the restoration of the monarchy. According to Odoki, the general view 
from both districts of Bushenyi and Mbarara was that: 
Traditional rulers were dictatorial and oppressive in the past. They exercised absolute rule before the 
advent of colonialism, having power over life, which they often abused. Their rule has no place in the 
modem world, which craves for democracy and respect for life. 652 
Hence the two districts of Bushenyl and Mbarara, through their RC5 (district) 
councils, submitted their resolutions to the Commission. The Bushenyi one read: 
All Councillors while contributing to the above... argued that the restoration of the Ornugabe would 
create sectarianism of having one group of the minority suppressing the majority, which would 
650 UCC, p. 540. 
651 Interview: Justice Odoki, March 12,1998, Kampala. 
652 ibid. 
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undermýine the social and economic development of Ankole. It would disrupt the present unity and 
peace ... and it would not be economically bearable by the people .... 
653 
The Mbarara District memo simply stated: 
Uganda should not at all have traditional rulers because the institution is divisive and outmoded. 654 
Because of such views against the monarchy, the Odoki Commission concluded: 
It is our considered view that the question as to whether a particular region, ethnic group or district 
should or should not have a traditional institution is of legitimate concern to all Ugandans if its existence 
would have implications for national politics or national resources. Otherwise we believe that the people 
concerned are the best judges on the issue, either because they have had a long history of association 
with the institution or they believe the institution has still an important role to play for them. 655 
However the Commission warned that, although there was overwhelming evidence 
that Buganda wanted their monarchy restored, in Ankole it was the opposite: 
Judging by the serninar reports, our own observation, and the memoranda from these Districts (Mbarara 
and Bushenyi) there appears to be a dominant view that kingship has no further role in those areas. In 
the seminars and public debates we noticed that, when compared to Buganda, there were far fewer 
people who supported the restoration of kingship. Even those few who supported it did not speak with 
the same love and commitment to it as their Baganda counterparts. The memoranda of the two RCVs in 
Ankole did not favour the institution. The majority of the RC3s and RC2s were also opposed to it. It is 
significant that all who opposed the restoration of the monarchy did not even see any role for it as a 
purely cultural institution. 656 
653 See Minute 29/93 Nkole Cultural trust and Monarchy, in Chairman's file, Bushenyi District 
Council File, BD/PM. The following people were elected at the same meeting to draft a resolution 
to read at Rwakitura meeting on behalf of Bushenyi District: L. Ndyanado, F. Rutaro, E. 
Kyabakama, K. Kanyogonya, Dr. D. Rwakishaya (now deceased). 
654 Proposals on the New Constitution by Mbarara District Resistance Council, 2 September, 1991. 
655 UCC, p. 548. 
656 (jCC, p. 544. 
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On the other hand, Baganda had never ceased to agitate for the restoration of the 
monarchy arguing that: 
The institution of traditional leaders is part and parcel of the cultural heritage of some Ugandans. As 
such those who want it and respect it should be able to have it as an essential part of their fundamental 
heritage to culture. The institution is intimately linked to the clan system, which forms the essence of all 
social relations. Without Ssabatak-a (head of clans) in the case of Buganda, the cntire clan system and 
social development is seriously affected. 657 
Consequently the NRM government in 1993, in a closed session, passed the 
constitutional (Amendment) Statute 1993658 and the Traditional Rulers (Restoration 
of Assets) statute 1993659 under pressure from Baganda monarchists who asked for 
the coronation of Prince Ronald Muwanda Mutebi H as Kabaka of Buganda. 66OThe 
institution of traditional rulers was included in the Odoki Constitution draft under 
chapter 18, Article 279, and in the final Uganda Constitution of 1995 under article 
246 (1) which states: 
Subject to the provision of this constitution, the institution of the traditional leaders may e3dst in any area 
of Uganda in accordance with the culture, customs and traditions or wishes and aspirations of the people 
to whom it applies. 661 
The Ankole representatives in the NRC, especially the Bairu, were resilient about the 
monarchy. 662 The Baganda could have a king but they would oppose the return of 
Obugabe in Ankole. Hon. Amanya Mushega's views represented the views of many 
Bairu NRC members. In a debate about the monarchies in Uganda, he said: 
657 See the memorandum submitted by the Ssabalaka-Ssabasajja's Supreme Council and clan leaders, 
p. 7. 
658 See 7he Constitution of Ugxyda (1967), Statute No. 7/ 1993. 
659 Statute No. 8/ 1993. 
660 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa and Hon. Eriya Kategaya. See the newspapers between March-July 
1993, especially the Arew Vision and 7he Monitor. 
661 See Ae Constitution of the Repuhlic of Uganda, 1995. 
662 This refers to the Ankole delegates' view of restoring the monarchy elsewhere. 
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Adthough I am a republican, I support the restoration of the monarchy in Buganda provided it will 
enhance unity and development. And although my support for Buganda is unreserved, I will be talking a 
different language when it comes to the restoration of the kingdom in Ankole. 663 
The debate on the Constitutional Amendment Bill 1993 became a controversial issue 
when the NRC, according to Weekly Topic of July 23,1993: 
turned into a tribal war between peoples of former kingdoms of Ankole and Toro. All Bairu from 
Ankole vehemently opposed the restoration of ebyaffe [a coined short hand for the Buganda 
monarchy] ... 
The outbursts of high profile politicians notably Amanya Mushega, Adonia Tiberondwa, 
Richard Kaijuka, Bart Katurebe 
... against prince 
John Barigye's dreams of becoming the Omugabe of 
Ankole were clear indicators of the divisions that characterised the relationship between Bairu and 
Bahima Since time immemorial. 664 
7.2. PRINCE JOHN BARIGYE AND THE NRM POLITICS. 
Prince John Barigye was the centre figure in the Obugabe controversy in 1993. As the 
presumed heir to the Ankole monarchy (his father Sir Godfrey Rutahaba Gasyonga 
died in July 1982), Barigye was installed as Ntare VI in a controversial coronation on 
Saturday 20 November 1993665 annulled by the government the day after. 
Barigye was bom on 10 January 1940. At the age of six, he went to Buddo 
Junior School and King's College Buddo (1946-1952). He was later sent to Britain 
where he completed his secondary education (1953-1959) before joining Cambridge 
University (1959-1962) for a degree in economics. He returned to Uganda after 
independence and worked in the ministry of Foreign Affairs (1963) and the Uganda 
High Commission Embassy in UK as Secretary for Economic and political matters 
(1964-66). Between 1967-1970, he worked in Uganda in the ministry of Foreign 
Affairs as Chief of Protocol and Political Development and later permanent Secretary 
(1970). After Amin's coup in 1971, Bafigye was appointed Ambassador to Germany 
and the Vatican, a post from which he resigned in 1973 in protest after Amin killed 
663 See Weekly 76pic, July 23,1993, "Prince Bafigye battles his 'rebel Bairu' in NRC", P. 26. 
664 ibid, p. 1. 
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Barigye's brother Patrick Ruhinda in 1972. Between 1973-1982, Barigye was in exile 
working for various organisations, including the United Nations. From 1983-1985 he 
was self-employed in Lesotho as a Computer distributor. He did not return to Uganda 
after the fall of Amin, but only in 1986, after the fall of the UPC regime. He was 
appointed Managing Director of a private company, Computer Applications Ltd. He 
returned to Uganda as NRM had come to power. The government ofTered him a 
political job either as an ambassador or Permanent Secretary in Foreign Affairs which 
he turned down: 
I had been in exile for almost 13 years and I did not want to return abroad as an ambassador. I wanted to 
stay in my country and rehabilitate family and myself I was not keen to be Permanent Secretary either 
because that was an office I held before in 1970. To be back at the same rank was not feasible for me. 666 
Asked whether he would have accepted a ministerial appointment, he said 'mostly 
likely I would have accepted it or some other senior post, which would have kept me 
in the country'. Why he was not offered such a post is not known but most 
interviewees imply that the government wanted to keep him out of Ugandan politics 
by appointing him an ambassador. Despite Barigye's long experience as a Civil 
Servant and moreover a Prince, Museveni's government could not appoint him to a 
senior job in 1986. At such an early stage, NRM was rewarding its supporters and 
Barigye had not been a guerrilla. 
However, his career in the NRM was revived in 1989 when he won the 
Kashari county seat in the NRC, standing against Mutabazi, a regional Agricultural 
Officer and former UPC. In theory there was no party vote though people tended to 
vote according to their former party identities. In Bushenyi for instance, in the 1989 
NRC elections nearly all the NRC representatives like Tiberondwa, Kanyomozi, 
Kaijuka were former UPC Ws and ministers in the Obote government. Barigye won 
the Kashari seat because the former UPC Kashari Ws, Rubaihayo and Kabogorwa, 
had been tarnished by Science/Syndicate divisions and Rubaihayo's involvement in 
the Banyarwanda expulsion in the 1980's. Barigye had not lived in Ankole, but he 
665 Interview: James Kahigiriza, Canon Semei Rwabushaija, Bishop Betungura and Sheikh Kaduyu. 
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was the son of the former king of Ankole, so those who had never seen him had heard 
about him. He seemed appropriate: 
We thought that as a person who had not lived among us, he would be neutral. Kashari people had 
diverse political and religious views and therefore we needed a person who was not one of us. He had 
not lived among us and therefore had not been tarnished by our polltiCS. 667 
If Bangye's impartiality became a ticket on which he was elected, it became a 
different story in 1992 when he stood for the RC5 chairmanship for Mbarara district. 
Local district councils were to be autonomous and responsible for their own 
development plans. To be the RC5 chairman in the district meant that he would be 
both the accounting officer and ultimate administrator. This attracted him to stand for 
the position. According to the law, he need not resign his position as NRC 
representative. He said: 
Many people from Ankole requested me to stand to be the Mbarara RC5 chairman because they trusted 
me. Mbarara district had been messed up with corruption and that was why people asked me. It was 
People who approached me because they had confidence in me due to the corrupfion and malpracfices 
that were apparent in Mbarara at the time. 
The two contending candidates were both Bahima, Barigye vs. Sabiiti, two 
in'Peccable Protestants and very much part of the elite of Protestantism in different 
ways. Barigye was of the royal family which obviously was Protestant and Sabiiti was 
the son of the former Anglican Archbishop Eric Sabiiti. However, it was not this 
factor that amazed people but rather the fact that Sabiiti beat Barigye in the elections 
On 9 March 1992. Sabiiti had aligned with Catholic councillors giving in to their 
demands for certain posts on the RC5 executive. 668 Asked why he lost to Sabiiti, 
Barigye said: 
666 Interview: Prince John Barigye, March 12,1998, Kampala. 
667 Interview: George Baruga, February 23,1998, Karuyenje-Kashafi. 
668 See "Mbarara rejects crown prince, Bafigye", in the Weekly Topic, March 20,1992, p. 12. 
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My honest view is I lost because my opponent used money to buy votes. Prior to the election day his 
669 group went around buying people to vote for them. 
Many interviewees agreed that Sabiiti used money and religion to win votes. The 
chairman was not elected by universal suffrage. An Electoral College of eighty 
District RC5 councillors from the 40 sub-counties in Mbarara district voted on behalf 
of the district. The system was that they would line behind the candidates of their 
choice, which made it very easy for councillors to be bribed. Barigye says: 
Two days before the elections, a group of Catholic councillors approached both me and my opponent 
separately and asked us what if I won and were elected, how many Catholic councillors would be put on 
the RC5 executive. Because of my belief in fairness, I gave them a formula, which would have ensured 
that every religious group would be fairly represented proportionate to their strength. But in the case of 
my opponent, he told them that his only interest was to be elected chairman and they could take as many 
executive offices as they wanted as long as they ensured his victory. So in block Catholics voted for him 
and that was how I lost. 
Asked why he did not accept Catholic demands Barigye said: 
I do not believe in the end justifying the means. I believe that if you use the wrong means eventually they 
are bound to distort and corrupt your end. It is wrong that for one to achieve a political goal, you must 
use every means possible. I believe that in everything that one does, he must be guided by some 
principles, which are important in one's ultimate goal. 
NRM government had attracted Catholics because UPC Protestants were held at 
arms-length by the new regime. Catholics and Bahima dominated the District Council 
and the District Administrator was Sarapio Karashani, an ardent Catholic who 
promoted Catholic interests. 670 Though Sabiiti was Protestant, he rewarded Catholics 
for their support. Though the Councillors below seem to be equally distributed 
between Catholics and Protestants, the Catholics' strength lies in the fact that they 
took the influential offices: 
669 Interview: John Barigye, February 23,1998, Kampala. 
670 Interviewee anonymous, March 19,1997. 
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Table 11: Membership of Councillors in the District Council, 1992.671 
NAME RELIGION OFFICE 
Sabiiti Justine Protestant Chairman 
Zombeire Frederick Catholic Vice Chairman 
Kagombe Charles Catholic Secretary for Finance 
Nyakwenegura. Grace Catholic Secretary for Women 
Kashundo Catholic Secretary for Security 
Gucwamaingi Yoramu Protestant Secretary for Education 
Katafire John Protestant Secretary, Mobilisation 
Katwire Protestant Secretary for Youth 
[j4ýýre Muslim Secretary, Information 
Sabiiti may have bribed some of them, but there were eighty councillors in forty sub- 
counties who substituted for the electorate. Barigye's defeat showed the fear that if he 
were elected RC5 chairman, he might go on to the monarchy and many Banyankole 
did not wish him put in a favourable position. 
7.3. WHY MUSEVENI SUPPORTED THE BUGANDA MONARCHY. 
On 31 July 1993, Ssabasajja Mutebi was crowned Kabaka of Buganda. 672 Other 
kingdoms soon followed. Prince Kaboyo of Toro was crowned Solomon Iguru of 
Bunyoro on II June 1994, and Wako Mulozi of Busoga in January 1996. Museveni 
thought that it was better to recreate all the kingdoms because he did not wish 
Buganda to stand alone. But he would not give similar support to the Ankole 
monarchy, because, while popular enthusiasm in other kingdom areas had made the 
issue a political vote catcher, the Ankole case would- be politically counter productive 
in the run up to the CA elections (1994) and the presidential elections in 1996. 
671 Interview: Y. Gucwamaingi, February 22,1998. 
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Why were the monarchies restored? Was government morally obliged to "repay" 
Buganda's "debts" during the guerrilla war as often alleged in the press? The five-year 
guerrilla war was fought in Luwero District on Buganda's soil and the Baganda 
suffered MoSt. 673 Indeed the events after the liberation war point towards that 
understanding. The first signal was the return to Uganda from UK of prince Ronald 
Mutebi supported by the NRM government. There were monarchists like Ssabalangira 
Beswen Mulondo in the NRM who played a pivotal role. Political negotiators in 
Buganda were ready to support NRM if only they were assured that the restoration of 
their Kabaka (whom they now referred to as Ebyaffe) would be a priority. 674 Some of 
the praise songs sung in honour of Museveni at the coronation implied that the NRM 
had finally settled the Baganda debt: 
Ssebo Museveni ossassude byonna. Teri bbanja-675 (Museveni you have paid all. There is no more 
debt). 
This was a clear indication that the monarchy question had remained a major issue on 
the political agenda ever since the 1966 crisis. In any case the Baganda, unlike the 
monarchists in Ankole, had never hidden their disenchantment over this issue and no 
government would appease them fully without addressing the monarchy question. 
Thus they saw Museveni as a man who would listen to them since they had fought 
with him against Obote. But in Ankole, the Bahima monarchists knew that they were 
a minority. Probably they hoped to achieve a restoration vAth the help of Muhima 
President and Bahima army officers. 
672 See the National and local newspapers of I. August 1993. 
673 Olaka-Onyango, "Thirty Years After the (B) Uganda Crisis: Are we heading for another? ", A Paper 
presented at the Annual Faculty of Law Symposium, Makerere University, Kampala, 26 April 
1996, p. 6. 
674 M. Doornbos and F. Mwesigye, 1994, "The New Politics of King Making", in Hansen and Michael 
Twaddle, From Chaos to Order. Ihe Politics of Constitution-Making in Uganda, Kampala: Fountain 
Publishers, p. 62. 
675 See The Mew Vision, I August 1993. 
253 
7.4. NKOLE CULTURAL TRUST (NCT). 
The idea of forming a cultural trust came to James Kahigiriza when he compared 
Ankole culture with Buganda. Some of Ankole's symbols had been taken to the 
Uganda Museum in 1967 but they could be returned. In 1992, he and the District 
Administrator (Mbarara) convened a meeting with others including Bishop 
Betungura, Kirindi, and others. This committee asked the president for permission to 
return Ankole's cultural symbolS. 676 In January 1993, they met the President who 
agreed but suggested they fon-n a cultural trust in which they should include Prince 
John Bangye since the cultural symbols were from the Ankole monarchy. 
On 27 January 1993, the Nkore Cultural Trust (NCT) Constitution was 
inaugurated with Barigye as its patron. It comprised of 15 Bahima and 13 Bairu. 22 
were Protestants, I Catholic, and 3 Muslims. I am unaware of the religious affiliation 
Of tWo. 677 The interesting thing about NCT membership was that nearly all the 28 
members were above 65 years old (apart from Barigye). These were the people who 
had the time and the interest to value their culture while the younger generation was 
not interested. The NCT constitution stipulated Barigye as the patron of the Trust: 
The fact that most of the important traditional sites, Relics and Regalia were made and belonged to his 
forefathers, the kings of Ankole and therefiare rightly should belong to him, as the heir of the last king of 
Nkore. 678 
The constitution stipulates that membership of the Trust is open to all Banyankole. 
Those that formed NCT were from different backgrounds, but all wanted the revival 
of Ankole culture. However if we consider the period 1992-1993 in which NCT was 
formed, then we raise questions as to whether it was not a ploy by people like Barigye 
and other monarchists to get a platform on which to push for the restoration of the 
monarchy. Asked what groups formed NCT, Barigye said: 
676 James Kahigiriza narrated this plot to me, February 6,1998. 
677 Many of them are known to me personally and that was how I could determine their ethnic and 
religious composition. 
678 See NCT constitution, Article 111,3. L(c). 
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in short all those interested in the preservation and development of Ankole Culture and who believe in 
the Ankole monarchy as the integral part of our culture. 679 
NCT did not only attract people like Bahima who had close links with the former 
monarchy, it was also composed of people like Bishop Betungura and James 
Kahigiriza, who, though Bairu, valued the monarchy. The choice of James Kahigiriza 
and the retired Bishop Amos Betungura was a political ruse to give NCT a good 
ethnic complexion and therefore to legitimise the NCT monarchical or "cultural" 
agenda. Kahigiriza was regarded as associating more with Bahima and therefore the 
monarchy than with Bairu. The latter regard him and Amos Betungura as turn- 
coats. 680 
However by July 1993, NCT changed from being a cultural group to a 
monarchical pressure group, pushing for the restoration of the monarchy in Ankole. 
James Kahigiriza felt that after Buganda's success, they should 'ask for our monarchy 
also'. Indeed Barigye started to fight for the restoration of the Ankole monarchy. In 
Weekly Topic of July 23,1993, he was reported battling it out with Bairu in the NRC 
when they called for a referendum on the Obugabe. The paper reported: 
Round one of the constitutional amendment was fought and won in Buganda but later shifted to Ankole 
where Kashari representative, prince John Bafigye (heir to the throne) battled with his "rebel Bairu" 
subjects in the NRC who had made it very clear to him that they are not prepared to support anything 
near to the monarchy in Ankole. 681 
Since NCT had identified itself as a monarchical pressure group, some of its members 
like Ornwana W'omuntu who had been its Secretary opted out. He had suspected 
NCT from the beginning. He said: 
679 Interview: Barigye, March 12,1998, Kampala. 
680 Interview anonymous, June 19,1997. 
681 Weekly Tqpic, newspaper, July 23,1993, p. 26. 
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After we would meet thinking that we all had conunon interest of reviving our culture, and after we 
would adjourn our meetings, Bahima and James Kahigiriza would stay behind and start new meetings in 
which they did not want us to be involved, and of which agenda and destiny we did not know. 682 
So promoting Banyankole culture was a launching pad for the restoration of Obugabe. 
Barigye was the chief campaigner of the monarchy and in July 1993, he led a foiled 
attempt to recover the Royal Dnnn, Bagyendanwa, from the Uganda Museum. He 
claimed that he wanted to regain the drums because they were a cultural artefaCt. 683 
But the government684 could not take his action lightly because Bagyendanwa is 
fundamental regalia in the coronation of Omugabe, VAthout which the whole 
ceremony lacks legitimacy. 
NCT at the beginning of August 199-35 invited religious leaders and members 
of the western region Joint Christian Council to a meeting at the Catholic Social 
Centre in Mbarara. They wanted to enlist the support of religious leaders, but church 
leaders dissociated themselves from the monarchy. Members of the Joint Christian 
Council told the bishops, kumurazeyo mugumeyo (if you identify with monarchists 
stay with them). 685 Republican Banyankole both Catholics and Protestants dominated 
the council. 
Following these failures, the President convened a meeting between the 
NCT and NRC members from Mbarara and Bushenyi on 23 August 1993 and urged 
the need to seek the people's mandate before any further moves towards a restoration 
of the monarchy. 686 Subjecting the Obugabe issue in Ankole to a referendum, the 
government capitalised on the Constitutional Commission Report which held that 
despite Buganda's support for the monarchy, things were different in Ankole. 
President Museveni would only support the restoration of traditional rulers where 
682 Interview: Omwana Womuntu, July 21,1997, Mbarara. He defected from the NCT because the 
Bahima used to by-pass him and hold meetings which were geared towards the restoration of the 
monarchy but which they did not want to discuss with him because he was Omwiru. They thought 
that he would leak their information that was very vital at those initial beginnings of the group. 
683 See "Bafigye demands drums", in The New Visiott, Saturday July 10,1993. 
684 This could have been really a deliberate sabotage by government for reasons already given. 
685 Interview with Bishop Bakyenga, May 12,1996, Nyamitanga. 
686 See Statement by Nkole Cultural Trust signed by their Legal Advisor, R. Matsiko on 25.11.1993; 
see also, Or-umuri, 25-31 October 1993, p. 4. 
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people showed overwhelming support for it. Hence his emphasis on the need to 
consult people of Ankole: 
The role of the government as far as the issue of monarchies is concerned, is to implement what the 
majority of the people want because a monarchy comes from the people, not government. 687 
The referendum was a political move to prevent the restoration of the unpopular 
monarchy. The President was backed by the Constitutional provision that the 
institution of a traditional ruler could only exist in areas where "people so wish". 688 
Museveni knowing the complexities that kingship would provoke in Ankole wisely 
put the referendum puzzle to the monarchists. The government was sure that it would 
be a big task to consult the people through the RC structure. NCT opposed the idea of 
a referendum on the moral grounds that Obote had no referendum before he abolished 
the kingdoms in 1967 and there was no need for one now. 689 Barigye claimed, "you 
can never hold a referendum to know whether one wants his culture". 690 Hence NCT 
tried to open branches and held seminars in several counties though there was 
resistance in the densely populated Bairu areas. 691 
Spearheading the restoration campaign was crown Prince Barigye, the 
claimant to the throne. By engaging in the Obugabe campaign and canvassing for 
support, Barigye weakened his position. By tradition, Omugabe did not campaign for 
his "cultural right. " Weekly Topic of August 20,1993 reported him trying to arouse 
people in one of the seminars he held in Kampala when he asked them, "Are you with 
me? " According to the paper, "the reply was a resounding Yes! " In an undertone 
Barigye commented, I hope they have heard", referring to all those who were 
opposed to the monarchy especially in the NRC. Barigye had earlier contested the 
687 See "Museveni advises Ankole Monarchists", in The trew Vision, 2 October 1997, pp. 1-2; and I 
am no Yes man, says Museveni", in Pie Uoifilor, 2 October 1997, pp. 1-2. 
688 See Article H8 of the constitution (amendment), Statute 1993. 
689 See'Tindikwesimba ahabwa CA - Barigye', in the Weekly Newspaper, Orumuri, 23-29 August 
1993, p. 16. 
690 See Weekly Topic, 20 August 1993, p. 4; See also Ae New Vision, "Barigye Rules out 
referendum", Friday August, 13,1993. 
691 See for example 7he New Vision, Thursday September 23,1993, Igara Rejects Barigye", p. 1. 
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Kashari county NRC seat (which he won), and the Mbarara District RC5 
Chairmanship (which he lost to Justin Sabiiti). But as traditional ruler, he was 
supposed to be apolitical. To create his public image through competing with his 
subjects compromised his position. He had made enemies in the campaigns, and this 
was counter-productive when the monarchy issue came up. 
Had Barigye followed the example of the Kabaka in not interfering he might have 
won sympathisers. The Kabaka of Buganda simply let the thing naturally bubble up, 
but of course Barigye could not afford that because it would never bubble up under 
any circumstances. But by campaigning for himself he served to alienate himself 
further from the people and the government. It put to question the declared objectives 
of the NCT: activating clan activities, teaching custom, enhancing research and 
making of handicraft. 692 The "cultural agenda" was simply a cover for the restoration 
of kingship. The Trust was seen as a minority monarchist agency, and in areas like 
Ka . ara, Igara and Sheema, NCT members were booed and chased away. 693 J 
Barigye also was the victim of a hostile press. 694 It alleged that he was UPC 
in the sixties and during the NRC campaigns in the 1989, he associated with UPC 
supporters like Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa. 695 This association with UPC created a 
negative image for him, for the 1990s were a period when UPC was pitted against 
NRM. The general mood in Ankole was pro-NRM and Barigye's contacts with UPC, 
which had a tainted record of human rights abuse in Ankole politics, served to isolate 
him. But Tiberondwa and Rurangaranga, both UPC, deny Barigye's connection with 
UPC. They said, unlike some Bahima, Barigye makes friends without considering 
ethnic or political alliances. Barigye said: 
692 See NCT constitution Article II, pp. 1-2. 
693 Interview: Bishop Amos Betungura, April 10,1996, Ruharo. 
694 This was largely a press taunt. 
695 For instance Bafigye was the Guest of Honour during a Fund raising function at a Primary School 
in Bushenyi District in January 1992 and he later spent a night at Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa's 
residence where he is reported to have met several UPC activists. See, Henry Turnwine, 77ie New 
Vhvion, 24 
February 1992. 
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I have never had UPC sympathies or for that matter antipathy. it was true that I conducted a fund- 
raising in Bushenyi. But the local people of the area through their NIP Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa invited 
me. He invited me to spend a night at his place from where we proceeded to the fund-raising the next 
morning. Tiberondwa, is purely a fiiend because both of us were in exile together in Zambia. But by 
identifying me with UPC they were only after smearing my name. 696 
His education accounted for this. As an intellectual, educated at Cambridge, he was 
above Bahima chauvinism. He had refused to be bribed to win the Mbarara RC5 
elections in 1992. Perhaps that is why Bairu Catholics opposed his attempts to 
popularise the revival of the monarchy. 
NCT tried to hide the coronation details but in an article entitled, "Barigye 
to be Ntare VI", New Vision revealed that the coronation committee was already 
instituted to organise the celebrations. 697 The paper's speculation helped the 
government, the church leaders and Ankole elders opposed to the coronation to keep 
aloof of the occasion. It seems to me that NCT had been working up in the last hour 
trying to coax support from the seemingly unimpressed Banyankole. NCT was still 
holding meetings even on the eve of the coronation. But the coronation was not to be 
spectacular. The only visible symbols were the canvas shades NCT put up on the early 
morning of 20 November 1993. They were not in a position to proclaim the 
restoration of the monarchy, so they did it by subterfuge. 
NCT leaders and members of the executive committees of branches of NCT covering 
the whole of Ankole met on 19 November 1993 and passed the proclamation to crown 
prince Barigye, as the heir of the late Omugabe of Ankole, Sir Charles Godfrey 
Gasyonga and Omugabe of Ankole, to be known as Rubambansi (His majesty) Mare 
VI of Ankole. They asked the Board of Trustees of the Nkore Cultural Trust to make 
immediate arrangements for the installation and coronation of Omugabe Ntare VI. 698 
However, Barigye's coronation was also beset by claims that he was a 
usurper. His father Gasyonga was not a bona-fide heir. The Rev. William 
Muchakumba Mirindi, who claims to be the son of the late Prince Absolom Mirindi 
696 Interview: John Barigye, February 12,1998, Kampala. 
697 See The New Vision, Monday, October 4,1993; See also "Barigye takes the Ankole Monarchy 
tomorrow", in the Weekly Topic, November 26,1996,3, p. 22. 
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and grandson of Kahaya 11, alleges that Barigye has no claim because his father, 
Gasyonga 11, was not a son of Kahaya 11.699 There were those internal divisions 
among the monarchists. But these were likely to be underplayed had NCT succeeded 
in convincing Banyankole to accept the monarchy. 
7.5. THE BANYANKOLE CULTURAL FOUNDATION (BCF). 
The activities of the Nkole Cultural Trust provoked a majority rejection of the 
restoration of the monarchy. One major expression of this reaction was the founding 
of the Banyankole Cultural Foundation (BCF) in July 1993. Its legal advisor, Dr. J. J. 
Barya, claimed it is a republican organisation, founded among other things to, 'oppose 
the restoration of the Ankole monarchy'. 700 The Foundation drew its support from the 
educated urban elite but also relied heavily on the large Bairu membership. The 
composition of BCF seemed to revive the Kumanyana movement. Though its leaders 
were recent graduates their actions and philosophy reflect the writings and history of 
the Kumanyana movement. They were the intellectuals who had been largely through 
Protestant schools and like the Kumanyana of the old with a Catholic component (for 
instance Asiirnwe). 
The BCF argued that much of greater Ankole did not have a tradition of 
monarchy. 701 It was imposed on them when they were annexed to Nkore. It also 
argued that culture is not synonymous with the monarchy, stressing that Kinyankole 
culture could flourish without having the Obugabe. There can be culture without 
kingship. The BCF drawing support from radical Bairu intellectuals at Makerere 
University used the favourable press and public debates to discredit the NCT: 
698 See, Statement by Nkore Cultural Trust. 
699 Rev. Mirindi made these claims in the local media on several occasions. See for instance 77ze 
Uotfitor, 23 December 1993, p. 18. 
700 See, J. J. Barya, "The Ankole Monarchy Controversy: Testing Democratisation and Cultural 
Revivalism", A paper presented at the NARRU General Assembly, Kabale, 27-28, February 1997. 
701 Interview: Mwambutsya-Ndebesa, May 15,1996, Makerere University. 
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We are very disappointed in that notwithstanding the fact that God used Moses to deliver his children 
from slavery in Egypt, much as he used Obote to remove the Obugabe that had submerged us for a long 
time, opportunists under the cover of NCT, in their bid to fill their stomachs want us to carry their 
burden again, something very sad indeed. 702 
Consequently, the ambiguities surrounding the restoration caused a debate as to 
whether culture and kingship can be considered synonymous. Pro-restoration argued 
that kingship was the essence of Nkore culture and that its restoration was vital. BCF 
argued there was no relation between kingship and culture, citing the example of the 
French culture that kept thriving even though the monarchy was tenninated. 703 
Honourable Eriya Kategaya while responding to a motion from Hon. Elly Karuhanga 
who had argued that if the Omugabe was installed in Ankole he would provide a 
central power, refuted the argument: 
We do not need a central power through monarchism because power is already there through the 
RCs. 704 
Monarchism in Ankole revived centuries of oppression and domination by the Bahima 
over the Bairu. Many still see kingship as a sign of past ethnic subordination to be 
resisted. 705 BCF used all this in its opposition to restoring what it considered a(I 
obsolete kingdom which had enhanced the position of the Bahima and encouraged the 
exploitation of Bairu: 706 
the Bairu tilling the land and carrying their excess loads of produce to the Bahima pastoralists to barter 
for milk, ghee, skins or a bull, usually in quantities that were not proportionally commensurate. 707 
702 See Orumuri, 6-12 September 1993. 
703 See "Kategaya blasts Barigye" in Yhe New Vision, Friday October 1993, during the Karugire 
Memorial Lecture at N4akerere University, 14 October 1993. 
704 ibid. 
705 See The Monitor, 3 September 1993, p. 3 
706 See Barya J. J., op. cit. 
707 For a detailed Study, see Ndebesa Mwambutsya, "Pre-Capitalist Social Formation: The Case of 
Banyankole of south-western Uganda", in Owen J. Kalinga (ed. j, East Aftican Social Science 
Research Review, Rome: OSSREA, January 1990, pp. 80ff. 
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BCF harped on the past misdeeds of the king towards his Bairu subjects: 
In the Ankole kingdom lived and still lives two ethnic groups - the Bairu and Bahima. The Bahima 
constitute 6 to 10 percent of the population. The Bahima were pastoralists. The Bairu were agriculturists 
and occupied a lower status in the pre-colonial social relations of Ankole ... 
These relations were 
compounded by colonial rule. In allocating chiefly posts, the Bahima took the lion's share. In 1901, when 
the British made an agreement with Ankole monarchy, out of ten county chiefly posts, only one was 
given to the Bairu. 708 
BCF accused the past kings of forced labour and unfair taxation policies exacted on 
the Bairu. During the colonial period, it was the Bairu who were made to do all the 
hard work of digging and grading roads, building bridges and clearing swamps. 
Bahima as chiefs lorded it over the Bairu. 7()9 These historical differences still carry a 
class division which has aggravated problems of ethnic integration. And this is what 
distinguishes the Ankole monarchy from Buganda monarchy. The latter has remained 
popular because of its embracing mechanisms, which unite the Baganda. For 
example, whereas commoners in Buganda have a patrilineal system, their princes 
have a matrilineal system which is not the case in Ankole. In Buganda a king takes the 
clan of his mother which ensures that every clan has a chance of producing a king. 
This makes him the king of all clans and therefore each clan has a special role 
regarding the king. 
708 Mwambutsya-Ndebesa, "Kingship and political Development in Uganda", a paper presented at 
Makerere University, 22 April 1994. 
709 See Asiimwe-Berinde G, Ortimuri, 30 August 1993, p. 6. 
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7.6. THE ISLAMIC CORONATION. 
The Nkole Cultural Trust attempted the coronation of Prince John Barigye on 20 
November 1993, at the Abagabe burial grounds in Nkokonjeru, Mbarara. It was 
disguised as a memorial function installing Barigye as heir to his father (Oniusika). 
Kahigiriza says: 
We had to do it that way because most institutions were against us. The government, people, police. So 
we had no other way out. Of course it would have been better if the occasion was officially honoured, 
but you have to play politics as it CoMeS. 710 
Barigye was crowned with traditional ritual, which the church in Ankole would regard 
as pagan. Dressed in bark cloth, Barigye emerged from a traditional grass thatched hut 
to be installed on his father's throne, placed near a stuffed lion to symbolise the 
strength and shrewdness With which he was to rule. 711 He was made to drink from the 
royal gourd, endeku, smoked the royal pipe and received an arrow and a bow 'to fight 
off his enemies and to defend the royal drum'. He also sowed a few seeds of millet, a 
traditional Bairu crop, to symbolise the ethnic inclusiveness of his kingdom and 
received a royal axe, traditionally nicknamed, Kailabagomi, which was used to hack 
off the kines opponents' heads. And after sitting on the throne and swearing to lead 
his people in truth and honest, he signed the oath with the new signature reading 
Ntare VI. 712 The Omugabe was crowned at the burial grounds Igashani, which in 
traditional Ankole was where the spirits of the kingship was supposed to abide. This 
was incompatible with the teaching of the church, which for many years has preached 
against spirit worship. 713 
There was a further religious factor in the coronation saga. A Muslim, Sheikh A. 
Kaduyu, the District Khadi of Mbarara, performed the ceremony in the presence of 
Canon John Rujoki, a Muhima, and archdeacon of Rushere, in Nyabushozi county. 
7 10 Interview: James Kahigiriza, March 12,1998, Mbarara. 
711 Inter-view: Sezi Busasi, June 12,1997, Nkokonjeru. 
712 See The New Vj. vion 22 November 1993, p. 2. 
713 Presumably also not the usual place in any case: it was not only offensive to the tradition of kings 
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That a Muslim crowned a Protestant king became a controversial issue. But Sheikh 
Kaduyu was a member of the NCT and had participated in the meetings that decided 
on the coronation, from which the Christian Bishops had distanced themselves. I 
suppose that Kaduyu took the occasion to raise the profile of Islam in the politics of 
Ankole. But as Kahigiriza confessed, the decision to ask Kaduyu to crown the king 
cwas a last resort because we did not have any other Bishop around. ' Though Bishop 
Betungura may have been present, he could not officiate because he was already 
retired. If Betungura had crowned Barigye, it would have been seen as an attempt to 
repossess his Bishop's authority. The decision to use Kaduyu may have been on the 
spur of the moment. 
Kaduyu's action could have been intended to cultivate a new link with the 
Muslims and the Bahima. It was the first time that Muslims in Ankole participated in 
the affairs of the Ankole monarchy. Kaduyu hails from the Protestant Bairu county of 
Igara, 'but Islam linked him with Baganda culture. Many Muslims in Ankole hail from 
Buganda and as Baganda they would be expected to be predisposed in favour of the 
monarchy. Kaduyu said: 
Before I participated in the occasion, I had to seek the consent of some of my elders in Islam. Since 
many of them are Baganda, I knew that they would support the monarchy and therefore I had no fear of 
any opposition from them. But had I been a Christian bishop, I would not have even bothered to seek 
their opinion for they would not have given it. 714 
The Anglican Bishop, Elisha Kyamugarnbi, did not officiate or even be present at the 
coronation because 'I had sensed that the coronation had no government blessing., 715 
Apparently his invitation letter stressed the memorial service. But because of the 
earlier media speculations, the Bishop did not attend. Importantly, he was a new 
Bishop just one year in office and would have started badly if he were to identify with 
what the govemment and the ma ority of Banyankole opposed. 716 Bishop Yoramu i 
crowned in Isingiro, it also underlied the 'hole in the comer' nature of the whole ceremony. 
714 Interview: Sheikh Kaduyu July 9,1996, Mbarara. 
715 Interview: Bishop Kyamugambi, September 17,1996, Ruharo-Mbarara. 
716 Interview: Bishop Betungura, April 10,1996, Ruharo. 
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Bamunoba of West Ankole could not officiate because he belonged to another diocese 
and needed special permission and invitation ftom the host diocese. Bishop 
Bamunoba said: 
We were invited on a general letter as Bishops. A letter written by a lay man Kirindi and addressed to 
Bishops, Kyamugambi, Bamunoba and Bakyenga was sent to us. But you see Kirindi had not any right 
to invite Bishops for a coronation. The invitation to other Bishops should have come from the diocesan 
Bishop Kyamugambi, not a lay man. 717 
Catholics had warned Bishop Bakyenga against any involvement. Under normal 
circumstances, the monarchists should have preferred even a Catholic Bishop to a 
Muslim Khadi. For since the history of Christianity and politics in Ankole, Protestant 
Bahima many of whom are monarchists had forged an alliance with Catholics. But 
things are changing. With recent NRM politicisation people have shifted away from 
voting according to ethnic and religious ties. Bahima could have realised that the 
alliance factor was no longer an issue which they needed to hold on to the Catholic 
Bairu. On the other hand, Catholics could have woken up to the fact that despite the 
alliance, it was always Bahima who took over prominent political offices mainly 
because it was they who had the necessary political experience. Thus when the 
monarchy issue surfaced again, Catholics realised that they had never gained much 
whether from Bairu Protestants or Bahima. 
Whether or not the Muslim should have crowned a Protestant king, the 
function was performed. Applause and ululation punctuated the king's speech. New 
Vision of November 22,1993, reported that, in a moving speech, the king of Ankole 
abolished forthwith the use of the words, "Bairu" and "Bahima" because they had 
outlived their usefulness and were dividing people. Barigye said, 'today we all have 
cows and also cultivate'. Among other people who spoke was Elly Karuhanga, the 
NRC member for Nyabushozi who, though happy that Barigye had become a king, 
regretted the fact that he was no longer a NRC member. On the very day Barigye was 
crowned he signed his resignation to the NRC Vice Chairman: 
717 Interview: Bishop Bamunoba, April 11,1996, Kyamugorani. 
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On my being installed and proclaimed today as Ntare VI Omugabe of Ankole, I wish to hereby tender 
my resignation as NRC member for Kashari county with effect ftom today. 718 
The NCT chairman's speech outlined the history of the Ankole monarchy since its 
first king Ruhinda 500 years ago. To impress the occasion upon the audience and to 
belittle the opposition from the government and Banyankole, Kahigiriza went on to 
justify how inclusive the former monarchy had been. He explained how Bairu had 
been part of the monarchy because the mother of Ruhinda, the first king of Ankole, 
was a Mwiru woman, Njunaki, from the Bayangwe clan: 
Obugabe bwa Nkole niburuga enyima emyaka 500. Bukatandika na Ruhinda. Ishe akaba ari omucwezi 
Wamala yamuzara aha muzana Njunaki, (The monarchy of Ankole is 500 years old. It started with 
Ruhinda whose father Wamala was from the Bachwezi dynasty. Wamala produced Ruhinda from 
Njunaki, a Mwiru woman). 719 
Most interviewees were doubtful of this lineage. They felt that he was only trying to 
find ground to prove that the monarchy was not just for Bahima. Kahigiriza's speech 
claimed Bairu involvement in the politics of Ankole during the monarchy. For 
instance it states that of the eight known Ankole Enganzi, six were Bairu. But four of 
these were Enganzi during the colonial period and especially after the emergence of 
Kumanyana movement from the late forties. The other two whom Kahigiriza alleges 
were Bairu are Mbaguta and Muhigo whom he lists as the first Enganzi of Ankole. 720 
Muhigo is unknown as far as Bairu are concerned. Mbaguta was not a Mwiru. Bahirna 
only regarded him so because he was an impartial leader who helped the Bairu and 
because he was an outsider from Mpororo. 
The speech was inappropriate for the occasion. One might have expected a 
reconciliatory speech in which the chairman outlined a new agenda for the monarchy. 
I say a new programme for the monarchy because one of the arguments against its 
718 See the New Vision, Friday, December 17,1993, p. 2. 
719 See Okugamba. Kwa. Chairman Nkore Cultural Trust kandi Enganzi y'Ankole, ahaizooba ryokuta 
Omwinginya John Patrick Barigye ahakiteebe kya Ishe nkomuhunguzi kandi Omugabe W'Ankole 
Ntare VI Rutashejuka ahakya. 20-11-1993, p. 1, ( NCT Chairman's speech on the coronation of John 
Patrick Barigye as heir and King of Ankole on 20-11-1993. 
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restoration was that it was a waste of resources. Instead Kahigiriza accused two 
influential Bairu counties of Igara and Sheema of having helped to abolish the 
monarchy in 1967. Attacking their NWs, Adonia Tiberondwa and Richard Kaijuka in 
particular, the NCT chairman said: 
Abantu aba bakaba bahikire k-uhakanisa ekintu ky'Obugabe ahakuba nibo bashangirwe babwihireho 
Nimumanya ngu okushenya nikirahuka kwonka okwombeka kugumire. 721 (These people were fight to 
oppose the restoration of the monarchy for it was they who had abolished it in 1967. You know it is 
easy to destroy though it is not as easy to restore). 
These MPs in particular were not prominent in national politics in 1960s but were 
Bairu who opposed its restoration in the 1990S. 722 
The irony of the Islamic coronation was that, after the king was crowned, 
instead of going to the mosque for a final blessing, NCT took him to the Anglican 
cathedral. This watered down Kaduyu's expectations of an Islamic profile among the 
Protestant Bahima. Apparently the monarchists wanted to hold the service at the 
traditional burial ground of the kings. But the Dean of the Anglican cathedral refused 
to conduct a memorial service at the tombs because Gasyonga H, Barigye's father, had 
been a devout Christian whose memorial service deserved a more honourable venue 
than the tombs. He suggested that the organisers of the "memorial service" go to the 
cathedral or to the former Omugabe's house at Nkokonjeru. 723 Retired Bishop 
Betungura failed to persuade the Dean. Canon Rwabushaija described the dramatic 
scene that followed. He had prepared for a memorial service: 
At around II O'clock when the service was due to start, heaven opened its doors. We saw horses and 
chariots leading the king to the cathedral. I needed to think fast for I guessed they had planned to 
surprise me and catch me unawares. I could not believe what my eyes saw at the cathedral entrance. 
720 ibid, p. 2. 
721 ibid, p. 1. 
722 See "Igara rejects Barigye", in the New Vision, Thursday September 23,1993. 
723 Interview: Canon S. Rwabushaija, July 10,1996, Ruharo. 
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Barigye was dressed exactly as the king Rubambansi of Ankole. Eyes from either side were turned on to 
me to see what I would do next. 724 
Bishop Kvamugambi had said he had flU, 725 and had delegated the service to the 
Dean. The presence of a Bishop might have signified the Church's approval and hence 
conflict with the government. The former Omugabe's chair, on which he used to sit 
whenever lie attended church, had been removed in 1967 and taken to the Museum. 
The monarchists asked the Dean to show them where the King was to sit. They 
wanted a special Chair at that spot. But the Dean sat Barigye on the Bishop's 
unofficial Chair. It was a memorial service, so the Dean amidst a packed cathedral of 
Bahima and monarchists said it was a memorial to Barigye's father, whom "Ankole 
still remembers for his ardent and exemplary leadership and commitment to the 
Christian values,,. 726 In his sermon and prayers, he avoided any word related to 
Omugabe but stressed Gasyonga's role in Ankole and urged Barigye whom he 
constantly referred to as mwana we to emulate his father's example. The inwana we 
(my child) is a demeaning expression which was meant to humble the self-exalted 
king and to emphasise the fact that, though Barigye had been crowned, the church had 
no hand in it. Tile Dean's refusal to recognise Barigye as king did not carry any ethnic 
connotations. Canon Rwabushaija is known and respected by both ethnic groups for 
his impartiality and has never been implicated in Ankole's differences. Canon 
Munwolia described him: 
It is hard to know where lie Wongs. You will never know whether he hates you or loves you. He keeps 
you at a distance. I guess this has helped him to be seen as impartial for both sides respect him and 
always go to him whenever they have disputes. 727 
724 ibid. 
725 The Bishop knew about the coronation before hand, so the flu could have been a real relief and at 
best a divine providence. 
726 ibid. 
727 Interview: Canon Njumwoha, March 11,1996, Bujaga. 
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The Dean was prudent since the restoration of kingship was controversial. Bishop 
Kyamugambi said: 
I had already sent my feelers, which warned me that the government was not in for it. And where voices 
conflicted, I had to listen to the government rather than the monarchists for when I was consecrated I 
vowed to respect and obey the Head of state and the Archbishop. 
728 
The majority of Christians were opposed to the "Islamic coronation". As far as they 
were concerned, it was not spiritually blessed, because all Abagabe (kings) of Ankole 
were Protestants. A king could only be crowned by a religious leader of the 
denomination to which he belonged. The crowning of Prince John Barigyc by a 
Muslim Sheikh was an insult to the Christians and the monarchy. Although retired 
Bishop Amos Betungura grudgingly supported Sheikh Kaduyu's action, because 
Omugabe was everybody's leader regardless of religious affiliation, he said that if 
government allowed a real coronation, a Muslim Sheikh should not be allowed to 
perforrn the ceremony. 729 Bishop Barnunoba said, "we shall first wash the king's 
head"730 presumably to efface what the Muslims had done. 
The second snag was that Sheilch Kaduyu had been a signatory to the 
memorandum submitted to Amin in August 1971, by Ankole elders rejecting the 
restoration of monarchies that Obote had abolished in 1967.731 He may have signed it 
under duress but it raises questions about his role in the coronation. Was the Sheikh 
used by die-hard monarchists to give the coronation a religious face? It is hard to say. 
But his involvement only served to make the monarchists and Prince Barigye himself 
less popular. To the Christians, Barigye had crowned himself like Napoleon 
Bonaparte of France. The Government responded speedily and negatively: 
The government has learnt with great surprise that some people last Saturday purportedly carried out 
the coronation of Prince John Barigye as the Omugabe of Ankole. The Government wishes the public to 
728 Interview: Bishop Kyamugambi, July 15,1996, Mbarara. 
729 Interview: Bishop Betungura, April 10,1996, Ruharo. 
730 Interview: Bishop Yoramu Bamunoba, July 18,1997, Kyamugorani. 
731 See Chapter two. Cf M. Doombos, op. cit., p. 143. 
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know that it had no advance knowledge or information on this matter and is not a party to the purported 
coronation. 732 
The Ankole RC leaders also disassociated themselves and the entire coronation was 
discredited. 
In August that year, the NCT had held a meeting with the President and other political 
leaders ftom Ankole to discuss the monarchy, and the monarchists had been advised 
to seek people's consensus on the matter. It was clearly politically sensitive and called 
for a popular mandate which Bangye had rejected three months before the coronation: 
I will not accept any referendum for Ankole and I urge you to fight with me for the freedom and unity of 
Ankole. Banyankole should unite and develop their area. 733 
Yet three months later, prince Barigye chose to defy government and his would-be 
subjects, to crown himself An exercise that imposed a king on the people and was 
bound to complicate the politics of Ankole and resurrect intra-ethnic confrontations 
could only be condemned734 when NRM was seeking a majority in the March 1994 
Constituency Assembly elections. The new Parliamentary and presidential elections 
that would follow the promulgation of a new constitution would give NRM another 
five-year term of office. Supporting a coronation by a small clique would have been a 
political blunder costing the Bairu vote. In the elections that followed Banyankole 
voted en masse for the NRM and the multi-party threat subsided. 
The secrecy with which the coronation was done alienated the little sympathy 
that they might have got. It was published as the last funeral rites of the late Omugabe 
of A-nkole, Sir Charles Gasyonga 11. When the District Administrator, Mbarara, 
Sikubwabo Kyeyune, sent security officers to stop the coronation, they were simply 
overwhelmed by the presence of a heavy deployment of military under Major- 
Generals Tinyefuza and Elly Turnwine, the top Bahima NRM brass, who supported 
the coronation. This constituted a serious question at a time when the monarchy issue 
732 See New Vision, Tuesday November 23,1993, p. 1. 
733 See "Barigye rules out referendum", in the New Vision, Friday August 13,1993. 
734 See "Coronation nullified", in the New Vision, Tuesday November 23,1993, pp. 1-2. 
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had clearly divided the Ankole politicians in government into the Museveni-Kategaya 
camp and the Tinyefuza-Tumwine (Major- Generals) monarchist supporters. That a 
function of top army officers were now turning "rebels" in support of a minority, 
partisan cause was indeed a serious affiront that government had to take steps to 
eliminate. 735 
A few days after the coronation, NCT filed a court case against itself 736 It 
was clever of the NCT, to ask its supporter, and the usher at the coronation, a royalist 
Kampala businessman, Ernest Mbaka, to file a civil suit against the Omugabe claims 
as the king of Ankole. While the case was in court, no Munyankole would discuss it 
because the case would be sub-judice. The court of law would find Mbaka lacking in 
evidence of his locus standi (status) and therefore throw out the case. Mbaka had to 
prove that, being a potential subject of the king, he would suffer injuries and his rights 
would be breached by the exercise of the king's authority. He would have to call 
people to testify as breach of their alleged rights. NCT knew very well that Mbaka 
would "fail in all these" and therefore this would infer the legality of the coronation. 
735 Interview: Mzee Murumba, July 19,1997, Kafunjo. 
736 See the Weekly Topic, December 3,1993, p. 3. 
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7.7. THE RWAKITURA DEBATE. 
After the coronation fiasco, the President summoned Ankole leaders to a meeting at 
his Rwakitura country home on 4 December 1993 to discuss the monarchy. In 
attendance were ministers, NRC members, and RC III-V councillors from the three 
districts of Bushenyl, Mbarara and Ntungamo, Army Commanders, leading religious 
leaders in Ankole and members of NCT and BCF. The object was for the NRM to 
throw back the decision on the people. 737 Musevem had called the meeting to discuss 
the issues of the purported coronation. He summarised prevalent opinions into three: 
those who wanted to revive and strengthen the culture of the Banyankole; those who 
wanted both the monarchy and culture and those who did not care whether or not the 
culture was revived. 738 Elly Karuhanga, NRC member for Nyabushozi County and a 
monarchy supporter, challenged the President on procedure: 
Your Excellency, this matter is before courts of law and it is prejudice for this meeting to deliberate on 
the matter, let us leave the courts to handle [it]. 739 
But the President was quick to outwit and interrupt Karuhanga: 
Honourable Karuhanga., the law is like butter which you put on bread to soften it but not just to eat 
the butter. Otherwise you could eat bread without it. We are not here only to discuss the coronation but 
all the other issues related to Ankole culture, and that is where politics comes in. 740 
The President called on the RC5 chairmen of the three districts of Mbarara, Bushenyi 
and Ntungamo to give memoranda from their people regarding their stand on the 
monarchy restoration issue. The RC5 chairman for Bushenyi, Yowasi Makaru, 
asserted that the people of Bushenyi unanimously rejected Obugabe and would not 
737 Interview: George Nkoba May 12,1996, Ibanda. 
738 See The Neu, Vision, Wednesday, December 15,1993, p. 18. 
739 See Ae, %nday Vision, Sunday, December 12,1993, p. 9, and 77ie Uganda Confidential; See also 
"Government lacks legal competence to nullify Barigye's coronation", in Weekly Topic, December 3, 
1993, p. 3. 
740 See TheSunday Vision, Sunday, December 12,1993, p. 9 
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allow the king to cross the Bushenyi-Mbarara border at river Koga. Should the people 
of Bushenyi ever want a king, they would raise the issue themselves. Yowasi Makaru 
evoked the Bushenyi RC5 resolution of 1991, which opposed the restoration of 
Obugabe, stressing that the current Council had no powers to reverse that stand. 741 
The RC5 chairman Justin Sabiiti of Mbarara. did not support it either although 
he is a Muhima. The Mbarara District Council's resolution said that the consultations 
carried out by the Nkore Cultural Trust were extremely limited and the District 
Council disassociated itself from the coronation. The District Council's resolution of 
1991 had said that traditional rulers should not be reinstated. 742 Sabiiti would not 
support the monarchy because he is often ridiculed in Bahima circles as 
Omushongora, 'half-caste', and even as Munyarwanda. At the Rwakitura meeting, he 
was reportedly insulted by Bahima, when he read the memorandum. But as Chairman 
of RC5 this had to be his stance. Though Bahima may appear united, they have 
internal divisions among themselves. The Bahima of Nyabushozi despise the migrant 
Bahima from other areas like Mpororo, Rujumbura, and Igara as not "originals". That 
is why migrants like Museveni are not keen on the monarchy issue, among other 
reasons. 743 "Original" Bahima of former Nkore in Nyabushozi despise such migrants 
as "Abairu" because they are not segregative and monarchy die-hards. 
John Karazarwe RC5 chairman of Ntungamo did not present any memorandum on the 
pretext that Ntungamo was still a new district. NCT said it was a cultural body. But 
when: 
the government brought back Obugabe [using the word in general sense of restoring monarchies] in the 
country, the Cultural Trust which happens to agree with the restoration of monarchies, also took it up 
and coronated. Barigye thus killing two birds with one stone, 744 
though it turned out killing one king with two stones! Asked why NCT did not consult 
people as agreed with the government, it argued that it did not need to and compared 
741 See The New Vision, 3 November 1993, p. 14. 
742 See The New Vision, Wednesday, December 15,1993, p. 18. 
743 Interviewee anonymous, April 12,1997. 
744 The Neu, Vision, Wednesday, December 15,1993, p. 19. 
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their decision with the government's which did not consult the NRC on the formation 
of the new constitution in 1992.745 Although it did not consult the NRC, it asked 
people to elect another body, the Constituent Assembly, to represent them in the 
constitutional debate. If NCT did not wish to use RCs on the Obugabe issue, on the 
grounds that they are political organs, and since the Trust wanted "cultural" people, 
NCT should have registered and organised Ankole clans to either discuss the issue or 
choose representatives to do so. 
The Bishops of Ankole, Yoramu Bamunoba, Elisha Kyarnugambi, and Paul 
Bakyenga, had prepared a short memorandum about the monarchy. In a statement 
read by Bishop Bamunoba, they gave three major reasons why the Churches in 
Ankole did not need to debate the monarchy issue. One was that restoring and not 
restoring Obugabe has no connection with Canon law that governs the church. The 
Church has Synods through which its representatives discuss issues and pass 
resolutions and laws governing and guiding the churches' decisions but the Obugabe 
issue had never been tabled for discussion. As Church leaders, they had no business 
with issues outside the church, which have not been handled by those committees that 
advise and guide the Church. The Bishops said the monarchy issue was a topic for the 
NRC not for the church. 746 
The Rwakitura result was that the RCs from the three districts voted on the issue with 
162 against, 2 for it and I abstention. Their statement read: 
The National Resistance Council members, District Council members and Religious leaders of Mbarara, 
Bushenyi and Ntungamo disuicts and members of the Cultural Trust sat in a meeting called by President 
Museveni on Saturday at Rwakitura in Mbarara District, and deliberated on the question of traditional 
rulers: All the three District Resistance Councils read their memoranda rejecting the purported 
coronation of prince John Barigye as Omugabe of Ankole on 20 November 1993. The Chairman of the 
Nkore Cultural Trust, Mr James Kahigiriza also made a statement defending the circumstances that led 
745 Interview: Sheikh Kaduyu, July 16,1996, Mbarara. 
746 Interview: Bishop Yoramu Bamunoba, May 12,1997. See also, "Ekihandiko kyaba Bishops Elisha 
Kyamugambi, Y. Bamunoba and Paul Bakyenga, (Memorandum for the three Bishop), in Onimuri, 
29 November-5 December, 1993, pp. 1-2. 
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to the purported coronation. The meeting expressed the desire to continue searching for a formula to 
revive and strengthen the culture of the Banyankole liaising with sister people of similar culture. 747 
The Rwakitura meeting resolved that the monarchy remain suspended in Ankole and 
unity be achieved some other way; that culture is important and should be upheld; that 
prince Barigye's coronation was null and void and finally that monarchists should 
consult people through a referendum about the restoration of the Obugabe in Ankole. 
That is where the matter rests. 748 
7.8. AN ANALYSIS OF THE RWAKITURA DEBATE. 
Museveni's influence on the monarchy is obvious. In an article by Denye Kalebo, 
"Why the referendum now? Key plot to tame Barigye Parties", President Museveni is 
quoted to have vowed that even if courts of law ruled in favour of either parties or the 
clandestine coronation of Barigye, politics would take precedence. 749 Kalebo's article 
recalled that in 1989, long before the coronation, in an NRC seminar, Museveni 
asked, "Mr. Bangye, did I go to the bush to make you a king? "750 Despite being a 
Muhima, Museveni was not ready to lose an election to crown an unpopular king. 
Barigye's coronation was an affront to Museveni's political power as President. He had 
to prove who was who. For example in the Uganda Confidentia175 1, he ridiculed the 
coronation as brewing "amarwa gataine permit", (brewing local beer without 
government permission). And as he has often said, he has to remain the 
"Ssabagabe"752 (the king of kings)! Perhaps this was what prince Barigye referred to 
when he said: 
747 This version is adopted from the New Vi-sion, Wednesday, December IS, 1993, p. 19.1 could not 
easily get the official version from the government due to "political reasons" as one official put it to 
me. 
748 Interview: Ezra Kikuri, March 13,1997, Bushenyi. 
749 See Weekly Topic, Year-Ender 1993. 
750 Weekly Topic, July 23,1993, p. 26. 
751 See Uganda Collf1denlial, 13-20 December 1993. 
752 A joke with a sting in the tail? 
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What I believe is that there are some powerful political forces or leaders from Ankole who do not 
support the monarchy. Those who reject the Obugabe in Ankole have various reasons. Some are 
politicians who feel that if Obugabe is restored, another centre of power VAN be created apart from 
themselveS. 753 
When Museveni opposed the restoration of the monarchy it was related with a fund- 
raising occasion where he portrayed himself the "new king in Ankole". New Vision of 
10 September 1989 ran a story which captured the interest of many Banyankole. 
Kaaro High School in Nyabushozi had held a fund-raising in which it raised more 
than 47 Million shillings and Musevem who was the guest of honour had contributed 
US $ 20.000. The school had started as a "Third World School" in 1983 ) by the UPC 
candidate, who had lost to the Democratic Party (DP), in the controversial 1980 
elections. It was first named Rwamasha Secondary School. In Runyankole, 
Rwamasha means a place where there is a lot of cow dung. Nyabushozi being a cattle- 
keeping area, the naming gave it a humble position. After the fall of UPC, it was 
changed to Kaaro derived from Kaaro-Karungi, a name that indicated where the king 
of Ankole built his palace or pitched camp. When the kingdom was abolished, Kaaro 
was at Kamukuzi-Mbarara. The changing of the school name from Rwamasha to 
Kaaro suggested that the king's seat had been moved from Mbarara to Nyabushozi. 
But who was this king? 
Was Museveni staking his claiM754 as the new king of Ankole by endowing the 
school with such generosity? The problem is that the Bahima considered him a 
usurper since he is ftom the abasita, a Bahima clan that did not traditionally provide 
the Omugabe. 755 That was why Bahima had felt particularly slighted because an 
earlier fund-raising in Mbarara by prince Barigye, who was then an NRC member for 
Kashari county, had failed dismally. He had raised only 1.7 millions, a shameful 
amount for a Prince. 
753 Interview: Prince John Barigye, March 12,1998, Kampala. 
754 Many interviewees. on this issue did not wish their names written down therefore the whole drama 
will remain anonymous. 
755 It is not so much the fact that it could not provide the Omugabe, for no other clans did, than the 
fact that it had a lowly status in the Bahima clans. So Museveni is regarded as a usurper among the 
Bahima not because he belongs to a clan that does not provide the Omugabe, but he is a member of 
a clan, which is regarded as an outsider. 
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For the Bairu, the renaming of the school was an insult. Their "cow-dung" school 
became restored to an aristocratic enclave and the old order, which they had defeated. 
They too saw Museveni as posing as the over-lord in Nyabushozi with his Kaaro close 
by on the site of their precious outpost. One NCT member said: 
it is not that Museveni is opposed to kinship in Ankole. It is simply that he wants to be the only king, 
both in Ankole and Uganda. 
His new palatial home at Rwakitura is seen as his castle. And he certainly treats it like 
one. He makes a point of inviting foreign royalty, while they are visiting Uganda, to 
meet him there. 
However, another important issue came out during the Kaaro fund-raising. 
On 12 September 1989, New Vision ran a front-page picture of Museveni carrying a 
string of gourds, which he had bought at the fund-raising. The caption in capital 
letters described his smile as "the smile of a winner". The string of gourds or 
Oinugainba is the only thing a traditional Muhima cattle-keeper carries from his home 
when he is moving with his cows, indicating that he has moved house. The symbolic 
significance of the photograph therefore ties in the fact that Kaaro may not have only 
moved from Mbamra to Nyabushozi, but it also moved from the royalists to the 
abasita. Museveni was subjected to a challenge before he took the Omugamba at the 
fund-raising. Kuteesa, who is a Muhinda (ruling clan among the Bahima) and who 
had beaten Museveni in the 1980 polls challenged Museveni. During the auction of 
the Omugamba, Kuteesa named a price to the applause from the Bahinda and 
Museveni would counter to the applause from the abasita. Each raised the stakes until 
finally Museveni ruled that the Omugamba was hiS. 756 This was part of the festivity 
fun, but perhaps there was more at stake than a few ornamental gourds: the kingship 
of Ankole. 
The Rwakitura meeting showed again ethnic rifts. NRM- claimed that ethnic 
distinctions of the past had been overcome. But Ankole's kingship once again was a 
source of contention between those two ethnic forces. Apart from a few Bahima like 
756 See The New Vision, 12 September 1989. 
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Museveni who opposed the monarchy and a few Bairu like Kahigiriza and Betungura 
who supported it, it was an ethnic struggle between Bairu and Bahima. The Bairu are 
still confident about being a majority and a middle class strong force. They were well 
represented at Rwakitura for they had a majority of the NRC members like Amanya 
Mushega, Adonia Tiberondwa, Miria Matembe, Kahinda Otaffire and Richard 
Kaijuka who had opposed the monarchy issue in the NRC. Bahima monarchists had 
hoped that since the government was predominantly Bahima, it would rule in their 
favour. 757 
The meeting also revealed who were who in Ankole and some hidden 
intentions among some monarchists. One Major General Tinyefuza, a lawyer, who 
married into the royal family, lamented Museveni's blocking the restoration of the 
monarchy, hoona Museveni watwima omuhanda, (Museveni you have blocked our 
way), to which Museveni responded, "if you have the power, you can open it". 758 
Whatever the Major General meant by "our way" remains his secret, though it was 
interpreted to mean that the Bahima had an agenda which Banyankole have up to now 
not known. The abusive language from both groups was symptomatic. One Muhima 
woman, a priest's wife, Verinah Rujoki, is said to have abused the anti-monarchy 
group as Imwe Bairu inwe after she had confessed that, when she heard that the 
monarchy had been nullified, she got her periods again despite the fact that she was 
beyond menopause! 759 Imwe Bairu mwe" is a strong derogatory term, suggesting 
that Bahima still despise Bairu. A Mwiru minister of Education responded angrily to a 
Muhima CA: 
President nobasa. ota kureka. embuzi nka Karuhanga kuhebebera aha mpaha'760 (President, how can you 
leave a goat like Karuhanga to murmur here), 
757 Interview: Adonia Tiberondwa, June 9,1997, Kampala. 
758 Interview: William Mukaira, May 14,1996, Bushenyi. 
759 See Ae Uganda Confidential, December, 13-20,1993, p. 9. 
760 ibid. 
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and referred to Verinah Rujoki's words as, abamwe baine ebigambo birikunuka 
nkebinyamp0761, (others have words that smell like shit). As long as the two groups 
smelt badly there was little chance for the monarchy. 
7.9. THE FUTURE FOR THE OBUGABE IN ANKOLE. 
The Obugabe is still highly controversial. Social inequality, minority domination over 
the majority and the exploitative social and economic relations of production which 
were built on to the detnment of the majority Banyankole are still strong emotional 
issues. Reviving the monarchy therefore would cause a rift between the Bairu and 
Bahima. The other point to consider is the constitutional requirement for issues of 
traditional rulers being subjected to the democratic will of the people. Whereas 
general consensus existed in other kingdom areas favouring their kings, an absolute 
minority fronted the Ankole case. Hence, for many even the issue of a referendum 
would be a waste of time. It is clear how the referendum would go. 
There is an argument that those (even if a minority) who want a king should have one 
since kings are hereditary. They quote article 37 of the Uganda constitution, which 
provides that: 
Every person has a right, as applicable, to belong to, enjoy, practice, profess, maintain and promote 
culture, cultural institution, language, tradition, creed or religion in community with others. 762 
However constitutional it may sound, the idea of a minority king is unsustainable 
because, although the king would be apolitical, he wi-11 still be a leader of all the 
people. And as Museveni said: 
You can not equate kingship with a religious sect ... because both are sections, but kingship long ago used 
to be inclusive; it is like in maths, you can not put like and unlike terms together... A king has never been 
for a few, one who had more spears ruled then, which is equivalent to today's vote. 763 
761 See Onimuri, December 20-27,1993, p. 11. 
762 The Constitution of the republic of Uganda, 1995. 
763 See The Motfilor, 2 October 1997. 
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Republicans see it as impossible and according to J. J. Barya: 
This argument fas to see that kingship is a historical construct attributable to a given people in an 
individual way. Unlike religion to which people subscribe on an individual basis, kingship is ascriptive in 
relation to a nationality, a people. Without this, it becomes a religion. 764 
This also raises the extent to which "if people so wish" is meant to cover the case of a 
minority amidst the majority. The bill did not provide for territorial boundaries but 
left it open that people concerned could practise their culture and pay homage to their 
particular king, whenever and wherever they wanted. If monarchists had not been 
overwhelmed by government and Banyankole majority, they might have been justified 
to ask that Barigye be crowned for those "who so vAsh". But when the kingdoms were 
abolished, they had certain geographical reference and boundaries. They were distinct 
units of government, each symbolically headed by a monarchical institution under 
which everybody was a subject. Barigye could not be a king of a minority for it could 
not be called a kingdom. The kingdom and district that was once Ankole no longer 
exists. 
Under the 1901 Ankole Agreement, the Omugabe was given 54 square 
miles of land as a private estate, while a further sixteen miles of land was given to the 
monarchy as an institution. The counties then controlled by the monarchy and Bahima 
contained 100 square miles. 765 If the monarchy were restored, these lands have to be 
returned as was the case of Buganda. This would deprive all those currently settled as 
customary tenants or leaseholders from the state. The people of Buhweju are 
particularly concerned about the fate of peasants on the kings land. 
The challenge is also how to resolve internal contradictions that arise as a 
result of changing situations. In Ankole, a king did not only embody religio-political 
and cultural powers, he was the richest man in the kingdom. His political legitimacy 
and relevance were linked to class domination. But things have changed and 
economic conditions have restructured the Ankole society to the extent that the 
764 j. J, Barya, op. cit., p. 40. 
765 ibid, See also Barya J. J. "CA Rejects Fraudulent Restoration of Ankole Monarchy", in National 
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traditional ruler is no longer Rugaba, (one who gives) or the richest man in society. 
Barigye failed to gain support because the Bahima-Bairu divide no longer coincides 
with class divisions. Without economic power to attract the poor, then it becomes 
questionable whether Barigye would have commanded political or social legitimacy 
in cases where his subjects are even economically stronger. 
It is true the monarchy issue was mainly an ethno-political problem and did 
not really involve the churches in their official capacities. Either way there are 
religious implications for both the Catholic and Protestant church especially now that 
the future of the monarchy is uncertain. Its uncertainty lies in the fact that since the 
monarchy issue in Ankole was mainly a political challenge, the political 
circumstances could change, as was the case of Buganda. The religious implications 
lie in how the church will relate to two divergent groups, and yet play a neutral role. 
Bairu as I have argued in this thesis have never fallen for the monarchy yet it is they 
who still form the majority in the church membership. The monarchy issue remains a 
challenge for the Anglican Church in a sense that it has a congregation, which is 
politically divided. It is likely that should the monarchy issue be reconsidered, it 
might resurrect the old scores which the church has tried to minimise. 
Interesting is the question of the Protestant Bahima and Bairu Catholics 
alliance. In Ankole Catholic DP had advertised itself as the monarchy champion in 
order to woo the Bahima to their side. But the 1993 monarchy controversy confirmed 
the fact that Catholics have never really supported the monarchy. As we have seen, it 
is the Catholics who were vehement in the campaign against the institution of the 
monarchy as was evidenced in the meeting between NCT and the Christian Joint 
Council (south-western) meeting held at the Catholic Social Centre. The question is 
whether from this experience, the Bahima-Bairu Catholic alliance still holds. It might 
not because, with the recent NRM's inclusive politics, either group might have 
realised that religion and ethnicity are having a lesser role and therefore not useful for 
either party. But also Catholic rejection of the restoration of the monarchy could have 
been due to the realisation of their insignificant participation and role even if the 
monarchy were restored since it was historically a Protestant affair. 
Analyst, vol. 2, no. 9,7 September, 5 October 1995. 
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A deeper question is to what extent Bahima really still see the role of the Protestant 
church as a "quasi-established" institution in its relation to the monarchy. Though the 
Anglican Church was established through the monarchy in Ankole, Bahima lost its 
grip to the Bairu Protestants. It could be partly the reason the monarchists did not 
mind which religious leader crowned the king. Bahima no longer see the Protestant 
church as an institution that enhances their interests. This probably justifies Bahima's 
recent agitation for the creation of their own diocese in Nyabushozi. 
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7.10. CONCLUSION: THE OBUGABE CONTROVERSY IN ANKOLE. 
The kingship had always been in question because it kept Bairu in a subordinate 
position. They had succeeded in reducing its power before it was abolished and 
Banyankole had not asked for its restoration. If there had been no revival of the 
monarchy in Buganda, there probably would have been no one particularly concerned 
about it in Ankole and other kingdoMS. 766 Importantly due to the attention and 
glamour which the government put on the coronation of Buganda's Kabaka, it 
attracted an enonrious gesture from other districts and began to demand for the same, 
though they had not been involved during the intense negotiations between Buganda 
and the government. 767 There had been no demand for it especially in Ankole, where 
District Resistance Committees of Mbarara and Bushenyi had opposed the idea. 768 
The sum total of this, as Doornbos and Mwesigye have expressed it, is that the 
restoration of Obugabe in Ankole: 
would have entailed the reinstatement of a monarchical institution derived from a historical premise of 
ethnically determined hierarchical status. Thus recognising the kingship would somehow have implied 
recognising an idea of ethnic inequality, with all the profound social and institutional consequences this 
might entail. It is not surprising therefore that representatives of the vast 'non aristocrafic' majority of the 
former kingdom should have put forward (the view) that Kinyankole culture is not per definition a 
monarchical oriented culture, and that the equation of monarchy and culture is a far too narrowly 
conceived construct. 769 
Barya sayS770' Up till 1967 when kingdoms were abolished by the UPC government, 
the Ankole monarchy was remembered for its old-age coercive instruments against 
the majority Bairu, its ideological tools such as the myths that justified and 
legitimised the minority rule by presenting it as a divinely-ordained order of class, 
766 Interview: Ezra Kjkuri, May 19,1997, Bushenyi. 
767 See The Uonilor, 23 July 1993. 
768 Interview: William Mukaira, May 19,1997, Bushenyi. 
769 M. Doornbos and F. Mwesigye, op. cit., p. 17. 
770 See J. J, Barya, "The Ankole Monarchy Controversy: Testing Democratisation and Cultural 
Revivalism", A paper presented at the NARRU general Assembly, Kabale, 27-28, February 1997, 
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social relations and power balance, the attributes the agricultural Bairu were paying 
through the king's lords; the alleged atrocious rituals by the old kings, such as spitting 
in the mouth of a Musingo clansman, staking the king's spear in a Mwiru's foot, 
cutting off Bairu's ears, having a Mwiru hold the thighs of a woman while a Muhima 
was having sex or sleeping with Bairu's wives while Bahima chiefs were on tour 
(Bahima coined a crude saying out of it that, owacuga omuzana niwe amanya 
eini, Tlenzo ye), etcetera. When the monarchy issue surfaced again in 1993, the Bairu 
did not want to see an institution that symbolised their unfortunate history of 
"slavery". To suggest the monarchy could be restored for those "who so wish" as the 
constitution stipulated, would have equated to saying that we restore apartheid in 
South Africa "for those who want it"! So ethnic division was clear again. It is obvious 
that the majority of the people could manage without what a king represented then. 
Probably the best thing that can happen for the good of Ankole is to relegate the 
institution to history. 
pp. 13-14 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
8.0. CONCLUSION. 
This study has sought to find out the way in which Christianity, ethnicity and politics 
have influenced each other in Ankole since the fifties and the consequences that have 
resulted from their interaction, given the apparent power struggles between the Bairu 
and Bahima, and between the Protestant Bairu on the one hand, and Catholic Bairu 
and Protestant Bahima on the other. The findings would seem to uphold the thesis that 
ethnicity and religion have been major determinant factors in the civic/political and 
economic power imbalance in Ankole, and that, although the Bairu and Bahima have 
lived together for centuries now, their relations, far from being symbiotic, have 
largely remained strained and exclusive and may even have been exacerbated due to 
the dynamics of inequality and the shift of power. 
As discussed in Chapter one, before Christian and western political contact, 
the Bahima had the monopoly of economic and civic/political power. The Batru were 
an entity of serfs under the kihima rule. Because the Bairu hardly had any forum 
through which they could air their grievances or express their interests, they seemed 
content to leave the alleviation of their plight to their rulers and brainworkers, the 
Bahima. However, the findings of this study reveal that with the introduction of 
Christianity, with its stipendiary church ministry, western education and the 
introduction of cash crops (all of which the Bahima did not enthusiastically embrace), 
the Bairu gradually became economically empowered, giving them a new sense of 
identity and worth. Through movements such as the Kumanyana, Bairu started to 
"fight" for their rights and privileges. Bahima saw this as a threat because it sought to 
redress the political and economic imbalance ftom which they had hitherto benefited. 
While the introduction of Christianity was to the advantage of the Bairu, in 
many respects, it was also a disadvantage because it divided them denominationally 
into Catholics and Protestants which weakened their common stand against Bahima 
domination. On a different note, Christianity worked to the advantage of the Bahima; 
not least precisely because it divided and therefore weakened the Bairu common 
front. Second, missionaries and later colonial administrators ruled through the 
Bahima reinforcing their social, political and economic hold over the Bairu. Moreover 
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the Bahima were never divided denominationally since with the conversion of the 
Omugabe to Protestantism, Bahima, when they became Christians, automatically 
followed suit. Thus one can conclude that the Protestant-Catholic, Bahima-Bairu 
antagonisms which to date characterise the religio-political landscape of Ankole, have 
their origin in missionary Christianity which was imported with its differences of 
Catholicism and Protestantism from Europe. 
In many respects, the Bairu Catholic-Protestant Bahima alliance against the 
Bairu Protestants dunng the political party politics period, was a religio-political 
tactic to address the ethno-political and economic power shift that threatened the two 
groups. The minority Protestant Bahima thought they could maintain themselves in 
power by an alliance with the majority Bairu Catholics whom they did not see as a 
political threat because their party, DP, promised to promote the monarchy (at least in 
Ankole). Thus, while party politics widened the gap between the Catholic and 
Protestant denominations, it did contribute to the bridging of an ethnic gap. In spite of 
the fact that Protestant Bairu have come into power, the Bahima have remained a 
power to reckon with especially in politics because they have their feet in both camps: 
UPC/Protestant and DP/Catholic. 
Further, whereas religion is seen as the surface cause of the religio-political 
power struggles, ethnicity, more than religion, has been the major cause of the 
economic-political power imbalance in Ankole. This can be seen in the fact that in 
1963 a UPC Protestant Muhima, Grace Ibingira, preferred the election of Kahigiriza 
(a mediocre Mwiru) as the Enganzi of Ankole, to Bananuka, a defender of the Bairu 
emancipation. Yet all of them were Protestants. Ibingira's concern was to protect the 
interests of Bahima even at the expense of his party colleagues. That ethnicity 
remained an important factor is further sustained by the fact that even Revival 
movement, profound as it has been in Ankole, has not eradicated ethnic sentiments 
even among its own fellowship. Thus we saw that in 1992 during a Diocesan Synod 
meeting at Ruharo cathedral (East Ankole Diocese), Bahima, both clergy and lay, the 
majority of whom were Revivalists, agitated for a separate diocese of their own, 
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alleging discrimination (which President Museveni called okugabura kuhi771, 
favouritism, at the consecration of Bishop Kyamugambi in August 1992) in the 
church. Of course the alliance with the DP Catholics had at its centre the protection 
and advancement of Bahima. 
The ethnic impact on both Bairu and Bahima can be seen in the fact that 
while for the Bahima Uganda got its independence in 1962, for the Bairu, real 
independence came only In 1967 after the abolition of the monarchy in Uganda. 
Furthermore, although Catholic Bairu had always allied with Bahima. in party politics, 
when it came to debates about the revival of the monarchy at the local councils and at 
Rwakitura, where Museveni was presiding, Bairu Catholics supported their traditional 
rivals the Bairu Protestants and not their Bahima allies. Catholics, as much as other 
Bairu, saw the restoration of the monarchy as political and religious bondage. In 
practice Catholics have always played second fiddle both to Protestant Bahima and 
Protestant Bairu: a double disadvantage. They have always been under the UPC 
Protestant Bairu politically and of course under the Protestant Bahima aristocrats. 
This may explain why only one out of the 28 members of the NCT was a Catholic. 
The abolition of the monarchy in Ankole did not solve but only shelved the ethnic 
differences and prejudices between Bairu and Bahima. Nor did it solve the 
denominational prejudices between Catholics and Protestants. The recent Bahima 
agitation for the restoration of the monarchy (1993) supports this conclusion. 
The churches in Ankole have suffered and may continue to suffer political 
setbacks as a result of allowing themselves to be manipulated by politicians. They 
have, in consequence, lost authority, ceased to be unbiased and their religious role has 
been damaged. And yet it is difficult to see how religious institutions could extricate 
themselves from politics in practice. There is a certain inevitability about their 
involvement. First, religions got involved due to the traditional and ethnic dynamics 
771 Many interviewees in Ankole thought that it was an unfair remark from the President since Bahima 
priests were not at all discriminated against by their Bairu counterparts. The first Bishop of Ankole, 
Kosia Shalita (1957-1969) was a Mututsi/Muhima. Even Bishop Amos Betungura, though he was a 
Mviiru, he did not discriminate against them. Actually in his term of office (1970-1992) there were 
more Bahima Archdeacons proportionally than there were Bairu. It was indeed during Betungura's 
period that many Bahima joined Church ministry. The consequence of Museveni's comment led the 
present Bishop to exaggerate the appointment of Bahima in senior Church offices without necessarily 
qualifýing for them. 
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of the "Power shift" between Bairu and Bahima and other ethnic minorities. 
Connected with this is the western imported religions and econo-political power 
craved for by each faction. Second, given the unpredictable econo-political situations 
of Uganda governments and especially since the Amin era, the churches and in 
particular the Bishops have become both an ecclesiastical and a political focus of 
unity and conscience for their adherents. Thirdly, the almost non-existent presence of 
Bahima converts in the Catholic Church and in Islam and the small Bahima numbers 
in the Church of Uganda ordained ministry (due to their preference for political and 
military power) makes it difficult to envisage in the near future, a bridging of the 
existing ethnic, religious and political hostilities. Fourthly, the recent restoration of 
monarchism in Uganda by the Musevem government, and the majority Bairu rejection 
of it in Ankole, leaves the religious institutions and in particular the Anglican church, 
with the religious and political dilemma of a divided constituency of Bairu and 
Bahima, each of whom seems to cherish their ethnic origins more than the Christian 
faith. 
The study also reveals that the abolition of political parties by Amin and his 
indiscriminate killing brought all the former rival factions, UPC-DP, Bairu-Bahima 
and Catholics and Protestants together. Not that their historical differences and hatred 
were forgotten, but because Amin became a common enemy. However, Amin's 
regime widened the gap between the Muslims and the other factions. Although Islam 
had been in the country for more than a century, it was not until Amin's regime that it 
surfaced prominently as a religion which had aspirations to influence the country's 
economic, political and ethnic destiny. Whether or not this was a viable aim, what is 
clear is that Islam and Amin were seen as synonymous. This impression has left Islam 
and Muslims suspect. Although Muslims had been allies of the Protestants, they had 
not been adequately rewarded and perhaps this accounts for their treatment and 
discrimination of Protestants during Amin's regime. The later's better education could 
also have been seen as a threat to the former. 
On the other hand the Protestant establishment in church and government 
had not mistreated Muslims and Catholics to the extent the Muslim government did to 
the Protestants and Catholics in the seventies. Maybe Muslims seized an opportunity 
while they had it and determined to exploit power as others had done before. It was "a 
tit for tat" not in terms of the killings, but in terms of "the winner takes it all" 
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principle. The Itendero Muslim massacres, however, were "a tit for a tat" that had 
reference to what were perceived as Amin's targeted killing of prominent Christian 
academics, politicians and Ankole's cream who were strong supporters of their 
respective churches. The killings claimed many influential middle class people who 
were the pillars of their respective churches and this (as far as the economy of the 
church is concerned) left a lasting generation gap (those killed were between 30-50 
years old) from which the churches in Ankole have not recovered. 
In light of all this, the return of Milton Obote to be president in 1980 was 
not a liberation for the Muslims nor indeed for the Bahima. For the Muslims, they 
were still identified with the hated Amin's regime and its atrocities. It could be further 
argued that neither was it a liberation politically for the Bahima, DP and Catholics. 
These were the forces which had jubilated at Obote's downfall in 1971. They were 
apprehensive and rather dreaded his return in 1980. To the Bahima, Obote had 
abolished their cherished monarchy and it was unlikely that he could ever be 
persuaded to restore it again. To the Catholics and DP, they had not enjoyed the best 
of peace in the 1960s. They had not been persecuted as individuals but their party DP 
had been marginalised, a situation to which it was to return in 1980. The fact that 
these forces dreaded Obote's regime can be further illustrated by the activities that 
followed the 1985 coup detat. When Bazilio Okello, a top military official and a 
Catholic, announced the coup and the consequent fall of the UPC government, in 
places where Catholics had a majority like Ibanda, Rubindi and Buhweju, Protestant 
houses were burnt down, plantations destroyed and cows slaughtered, including those 
of Bishop Yoramu Bamunoba. 
As a result of its close association with UPC, the Anglican Church (COU) 
met a cold welcome from the NRM government which brought the former DP 
Catholics, Bahima, Banyarwanda and Muslims to the fore in the NRM's programmes. 
The chakantuchaka (politicisation) seminars were for example intended to 
"dechristianise" the stalwart supporters of the churches and in particular those of the 
church that had close links with UPC. This is supported by the findings that the 
Resistance Council (RCs) executives from local to district levels, were predominantly 
former DP Catholics and Bahima. However, in some way the COU gained from this 
cold reception because many of the prominent former UPC supporters who had not 
fled the country began to direct their efforts into church work, to some extent bridging 
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the gap left by Amin's killings. For example the fon-ner stalwart UPC and Kihimba 
(Administrative Secretary) of Mbarara district, George Nkoba, offered himself for 
ordination and Yoramu Gucwamaingi who had contested with Museveni in the 1980 
elections became the Head of Laity for East Ankole diocese. The same can be said of 
Dr. Adonia Tiberondwa, who became the Head of Laity in West Ankole diocese. 
Soon however, government softened its attitude to the COU when it realised how 
entrenched in society the churches were and also that the elections of local and 
national councillors was mostly based on ethno-religious sentiments. 
The expulsion of the Banyarwanda refugees from Ankole by the UPC Youth 
Wingers had government backing and was, among other things, triggered by their 
ethno-religious affiliations which had inclined them towards Catholics and Bahima. 
As we saw in Chapter six, the majority of Banyarwanda refugees were pastoralists and 
Catholics by religious affiliation. Although other reasons contributed to their 
expulsion (for instance their alleged collaboration with Museveni in the bush war and 
the stealing of cattle), the central issue concerned their ethnic and religious affiliation 
which linked them to the opponents of the UPC government. 
Whereas the monarchy had been for centuries part and parcel of Kinyankole 
culture, five things equally account for the rejection of the restoration of kingship in 
1993. First the kihima and the monarchical culture was/is different from the Bairu 
culture in many ways including language dialect. Second, Bairu maintain that 
Kinyankole culture can and has continued to survive without the monarchy. Thirdly, 
the former Ankole kingdom was a creation of the colonial powers who amalgamated 
the different and independent small kingdoms and chiefdoms that more or less 
followed the present day county boundaries. In addition the former Ankole kingdom, 
then one district, now comprises three independent and decentralised districts which 
by the virtue of the financial and ethnic implications involved, may not easily come 
under one monarch, especially as the majority of the population in these districts are 
Bairu. In rejecting Barigye as RC5 chairman people saw this as a step to the throne as 
the chief administrator of the district. His standing for political office side by side 
with his would-be subjects and being defeated, seriously impaired his claims to the 
throne. His defeat, regardless of other factors, could have been a rejection of his 
kingship. This obviously eroded the long cherished kihima mythology that their 
kingship was divinely instituted. Barigye's defeat could account for why he and his 
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supporters opposed the idea of a referendum: they knew it would not favour them. By 
rejecting a referendum, they hoped they would eventually manoeuvre their way 
through. In light of this and given the fact that most of the 28 members of the NCT 
were above 65 years old, it may be concluded that these were people who had in one 
way or another benefited from the monarchy, and who because they were now retired 
and rather felt behind by the modem political currents, wanted the monarchy revived 
to accord them their diminishing dignity in society. 
Turning to Barigye's nugatory coronation, the refusal of the Bishops and 
their clergy to attend the coronation was both ecclesiastically and politically 
calculated. The majority of the Christians did not want the monarchy restored nor did 
the government. For the clerics to have given it a blessing would have been easily 
seen as a sell out of the church and sabotage to the government. Besides, the 
coronation of a Mugabe of Ankole by a Muslim, instead of the traditional Protestant 
ceremony, may have far reaching implications for Barigye's future monarchical claims 
and raises many unanswered questions. For example, did by so doing, Barigye declare 
his dislike for the COU? Did he imply he could be crowned by any religious leader no 
matter what were the religious connections with the monarchy and the public 
opinion? Was he thereby defying his forefathers' acknowledgement that it was the 
missionary Anglican Church that had consolidated the monarchy in Ankole? Was he 
declaring Islam an equally acceptable religion, although none of his Bahima 
tribesmen have ever embraced it? Whatever Barigye thought, this incident not only 
caused mixed feelings among Banyankole but also implied that Barigye was imposing 
himself on the people. This belied his claims that his rule would not follow in the 
footsteps of his forefathers. However, it could be argued that Omugabe being a man 
of all people no matter what other ethnic background and beliefs could be crowned by 
a leader of any religion in his kingdom. 
From the findings of this study the researcher is also led to agree with the 
advocates of the monarchy who argue that Barigye's rule would not be as dictatorial as 
his forefathers had been given the democratic rights people have now. But this is not 
to overlook the fact that kingship is an institution which only needs time to grow to a 
strength people had not imagined. According to the Rwakitura debate, one is led to 
conclude that any attempts to restore the monarchy in Ankole by force is likely to lead 
to serious confrontation between Bairu and Bahima. From that perspective therefore, 
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it may be concluded that President Museveni whose future political career (in Ankole) 
depended on the votes of the majority Bairu. was right to side with them both for his 
own good and the democratic rights of Banyankole. 
To what extent then should the church be involved in politics? The church 
certainly has a vital role to play in the politics of a nation. The church in Ankole, and 
Uganda at large, has always championed social action. It pioneered social services 
like schools and hospitals, roads and agriculture, and hence shaped Uganda as a 
nation. The church has been and should continue being a partner with the state in 
fighting ignorance, disease and poverty among the masses. But above all, the 
Christian church should continue to be the 'conscience' of the state; it should not 
abdicate its cardinal mission of providing spiritual and moral guidance to the 
politicians and the people. The church should continue to lead and guide the state 
rather than the other way round. This, the church can do if it maintains a neutral stand 
in partisan and sectarian politics that divide its flock. 
However the concept of 'conscience' many be a vague term especially in a 
country like Uganda where there is religious pluralism. Amos Kasibante criticises 
it. 772 He argues that for the church to. conceive itself as the conscience of the state 
excludes other religious traditions like Muslims and is only relevant in those countries 
where the church is a "state church'. Whereas Kasibante might be right, it is still 
relevant for the church to take a guiding role in a country like Uganda where more 
that 80% are Christians. This does not mean courtship with the civic authorities. The 
church needs to be concerned with the need to defend human rights, speak against 
corruption and grieve for unemployment, street children; support women's 
emancipation and be in partnership with the state for development. 
So far it has not achieved this. First, because it has compromised its mission 
and vision for temporary political patronage from the powers that be, especially for 
financial and material support from politicians. Secondly, the church leaders putting 
their personal interests before those of the church. Church leaders should not openly 
772 See Amos Kasibante, 'Beyond Revival: a proposal for mission in the Church of Uganda into the 
third millennium', in A. Wingate and others (eds. ), Angficanism: A Global Communion, Mowbray, 
1988, pp. 363-368. 
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identify with or campaign for a political group or leader. This ultimately divides their 
flock and undermines their impartiality. Where ethnic differences are still strong and 
seem to underlie religious and political alliances from time to time, the church should 
take up the challenge to unite its followers rather than encouraging any political bias. 
Only then will the church avoid its past mistakes and reassert its mission, credibility 
and relevance in the twenty-first century. 
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8.1. REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF RELIGION IN ANKOLE 
In the light of the findings, discussion and the conclusions made, the researcher 
recommends that: 
(i) Religious and civic institutions and cultural trusts encourage intermarriage 
between Bairu and Bahima so that in the long run there is a bridging of the 
gaps between the two groups. 
(ii) Open academic debates about ethnicity in Ankole be organised at local levels 
to dispel prejudices between the two groups. 
(iii) The church identifies and uses its members who have been thoroughly 
influenced by the Revival movement in both camps to reach and influence 
those who still value their ethnic roots rather than their Christianity. 
(iv) In consultations with the United Nations, a code of practice be drafted for 
handling and helping refugees and society be educated about their rights and 
privileges. 
(V) That ecumenical contacts to enhance cordial relations between Catholics and 
Protestants be initiated and strengthened right from the local church level and 
that similar arrangements for dialogue between Islam and Christianity be 
initiated to dispel fears and prejudices between the two. 
(vi) That if the churches/religions are to be involved in politics, they should do so 
as a united front rather than as individual denominations. 
(Vii) That the restoration of the monarchy in Ankole if it is wanted at all be left to 
evolve naturally. 
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8.2. REFLECTIONS ON FUTURE RESEARCH. 
This research was exploratory although exhaustive and conclusive. In view of this and 
the fact that there is insufficient literature on the subject, the researcher suggests that 
further research be carried out on the now listed aspects. 
(i) The findings of the study reveal that there has been ethno-political antagonism 
between Balru and Bahima. This suggests a need for healthy ethno-cultural 
relations. 
The findings also reveal that the expulsion of the Banyarwanda refugees was 
due to their ethno-religious and political affiliations. This suggests a need for 
an understanding of the refugees' activities before and after the NRM take- 
over. 
(Iii) Further research into the major problems of refugees is needed (possibly a 
full-blown thesis) with special concentration on the western borders of 
Uganda and the political problems of neighbouring countries. 
(iv) The findings further reveal that there was confrontation between Christians 
and Muslims during the seventies. This suggests a need for dialogue between 
Islam and Christianity. 
(v) There is need for research into government reservations about kingship in 
Ankole. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHY AND A LIST OF SOURCES 
ORAL INFORMANTS. 
Not all my informants appear in this list because for one reason or other, some did not 
wish to be quoted, not even to be mentioned by name. My apologies to those 
informants who did not object to their names being mentioned but do not appear in this 
list. Below are the names of only the major informants who I consulted several times or 
whose information was basic to the understanding of this study. 
Bakyenga, Paul, Bishop, (born 1944). 
Interviewed at his house at Nyamitanga on 6 June 1997. Priest 1971, Headmaster 
Kitabi Seminary 1971, Rector Gaba National Seminary 1982 and Bishop 1989. 
Balinda, Abasi, Haji, (no year given). 
Interviewed at his home at Kabwohe on 12 June 1997. Was active in the politics of 
the sixties and also a Member of Parliament. 
Bamunoba, Yoramu, Bishop, (born 1931) 
Interviewed at his home Kakiika Mbarara. on 22 July 1997. Graduated in 1953 as a 
teacher trainer; ordained in 1969, Principal Teachers College Kakoba and University 
Chaplain, Makerere 1974-76, elected Bishop of West Ankole Diocese in 1976, retired 
1996. 
Bamutungire, William, Rev. Canon, aged 78. 
Interviewed him at his home Rwentanga on 31 July 1996. He trained as a primary 
teacher before joining church ministry in 1954. He worked in different parts of 
Ankole. He retired as the Dean of St. James Cathedral Ruharo Mbarara in 1983. 
Barigye, John (born 1940). 
Interviewed at his office Kampala on 12 March 1998. 
Betungura, Amos, Bishop (born 1921). 
interviewed at his home Ruharo on 31 July 1996. Primary teacher, 1950-52, ordained 
1959, Principal Bishop Tucker Theological College, elected Bishop of Ankole 
Diocese 1970, retired 1992. 
Bikangaga, John (year not given). 
Interviewed at his home Makindye Kampala on 18 July 1997. Former teacher and 
king of Kigezi. Served in various capacities in the civil service after the abolition of 
kingdoms in 1966. 
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Bukabeba, Emmy (born 1951). 
Interviewed at his home at Kakyeka Mbarara on 30 July 1996. Former Lecturer 
Makerere University. 
Butagira, Francis (born 1941). 
Interviewed at his office Mbarara on 31 July 1996. Former Attorney General and 
Speaker to the National Assembly and Member of Parliament for Rwampara in 1980. 
Bwengye, Francis, (born 1942). 
Interviewed at his home in Kampala on 29 July 1997. Lawyer and former Secretary 
General for the Democratic Party. He is currently self employed in Kampala. 
Byanyima, Bonefasi (no year given). 
Interviewed at his home Ruti Mbarara on 29 March 1997. Founder member of the 
Democratic Party in Ankole. He was a Member of Parliament for Kashari and 
Nyabushozi in the sixties. Still active in party politics. 
Guewamaingi, Yoramu, (born 1936). 
Interviewed at his home Ruharo Mbarara on 6 August 1996. Teacher and later joined 
politics in 1980. He is now the Head of Laity for East Ankole Diocese. 
Itima, Blasio, Rev. Canon (born about 1913). 
Interviewed at his home Nshongi, Kigarama on 7 May 1996. Catechist 1939, joined 
Revival 1944, lay reader 1949, deacon 1960, priest 1962, archdeacon 1978. Retired 
1984. 
Kabaza, Zab (born 1921). 
Interviewed at Namirembe Provincial Offices on 28 June 1996. School Supervisor in 
the Native Anglican Schools. Joined Revival in 1936 and retired Provincial Missioner 
Church of Uganda. 
Kaduyu, Sheikh (born 1931). 
Interviewed at his Office Mbarara on 12 June 1996. Kaduyu is the head of the 
Muslims in Ankole. 
Kahenano, Joram (born 1948). 
Interviewed at his home Mbuya, Kampala on 22 July 1997. 
Kahigiriza, James (born 1921). 
Interviewed at his home Kakiika Mbarara on 18 July 1996. Graduated in 1948, joined 
Politics in 1957, Assistant Enganzi 1957-1960, County chief, Enganzi 1963-1967. 
Kakubi, John Baptist, Bishop (born 1929). 
Interviewed at his retirement home in lbanda on 25 August 1996. After Seminary 
training 1961, worked as Curate Nyamitanga Cathedral, Education Secretary and 
Headmaster Kitabi Seminary, 1967-69. Became Bishop of Ankole in 1969. Retired 
1989. 
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Kamujanduzi, Rose, Mrs (born 1911). 
Interviewed at her home Kakiika Mbarara on 31 July 1996. She married in 1936 and 
with her husband Rev. Eliakim KamUianduzi, served in Buhweju, Ruharo and 
Rwampara parishes. 
Kamukatna, Dixon, (born 1957). 
Interviewed at his office at Makerere University on 15 May 1996. He is a lecturer in 
the Department of History. 
Kategaya, Eriya, Honourable, (born 1943). 
Interviewed at his office Kampala on 13 March 1998. Graduated as a Lawyer in 1970, 
lecturer Institute of Public Administration, Advocate 1972-1973, exile 1973-79, 
Minister of Commerce 1980, guerrilla war 1981-86, and now Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and First Deputy Prime Minister in the Uganda Government. 
Vikuri, Ezra (born 1934). 
Interviewed at his office in Bushenyi on 25 July 1996. Started teaching in 1953, 
joined politics in 1960 as Councillor for Kyeizoba sub-county in the Eishengyero until 
1970. 
Kituna, Eliasaph, Rev. Canon (born about 1920). 
Interviewed at his home Rwentondo, Kashaka on 14 April 1997. Catechist 1938, 
deacon 1965, priest 1967, archdeacon 1981. Retired 1987. 
Kyamugambi, Elisha, (born 1942). 
Interviewed at his home, Ruharo on 15 July 1996. Primary teacher, ordained in 1976, 
worked as Diocesan Treasurer and Archdeacon. Consecrated Bishop in August 1992. 
Lugimbirwa, Enock, (born about 1932). 
Interviewed at his home Ruharo on 10 April 1996. Active member of the Revival 
movement. 
Magezi, Is'haq (born 1939). 
Interviewed at his home at Kabwohe. He served in various places as the District 
Commissioner during Idi Amin's regime. He is no%,, ý a local businessman. 
Makaru, Yowasi, (born 1930). 
Interviewed at his home Butsibo on 29 March 1997. Joined Revival movement in 
1962. Primary teacher from 1955 to1967. Member of the Ankole Eishengyero 1961 to 
1971. He is currently Chairman RC5 for Bushenyi District. 
Mugimba, Eliaezer (born 1908). 
Interviewed at his home Ruharo, Mbarara in 1990. Grandson of Omukama Ndagara of 
Buhweju who was murdered in battle against the British. Teacher, Mbarara High 
School; joined Revival in 1936. One of the Balokole students expelled from Mukono 
in 1941. Leader of Revival in Ankole. Bible translator into Runyankole Rukiga with 
Stanley Smith in 1957. Died in 199-33. 
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Muhoozi, Eliphaz, Rev. Canon (born 1928). 
Interviewed at his home Komukyera Mushanga on 31 July 1996. Ex-teacher lay 
reader 1959, deacon 1963, priest 1965, archdeacon 1971, and bible translator 1981. 
Now retired. 
Mukaira, William, (born 1932). 
Interviewed at his farm Nyaruzinga Bushenyi on 24 July 1996. Formerly a primary 
teacher and Minister of Education in the Ankole Local government. He is a 
progressive farmer and knowledgeable about Ankole politics. 
Murumba, Anania, (born 1910). 
Interviewed at his home Kafunjo on 10 July 1996. Worked in the Omugabe's 
govemment as a county chief and retired towards independence. 
Mwambutsya-Ndebeesa, (year not given) 
Interviewed at his office Makerere University on 26 March 1997. Lecturer, Makerere 
University. 
Ndiwa-Ndikora (born 1940). 
Interviewed at his home Mbarara on 23 July 1997. Graduated in 1968, worked as 
District Commissioner in various parts of the country including Bushenyl (1982-85) 
and Mbarara Districts 1986-88. He was knowledgeable in the party politics of the 
eighties. 
Njunwoha, Lazaro, Rev. Canon (born 1923). 
Interviewed at his home Bujaga, Rwampara on 16 July 1996. Worked as a Catechist, 
lay reader and priest. 
Odoki, Justice (born 1940). 
Interviewed at his chambers Kampala on 12 March 1998. He served in various 
capacities in the legal profession and is now the Chairman, Uganda Constitutional 
Commission. 
Rurangaranga, Edward (born 1932) 
Interviewed at his home Ishaka-Bushenyi on 2 August 1996. Graduated as a teacher in 
1959, elected in the Eishengyero in 1960, Deputy Speaker to the Eishengyero in 1967, 
exile 1972-79, Minister of State 1981. 
Rwabushaija, Semei, Rev. Canon (born 1929). 
Interviewed at his home Ruharo Mbarara on 28 August 1996. Worked as Lay 
readerl945-60, priested 1964, retired as Dean of St. James Cathedral in 1994. Active 
member in the Revival movement and the affairs of the Anglican Church in Ankole. 
Rwabushongo, Pulitazio, (born 1940) 
Interviewed at his home Omunsikye Nyamitanga on 10 May 1996. 
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Rwetsiba, William, (born 1922). 
Interviewed at his Hotel Kampala on 21 March 1998. Graduated in 1944, taught at 
Buddo and Ntare School until 1958 when he joined politics representing Ankole in 
Legco. He is the founder member of UPU and the first President of UPC. 
Sabiffi, Gerladine, Mrs (born 1912). 
Interviewed at her home Kinom Rwampara on II July 1996. Former teacher, she 
married Eric Sabiiti who later became the archbishop of the Church of Uganda. She is 
a prominent member and pioneer of the Revival movement. 
Tiberondwa, Adonia, Dr. (born 1936). 
Interviewed at his home in Kampala on 4 August 1997. Graduated in 1955, taught at 
Ntare School and Teso College, joined politics in 1960 as a special nominee to the 
Eishengyero and UPC Secretary, Ankole branch. Director of Kyambogo Teachers 
College, exile 1973-79, Minister of Industry and Technology in the eighties. He is 
now Senior Lecturer at Makerere University. 
Tuma, Tom, (no year given). 
Interviewed at Namirembe offices on 2 August 1997. Former lecturer Makerere 
University. He is now Co-ordinator for the Planning, Development and Rehabilitation 
in the Church of Uganda. 
Turihamwe, Sam (born 1936). 
Interviewed at his home Nyamiko, Bushenyi on 12 August 1998. Primary teacher 
1959-1981, Sub-county chief 1981-1986, County Chief 1987-1993. 
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ARCHIVAL SOURCES. 
UGANDA 
Church Archives 
A. Church of Uganda. 
1. Ruharo Archives. 
Located at Ruharo, East Ankole Diocesan Headquarters. They consist of mainly of 
letters to and from the government, Bishop's correspondence to parishes and letters 
from abroad. They provide a useful study and understanding of the tension between 
Amin's regime and the Anglican Church. Unfortunately they are heaped in one box 
and it is really not easy to know which letter belongs to which file. Some of the files 
are not labelled. But in particular see files: 
The Refugees file, EAD/6 which consists information about Banyarwanda refugees 
during their expulsion in 1982-84. 
The Diocesan Council file - vAth Diocesan business and minutes of the various 
meetings. 
Government file GNDR/R12 and Political Affairs file: consist of Government 
correspondence with the Church on various issues: refugees, 
Church invitation letters to government officials to visit the 
diocese, Church/Government conflict especially during Amin's 
period. 
Bishop's files, EAD/GC/2/23 and in particular file BP. No. 6/l/I which holds very 
sensitive letters from Governor Juma Bashir to Bishop Amos 
during Amin's regime. 
2. Parish Archives (East Ankole Diocese). 
These are located at the oldest parishes (now Archdeaconry centres) in the diocese 
especially at Ibanda, Kinoni, Ruharo cathedral, Kitunga and Kabwohe (the last two 
Archdeaconries are in West Ankole Diocese). They contain records of the local 
churches such as church councils and committee minutes, teachers' records, baptism 
registers, preachers registers and marriage registers. 
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3. West Ankole Diocese Archives. 
These are held at Bweranyangi cathedral. They do not contain much useful 
information and not much effort and interest has been put in to organise them. 
Despite being a recent diocese (created in 1977) there were no relevant files to look 
at. 
4. Namirembe Archives. 
These are being restored at the Provincial Headquarters Namirembe, Church of 
Uganda. In particular the files below were useful. They contain correspondence 
between Archbishops, Brown, Eric Sabiiti and Janan Luwum to other diocesan 
Bishops or Government officials: 
Bishop of Ankole A6 (a), 1960-1969/Leslie Brown and Eric 
Sabiiti - 160/12. 
Conference for ministers C110 1970-1973/ Eric Sabiiti and Janani 
Luwum - 1970/12. 
Archbishop's personal letters 1974-75/Janani Luwum - 25/2. 
Anglican Church - Central Administration, A/4,1975-77/Janani 
Luwum - 149/11. 
B. Roman Catholic Church. 
1. Mbarara Diocese Archives. 
Located at the Ageteraine office, Nyamitanga, Mbarara. Unfortunately the Diocesan 
Chancellor denied me access. 
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Government Archives. 
1. Kamukuzi Archives. 
Located at the District Commissioner's office, Kamukuzi. Most of the material was 
destroyed during the 1979 war. Only a few files survived. See Religious Affairs files: 
Catholics, RA, R/2 1971 and MNS 2/2 and in particular file No. MSN 1. 
These contain correspondence letters with the governments since 
1960. Some of these files were not labelled and could only be 
identified by the dates of the letters inside and the signatures. 
Protestants: Only one file, MNS/6/4, could be identified. 
Others files: see UNLF/A (197-1980) file which contains infori-nation about the 
initial beginnings of the Uganda National Front/Army; UPC file, 
contains party correspondence and in particular see the Youth 
File, Youth/DC, YD/C I which contains information on 
Banyarwanda and their expulsion in 1982-1984. 
Note that at the time of research the Kamukuzi archives were under rehabilitation, so 
it is likely that some of the information given above might have changed. 
2. Bushenyi Archives. 
Located at the District Commissionez's office, Bushenyi. Many files were destroyed 
during the 1979 war and those, which survived, are not organised. UsefW files are: 
Catholic file: It contains useful correspondence between the Catholic Church 
and the UPC District Officials during the 1980s. This file is 
particularly important in that it reveals the tension between the 
Catholic Church and the UPC government especially in Bushenyi. 
Protestant file: Contains mainly various invitation letters from the Bishop of 
West Ankole Diocese to the District Official/ MPs either to a 
fund-raising or to a particular Church Service. 
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3. Uganda Government Archives, Entebbe. 
Archival series: Class A 24 and A 15. Consists of material about the British colonial 
administration in Ankole. I visited these archives but again they were not relevant for 
my period of study. Most of the files closed in the sixties and not much progress has 
gone since then. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1. Church Missionary Archives (CMSA), Birmingham University Library, 
Heslop Room. 
Archival series G. 3 A7 (1898-1934), consisting of correspondence between Uganda 
CMS mission and the CMS headquarters in London and of original annual letters of 
individual European missionaries who worked in Ankole and elsewhere in Uganda. 
Apart from looking at these archives, I did not particularly use them. They did not 
contain useful information as far as my research period was concerned. 
2. International Missionary Council Archives (IMCA): Africa 1910-45. 
Located at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 
Archives Box 259 on East Africa, Uganda, consisting of correspondence about 
education in Uganda. Again this was not relevant my period of study, thus the reason I 
do not provide detailed file information. 
I The Clayton family letters. 
A collection of private letters written in Ankole by the Rev. Herbert Clayton (one of 
the CMS missionary pioneers in Ankole) and his wife Hilda to their families in 
England. They are now kept by their families Enid, Margaret and Muriel at their 
home at Kendal in Cumbria, England. 
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NEWS PAPERS 
Busesire 
This was a local newspaper in the sixties. It means enlightenment, perhaps reminding 
Bahima that times are gone when Bairu were instruments of exploitation. It reported 
on the'mass baptisms'of 1962. 
See articles: 8 April 1962,16 April 1962. 
New Vision 
A government paper which started in 1986 after the NRM take over. However it is not 
strictly censored by the government as was the case with the previous regimes. On the 
whole its reports tend to be balanced. 
Articles referred to: 12 September 1989,1 August 1993,10 July 1993,13 August 
1993,23 September 1993,14 October 1993,22 November 1993,23 November 1993, 
12 December 1993,15 December 1993,17 December 1993,2 October 1997, 
Orumuri 
A weekly local vernacular paper in Ankole. 
See articles especially about the Obugabe: 23-29 August 1993,6-12 September 1993, 
25-31 October 1993,29 November-5 December 1993,20-27 December 1993 
The People 
A UPC newspaper. It reported favourably about the government. It was very active in 
the sixties and obviously was banned during Amin's time. It contains scattered 
information on the debate about the monarchy in Ankole in the sixties. See especially 
newspapers of June-September 1967. 
The Monitor 
An independent paper which started in the early years of the NRM regime. It is a very 
good paper which provides an alternative to the government view. It is widely read. 
Articles referred to: 23 July 1993,3 September 1993,15 April 1994,2 October 1997, 
The Uganda Times 
A Government paper during the UPC regime in the eighties. 
Articles consulted: 28 May 1980,17 June 1980,15 June 1980,27 October 1982 
Uganda Argus 
It was the main government paper in the sixties and part of the seventies. 
Articles referred to: 2 February 1971,25 August 1971,11 October 1971 
Uganda Confidential 
A weekly independent and controversial paper. Its readership is still limited to the 
urban centres. It refers itself as 'a paper that splits the atom' in its campaign against 
corruption: 
See article: 13-20 December 1993 
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Weekly Topic 
A weekly independent paper which started in the early years of NRM's regime. 
Articles referred to: 8 April 1987,20 March 1992,23 July 1993,3 December 1993, 
Year-Ender 1993,26 November 1996. 
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